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New York Expands Paid Family Leave to Collective-Bargaining Construction Workers — Effective January 1, 2027

Effective January 1, 2027, New York expands Paid Family Leave (PFL) eligibility to reach construction workers who perform work for multiple employers under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The change, enacted by Assembly Bill A4727 and signed into law on December 19, 2025, lets qualifying construction workers aggregate weeks worked across multiple CBA-signatory employers to meet PFL’s service threshold Construction employers that are parties to a CBA should expect a larger share of their workforce to become PFL-eligible and should prepare their payroll and benefits processes now.

New York’s PFL program provides eligible employees with job-protected, paid leave to bond with a new child, care for a family member with a serious health condition, or address a qualifying military exigency. The benefit is funded entirely by employees through payroll deductions; employers are not required to fund any portion of the benefit (N.Y. Workers’ comp. Law § 209 (McKinney)).

Under the existing rule, a full-time employee generally must complete 26 consecutive weeks of employment with a single covered employer before becoming eligible for PFL. That requirement poses a structural barrier in the construction industry, where workers routinely move among employers over the course of a year and rarely accumulate 26 consecutive weeks with any one company.

A new statutory category. The Workers’ Compensation Law now defines a “Construction employee” as a worker who performs “construction, demolition, reconstruction, excavation, rehabilitation, repairs, renovations, alterations, or improvements for multiple employers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement” (N.Y. Workers’ comp. Law § 201 (McKinney)).

Aggregation of service across employers. A qualifying construction employee may count covered weeks worked across multiple CBA-signatory employers toward PFL eligibility. Eligibility is satisfied where, in the aggregate, the worker performed construction-related work for at least 26 of the prior 39 weeks for employers that are signatories to a collective bargaining agreement.

The practical effect: workers who could never satisfy the 26-consecutive-week test with a single employer may now qualify based on their cumulative service across the signatory group.

What Is Not Changing

A CBA Administration Option

New York’s PFL regulations permit an employer and a union to administer PFL through their collective bargaining agreement — rather than through the standard statutory mechanism — provided the agreement furnishes PFL benefits “at least as favorable” as the law and does not allow employees to waive their right to family leave. For multiemployer construction arrangements, this may allow the parties to tailor administration, potentially through a multiemployer health and welfare fund, so long as employees receive benefits at least equivalent to the statute.

Action Items for Construction Employers

  1. Determine whether the new rule reaches your workforce. If you are a CBA signatory, identify which workers may now qualify through aggregated multi-employer service.
  2. Coordinate week-tracking across the signatory group. Work with your payroll administrator, PFL carrier, and any benefit funds on how covered weeks will be reported, aggregated, and verified across employers.
  3. Update your PFL intake and claim-handling procedures to account for the expanded eligible population and confirm you can meet the three-business-day employer-response requirement.
  4. Confirm the 2027 contribution rate and benefit cap with your carrier before adjusting payroll deductions for the new year.
  5. Review your CBA with labor counsel to evaluate whether to administer PFL through the agreement and a multiemployer fund, and whether any CBA language needs to be conformed to the new law.

This alert is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. The 2027 Department of Financial Services contribution and benefit figures should be independently confirmed.

Appellate Court Declines Partial Enforcement Of Construction Contract

A contract is an agreement between two parties that the law permits to be enforced in court. Even if the agreement is private and does not involve the state, the public policy behind this right to enforce a private agreement is that without being able to resort to the courts for enforcement, parties would be reluctant to enter into the contracts which power our economy—or, even worse, resort to private enforcement methods. However, there are certain contracts which, before they will be deemed enforceable, have to meet other requirements for various reasons. One such private contract is the home improvement construction contract, which has to meet certain specific statutory requirements as to form before a court will enforce it. An appellate court, in the recent case of Amber Well Drilling, LLC v Reed, recently affirmed that where such a contract is unenforceable, it is unenforceable in its entirety.

Background

In September of 2020, the Reeds retained Amber Well Drilling to drill a well at their home in Poland, New York. The form of contract, prepared by the contractor, was a single-sheet form that provided for certain unit prices for Amber Well’s work. This contract provided for interest at the rate of two percent per month for late payments, and attorneys’ fees to be recovered by Amber Well if it had to undertake collection activities with the assistance of counsel. 

Amber Well performed the required work, but the Reeds did not pay their balance. Accordingly, Amber Well filed a mechanic’s lien seeking payment of $40,613.48. Ultimately, Amber Well sued to foreclose the lien, and also asserted breach of contract and quantum meruit claims to recover this balance.  After discovery, the matter went to trial before a jury. At trial, the court ruled that the contract was not enforceable because it did not comply with Section 771 of the General Business Law, which requires that home improvement contracts contain certain enumerated provisions, including “the approximate dates, or estimated dates, when the work will begin and be substantially completed, including a statement of any contingencies that would materially change the approximate or estimated completion date”. The court, however, allowed Amber Well to recover under the quasi-contractual theory of quantum meruit. The jury awarded Amber Well the reasonable value of its work in the amount of $37,719. 

After the verdict, Amber Well moved for an award of its attorney’s fees and increased interest (the difference between the statutory rate of 9% and the contractual rate of 24%), pursuant to the contract. The Reeds opposed, arguing that since the court found that as the contract was unenforceable, neither attorney’s fees nor enhanced interest could be awarded. 

Decision

The trial court agreed that as the contract was unenforceable, its attorney’s fees and interest provisions could not be salvaged. Accordingly, following well settled law that “in the absence of any pertinent contractual or statutory provision with respect to the recovery of amounts expended in the successful prosecution or defense of an action, each party is responsible for its own legal fees”, the court declined to award any attorney’s fees to Amber Well, and awarded pre-judgment interest at the (lower) statutory rate. 

Amber Well appealed, but the appellate court affirmed. After going over how Amber Well’s contract failed to comply with the statute, the appellate court held that “we agree with [the Reeds] that [t]o allow [Amber Well] to draft a noncompliant contract and yet still recover attorneys’ fees and interest at [Amber Well’s] chosen rate as provided in the contract would only ‘incentivize contractors to disregard the statute, thereby thwarting the intent of the statute,’ which is ‘designed to protect the homeowner’”.

Comment

There are two lessons to be gleaned from the appellate court’s holding. The first is for contractors who are performing home improvement work that their contracts have to comply with the consumer protection provisions set forth in Section 771 of the General Business Law. The second lesson is a broader lesson that where a contract is ruled to be unenforceable for one reason or another, the entire thing is unenforceable, and the parties cannot cherry-pick from other provisions that they would still like to enforce. Accordingly, contractors would be well advised to have their attorneys involved in drafting and negotiating their contracts to make sure that they are enforceable and don’t have to rely on a quasi-contractual theory as a backup. Failing such, we see that attorney’s fees and enhanced interest provisions can go by the boards. Also falling with the unenforceable contract could be its warranty provisions, indemnification provisions, insurance provisions, and other important provisions which were otherwise designed to survive the completion of the contract. 

About the authors: Thomas H. Welby, Esq., P.E., is General Counsel to the CIC and the BCA, and founder and Senior Counsel to Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP. Gregory J. Spaun, Esq., is General Counsel to the Queens and Bronx Building Association and a partner with the firm.

Appellate Court Affirms Denial Of Motion To Amend Lawsuit To Permit Subcontractor To Assert Direct Claims Against Project Owner

Our readers will not be surprised to learn that we believe that mechanic’s liens are a powerful tool to assist unpaid contractors in collecting their money. We recently wrote about how failing to follow the requirements of asserting and foreclosing such liens is fatal to any subsequent recovery on the lien. In a nutshell, because the mechanic’s lien is a statutory compromise that gives a contractor the right to sue someone with which it has no contractual relationship, the need for the lienor to follow formalities (such as filing and renewing a Notice of Pendency) is emphasized. In the recent case of Marine Bulkheading, Inc., v Ibex Construction Company, LLC, and Costco Wholesale Corporation, an appellate court rejected an attempt by a subcontractor to get around the fact of a bankrupt general contractor and its own failure to renew a required Notice of Pendency by seeking to amend its complaint to include direct non-lien foreclosure claims against the project’s owner.

Background

In late 2015, Ibex Construction Company entered into a contract to construct a Costco on Third Avenue in Brooklyn. Because of the proximity of the property to the Gowanus Canal, foundation piles were required. That scope of work was subcontracted to Marine Bulkheading, Inc. Marine performed its work, but was not paid by Ibex. Marine filed a mechanic’s lien, and ultimately sued Ibex and Costco to foreclose the lien. Marine also asserted contract claims against Ibex. Marine filed a Notice of Pendency at the time it started the lawsuit, but never renewed its filing after three years, as required by the statute. 

Ultimately, Ibex filed for bankruptcy, and the lawsuit was stayed by federal law as a result. (Many practitioners mistakenly believe that a bankruptcy filing and the Automatic Stay prohibit taking ANY action against a bankrupt debtor; this is not true, a creditor is permitted to take actions to perfect and maintain liens pending the bankruptcy. The only thing prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code are attempts to collect on that lien.) By the time the lawsuit resumed, the deadline to renew the Notice of Pendency had passed (and, if you read our recent column, you realize that this resulted in the effective voiding of the mechanic’s lien). In an attempt to get around the now unrecoverable mechanic’s lien and the bankrupt general contractor, Marine moved to amend its complaint to assert a quasi-contractual quantum meruit claim directly against Costco, the project’s owner. In so moving, Marine noted the delays to the case and that there would be no prejudice to Costco as all facts were already known. Costco opposed, noting that there was already a contract between Marine and Ibex that covered the subject matter of the dispute, and arguing that such direct subcontractor against owner claims were improper.

Decision

The motion court denied the motion, following well settled law that holds that where there is already a written contract governing the subject matter of the dispute, quasi-contractual claims arising out of that same dispute are barred. Marine, with no other avenue to salvage any recovery, appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed, not only finding that the existing contract barred the proposed new claims, but also that “a property owner who contracts with a general contractor does not become liable to a subcontractor on a quasi-contract theory unless it expressly consents to pay for the subcontractor’s performance. The owner’s mere consent to and acceptance of improvements placed on his [or her] property by the subcontractor, without more, does not render it liable to the subcontractor”. 

Comment

While one has to admire Marine’s attempt to extricate itself from the effects of both the GC’s bankruptcy and its own failure to renew the Notice of Pendency, such were too little, too late. As we noted in a recent column, mechanic’s lien formalities are necessary because the mechanic’s lien is a statutory compromise that gives a contractor the right to sue someone with which it has no contractual relationship—and, in most circumstances, provides security for the underlying debt. Here, the contractor failed to follow all of the required formalities to keep its lien in place (the maintenance of the Notice of Pendency by making sure that it was timely renewed). Accordingly, once the Notice of Pendency expired, so did the contractor’s right to maintain the lien foreclosure lawsuit. Its post-hoc efforts to salvage recovery by asserting alternative claims against the only remaining solvent defendant (the owner) were not sufficient as a matter of law.

Mechanic’s liens must be prepared, filed, served (with proof thereof), and perfected (and maintained) correctly.  It is simple, fast and inexpensive to renew a Notice of Pendency.  It is very costly not to do so. Therefore, should you have any questions as to how to best protect your rights to recover on a mechanic’s lien, you should consult with experienced construction counsel.

About the authors: Thomas H. Welby, an attorney and licensed professional engineer, is General Counsel to the CIC and the BCA, and is the Founder of, and Senior Counsel to the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, with offices located throughout the Tri-State Region. Gregory J. Spaun, General Counsel to the Queens and Bronx Building Association, and an attorney and a partner with the firm, co-authors this series.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Governor Hochul Signs Construction Reporting Pay Act: What You Need To Know

In recent years, the New York State legislature has been imposing additional requirements on how contractors treat, and pay, their workers. Many of these requirements relate to the payment of prevailing wages, but not exclusively. On September 9, 2026, Governor Hochul signed another one of these requirements, and this one applies to both prevailing wage and non-prevailing wage projects. These requirements go into effect on Tuesday, December 8, 2026.

The Construction Industry Reporting Pay Act enacts two new statutes, Labor Law § 196-e for non-prevailing wage jobs, and § 224-g for prevailing wage jobs. Both of these statutes generally parallel each other in that they both require contractors to pay their workers who report for work a certain minimum pay. For prevailing wage jobs, this minimum is four hours’ pay at the prevailing rate (including supplements), even if the actual time worked is less than those four hours. For non-prevailing wage projects, the pay is for the lesser of the time of the regularly scheduled shift, or four hours. Additionally, when workers are told not to report to work on less than 12 hours’ notice (for instance, when there is no work because of weather, owner or general contractor shutdowns, delivery problems, or emergencies), contractors are required to pay those workers two hours’ pay (which, for prevailing wage jobs, is at the prevailing rate and includes supplements). 

It is important to note that these statutes establish only minimum requirements. If an applicable prevailing wage scale, collective bargaining agreement, or project labor agreement requirement is more generous, those higher requirements control. Stated simply, the new statute does not reduce any obligations already imposed, it simply creates a minimum floor where there are no otherwise applicable requirements.

The takeaway for contractors is to make sure that where they have workers report to a jobsite, they have sufficient work to justify having the worker report. Further, while not mandated by the Act, contractors should seriously consider implementing a time-stamped method of giving and preserving cancellation notices. As liability results from failing to provide timely notice and make the required payment, not simply from failing to document the communication, without such documentation contractors are going to have difficulty proving that timely notice was provided. Another important takeaway is that payments required under § 196-e are expressly deemed wages, while payments under § 224-g are deemed prevailing wages or supplements. Accordingly, a violation may involve more than payment of the underlying two or four hours—it may trigger enforcement actions under the applicable wage-and-hour or prevailing-wage statutes. 

Since this is a new statute, the Department of Labor has not yet promulgated any regulations (as of the initial publication date of September 21, 2026) as to, for instance, what kind of communication will be deemed sufficient when a contractor calls off workers, how the term “promised hourly wage” will be interpreted, or how they otherwise need to document their compliance. So, as always, stay tuned, and reach out to me if you have any questions or would like more information about this, or any other employment-related requirement. I can be reached at gspaun@wbgllp.com, or by phone at (914) 607-6425.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Gregory J. Spaun at gspaun@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6425

ALJ Affirms Citation and Monetary Penalty To Firm For Not Filing OSHA Report on Time as ‘Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse’

Construction employers can often focus their safety efforts where hazards are most visible: equipment operation, electrical exposure, fall protection, and lockout procedures. While those efforts remain essential, a recent decision from the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) serves as a reminder that compliance does not stop at physical conditions on the shop floor. Administrative and reporting obligations under OSHA can carry real consequences, even when an employer has otherwise invested in safety.

In Secretary of Labor v. Pleasant Mount Welding, Inc., the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) vacated a cited electrical violation but affirmed a penalty for failing to timely submit an OSHA injury and illness summary electronically. The decision highlights two important lessons for construction employers: first, not every alleged “extension cord violation” will withstand scrutiny; and second, OSHA reporting requirements are to be strictly adhered.

OSHA’s inspection in this matter did not arise from an accident or anonymous call regarding unsafe practices (i.e. unprogrammed inspections). The inspection originated through OSHA’s national emphasis program (an NEP) to address the hazards of amputations in specific industries. OSHA’s NEPs are temporary programs focused on specific and particular workplace hazards and high-hazard industries, which sets forth that OSHA’s officers shall initiate randomized inspections under an NEP if a company falls under a specific classification indicating that the company falls under a designated high-risk industry (which includes construction and manufacturing) and has 10 or fewer employees. During these inspections, an OSHA officer may also identify any plain view violations, and the scope can be expanded if the company has history of employee injury or illness as noted on their OSHA 300 or 301 forms.

Here, during the inspection of Pleasant Mount Welding (PMWI)’s facility in Carbondale, PA, OSHA identified flexible cords powering a milling machine and a rotating bending machine and issued a serious citation under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.305(g)(1)(iv)(A), alleging that extension cords were being used as a substitute for fixed wiring.

At the hearing, the evidence showed that the machines were mobile, frequently repositioned to meet production needs, and powered through cords connected to existing wall outlets. Importantly, fixed wiring existed throughout the facility and was actively in use. The cords did not run through walls, ceilings, or floors, nor were they concealed or attached to building surfaces.

The ALJ focused on the language of the standard, which prohibits flexible cords from being used “as a substitute for the fixed wiring of a structure.” The ALJ rejected OSHA’s attempt to equate a machine with a “structure” and emphasized that the cords were being used to power equipment, not to replace building wiring. The citation was therefore vacated.

For construction employers, the takeaway is not that extension cords are risk-free, but that citations must be grounded in the actual text of the standard. Cord usage should still be evaluated for trip hazards, damage, overloading, and improper routing. However, where equipment is portable and fixed wiring is present and functioning, employers should not assume that any long- term cord use automatically violates OSHA’s rules. Documentation of equipment mobility and electrical layouts can also be critical in defending these claims.

However, the ALJ maintained the record-keeping citation. PMWI employed more than 20 employees and fell within a covered NAICS classification. As such, it was required to electronically submit its OSHA Form 300A Summary of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses by March 2 of the following year.

Although PMWI maintained OSHA logs on-site and had only one recordable injury for the year, the summary was never submitted electronically. PMWI’s management conceded as much, testifying that they were unaware of the electronic submission requirement and believed the obligation ended with maintaining the forms internally. As the maxim goes, “ignorance of the law is no excuse” and so the ALJ affirmed this citation and upheld the monetary penalty. The decision makes clear that OSHA reporting violations are established simply by the failure to comply regardless of intent, injury frequency, or overall safety performance. PMWI presented evidence of safety committees, third-party inspections, and insurer-provided training. While those efforts are commendable, they did not offset the reporting violation or warrant a reduction of penalty especially in the absence of a written, employer-maintained safety program.

Construction employers should view this as a reminder that administrative compliance is part of safety compliance. Training programs, toolbox talks, and hazard assessments do not excuse missed deadlines or incomplete submissions. The policy behind the forms is that OSHA utilizes this data to identify trends, target inspections, and evaluate industry risks. When an employer fails to submit required information, all employees are deemed exposed because OSHA is deprived of accurate insight into working conditions.

This decision reinforces several practical and administrative points.

  • Review OSHA recordkeeping obligations annually, including electronic submission deadlines and post requirements.
  • Confirm whether your NAICS classification triggers electronic reporting requirements.
  • Assign clear responsibility for OSHA submissions and require confirmation of completion.
  • Maintain written safety programs, even when third parties provide training or audits.

Construction safety is often measured by what happens in the field, but OSHA enforcement extends well beyond visible hazards and field conditions. Although this decision shows that employers can successfully challenge overbroad interpretations of safety standards, they cannot overlook their reporting and administrative requirements.

About the author: Costas Cyprus, Esq. practices construction law and commercial litigation with Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, in White Plains, NY. He can be reached at 914-428-2100 and at ccyprus@wbgllp.com. The articles in this series do not constitute legal advice and are intended for general guidance only.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Utility Interference Costs: Written Agency Direction Can Preserve a Contractor’s Claim

A recent decision in P & T Contracting Corp. v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. highlights the importance of documenting responsibility for utility interference work on public projects.

P & T Contracting was replacing lead water lines for the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. During the project, it encountered Con Edison infrastructure near its work area. Con Edison allegedly directed the contractor to excavate around the facilities by hand, increasing the contractor’s costs and reducing productivity.

The contractor sought payment from Con Edison for this additional work. Con Edison moved to dismiss, arguing that it had neither received a direct order from DEP nor entered into an interference agreement with the contractor.

The court denied Con Edison’s motion. The contractor alleged that DEP had directed Con Edison to protect its facilities and that DEP was copied on communications concerning the hand excavation. Because discovery had not yet occurred and the relevant communications were not before the court, the court found that the contractor had sufficiently alleged the possible existence of a direct agency order. The court also permitted the contractor to amend its complaint to provide additional details concerning that alleged order.

The decision does not establish that Con Edison must ultimately pay the contractor. It merely allows the contractor’s claims to proceed through discovery.

Practical Takeaways

A public contractor cannot ordinarily make a utility responsible for interference costs merely by notifying the utility of the project. Responsibility will generally depend upon a direct order from the public agency or an agreement allocating the interference work and its cost.

Before performing utility-related extra work, contractors should:

  • Request a written agency directive identifying the utility’s obligations.
  • Seek a written interference agreement among the contractor, agency, and utility.
  • Give all required contractual notices and expressly reserve payment rights.
  • Confirm who will pay before proceeding, whenever safety and project conditions permit.
  • Separately track labor, equipment, materials, delays, and productivity impacts.
  • Preserve all emails, meeting minutes, field directives, photographs, and daily reports.

The bottom line is straightforward: utility direction alone may not establish payment responsibility. A clear written agency directive or interference agreement remains the best protection against performing costly work without a confirmed source of payment.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at ttripodianos@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6440

Receivables Purchase Agreement Enforced Against Contractor and Personal Guarantor

A recent New York decision warns contractors using merchant cash advances or receivables financing: when repayment is genuinely contingent on future receipts, a court may treat the transaction as a purchase – not a loan – and reject a usury defense.

What Happened

In Simply Funding LLC v. Clarkston Complete Renovation LLC, the funder paid the contractor $120,000, less an agreed origination fee, in exchange for $169,200 of future receivables. The contractor authorized weekly ACH withdrawals of $3,845.45, and its principal personally guaranteed performance. After remitting $49,990.85, the contractor blocked further withdrawals. The funder sued for $121,709.15.

The Decision

The court dismissed the contractor’s affirmative defenses and granted summary judgment to the funder. It held that the agreement was not a loan – and therefore was not subject to New York’s usury laws – because:

  • it contained a reconciliation process allowing withdrawals to adjust based on actual receipts;
  • it had no fixed repayment term; and
  • bankruptcy alone was not an event of default.

The court also rejected defenses based on unconscionability, lack of a contract, statute of frauds, lack of standing, failure to mitigate, and unclean hands. The funder’s business records established the funding, partial remittances, and blocked ACH transactions. Judgment could be entered for the amount demanded.

Why This Matters

The decision does not make every receivables purchase agreement enforceable. Courts examine substance, not labels, and the result turns on the agreement’s actual terms and operation. But when repayment is truly contingent and the agreement includes the three features above, a usury defense may fail. A personal guaranty can also expose the business owner directly.

Blocking ACH withdrawals is not a legal strategy. It may trigger default fees, attorneys’ fees, and immediate liability while depriving the business of leverage.

The Bottom Line

Before signing, contractors should have counsel review the cash actually received versus the receivables sold, the reconciliation process, ACH and default provisions, personal guaranties, stacking and cross-default restrictions, attorneys’ fees, and forum provisions. Merchant cash advances may provide fast cash, but the effective cost can be steep and the remedies aggressive. Review the agreement before signing – not after the withdrawals become unsustainable and the lawsuit arrives.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at ttripodianos@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6440

A Default Does Not Mean an Automatic Win: Construction Claims Still Require Proof

A recent New York Supreme Court decision, Doka USA, Ltd. v. Highbury Concrete Inc., provides an important reminder for contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, and equipment rental companies: even when the defendant fails to appear, the plaintiff still must prove its claims with competent documentation.

Doka sought more than $900,000 for allegedly unpaid equipment rentals, materials, and services furnished on four New York construction projects. The defendants did not appear, and Doka moved for a default judgment.

The Court granted judgment on breach of contract claims involving three projects, awarding approximately $558,000, because Doka submitted complete contracts and evidence demonstrating its performance, the defendant’s nonpayment, and the resulting damages.

However, the Court rejected the breach of contract claim on a fourth project because the contract submitted to the Court was incomplete and did not include the terms and conditions necessary to establish the claim.

The Court also denied several additional claims because the supporting documentation was insufficient, including claims under New York’s Prompt Payment Act, account stated, Article 3-A of the Lien Law, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, replevin, and conversion.

Among other deficiencies, the plaintiff failed to submit invoices demonstrating when they were sent and whether they were disputed, failed to provide sufficient evidence that trust funds had actually been received and diverted, and failed to specifically identify equipment allegedly being wrongfully withheld.

The Court also declined to award attorneys’ fees at that time because the plaintiff failed to submit adequate documentation establishing the amount and reasonableness of the fees incurred.

Construction companies should maintain a complete and organized project record throughout the life of every project. At a minimum, that record should include:

  • Fully executed contracts and all incorporated terms and conditions;
  • Copies of invoices and proof showing when they were transmitted;
  • Payment records and account statements;
  • Documentation regarding receipt and use of project funds where trust claims may be asserted;
  • Detailed records identifying rented, damaged, missing, or unreturned equipment; and
  • Detailed attorney billing records where contractual attorneys’ fees may be recoverable.

A defendant’s default may eliminate the opposition, but it does not eliminate the plaintiff’s burden of proof.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at ttripodianos@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6440

Federal Ownership Alone Does Not Guarantee Miller Act Protection

A recent federal court decision highlights an important risk for subcontractors performing work at federally owned facilities: a project’s connection to the federal government does not necessarily make the Miller Act applicable.

In U.S. v. E.W. Howell Co. LLC, a steel subcontractor sought to recover approximately $1.5 million allegedly due for work performed at Brookhaven National Laboratory. Although the laboratory is owned by the federal government, it is operated by a private entity that contracted with the project’s prime contractor.

The prime contractor furnished payment and performance bonds to the private operator. The United States was not named as an obligee on the bonds.

The subcontractor argued that the Miller Act applied because the work was performed on federally owned property and federal regulations required the United States to be named on the payment bond. The Court rejected those arguments and dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction.

The Court concluded that:

  • The payment bond was furnished to a private entity, not to the United States.
  • The private operator was a federal contractor, not an agent of the federal government.
  • The Court could not treat the United States as an obligee merely because it should have been included on the bond.
  • The subcontractor was responsible for confirming that the required payment protections were actually in place.

The decision also left the subcontractor subject to the subcontract’s requirement that disputes be litigated in Nassau County Supreme Court and its requirement that the parties participate in mediation before commencing litigation.

Subcontractors should not assume that the Miller Act applies simply because the project involves federally owned property, federal funding, or a federal facility. Before beginning work, subcontractors should obtain and review the payment bond and confirm:

  1. The identity of the bond obligees;
  2. Whether the United States is expressly named;
  3. Whether the bond satisfies applicable federal requirements; and
  4. Whether the subcontract contains mandatory mediation, notice, or forum-selection provisions.

The best time to determine whether a payment remedy exists is before the work is performed—not after payment stops.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at ttripodianos@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6440

Appellate Court Declines to Dismiss Claims Based on Parties’ Course of Conduct Despite Writing Requirement in Contract

One of the more ubiquitous provisions in a construction contract is the provision that the contract cannot be modified except in writing. This issue usually (but not always) arises in the context of a fight about open change orders that were not signed off by the owner or upstream contractor before the work was performed, or a provision requiring that all change orders or other modifications be in writing. When this fight arises, all of the “just get it done and we will do paperwork later”, and similar conversations, are conveniently forgotten, and all of a sudden contractual formalities become paramount to the party resisting the change order. However, an appellate court, in the recent case of Tekton Builders, LLC v 1232 Southern Boulevard LLC, reminds us that even in the presence of such a modified-only-in-writing provision, the parties’ course of conduct, how they deal with each other during the project, can amount to a waiver of a contract’s requirements, including requirements relating to writings.

Background

In March of 2015, 1232 Southern Boulevard LLC, the entity which owns the property housing the Children’s Aid College Prep School, entered into an agreement with Tekton Builders for Tekton to serve as the construction manager for Children’s Aid’s project to build a charter school. The project was to have been completed in time for the 2016-17 school year, but the project was beset with various delays from the start. These delays were thoroughly discussed between all relevant parties in jobsite meetings, in email correspondence, and in other similar notes. Ultimately, in January of 2017, Tekton was terminated, and it sued to foreclose a mechanic’s lien and recover its costs, including its extended general conditions and the work it performed after the original completion date.

After discovery, Children’s Aid moved for summary judgment dismissing Tekton’s delay and change order claims, arguing that the contractual notice requirements were not followed and, therefore, Tekton waived its right to recoup these costs. (Children’s Aid also moved for summary judgment discharging Tekton’s mechanic’s lien, arguing that it was exaggerated.) In opposition, Tekton argued that Children’s Aid was kept fully apprised of the nature and extent of the delays in meetings, through email correspondence, through proposed change orders requesting extensions of time (and associated costs), and through stop work orders issued by the City. Accordingly, Tekton argued that Children’s Aid could not credibly claim any prejudice as a result of the failure to reduce this common knowledge to a contractually required written form. In that regard, to the extent that the contract required such formalized written notice, Tekton argued that such was waived by Children’s Aid’s own failure to comply with the contract in failing to promptly respond to change order requests, and in directing extra work notwithstanding such failures. 

Decision

The motion court denied that branch of Children’s Aid’s motion which was for summary judgment on its failure to comply with the condition precedent (written notice) defense, holding that there were issues of fact as to whether Children’s Aid waived the protection of the contractual provision by its course of conduct, and that such issue would have to be reserved for trial. (The motion court did, however, grant Children’s Aid summary judgment discharging Tekton’s mechanic’s lien, finding that it was willfully exaggerated, and that the amount of damages sustained by Children’s Aid as a result would be determined at the trial.)

Children’s Aid appealed the denial of summary judgment on its written notice affirmative defense, but fared no better before the appellate court. In affirming the order, the appellate court held that “even when a contract contains a nonwaiver clause and a provision stating that it cannot be modified except by a writing, it can still be effectively modified by actual performance and by the parties’ course of conduct”, and that there were issues of fact as to whether the parties waived this provision by their conduct which precluded an award of summary judgment to Children’s Aid. (On Tekton’s cross-appeal, the appellate court also affirmed the discharge of the exaggerated mechanic’s lien, holding that Tekton’s explanation of “inadvertent inclusions” in the lien, without an attempt at explanation, was not sufficient to rebut the showing that the lien was otherwise willfully exaggerated.)

Comment

While a written notice provision is designed to protect the parties by ensuring that there is an adequate paper trail for any dispute, parties are always free to chart their own course of action outside of the contractual provisions. However, when a dispute arises, if the parties ignored the specifics of the contract at the time, they cannot realistically expect a court to belatedly enforce the specifics of the contract simply because it would be more expedient for one of the parties. 

If you find this decision to be encouraging, take note of the fact that both of the contracting parties here were private entities.  A very different result may have been reached if the owner was a public entity. Public owners benefit from statutory requirements of strict compliance, and courts are generally more reluctant to stray from contractual adherence because there is no equitable estoppel doctrine applicable against municipalities. After all, the public policy rationale in that context is to protect the taxpayers’ pocketbook!

In order for a contractor to best protect its rights under its contract (and preserve its right to rely upon, or set aside its provisions in connection with any dispute), it would be well advised to consult with experienced construction counsel. (And, on another note, exaggerating a mechanic’s lien is still a very bad idea.)

About the authors: Thomas H. Welby, an attorney and licensed professional engineer, is General Counsel to the CIC and the BCA, and is the Founder of, and Senior Counsel to the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, with offices located throughout the Tri-State Region. Gregory J. Spaun, General Counsel to the Queens and Bronx Building Association, and an attorney and a partner with the firm, co-authors this series.