Skip to main content

Safety Policy: Owners’ and Contractors’ Non-Delegable Duty to Ensure Compliance With “Specific” Safety Rules in New York’s Industrial Code

While most construction-industry employers in New York are somewhat knowledgeable about OSHA’s construction regulations and the notorious “Scaffold Law,” many have never heard of New York’s “Industrial Code,” which is another source of regulations your safety program needs to take into account.

By statute, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor issues safety regulations.  They are collected in Part 12 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations (NYCRR).

The recent 4-3 decision by the New York Court of Appeals in Misicki v. Caradonna, in addition to giving me an opportunity to alert you to the murky rules of liability under the Industrial Code, overturned existing precedent, and has lowered the bar somewhat for an injured plaintiff to get his case to a jury.

Misicki, a laborer, was working on the renovation of a pool deck at a residential cooperative.  The owner, whom we’ll call “Shore” for short, had engaged Misicki’s employer, “Upgrade,” to perform the job.
One day Misicki was given a hand-held, 9-inch, electrically-driven angle grinder, and was told to cut a slot into a line marked on a wall, between one and two feet above the deck.

The grinder was supposed to have a removable handle, which could be fitted onto the grinder in any of several different positions.  Misicki complained to his foreman about the missing handle, but was instructed to use the grinder without it.

At one point, Misicki had to lie on his side beneath a protruding balcony, and use the grinder in an awkward position.  The grinder “kicked back,” the grinding wheel struck Misicki in the face, and he was badly injured.

Although of course unable (because of the Workers’ Compensation Law) to sue his employer, Misicki sued Shore for common-law negligence and under several provisions of the Labor Law.  As usual in such cases, Share then brought a third-party action against Upgrade.

After discovery and the weeding out of several claims through motion practice, what remained was a single claim under Labor Law ¬ß 241(6), which “requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor.”  That duty is “non-delegable” — which is to say that the premises owner may be held liable, even if it did not supervise the work.

A finding that an Industrial Code safety rule was not observed does not mandate a finding of liability: it is merely evidence for the fact-finder to consider on the question of the defendant’s negligence.  And, unlike the Scaffold Law, the plaintiff’s comparative negligence may be considered.

Where matters become really confusing is that a breach of the non-delegable duty will not support a lawsuit under Labor Law § 241(6) unless the provision not complied with mandates compliance with specific specifications, as opposed to merely reiterating safety standards in general terms.
In Misicki, analysis of whether the provision in question, 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a), was “specific” or “general” focused on the following three sentences:

  1. All power-operated equipment shall be maintained in good repair and proper operating condition at all times.
  2. Sufficient inspections of adequate frequency shall be made of such equipment to insure such maintenance.
  3. Upon discovery, any structural defect or unsafe condition in such equipment shall be corrected by necessary repairs or replacement.

Defendant moved in the trial court for summary judgment, relying on a line of prior Second Department precedents holding that section 23-9.2(a) merely establishes general safety standards which do not give rise to a non-delegable duty.1 

Supreme Court, the trial court, at first agreed that, since it was sitting within the Second Department,  it was bound by precedent to dismiss Misicki’s Labor Law ¬ß 241(6) claim.  Plaintiff moved to reargue Supreme Court’s dismissal order, and convinced Supreme Court to distinguish earlier Second Department cases and instead follow the Zucher case, from the Fourth Department, to find an actionable violation of  a sufficiently-specific mandate to remedy upon discovery a “structural defect or unsafe condition.” Misicki argued that, read together, the second and third sentences mandate sufficient inspections, and the correction of any defects or unsafe conditions found.

Supreme Court therefore reversed itself and reinstated the plaintiff’s Labor Law ¬ß 241(6) claim.  Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which reversed the reinstatement of the plaintiff’s claim, reaffirming its rule (prevalent also in the First and the Third Departments) that ¬ß 23-9.2(a) is too general to give rise to a non-delegable duty.

The Court of Appeals agreed to hear the plaintiff’s appeal, in order to resolve the conflict between the Fourth Department on the one hand, and the First, Second and Third Departments on the other.
The appeal to New York’s top court produced a 4-3 decision adopting the minority (Fourth Department) rule, reversing the Second Department, and reinstating Misicki’s claim.  It produced also two sharp dissents, disagreeing both with the majority decision and with one another.

Many non-lawyers would approve the common-sense approach of the dissent by Judges Smith and Pigott.  These dissenters found the entire “specificity” analysis uncalled for, because Subpart 23-9 is limited by its terms to “heavy equipment or machinery.”  This dissent likens scrutinizing, for specificity, a provision which plainly ought not to apply “to deciding whether I would be a bicycle if I had wheels.”

Remarkably, the inapplicability of a rule concerning “heavy equipment or machinery” was never raised by defendant’s attorney.  Judges Pigott and Smith argued in vain that an exception should be made to the rule relied upon by the other five Judges in choosing to exclude this obvious, common-sense argument —  namely, that generally cases must be decided based upon arguments actually raised by the litigants.

The third dissenter, Judge Graffeo, wrote her own opinion, agreeing with the majority that the applicability argument could not be considered, but voting nevertheless to affirm the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, based on the reasoning of the prior Second Department cases that found the provision too general.

The four-Judge majority, however, found in the last of the three sentences quoted above (imposing a duty to replace or repair defective or unsafe equipment) a “distinct standard of conduct” which, in their view, is “precisely the type of ‚Äòconcrete’ specification” required.

While ultimately the issue of liability was left for the jury, under the Court of Appeals’ decision in Misickiif some party to or participant in the construction project should be found to have caused the plaintiff’s injuries, then the defendant-owner would be vicariously liable without regard to fault.

Misicki, in which each of the three decisions that followed the first one reversed the one that preceded it, underscores the dubious wisdom of having different liability rules for “specific” and “general” duties under the Industrial Code.  Your safety director must nevertheless take into account, in fashioning your safety program, provisions of the Industrial Code that even arguably apply to the work performed by your trade.


1 The four “Departments” of New York’s Appellate Division comprise, in theory, a single statewide court.  However, the “Departments” may differ among themselves (until their conflict is resolved by the Court of Appeals) in which case the lower-level trial courts within each Department are bound by the precedent established by the local Appellate Division.

Can a California Consultant compel Developer in New York Federal court to submit a dispute to arbitration pursuant to an unsigned agreement?

Question. Consultant, a California corporation with offices worldwide, provides technical and management support services for various infrastructure projects. Developer, a New York corporation, retained Consultant to provide engineering and consulting services in connection with the development of a property in Connecticut. The parties’ relationship was governed by a Master Services Consulting Agreement (“MSA”) that included, among other terms, a broad arbitration provision. The MSA provided that the terms for Consultant’s services would be negotiated between the parties through various Task Orders. Each Task Order incorporated by reference the terms of the MSA.

Eventually, a dispute arose between the parties concerning work performed by Consultant. After several attempts to resolve the dispute proved unsuccessful, Consultant served Developer with a demand for arbitration claiming that it was owed the sum of $1,788,127 for services rendered. Pursuant to the arbitration provision in the MSA, the American Arbitration Association scheduled an arbitration hearing in California. Can the Consultant in New York Federal court, compel Developer to submit the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the MSA and Task Orders?

Answer. YES.

A. Does the Federal Court have Diversity Jurisdiction

A federal court has the authority to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), provided that the court has jurisdiction over the underlying controversy. Here, Developer contends that the Court has no authority to compel arbitration and that the matter must be remanded to the state court because subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. In particular, Developer contends that the parties are not diverse and the amount in controversy is less than the $75,000 required by 28 U.S.C. 1332.

1. Whether the Parties are Diverse

It is well-settled that, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is a citizen of the state where it is incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business.. It is undisputed that Developer is a citizen of New York. Although Consultant is incorporated in California, Developer contends diversity jurisdiction is lacking because Consultant’s principal place of business is also in New York. Where, as here, a corporation’s activities are “decentralized and spread across numerous states, courts apply what is known as the ‚Äònerve center’ test,” to determine a corporation’s citizenship.. Under the “nerve center” test, courts focus on those factors that identify the place where the corporation’s policies originate.

Developer contends that Consultant’s principal place of business must be in New York because all of Developer’s business dealings with Consultant have taken place in New York. However, the fact that the parties’ business dealings were all conducted in New York does not go to the salient question of where the company’s policies originate. Consultant has been headquartered in Southern California since its formation in 1970. Consultant’s Long Beach, California headquarters houses hundreds of employees as well as the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, the General Counsel and the company’s marketing, corporate, and human resources departments. Under the circumstances, there can be no question that Consultant’s corporate policies are promulgated in California. Accordingly, Consultant has met its burden to show that the parties are diverse.

2. Whether the Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000

A party invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts must show that there is a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Developer contends that there is no monetary amount in controversy because it the only issue before the Court is whether to stay arbitration. Consultant counters that the Court may look to the amount it is seeking in the underlying arbitration to assess whether the amount in controversy requirement is met. The Consultant is correct.

In determining whether the jurisdictional amount in controversy is satisfied a court may look to the amount a party might obtain in the arbitration that it seeks to compel. Here, in the putative arbitration proceeding, Consultant is seeking $1,788,127 from Developer for services rendered. Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Accordingly, because Consultant has met its burden to establish that the Federal Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

B. Can the Consultant compel Developer to submit the dispute to arbitration?

The FAA provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court … for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. 4. It is well-established that the FAA creates a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. However, arbitration is a “matter of contract [and] … a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to so submit.”

Here, Developer claims that it is not bound by the MSA-and therefore not bound by the arbitration provision contained therein-because the MSA was never signed by a Developer representative. Consultant counters with an affidavit from its Project Manager, who avers that he witnessed Developer’s Chief Financial Officer sign the MSA. This purely factual dispute need not be resolved because there is an independent reason why the parties should be compelled to submit this matter to arbitration.

The Second Circuit has held that a nonsignatory to a particular agreement can be bound by an arbitration clause in that agreement where the nonsignatory enters into a separate contract that incorporates the arbitration provision. Here, pursuant to the terms of the MSA, the parties negotiated and entered into various Task Orders that set forth the price and nature of the services Consultant was to perform. Each Task Order provided that “except as otherwise specified herein, the terms and conditions of the [MSA] are incorporated in this Task Order by reference.”

Developer does not and cannot dispute that these Task Orders were signed by an authorized Developer representative. In light of the fact that the Task Orders unequivocally incorporated the MSA by reference, Developer is bound by the MSA and the clear and unambiguous arbitration provision contained therein.

Accordingly, Consultant can compel arbitration.

Court Addresses Liability of Successor Company

Under what circumstances can a successor company be liable for the debts of a predecessor company? A company does not become a successor company responsible for the debts of the so-called predecessor company merely by purchasing the earlier company’s assets. In the recent case of Crown Painting & Decorating, Inc. v. VBH Luxury, Inc., a subcontractor sought to recover monies due for work performed against a general contractor on the basis that it is a successor company to the previous contractor for which the work was performed. 

Background 

Crown Painting & Decorating, Inc. subcontracted with Maxcon General Contracting Corp. to perform work at a building owned by VBH Luxury, Inc. The subcontractor’s work was completed in August 2002. In January 2003 the president of the general contractor, Maxcon, formed another corporation, Omnicon Interiors, Inc., of which he was also president. Maxcon did not pay the subcontractor as agreed and the subcontractor sued Maxcon for breach of contract. The subcontractor also sued Omnicon, claiming that as a successor company, it was liable for the debts of Maxcon. 

According to the subcontractor, Omnicon not only had the same president as Maxcon, but performed the same work, had the same clients, the same secretary, the same telephone number and was “right around the corner” from Maxcon’s old place of business. Additionally, in March of 2004, in response to the subcontractor’s payment demands, the subcontractor was invited to go to Omnicon’s office and receive partial payments in the amounts of $1,500 and $750, with both checks paid from Onmicon’s bank account. Omnicon also acknowledged that Maxcon was “no longer doing business.” 

Omnicon argued that it was formed after the subcontractor’s work was completed, that it had no involvement in the subcontractor’s work, that it never entered into any contracts with the subcontractor, and that Omnicon’s place of business was different than Maxcon’s. Based on these argument’s Omnicon moved for summary judgment, seeking to have the subcontractor’s claims against it dismissed.

Decision

The court denied Omnicon’s motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the court first noted that a corporation does not become a successor corporation responsible for the obligations of the predecessor merely by acquiring the latter’s assets. However, the court also pointed out that there are four ways in which a corporation may become liable for a predecessor’s obligations. The four ways are: (1) where the corporation expressly or impliedly assumed the predecessor’s tort liability; (2) where there was a consolidation or merger of seller and purchaser; (3) where the purchasing corporation was a mere continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape obligations. The court determined methods three and four did not apply because Maxcon was never dissolved and the subcontractor never alleged fraud. 

However, as to methods one and two, the court determined that Omnicon was possibly liable to the subcontractor under a successor liability theory. In so holding, the court focused on the subcontractor’s argument that Omnicon assumed Maxcon’s debt to the subcontractor by promising to pay and then partially paying the subcontractor. The court also focused on the similarities in ownership and business operations of Macon and Omnicon. 

Since Omnicon was potentially liable under the successor liability theory, the court denied its motion for summary judgment. 

Comment 

Successor liability is often a bone of contention in the construction industry. Though courts are hesitant to extend liability to separate and distinct companies, this case illustrates that there are exceptions. The prudent contractor should be aware of these exceptions in conducting its business operations. 

Safety Policy: Eighth Circuit Adopts Broad View of General Contractor’s Duty to Protect Subcontractor’s Employees

An issue long unsettled for purposes of the OSH Act is the extent of a general contractor for OSHA violations affecting only subcontractors’ employees.

A view long favored by the OSH Review Commission, is that the general contractor may be cited for violations it created, and any to which its own employees were exposed, but not for hazards created by others subcontractors or other employers at the site.

The Secretary of Labor for years has proposed a more expansive view, that the GC (at least where it has authority sufficient to prevent or abate hazards) must protect all employees — not only its own — from OSHA violations.1

In a recent appellate decision, Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the applicable regulation permits employers to be cited, even where their own employees are not exposed to the subject hazards.

In Summit Contractors the GC on a dormitory project subbed out virtually all of the work and had only a project superintendent and three assistants onsite.

On two or three occasions, Summit’s project superintendent observed employees of its exterior brick subcontractor, All Phase, working without personal fall protection on scaffolds lacking guardrails.  Although Summit’s super cautioned All Phase to correct these problems, upon moving the scaffold to another location, All Phase’s men again worked without fall protection and guardrails.

OSHA cited Summit under OSHA’s  “controlling employer” citation policy, despite the fact that none of Summit’s own employees were exposed to any hazard created by the scaffold violation.

Summit argued at trial that 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1912(a) places a duty on employers to protect only their own employees — not those of any subcontractor.  The Administrative Law Judge rejected this argument, and upheld the citation.

The OSH Review Commission granted Summit’s petition for review, and held, by a 2-1 margin, that as Summit had argued  1910.12(a) only that each employer protect its own employees.  The Commission therefore vacated the citation against Summit, but the Secretary petitioned for further review by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  

Section 1910.12(a), which dates back to OSHA’s inception in 1971, provides:

The standards prescribed in part 1926 of this chapter [the construction industry standards] are adopted as occupational safety and health standards under section 6 of the Act and shall apply, according to the provisions thereof, to every employment and place of employment of every employee engaged in construction work.  Each employer shall protect the employment and places of employment of each of his employees engaged in construction work by complying with the appropriate standards prescribed in this paragraph.

The Secretary’s initial multi-employer worksite policy, as indicated in OSHA’s initial Field Operations Manual (1971) adopted the “creating” and “exposing” employer citation policies, but not the “controlling” employer policy.  Thus, in OSHA’s early days, OSHA considered itself as having authority to cite general contractors only for hazards to which its own employees were exposed (plus any it had itself created).  In the early 1970s, the OSH Review Commission likewise construed the policy in the same, narrow fashion.

Indeed, for a brief period during the mid 1970s, the Secretary was engaged in making its policy even narrower, at the same time that some courts were heading in the opposite direction.  Two Courts of Appeals, including our Second Circuit2 in the Brennan case, expressed the view that 29 U.S.C. ¬ß 654(a)(2) — which requires “each employer” to “comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter” — is not limited to “situations where a violation of a standard is liked to exposure of his employees to the hazard.”

At about the same time, the Secretary temporarily altered the OSHA Field Manual to limit citations only to the “exposing employer.”  In light of the cases, however, favoring a more expansive policy, in 1976 the Secretary reversed its view, essentially viewing the policy to have been judicially expanded.

Over the years since 1976, most employer challenges to the broader “controlling employer” rule have not succeeded, although one circuit, the Fifth, has doggedly held to the contrary.  In 1995 (as the recentSummit Contractors decision noted) a decision by the District of Columbia Circuit remarked in passing that the current multi-employer worksite doctrine is in “marked tension” with 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1910.12(a).

In Summit Contractors, the majority of the Eighth Circuit panel read the language of ¬ß 1910.12(a)(2) (concerning the employer’s duty to protect the “places of employment of each of his employees”) as permitting the Secretary to cite “controlling” employers.  It found that “the plain language of part (2) does not preclude an employer’s duty to protect . . . others who work at the place of employment, so long as the employer also has employees [there].”

While the majority took the view that ¬ß 1910.12(a)(2) “unambiguously” supports the Secretary’s view and the “controlling employer” policy, it stated further that even assuming the provision to be ambiguous, the courts must defer to any reasonable interpretation construction by the agency (even if “not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards”).

The dissenting judge argued that ¬ß 1910.12(a) is unambiguously contrary to the construction adopted by the majority, and that it yields an unworkable result, as even the most sophisticated general contractor cannot  be expected to recognize violations of the intricate requirements affecting the trades of specialized subcontractors. 

Obviously, a general contractor detecting a serious OSHA violation by a subcontractor should act to correct it, whether its own forces are exposed or not.  Worker safety is more important than the precise boundary between employers’ responsibilities under OSHA (not to mention that negligence law imposes on a general contractor, in most states, a duty to abate worksite hazards where it has authority to do so).

Nevertheless, we should hope that Summit Contractors or a similar case soon makes its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The dissent, I believe, correctly argues that the majority’s interpretation of ¬ß 1910.12(a)(2) rests upon a “puzzling and unsupported extension of regulatory intent” and that it is impractical and unjust to impose on general contractors full mastery of the detailed requirements affecting all of the subcontractors’ trades.

Thomas H. Welby is a licensed professional engineer, as well as an attorney and managing partner of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, a construction law firm with its main office in White Plains. Articles in this series are for general guidance only, and should not be relied upon as providing all information necessary for compliance with OSHA and other legal requirements.

The liability discussed in this article (and the OSHA cases mentioned) is only exposure to being cited by OSHA for violations of the Act (not liability for civil damages for personal injury or wrongful death).tort claims for personal injury or wrong.

The Second Circuit embraces New York, Connecticut, and Vermont.

A further difficulty with the majority’s interpretation is that, by the logic of its grammatical analysis, there is no basis to restrict the extension of the duty to protect the workplace to employers effectively having the authority to do so.

The Owner can make claim as equitable subrogee to the rights of the Town under the payment and performance bonds posted by Contractor.

Question. This matter arises from the excavation work undertaken in anticipation of the construction of a residential subdivision and golf course. Is the Contractor’s surety responsible for the reimbursement of the Owner for certain fees and costs the Owner paid to the Town, and additional fees and costs the Owner may be required to pay to the Town, in connection with the excavation?

Answer. YES. The Owner is entitled to recover the excavation fees as the equitable subrogee of the Town under certain bonds posted with respect to the excavation.

The Owner entered into an excavation agreement with Contractor1, pursuant to which Contractor1 undertook to perform excavation work with respect to the Owner’s 186-acre development project. The excavation agreement apparently was entered into in anticipation of the conditional approval of the subdivision that ultimately was granted by the Planning Board of the Town (hereinafter the Planning Board). Among the conditions imposed in connection with that approval was the requirement that the Owner implement certain mitigation measures identified in a findings statement that had been adopted by the Planning Board, in satisfaction of the requirements of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8, hereinafter SEQRA). One of those measures was the payment of fees required by the Town Code.

The excavation agreement specified that Contractor1 would be required to remove from the site and haul away approximately 1.665 million cubic yards of material in accordance with the SEQRA findings statement and the final engineering plan. It also specifically obligated Contractor1 to pay “any municipal fee … pursuant to the Town requirements,” making specific reference to the Town Environmental Preservation Capital Reserve Fund. The agreement also provided that Contractor1 “shall not over excavate any area.” With respect to Contractor1’s compensation for its services, the excavation agreement provided that the Owner would have “no financial obligation to [Contractor1] other than [Contractor1] shall own any and all excess material taken from the site in conformance with the approved plan.”The excavation agreement further provided, however, that Contractor1 would be paid $1.5 million to excavate the drainage and sewers for the development. The excavation agreement was signed by Contractor1’s principal.

The municipal fees to which the excavation agreement referred (hereinafter the Environmental Fund fees) are imposed by the Town Environmental Preservation Capital Reserve Fund Law. Prior to commencement of the excavation, the applicant “must post a bond in such form as shall be approved by the Town Attorney and in an amount to be specified by the Planning Board to guarantee performance in accordance with the approved site plan or the approved subdivision plan”.

To satisfy its obligations under the excavation agreement, Contractor1 entered into an oral agreement with the Excavate-Co. According to Excavate-Co’s principal, Contractor1 agreed to sell Excavate-Co approximately 471,425 cubic yards of excess fill at $3.50 per cubic yard, or approximately $1.65 million, which Contractor1 would dedicate to the payment of the Environmental Fund fees due to the Town. According to Contractor1, however, Excavate-Co was to make the payments for the fill directly to the Town.

Surety issued a “payment bond” (hereinafter the first payment bond) to the Town in the amount of $500,000. Executed by Excavate-Co, the first payment bond recited that Excavate-Co, as “Principal,” was obligated to provide a bond guaranteeing the payment of fees to the Town for the removal of material from the site, and bound Surety,” to pay those fees in the event that Excavate-Co failed to do so. The first payment bond was amended on the day of its issuance to add Contractor1 as a principal. According to Excavate-Co, however, the Town rejected the first payment bond because the amount was insufficient.

Another “payment bond” in the amount of $1.5 million (hereinafter the second payment bond) was executed by Paving Corp. as “Principal,” and Excavate-Co as “Sureties.” The second payment bond recited that Paving Corp. has applied to mine property belonging to the Owner at the same location and provided that the principal and sureties “hereby undertake and become bound in the sum of $1,500,000 to the Town for the payment of any sum due the Town by Paving Corp. for the mining of property of the Owner, incidental to the development of said site. According to Excavate-Co, the Town rejected the second payment bond because it was not issued by a bonding company.

The Owner disputes Excavate-Co’s contention that the Town rejected the first and second payment bonds.

Contractor1 and Excavate-Co, as “Principals,” and Surety executed a “Performance (Completion) Bond” (hereinafter the performance bond). According to its terms, Surety was obligated to the Town, up to the sum of $1.665 million, to satisfy the obligation of Contractor1 and Excavate-Co to remove approximately 1.6 million cubic yards of fill at The Owner site “in accordance with the construction specification of the Town all in conformance with the plot and drainage plan approved by the Town Planning Board and to the satisfaction of the Town.”

According to Excavate-Co, the performance bond replaced the first and second payment bonds, and was intended to comply with the bonding requirement of Town Code, and was accepted by the Town. The Town Attorney required, however, that the performance bond be relabeled a “restoration bond,” and that the language of the bond be modified to provide for Surety’s guaranty of the principals’ obligation to remove the fill “in accordance with the construction specifications of the Town and the Town Planning Board, as approved, pursuant to the Town Planning Board’s Subdivision Grant, and Town Planning Board’s Site Plan Grant, and furthermore, in conformance with the Plot and Drainage Plan approved by the Town Planning Board and to the full satisfaction of the Town .”

Surety made the requested change in a rider, which was executed by Contractor1 and Excavate-Co, on behalf of Contractor1 and Excavate-Co, respectively; the Town Board accepted the performance bond.

According to Excavate-Co, Excavate-Co paid the sum of $500,000 to the Town and the sum of $485,000 directly to Contractor1 pursuant to its oral agreement with Contractor1. Excavate-Co’s payments to the Town were made on its behalf by Paving Corp. in the sum of $300,000.

By letter the Town advised The Owner of its “concerns” with respect to a number of issues related to the project, including the over-excavation of the property and the failure to pay “all outstanding fees related to the excess materials application.”

The Town issued a stop-work order with respect to the project, citing over-excavation of the property. In order to resume work, The Owner paid the sum of $740,000 in Environmental Fund fees to the Town, and agreed, in a stipulation dated to deposit with the Town the additional sum of $250,000 with respect to the Town’s claim for additional fees as a result of the claimed over-excavation. The Owner also paid the sum of $50,000 to the Town for the engineering costs the Town had incurred in determining the amount of the over-excavation.

The Owner seeks damages as equitable subrogee to the rights of the Town under the payment and performance bonds.

Equitable Subrogation

The Owner attempts to establish a contract claim against Excavate-Co based upon Excavate-Co’s liability to the Town under the payment and performance bonds. Although The Owner is not a party to those bonds, it asserts that, having paid to the Town the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs guaranteed by the bonds, it is entitled, as the equitable subrogee of the Town, to recover from Excavate-Co the funds it has paid to the Town. Although The Owner’s argument is a novel one, it is meritorious and The Owner is entitled to judgment against Excavate-Co on this ground. The doctrine of equitable subrogation “is broad enough to include every instance in which one party pays a debt for which another is primarily answerable and which in equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the latter, so long as the payment was made either under compulsion or for the protection of some interest of the party making the payment, and in discharge of an existing liability

As an equitable doctrine, subrogation is designed to promote justice, and thus, is dependent upon the particular relationship of the parties and the nature of the controversy in each case Considering the circumstances here, insofar as the first payment bond and the performance bond are concerned, The Owner has satisfied all the requisite elements of its equitable subrogation claim and thus established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law against Excavate-Co for the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs it paid to the Town.

In its capacity as a principal under the first payment bond and the performance bond, Excavate-Co agreed that it would pay the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs directly to the Town. “Surety bonds-like all contracts-are to be construed in accordance with their terms” The first payment bond explicitly bound Excavate-Co to pay up to the sum of $500,000 with reference to “fees for the removal of materials” from the site. The performance bond expressly incorporated by reference all of the terms, regulations, and conditions imposed by the Town in connection with the construction and excavation at the site, which necessarily included the obligation to pay the Environmental Fund fees and engineering.

In satisfying Excavate-Co’s obligation to the Town, The Owner acted “under compulsion or for the protection of some interest” of its own. As the developer of a 177-unit residential development, The Owner had an undeniable interest in the timely completion and approval of the project. That interest was threatened when the Town withheld certificates of occupancy and stopped work on the project by reason of the alleged over-excavation. In order to address this threat, The Owner paid the Town the sums of $990,000 in Environmental Fund fees and $50,000 in engineering costs, and thereby satisfied the Town’s condition for permitting development work to resume. The payments were made, therefore, for the purpose of protecting The Owner’s interest in the completion of the project.

Finally, the Environmental Fund fees and the engineering costs were obligations “which in equity and good conscience should have been discharged by” Excavate-Co. Excavate-Co agreed, both as a principal on the performance bond and in its oral contract with Contractor1, to pay the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs required by the Town. In return, Excavate-Co took possession of the fill, a valuable commodity. Excavate-Co thus received the benefit of its bargain. The Owner, by contrast, both paid the fees and costs required of it and otherwise lost the ability to recover the value of that commodity, which would thus enable it to recover the fees and costs it had paid. In “equity and good conscience,” therefore, The Owner should be able to recover the value of its payments to the Town from Excavate-Co.

On this basis, The Owner thus established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to claim sounding in equitable subrogation, insofar as asserted against Excavate-Co on the first payment bond and the performance bond. The same cannot be said, however, of The Owner’s claim with respect to the second payment bond. Excavate-Co is not a principal under the second payment bond; the principal on that bond is Paving Corp.. There is no evidence as to the relationship between Excavate-Co and Paving Corp.. The Owner failed to carry its burden, therefore, with respect to its equitable subrogation claim under the second payment bond.

In response to The Owner’s prima facie showing with respect to the performance bond and the first payment bond, Excavate-Co’s obligation, if it is to avoid the entry of judgment against it, is to demonstrate the existence of a material and triable issue of. Excavate-Co raised such an issue with respect to the first payment bond, but has not done so with respect to the performance bond.

Generally, delivery and receipt of a bond constitutes sufficient approval and acceptance of it Here, however, the Town Code requires that the bond be “approved by the Town Attorney … in an amount to be specified by the Planning Board”. Excavate-Co claims that the Town did not accept the first payment bond.. Thus, Excavate-Co raised a material issue of fact whether the Town Board had accepted those bonds pursuant to the requirements of the Town Code

Excavate-Co did not raise a triable issue of fact, however, with regard to the Town’s acceptance of the performance bond.

Surety

Surety contends that the Town never accepted the performance bond because it was renamed a “restoration bond” and that, in any event, the performance bond only obligated it to pay the cost of restoring the premises in the event of default by the contractor. Contrary to these contentions, as shown above, the Town Board issued a resolution adopting the performance bond which, as amended, did not absolve Surety of its conditional liability as surety for the payment of the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs, but rather expanded Surety’s obligations to include a requirement that it restore the site in the event of breach by the principals. Surety also argues that The Owner cannot recover under the doctrine of equitable subrogation because it was satisfying its own debt when making payments to the Town. As discussed above, however, the Owner was paying the obligations of Contractor1 and Excavate-Co, obligations for which Surety was conditionally liable as surety under the performance bond.

Court Rules on Method for Calculating Damages

What is the proper method for calculating the value of work performed and lost profit damages where a contractor is wrongfully terminated? What is the measure of damages to the owner of a project where the contractor willfully and intentionally exaggerates its mechanic’s lien? Both questions were recently addressed by an appellate court in Abra Construction Corp. v. 112 Duane Associates, LLC. 

Background 

Abra Construction Corp., a contractor, entered into a construction agreement with 112 Duane Associates, LLC, an owner. After working on the job for approximately two months, the owner terminated the contractor. Disputes arose over the propriety of termination and the amount due to the contractor. Since the parties were unable to resolve their disputes, the contractor filed a mechanic’s lien against the project and commenced a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action. 

The owner defended the foreclosure action on the grounds that termination was proper, and, the owner argued that even if the termination was improper, the amount of the contractor’s mechanic’s lien was willfully exaggerated. The contractor argued that termination was improper, that it was entitled to its lost profit because of the wrongful termination, and that the mechanic’s lien was not willfully exaggerated since, according to the contractor, it was entitled to file a lien for the percentage of its contract based on overall project completion. In other words, the contractor argued that if the project was 50% complete, it could file a lien for 50% of its contract value, regardless of the extent of the work actually performed by the contractor. The percentage of completion method used by the contractor for calculating the value of its work was inaccurate because the contractor failed to establish substantial completion of the contract as a whole. In addition, according to the court, the completion-percentage method was rejected because the contractor sought to obtain the benefit of the percentage of completion of work performed by other subcontractors, for which the contractor did not pay them. 

The trial court properly calculated the value of the work performed by using the contractor’s payroll records, adding reasonable percentages for the cost of labor, overhead and profit, and adding to that figure the amount of proven cost of the contractor’s materials. 

Decision

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. In so doing, the court first noted that under the mechanic’s lien law a contractor is only entitled to file a lien for the value of labor and materials it provided to the project. The court held that the evidence amply supported the trial court’s finding that the contractor had willfully and intentionally exaggerated its mechanic’s lien since the contractor knew that the amount of its mechanic’s lien was unrelated to the value of labor and materials it actually furnished to the project. The court pointed out that the amount of the lien was almost seven times the amount due and owing to the contractor. 

The court noted that the penalty for filing a willfully exaggerated lien is the difference between the lien as filed and the amount due to the contractor. Based on the court’s findings, the contractor’s lost contract profit of $294,808.20, which was awarded to the contractor because it was wrongfully terminated, was reduced by $243,808.20, which was the amount by which the court determined the contractor’s lien had been willfully exaggerated. According to the court, rather than receiving its lost profits of $294,519.05, the contractor was only entitled to recover $50,710.85 because it filed a willfully exaggerated lien. 

Comment 

As illustrated in this case, the value of work performed and lost profit are properly awarded when a contractor is wrongfully terminated. As further demonstrated, however, mechanic’s liens are intended to secure the value of labor and materials actually furnished to a project. The filing of a willfully exaggerated mechanic’s lien subjects a contractor to harsh penalties, which includes liability to the owner for the amount of the exaggeration, the amount of the owner’s attorneys’ fees, and the costs of discharging the lien by a discharge bond or otherwise. Contractors should be careful to ensure that the amount of their lien is limited to the value of labor and materials actually furnished to the project. 

Contractual Time Limitation Bars Sub’s Claim

Contractors and subcontractors should be aware of contractual and statutory time limitations by which a claimant must commence an action for breach of contract. If the lawsuit is not started within the contractual or statutory time period, the suit will be dismissed as time-barred. 

Under New York’s statute of limitations, a breach of contract claim must be brought within six years from the date upon which the cause of action accrued. Claimants should be mindful, however, that the parties’ agreement may reduce the statutory six year time period to a substantially shorter time period. 

In addition, problems may arise as to when the cause of action accrues to commence the limitation period. In the recent case of Vardo Construction Corp. v. Spectrum Contracting Group, Inc., the court applied the short four-month contractual period to bar the subcontractor’s claim for breach of contract. 

Background 

Spectrum Contracting Group, Inc., as general contractor, entered into an agreement with the New York City Housing Authority to provide labor and materials for a project known as the Polo Grounds Towers Community Center. By written agreement, Spectrum subcontracted a portion of the work to Vardo Construction Corp. The subcontract established a four-month time limitation on claims by the subcontractor against the general contractor. The four-month time limitation ran from the date of the breach of the subcontract. A dispute arose over payment and completion of the work, and on September 23, 2005, the general contractor sent a letter advising the subcontractor that the general contractor would be completing the subcontractor’s work and backcharging the subcontractor for the costs to do so. 

The subcontractor sued the general contractor for breach of contract on December 22, 2006, seeking to recover its subcontract balance. The general contractor moved for summary judgment based on of the subcontract’s four-month limitation period. 

Decision

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the general contractor. In so doing, the court relied on the general contractor’s September 23, 2005 letter to the subcontractor. The court noted that the correspondence clearly advised the subcontractor that the general contractor was going to complete the subcontractor’s work, and would backcharge the subcontractor for the costs incurred in so doing. According to the court, this was when the subcontractor knew that it was not going to be allowed to complete the project, would not be paid until completion of the project by another party, and indeed might not be paid at all. The court held that it was at this time that the subcontractor had a claim against the general contractor for breach of contract. Consequently, the four-month contractual limitations period ran from September 23, 2005 to January 23, 2006. Since the four-month limitations period expired on January 23, 2006, and the subcontractor’s action was not commenced until December 22, 2006, the action was dismissed as time-barred by the court. 

Comment 

Courts will strictly construe time limitations periods that are voluntarily negotiated by the parties. This means that before even considering the merits of a claim, courts will make certain that there has been strict compliance with the parties’ agreed-upon time limitation periods. Courts will not rewrite or change the terms of an agreement that was freely negotiated between the parties. The unpaid claimant, or potential claimant, should make every effort to become thoroughly familiar with their contractual limitation periods. If the terms of the limitations period are not complied with, the claim will often be lost. 

Safety Policy: Are MUTCD Rules Part of OSHA?

In 1900, there were only about 8,000 registered motor vehicles, and 10 miles of paved roads, in the United States.  The first centerline to be painted on an American highway was in Michigan, in 1911, and the first STOP sign appeared in Detroit in 1915.

The early decades of the Automobile Age saw a chaotic lack of uniformity in road and highway signals and signage.  The first serious attempt to publish proposed uniform standards appears to have been a mimeographed manual, prepared under the joint auspices of the National Conference on Street & Highway Safety and the American Association of State Highway Officials, which appeared in 1935.

While that first “Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices” was a private effort, for some years now the traffic control “Bible” appearing under that name has been promulgated by the Federal Highway Administration, part of the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The power that goes with the ability to dispense — and to withhold — federal highway funds has been employed to oblige all of the States to adopt MUTCD as part of State law, although many states (including New York and Connecticut) have adopted the Federal MUTCD with state-specific supplements, and about a half-dozen states, while declining to adopt Federal MUTCD outright, have kept federal highway funds flowing to them by adopting State versions in “substantial compliance” with the Federal version.

MUTCD is thus to be found on the bookshelves of state and local highway agencies, planning, construction and engineering organizations, law enforcement agencies, insurance companies, and many others.

Familiarity with MUTCD is obligatory, not only in the obvious case of companies engaged in the construction and maintenance of highways and other thoroughfares, but also if your company does work in proximity to roadways, as may affect traffic.

But is MUTCD part of OSHA?

A recent decision of an administrative law judge of the OSH Review Commission gives this answer:  yes, as to those mandatory provisions of Part VI of MUTCD, “Temporary Traffic Control,” which are incorporated by reference in construction standard ¬ß 1926.200, “Accident prevention signs and tags.”

In Secretary v. CPM Constructors, the general contractor was performing road paving and related work in a high-traffic area, with a high volume of pedestrians, on-street parking, and retail businesses, in Freeport, Maine.

Following inspection, the employer, CPM, was cited for a “Serious” violation of 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.200(a), which provides that “Signs and symbols required by this subpart shall be visible at all times when work is being performed, and shall be removed or covered promptly when the hazards no longer exist.”

Specifically, CPM was alleged to have failed to remove or cover promptly a sign announcing the presence of flaggers ,when a portion of its work was concluded on Main Street (a north-south road) and the flaggers followed CPM’s crew a distance of perhaps four tenths of a mile to a site on Mallet Drive, a roadway intersecting with, and perpendicular to, Main Street.

MUTCD ¬ß 6E.05 provides that “flagger stations should be preceded by proper advance warning signs.”  The Secretary and the employer agreed that, as the roadways in question were in an urban (low speed) setting, due to heavy traffic congestion and a high volume of pedestrians, under MUTCD the minimumdistance between the flagger and the nearest “Flagger Ahead” sign was 100 feet.

A “Flagger Ahead” sign located near the Fire Station on Main Street was left in place, the parties agreed, for approximately 45 minutes after the time that the work crew and flaggers had moved over to Mallet Place.  Following that move, the distance between the sign near the Fire Station, and the one flagger in use on Mallet Place, was about 4/10 of a mile.  Neither the cited OSHA standard, nor MUTCD itself, prescribes a maximum distance between the “Flagger Ahead” sign and the flagger.

Why the apparent oversight in removing (or covering) the “Flagger Ahead” sign by the Fire Station after the work crew had moved was alleged to constitute a “Serious” OSHA violation is suggested by MUTCD ¬ß 2C.02, which states in part:

The use of warning signs should be kept to a minimum as the unnecessary use of warning signs tends to breed disrespect for all signs.

The Secretary asserted that the employer ought to have promptly removed the “Flagger Ahead” sign near the Fire Station when work at that location was completed, and placed within a reasonable distance (between 100 and 300 feet) from the place on Mallet Drive where the work was proceeding.

The Secretary further argued that the 2000 foot distance between the sign near the Fire Station and the flagger on Mallet Drive was “patently unreasonable.”

The citation in CPM Constructors was submitted on stipulated facts to the Administrative Law Judge for his decision on the law.  Interestingly (and contrary to any notion that the employer can’t get a fair shake in a contested OSHA citation before an administrative law judge, paid by the Department of Labor) the citation was vacated.

First, to prove an OSHA violation, one necessary element which the Secretary must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, is that the cited standard applies.  While the standard cited provides that a “required sign” must be removed, or promptly covered, when no hazard exists, nothing in 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.200(a) actually requires a flagger sign when using a flagger.  Section 6F.2D of MUTCD, the ALJ observed, states that “flagger stations should be preceded by proper advance warning signs,” but “should” makes the prescription discretionary, not mandatory, and it is only mandatory elements of MUTCD Part VI that are mandatory under OSHA.

The only mandatory statement in MUTCD that specifically requires a flagger sign applies to lane closures on low-volume, two-land roads.  That section provides that “when flaggers are used, the Flagger symbol sign shall be used in place of the YIELD AHEAD sign.”

The ALJ found that standard did not apply to the facts of CPM Constructors,  because the road at issue was a high-traffic area, not a low-volume, two-land road.  Thus, on the facts in CPM Constructors, the “Flagger Ahead” sign was not a “required sign” that had to be removed or promptly covered, and the Secretary thus failed to carry her burden to show that the cited standard applied.

Moreover, the ALJ in CPM Constructors found, even assuming the applicability of the cited standard, the Secretary failed to show noncompliance with its terms.

Part 2 of MUTCD provides, as a standard, that “the use of warning signs shall be based on an engineering study or on engineering judgment.”  While the Secretary argued that the 2000-foot distance between the flagging activity on Mallet Drive and the flagger sign on Main Street was the equivalent of there being no flagging activity on Mallet Drive for purposes of the cited standard, the employer asserted that the placement of the flagger sign was reasonable in the circumstances, because any other placement would have resulted in its effect being lost in the flood of traffic, pedestrians, parked vehicles, and retain business advertisements and signs.

CPM’s proffer of reasons, tailed to the specific facts of the case, that supported the placement of the flagger sign, coupled with the Secretary’s failure to allege (much less demonstrate) a failure to use an engineering study or engineering judgment, was found by the ALJ to add up to a failure to prove noncompliance with the cited standard’s terms.

Note that while it is only the mandatory provisions of MUTCD Part VI that are technically mandatory under OSHA, the non-mandatory provisions re properly referred to when interpreting a doubtful term of a provision.

The obvious lesson from CPM Constructors is that compliance with MUTCD’S mandatory provisions related to accident prevention signs and tags is part of OSHA compliance.

A further lesson, I propose, is that CPM Constructors underscores that ALJ proceedings in the OSH Review Commission are not to be shunned as stacked against the employer.  The judges there are knowledgeable and meticulous, and (usually) “get it right” on the law.

Subcontractor’s Written Agreement Releasing All Claims Valid on Pre-Termination Claims

Question. The dispute between the parties, the Heating and Ventilating (“HVAC”) Subcontractor and its Sub-Subcontractor arises out of a public construction project. The contract price of the first sub-subcontract (contract # 1) was $3,550,000.00. Under the terms of both subcontracts, the sub-subcontractor was required to perform both modifications requested by the Owner, referred to as MODs and Contractor Proposed Changes, referred to as CPC’s, which represent claims of the contractor for work they believed to be changes in the original contract documents. Four years into the project, the Owner held Contractor in default of its prime contract and terminated the same.

Contractor’s Performance Bond Surety (“Surety”) stepped in to complete the project. In the interim, Subcontractor, Sub-Subcontractor, Sub-Subcontractor’s surety (“Sub-sub-Surety”), and Surety and Contractor engaged in negotiations concerning the completion of the work. Ultimately, Subcontractor entered into a second sub-subcontract (contract # 2) with Sub-Subcontractor to complete the project. However, prior to entering into this second agreement, Subcontractor wrote to Sub-Subcontractor, informing Sub-Subcontractor that Subcontractor would be required to provide Contractor with releases for all of subcontractors. The letter also informed Sub-Subcontractor that it was required to provide Subcontractor with a release both for Contractor and for Subcontractor and to provide Subcontractor with labor, material and performance bonds. In return, Sub-Subcontractor would receive a new contract for completion of the project in the amount of $2,100,000.00. The letter also states that Subcontractor will pay Sub-Subcontractor $253,817.00 and that it will repay Subcontractor its retainer balance in the amount of $80,748.00 as that amount is received from Surety. Attached to the new subcontract is a “Rider # 2” which states both of these above amounts will be paid to Sub-Subcontractor upon Sub-Subcontractor signing a completion contract with Subcontractor and providing Subcontractor with a release. The second subcontract is clearly signed by the presidents of Subcontractor and Sub-Subcontractor. The payments were made as set forth and the new sub-subcontract for the amount set forth was signed. Also attached is a General Release by Sub-Subcontractor in favor of Subcontractor containing the apparent signature of President of Sub-Subcontractor.

The second subcontract also contains a provision that Sub-Subcontractor will provide Subcontractor with a General Release to enable Subcontractor to conclude its prior contract with Contractor. In addition, the second subcontract states as follows at paragraph 23: “Sub-Subcontractor authorizes Contractor and Surety to deduct 20% of Sub-Subcontractor’s portion of any MOD or CPC resolved by and paid for by the Owner to the extent that Owner includes an allowance for Sub-Subcontractor”.

Contractor, Subcontractor and Sub-Subcontractor all, as set forth in various letters, negotiated their various claims for extra work with Owner. By letter, Sub-Subcontractor set forth in writing its claims in the amount of $2,338,973.71 that would be passed through Subcontractor to Contractor and ultimately to Owner. The Owner adjusted its contract with Contractor by recognizing over $10 million in extra work claims. Many of the claims submitted were valued by the owner at $0.00. The total allowed for Sub-Subcontractor’s extra work claims, when the attorney’s fee percentage is deducted, was $87,086.65. Article 4.6 of both contracts signed by Sub-Subcontractor states that “(t)he determination of the Owner or Owner’s Representative as to the extent or value of the Work performed and materials and equipment furnished by the Subcontractor shall bind the Subcontractor”. As Sub-Subcontractor’s current complaint contains claims against Subcontractor for extra work, which the owner valued at zero and a delay claim which the owner included within the $87,086.65 already mentioned, Subcontractor asserts that all other and duplicative claims should be denied.

Sub-Subcontractor alleges that it was influenced to return to the jobsite and complete its work based on certain misrepresentations. These included assertions that no entity had yet been paid its MODs or CPC’s and Sub-Subcontractor would receive all its extra work claims, less 20% for attorney’s fees for everything it had supplied prior to the termination of Contractor. Sub-Subcontractor states that such promises were made to it by Subcontractor and by Sub-sub-Surety, which he now questions, since he later learned that Subcontractor’s surety had become a wholly owned subsidiary of Sub-sub-Surety. He then alleges that he has no recollection of signing any releases. He states that he entered into the second agreement only based on assurances that Contractor and Subcontractor would seek to collect his pre-termination claims; that Sub-sub-Surety would finance its completion and that Sub-Subcontractor would be paid timely for its work on the second contract. Sub-Subcontractor asserts that none of these promises were valid. He later discovered that Subcontractor had collected over $7 million on its signing with Surety, much of which belonged to Sub-Subcontractor. He asserts further that he has since learned that Subcontractor was submitting Sub-Subcontractor’s extra work claims in the first contract and collecting them without passing through payment. This continued, according to Sub-Subcontractor throughout Sub-Subcontractor’s work on the second contract. In large part, Sub-Subcontractor appears to be arguing that it entered into the second agreement, believing it was owed over $4 million, because it was promised that Subcontractor and Sub-sub-Surety would be collecting much of this sum from the owner. It later learned that such monies could not be collected because Subcontractor had already been paid for Sub-Subcontractor’s work and, therefore, would not be paid again in a dispute with the Owner.

Now, Sub-Subcontractor argues he has learned that Subcontractor received $550,000 from Contractor as part of the settlement of a mediation between Subcontractor and Contractor but that Sub-Subcontractor was not told about this, nor did it receive any pass thorough from Subcontractor. Subcontractor, he asserts, has no real excuse for this and its latter day claim that Sub-Subcontractor owes Subcontractor $268,986 for work not completed by Sub-Subcontractor on the second contract is simply made up. Sub-Subcontractor asserts that there is no proof that Subcontractor paid a second subcontractor for uncompleted work on the second contract. Based on Subcontractor’s misrepresentations and conversion of funds belonging to Sub-Subcontractor, the sub-subcontractor asserts that Subcontractor cannot deny the claims.

In reply to Sub-Subcontractor’s allegations, Subcontractor relies upon documentary evidence that belies each and every one of Sub-Subcontractor’s claims. First, by letter Sub-Subcontractor received a summary of all the extra work payments that Subcontractor was receiving on the first contract; second, by the time of the termination of contract # 1, Sub-Subcontractor had received $190,124 in extra work payments; third, there exists no written agreement setting forth that Sub-Subcontractor will be paid in full for all its extra work claims in return for entering into the second contract and it is obvious from the written agreements that Sub-Subcontractor would only get paid for that extra work approved by the Owner; fourth, it is undisputed that Sub-Subcontractor was to furnish a General Release of the First Contract as a condition to receiving the Second Contract; fifth, contemporaneous documents issued prior to this lawsuit from Surety to Sub-Subcontractor state that the Release from Sub-Subcontractor was indeed executed. Sixth, Sub-Subcontractor cannot dispute the clear provision of its written agreement, paragraph 4.6 to both agreements which makes the owner the final arbiter of extra work claims and binds the subcontractor to its determination With regard to the second contract, Subcontractor states that Sub-Subcontractor does not refute that certain of its claims; the $150,000 was already paid. The Subcontractor reiterates its grounds for defeating Sub-Subcontractor’s claims that were for work sought by Surety and certain claims as being duplicative of a claim made pre-termination and rejected by the Owner.

Do Sub-Subcontractor’s claims survive?

Answer. No as to pre-termination claims. Yes as to post-termination claims.

In the commercial world, where parties are sophisticated entities, negotiating at arm’s length, enforcement of their agreements preserves the necessity for commercial clarity. Where the language of a release is clear and it is accompanied by valuable consideration, the allegation of economic duress will not lie.

Viewing the writings of the parties, including Subcontractor’s letter to Sub-Subcontractor; the signed second subcontract agreement, specifically requiring and agreeing to the release of all claims against Subcontractor and Contractor; the reference in the signed subcontract to the attached release, the contemporaneous writing prior to any litigation to the release signed by Sub-Subcontractor; the consideration, with proof that payment was made, of the amounts set forth in the letter to Sub-Subcontractor, the receipt by Sub-Subcontractor of a second subcontract in the amount of $2,100,000, the intent of the parties is far from ambiguous. Sub-Subcontractor released Subcontractor from any and all claims relating to contract # 1 (the pre-termination phase) and Subcontractor granted Sub-Subcontractor $253,817 and $80,748 in payments plus a new agreement for over $2 million. In that same written agreement, it is made clear that the release is necessary in order “(t)o enable Subcontractor (to) conclude our prior contract with Contractor” and that any claims for MODs and CPCs, to the extent determined in Sub-Subcontractor’s favor, will require a deduction of 20% in attorney’s fees. Both agreements state that the determination of the owner as to the extent of the value of any work performed by the subcontractor “(s)hall bind the Subcontractor”. The moving papers contain Owner’s final determination on contract # 1, which, when subtracting the agreed upon percentage for attorney’s fees, equals $87,086.65. Accordingly, other than for that amount, Sub-Subcontractor’s claims for the pre-termination contract are invalid pursuant to the clear meaning of the parties’ agreement.

With regard to the post termination claims, Subcontractor has been unable to demonstrate the same kind of clear agreement, which would entitle it to judgment. There remains a dispute as to whether some were for work performed directly for Surety or whether they were for work performed for Subcontractor when Sub-Subcontractor merely contacted Surety because it was not receiving timely payment from Subcontractor. It is also unclear whether the claims for review of shop drawings in the post termination phase is for new work or for work, for which a claim had already been rejected. Those claims, the claims as well as Subcontractor’s claim allegedly relating to payments made due to Sub-Subcontractor’s default prior to leaving the job on contract # 2 will be preserved. Accordingly, the Sub-Subcontractor’s and Subcontractor’s claims with regard to contract # 2 survive.

Architect Copyright

Question. The Builder is a residential home builder in New York. In the course of its business, the Builder engages licensed architects to provide services related to home designs and approval of proposed home plans.

The Architects are New York-licensed architects specializing in home designs and home plans. Specifically, the Architects are in the business of designing, drafting and modifying home plans, as well as marketing, advertising, and selling home plan designs through traditional print and Internet media. The Builder engaged the Architects for architectural services and the Architects provided services to the Builder. During that time period, prospective clients approached the Builder with proposed plans for home designs. Some of these proposed plans bore no indication of their original source. Others indicated that they were created by Generic Plans, a popular national licensor of home designs. As a matter of course, the Builder passed along all of the proposed home plans that it received to the Architects for them to review, modify for compliance with local regulations, and approve.

The Builder provides the following representative example of its dealings with the Architects. The Builder received a photocopy of a proposed home design from a prospective client, through a broker. The photocopy was of a home design by Generic Plans known as “Basic McMansion.” The design drawings included markings indicating that the design was the property of Generic Plans. The Builder contracted with the Architects to produce construction drawings from the photocopy. The Builder raised with the Architects the possible need to obtain a license from Generic Plans to use the Basic McMansion design. The Builder made inquiries as to whether the Architects’ software was compatible with that of Generic Plans. The Architects assured the Builder that there was no need to purchase a license from Generic Plans, because the finished plans would be significantly different from any version given to the Builder by the prospective client. The Architects modified the design drawings, and Architect filed his own copyright applications for the modified designs. Architect advised the Builder to use the modified plans, and officially approved the plans. The Builder proceeded to construct multiple homes using the drawings.

Generic Plans filed a copyright infringement action against the Builder. Generic Plans did not file suit against the Architects, but did accuse them of copyright infringement, and reached a settlement with them prior to commencing the action against the Builder. The Builder incurred legal fees and other business expenses as a result of defending the action. The Builder ultimately chose to settle the action.

Generic Plans brought a second action against the Builder for copyright infringement, based on additional homes that the Builder had built that were not covered by the settlement in the first action. The home designs at issue in this second action had been approved by the Architects in the same manner that the home designs in the first action had been approved. In the second action, Generic Plans sued the Architects for infringement as well as the Builder. Once again, the Builder incurred legal fees and other business expenses in defending the suit. Once again, it chose to settle the suit, agreeing to make a payment to Generic Plans through its insurance carrier. Following this settlement, Generic Plans voluntarily dismissed the action, with the result that the Architects did not pay a judgment or a settlement in the second action.

Is the Builder entitled to contribution from the Architects under New York State common law for its expenses in connection with the Generic Plans litigations?

Is the Builder entitled to indemnification from the Architects under New York State common law for its expenses in defending the two Generic Plans actions?

Answer. No.

Contribution

There is no right to contribution under the Federal Copyright Act. The Builder’s effort to find a right to contribution in New York State law is unavailing. Whether contribution is available in connection with a federal statutory scheme is a question governed solely by federal law.

Even if the Court allowed the Builder to invoke New York State law to support its claim for contribution in this case, the Builder would still fail to state a claim. The right to contribution under New York State law is governed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. ¬ß 1401. Section 1401 of the C.P.L.R. provides: “Except as provided in section[ ] 15-108 [of the GOL]… two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered against the person from whom contribution is sought.”. GOL ¬ß 15-108 provides, in relevant part: “A tortfeasor who has obtained his own release from liability shall not be entitled to contribution from any other person.”GOL ¬ß 15-108(c).

In this case, the Builder settled both of the litigations brought by Generic Plans for which it now seeks contribution from the Architects. Therefore, the Builder’s claim is barred by GOL ¬ß 15-108(c). There is an exception to GOL ¬ß 15-108(c) for parties who reached a settlement post-judgment. See GOL ¬ß 15-108(d) (“A release or covenant not to sue between a plaintiff or claimant and a person who is liable or claimed to be liable in tort shall be deemed a release or covenant for the purposes of this section only if … (3) such release or covenant is provided prior to entry of judgment.”). However, the Builder settled both Generic Plans litigations before any judgment or any apportionment of liability by a finder of fact. Indeed, there was never any judgment or apportionment of liability by a finder of fact in either Generic Plans litigation, for the very reason that the Builder chose to settle rather than defend the actions. Thus, the exception to GOL ¬ß 15-108(c) does not apply in this case.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Builder cannot state a claim for contribution in this case.

Indemnification

The Builder’s claim for indemnification is unaffected by the success or failure of its claim for contribution.

Indemnification is a claim by which the party held legally liable shifts the entire loss to another. It arises out of a contract which may be express or may be implied in law to prevent a result which is regarded as unjust or unsatisfactory. The Builder does not claim that it had a contractual right to indemnity. In order for indemnification to be implied under common law, a party must establish that it cannot be held responsible for the underlying injuries to any degree

In this case, the Builder cannot establish that it was without fault with respect to the underlying injuries to Generic Plans. The Builder knew that the plans at issue in both Generic Plans lawsuits originated from designs that belonged to Generic Plans, even before it gave the plans to the Architects for modification and approval. Indeed, the Builder alleges that it raised copyright concerns with the Architects, suggesting to the Architects that it might be necessary to obtain a license from Generic Plans to use the designs.

It is plain that the Builder in this case was aware of potential copyright issues but chose to ignore them, provided the copyrighted designs to the Architects, and proceeded with the construction of the homes upon receiving the Architects’ approval. Therefore, it is clear that the Builder bore at least some fault for any infringement of Generic Plans’ copyrights.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Builder cannot state a claim for indemnification in this case.