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No Oral Modification of Loan Agreement

Question. Bank seeks to collect on a note (the Note) executed by Borrower, guaranteed by the Guarantors. Pursuant to provisions set forth in the Loan Agreement executed at even date with the Note, Borrower was granted the option to extend the maturity date upon the existence of certain conditions. By amendment to the Loan Agreement, Bank and Borrower agreed that notwithstanding the failure of all conditions specified the maturity date would be extended. When payment was not made as promised, Bank sent Borrower and the Guarantors a notice of default.

Bank seeks a judgment against Borrower for the principal amount of the Note plus interest, and judgment against the Guarantors.

Guarantor asserts that the vice-president of Bank, told him that “we didn’t need to worry about the pending maturity of the notes (and) that the Bank would extend the loan on commercially reasonable terms for an additional year.”

Can a bank official orally agree to an extension of the maturity date of a note?

Answer. YES, but not under these facts.

The vice-president of Bank does not specifically deny the oral promises allegedly made by him, but refers to his letters to Borrower in which he advised Borrower that it was not entitled to rely on any oral statements purportedly made by Bank to refrain from exercising any of its rights under the Loan Agreement, the Notes, the Mortgages or any other Loan Documents. Bank acknowledges that after declaring the Note in default it did engage in negotiations relating to a possible extension of the Note, and that the parties entered into what Bank refers to as a Pre-Negotiation Agreement. Therein the parties agreed that no modification of the loan shall constitute a legally binding agreement until reduced to written documentation which is signed by all necessary parties and that Bank may terminate the negotiations for any reason or no reason, and defendants acknowledged that none of them has any defense, setoff, claim, counterclaim or cause of any kind or nature whatsoever with respect to the Loan Documents.

With respect to the claim of an oral modification of the maturity date of the Note, it specifically provides that Bank shall not by any act, delay, omission or otherwise be deemed to have waived any of its rights or remedies, and no waiver of any kind shall be valid unless in writing and signed by Bank. Also, as noted above, the Pre-Negotiation Agreement similarly bars an oral modification of the loan documents.

When an agreement contains a clause requiring any modification of the terms of such (agreement) to be in a writing signed by the (Bank), an oral modification is generally unenforceable. Exceptions to the foregoing principle will be applied in situations where a party can show partial performance…unequivocally referrable to the oral modification, as well as when the Bank has induced another’s significant and substantial reliance upon an oral modification, in which case an estoppel may be invoked to bar a party from enforcing the no oral modification clause.

The purpose of estoppel is to prevent someone from enforcing rights that would work injustice on the person against whom enforcement is sought and who, while justifiably relying on the opposing party’s actions, has been misled into a detrimental change of position. Here, in light of the facts asserted, including the letters and the provisions of the Pre-Negotiation Agreement, Borrowers have not shown that they were misled or that they significantly and justifiably relied on (the alleged oral promise to their) disadvantage, and thus an essential element of estoppel is lacking.

Court Rules on Personal Liability Against Corporate Owner

A corporation has an existence separate and distinct from that of its individual officers, directors and stockholders. The general rule is that individual owners of a corporation are insulated from personal liability for corporate debts, and that individuals may incorporate for the purpose of limiting their liability. 

In certain circumstances however, owners may be liable for some underlying corporate obligations. In an appropriate case, a court will disregard the corporate entity or “pierce the veil” of the corporate entity and hold a corporate officer or shareholder personally liable for corporate debt. In the recent case of East Hampton Union Free School District v. Sandpebble Builders, Inc., the court addressed the issue of piercing the corporate veil and imposing personal liability against the corporation’s president and principal owner. 

Background 

In June 2006 the East Hampton Union Free School District negotiated a construction management agreement with Sandpebble Builders, Inc. The agreement was negotiated in principle and was subject to signature by the construction manager’s owner and president, Victor Canseco. Although Mr. Canseco indicated that he would sign the contract, he later refused and additional negotiations were held, but again, Mr. Canseco refused to sign the agreement. This sequence of re-negotiation, agreement in principle, and refusal to execute was repeated twice more until, by letter dated September 15, 2006, the construction manager terminated negotiations, and stated that it was “ready, willing and able to perform”, but only under the terms of an abandoned 2002 agreement between the school district and the construction manager, which contained more favorable terms. The school district contracted with a different construction manager and sued Sandpebble Builders, Inc. and Victor Canseco, personally for breach of contract. 

In support of the school district’s direct claim against Mr. Canseco, the district argued that Mr. Canseco was the president and owner of Sandpebble, that he exercised “complete dominion and control” over Sandpebble, and that Mr. Canseco used such power to commit a wrong against the school district. According to the school district, Mr. Canseco never intended to perform the work as negotiated under the contracts. Rather, Mr. Canseco engaged in bad faith and unfair negotiating tactics by repeated demands for new terms, after having reached an agreement in principle, which were designed to delay progress of the project in order to pressure the district to offer more favorable terms. 

Mr. Canseco moved to dismiss the claims against him personally on the ground that in his dealings with the district he acted solely in his capacity as president and principal owner of Sandpebble. Additionally, Mr. Canseco argued that the allegations contained in the complaint were insufficient to maintain an action against him personally. The trial court denied Mr. Canseco’s motion to dismiss and he appealed. 

Decision

The appellate court reversed the trial court, and dismissed the school district’s direct claims against Mr. Canseco. In so doing, the appellate court relied heavily on prior case law, which states, “The general rule, of course, is that a corporation exists independently of its owners, who are not personally liable for its obligations, and that individuals may incorporate for the express purpose of limiting their liability. The concept of piercing the corporate veil is an exception to this general rule, permitting, in certain circumstances, the imposition of personal liability on owners for the obligations of their corporation. A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court in equity should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over it in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the plaintiff.” 

According to the court, the factors to be considered in determining whether the owner has “abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form” include whether there was a failure to adhere to corporate formalities, inadequate capitalization of the corporation, personal and corporate commingling of accounts, and use of corporate funds for personal use. Although the school district alleged in its complaint that Mr. Canseco exercised “domination and control” over the corporation, it did not allege the factors necessary to find that Mr. Canseco “abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form.” Accordingly, the appellate court granted Mr. Canseco’s motion to dismiss the claims against him personally. 

Comment 

The analysis of whether a corporate principal can be held personally liable requires a detailed review of the relevant facts and the allegations contained in the complaint. However, even after a thorough review of the facts and allegations, judges and juries can still arrive at different conclusions. In this case, three of the five appellate judges agreed that the claims against Mr. Canseco should be dismissed, while two appellate judges would have let the claims remain. 

The majority of the judges held that an allegation in the complaint of “domination and control” is not standing alone, sufficient to state a cause of action for personal liability against the corporate owner. The two dissenting judges, however, held that the complaint states a cause of action against Mr. Canseco under the “piercing the corporate veil” theory because the complaint alleges Mr. Canseco’s bad faith conduct, consisting of his “repeated negotiations of contract terms with the school district, to which he would orally agree on multiple occasions while never intending to execute written contract documents, all in a deliberate effort to delay the construction project as a means of leveraging a greater percentage of completion from the school district.” 

An appeal of this decision to New York’s highest court remains possible, and would finally determine whether Mr. Canseco can be sued personally for corporate debt under the “piercing the corporate veil” theory.

Safety Policy: Check Out OSHA Compliance Assistance

As OSHA nears its 40th birthday, most Americans are too young to recall that this program, today seen as a familiar part of the landscape, was enacted only after a pitched three-year battle, following skirmishes and forays into the area of federal regulation of workplace conditions reaching back to the later years of the 19th century.

The years preceding the enactment of OSHA, the mid-1960s, were a propitious time for renewed federal efforts.  Not only was Congress considering, and passing, civil rights and environmental laws which would have been unthinkable just a few years before, but workplace conditions of the time served as a spur to the effort.

That is to say, America was still an industrial economy in the 1960s, and the long-extant dangers of the belts-pulleys-and-gears technology of the early 20th century were being joined by an array of more newfangled (largely chemical) technologies and processes that posed considerable risks to worker safety and health.

A 1965 Public Health Service report stressing the links between chemical exposure and cancer, the disclosure in 1967 of a shockingly high incidence of lung cancer among uranium miners dating back more than two decades, and a West Virginia mine explosion in 1968 that killed 78 led President Johnson to declare that the time had come “to do something about the effect of a workingman’s job on his health.”  As of 1968, in what was obviously a much smaller workforce than today, more than 14,000 workers were killed on the job annually, and more than 2.2 million injured.

Paradoxically, the famously persuasive President Johnson failed in 1968 to win passage of an ambitious proposal for federal health and safety regulation in the workplace.  That initiative fell victim to the president’s waning influence, due to the race riots and antiwar controversies of the day.

Some may be surprised to learn that although, to be sure, the proposals made by his successor were somewhat less labor-friendly than LBJ’s failed proposal, Richard M. Nixon had promised action on the issue while campaigning for the White House in 1968, and after taking office, he carried through on that promise.

The U.S. Chamber of Congress, representing industry, had hoped to limit actual penalties under any workplace safety legislation to willful, flagrant violators, and to prevent implementation of safety standards more demanding than “consensus” standards developed by industry groups.

One issue dear to both sides was that organized labor wanted authority over any new regime wholly under the control of the Department of Labor, while industry was flatly opposed to that.  The Department of Labor also had a “turf battle” with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

While the Democrat-controlled Congress ultimately gave labor much of what it wanted, one compromise divided authority, with a newly-created agency within the Department of Labor setting the standards and carrying out inspections, and the OSH Review Commission acting as a first-level appellate tribunal for parties disagreeing with administrative law judge decisions.

While noting some reservations, President Nixon signed the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and joined with both industry and labor in praising it.  Years afterward, as American politics tilted to the right, and labor softened its demands hoping to slow the rush of manufacturing jobs offshore, at times OSHA drew fire from liberal and advocacy groups for not enforcing standards stringently enough.

Despite some significant impairment in its protective mission as a result of companies abandoning the American labor market to manufacture goods abroad, OSHA has achieved considerable success.

The OSHA leadership has also exhibited some resourcefulness in deploying limited resources to achieve widespread compliance with its standards and lower rates of injury and illness from workplace conditions.

In August, results of an analysis of federal safety data by the Associated General Contractors of America showed a drop in the construction industry fatality rate over the 10-year period from 1998 to 2008 of 25% — from 12.9 deaths per 100,000 construction workers to 9.6.  The gross number of fatalities, despite the considerable grown of the market, fell from 1,171 in 1998 to 969 in 2008 (a drop of 17%).

During the same 10-year period, the number of “time missed” injuries in construction fell 42% from 3.3 per hundred to 1.9.

It’s probably no coincidence that the period in which there occurred such heartening reductions in construction-workplace injury and death corresponds to the inception of the “collaborative safety oversight” approach introduced by OSHA in the late 1990s.

Recognizing its limitations as the “safety police,” OSHA over the past 10 years has devised a number of programs, which vary in their scope and their details, but all have in common a voluntary collaboration between employers and OSHA.  To use as an example just one such program, the “Strategic Partnership Program for Worker Safety and Health,” the Partnership aims at getting a formal agreement with an employer (or, commonly, a group of employers), workers, and worker representatives, to identify the most serious workplace hazards, develop workplace or site-specific safety and health management systems, share resources, and identify and implement effective ways to reduce worker injuries, illnesses, and deaths.

“Partnerships” are most popular with small businesses (50 employees or less) and many construction employers and construction-related trade unions, have  participated.

If you check out the osha.gov website, you will see details concerning a variety of “compliance assistance” programs as well as a number of success stories from around the country.

Certainly, much can be said in favor of inviting active technical assistance from OSHA, and demonstrating to both OSHA and your workforce that as an employer you don’t see OSHA as a mere nuisance and ducking citations as your #1 safety priority.

The approach, to be sure, has its critics, notably safety advocates who complain that “compliance assistance” is essentially a pro-employer, anti-enforcement device, whereby companies (mostly larger companies with good safety programs and low accident rates already) consume OSHA staff members’ scarce man-hours that might better be spent fining, and finding, violators than in “preaching to the choir” in programs that lack enforcement “teeth.”

“Compliance assistance” first caught on in the Mining Safety and Health Administration and, in the wake of the Crandall Canyon mine disaster in 2007, critics savaged the concept as a means of avoiding confrontation with well-connected mine owners (such as the one in that case, whose direct and indirect contributions of almost $1 million to Republican candidates were seen as having won cursory MHSA review of the mining plan alleged to have led to the fatalities).

Certainly, it cannot be denied that, as argued by a former (Clinton-era) senior MHSA official that “every minute you spend on compliance assistance is a minute you’re not spending on enforcement.”

On the other hand, it’s probably unrealistic, and perhaps too cynical, to suppose that it was chiefly the fear of stern enforcement that (before “compliance assistance”) motivated employers to comply with OSHA.  Most employers do care about employee health and safety — and, as monetary penalties for violations have always been modest (at least for non-“Willful” violations) it could hardly be that it was mainly the fear of such penalties that motivated OSHA compliance prior to 1998.

Nevertheless (and allowing that the mining industry may have issues that don’t apply to general industry or to construction) the utility of “compliance assistance,” in the universe of companies regulated by OSHA, must ultimately be measured by results.  While determining the exact extent to which “compliance assistance” may be credited with falling accident rates is not an easy task, if the growth of the approach coincides with sharp drops in safety incidents, it’s likely a good idea.

In terms of your own safety strategy, trying out a “Partnership” or other voluntary program may be worthwhile, following which you will make your own determination as to whether programs of this type help keep your workers alive and safe.

Failure to dispute account stated leads to quick results for creditor.

Question. Subcontractor submitted to Contractor, and Contractor received, monthly invoices for services it performed for Contractor. Contractor did not object to the invoices at any time, except for an undocumented allegation of an oral objection. Contractor also made a partial payment against a bill. Is Contractor now barred from disputing those invoices and can Subcontractor collect on its account stated?

Answer. YES. An account stated is an agreement between the parties to an account based upon prior transactions between them with respect to the correctness of the separate items composing the account and the balance due, if any, in favor of one party or the other. It is well settled that where an account is made up and rendered, the one who receives it is bound to examine it, and, if the accounting is admitted as correct, it becomes a stated account and is binding on both parties, the balance being the debt which may be sued for and recovered by law.

Contractor and Subcontractor entered into a written agreement. Subcontractor performed under the agreement and submitted numerous bills of account to Contractor, and Contractor has not objected to any of them.

Contractor acknowledged the validity of Subcontractor’s Invoices by: (1) failing to make any objection thereto; and (2) making five separate partial payments to Subcontractor.

In response to Subcontractor’s arguments regarding an account stated, Contractor maintains that they raised questions in connection with the Invoices. Contractor alleges that “questions” had “been raised,” and that Subcontractor’s fees were “a matter of frequent discussion.”

It is well established that an undocumented allegation of an oral objection is insufficient to defeat an account stated. Contractor’s fails to support his attestation that “questions have certainly been raised in connection with the Invoices” and that “the extent of the fees was a matter of frequent discussion” with and does not disclose the nature or content of those questions and discussions, i.e. whether they objected to the Invoices; nor does Contractor specify which Invoices they questioned or discussed.

Additionally, it is well established that where a partial payment is made against a bill, it acknowledges the validity of the bill, “thereby establishing it as an account stated”.

You should consult with your own attorney but the following sample clauses may be helpful to include in your contracts to achieve similar results and save on potential litigation costs:

[SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] books and records showing the account between [SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] and [CONTRACTOR] shall be admissible in evidence in any action or proceeding as prima facie proof of the items therein set forth. The statements also create an account stated and are conclusive as to the amount owed unless challenged in the thirty days after they were sent to CONTRACTOR, [SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] monthly statements rendered to [CONTRACTOR] shall be binding upon the undersigned (whether or not the undersigned received copies thereof) and, shall constitute an account stated between [SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] and [CONTRACTOR], unless [SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] shall receive a written statement of [CONTRACTOR’s] exceptions within thirty (30) days after the statement was mailed to [CONTRACTOR].
The monthly statements should contain similar language on the bottom of every page,
THIS STATEMENT SHALL BE DEEMED CORRECT AND BINDING UPON YOU AND SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ACCOUNT STATED BETWEEN US, UNLESS WE RECEIVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF YOUR EXCEPTIONS WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER SAME IS MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU.

Language consenting to the jurisdiction of the local state or federal courts, choice of law and an agreement that service of process can be made by mail is also helpful.

Subcontractor Allowed Recovery for Value of Work Performed

Where a contractor has not been paid he can sue for a breach of contract, for which he can recover the amount due on the contract. If there is no contract in existence between the parties, the contractor can sue for the reasonable value of the work he had performed. This legal theory is called quantum meruit. To determine the amount the contractor should be awarded in quantum meruit, the court will focus on the fair and reasonable value of the work provided by the contractor. 

It is important that the contractor understand the distinction between the two remedies because the contractor’s amount of recovery may vary significantly depending on whether he is allowed to sue for breach of contract or recover on quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the work he has performed.

In the recent case of ADCO Electrical Corporation v. HRH Construction, LLC, the subcontractor elected to sue to recover damages in quantum meruit rather than for breach for contract.

Background 

HRH Construction, LLC, as construction manager, sent a notice of intent to ADCO Electrical Corporation, an electrical subcontractor, in connection with the construction of the Performing Arts Center in White Plains, New York. The notice of intent stated in part: “This will constitute a notice of our intent to award you a contract for the Electrical Work at the [Performing Arts Center] for the total sum of ‚Ķ$685,000. This agreement is in accordance with drawings‚Ķ dated 6/10/03 as prepared by Enviro Design, Inc.” The notice of intent also clearly stated that it was “subject to the execution of a formal contract by [general contractor], to follow”. Though the construction manager sent the subcontractor a $685,000 fixed-price subcontract, it was never signed by the general contractor, the construction manager or the subcontractor. 

The subcontractor supplied labor, materials and equipment to the project, for which it claimed a portion was unpaid. According to the subcontractor, the actual fair value of the labor, materials and equipment it supplied was $1,267,675. Since the subcontractor was of the belief that the actual fair value of the labor, materials and equipment supplied by it to the project was greater than the $685,000 stated in the letter of intent, it chose to sue based on quantum meruit. 

The general contractor and construction manager argued that a binding obligation arose under the subcontract by virtue of the fact that the parties agreed to all of the subcontract’s terms and simply failed to sign the document. Alternatively, they argued that the letter of intent created a contract and established an agreed fixed price which was binding on the subcontractor. 

A trial was held and the jury awarded an additional $393,469.75 to the subcontractor in quantum meruit. The general contractor and construction manager appealed.

Decision

The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the subcontractor. Relying on established case law, the court stated, “(i)f the parties to an agreement do not intend it to be binding upon them until it is reduced to writing and signed by both of them, they are not bound and may not be held liable until it has been written out and signed.” The court then looked to the plain language of the notice of intent, which contemplated a future written agreement that was never entered into. Since the written agreement was never entered into, the court held that both it and the letter of intent were not binding on the subcontractor. 

The court also found no merit to the argument that the parties had actually agreed to the subcontract’s terms, but simply failed to sign it. The court noted that rather than sign the subcontract, the subcontractor proposed several material modifications, which constituted its rejection of the proposed contract and a counteroffer that was never accepted by the general contractor or the construction manager. 

Since no binding contract governed the contractor’s work at the project, the appellate court agreed that the award for the fair and reasonable value of the work performed in quantum meruit was appropriate. 

Comment 

Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine which seeks to make a contractor “whole” by compensating him for the fair and reasonable value of his work. Quantum meruit is not available where a valid and enforceable agreement exists. Though the damages recoverable in quantum meruit may often approximate the damages recoverable for breach of contract, the prudent contractor should be familiar with the principles of quantum meruit. The distinction between the two legal remedies is readily apparent in this case where the fair and reasonable value of the work performed far exceeded the contemplated price of the work. 

Safety Policy: Two “Serious” Violations Upheld Against Underpinning Subcontractor

A recent OSH Review Commission case, upholding two “Serious” OSHA violations against an underpinning subcontractor, is instructive both as a reminder of the regulations violated, and for aspects of how the employer handled the matter.

 In Secretary v. JPC Group, Inc. the employer was hired to underpin foundation walls of two buildings, 1902 and 1910 Spring Garden Street, located on either side of a construction site in Philadelphia.  JPC did a test dig at building 1910, removing enough soil from against the wall to expose a portion of its foundation.  This revealed loose stones in the foundation, with no mortar between them.  Uncertain that the wall was suitable for underpinning, laborer Claude Enoch approached JPC foreman and designated “competent person,” Jeffrey Nicolai, to request that Nicolai assess the wall’s condition.  Nicolai did so and, agreeing with Enoch’s view, referred the matter to JPC project manager Timothy Boyce, an engineer.  Boyce told Nicolai to close the test dig area, and to halt all underpinning work until Boyce could evaluate the site.

The following day, JPC performed another test dig attended by Boyce, project engineer Bevan Lawson, and others.  This revealed that, due to the deterioration of the mortar, some of the foundation wall’s stone work had collapsed, following efforts to excavate soil from beneath the foundation.  Boyce determined that excavation under the wall of building 1910 could not be done without endangering the building’s stability.  Underpinning, Boyce determined, would have to be delayed until Lawson could revise the plans.  In the meantime, Boyce determined that the walls should be protected by applying Gunite, a waterproofing agent.  That process would necessitate removing all of the soil along the sides of each wall, but not from underneath the wall.

Nearly 2 weeks thereafter, a crew made up of laborers Enoch (who had done the first test dig) and Theodore Slater, and backhoe operator Richard Hartley, began preparing the foundation walls for the Gunite application.  Hartley first removed all of the soil berm left by the GC to support the walls of building 1902, then moved his backhoe to the rear of building 1910.

  As the parties would later stipulate, Hartley began excavating at the rear of building 1910, and worked his way along the wall towards the front of the property.  The two laborers then used shovels to remove the remaining soil that Hartley could not remove with the backhoe, before attaching mesh and rebar to the wall.  JPC did not use any type of support system, such as shoring, while performing the excavation work.

Hartley had removed the berm along about half the length of the foundation wall of building 1910, when he had to pause because soil in bulk was blocking his way.  Enoch and Slater were near the south end of 1910, preparing to place rebar and mesh, when they heard popping sounds.  Heeding shouts by a foreman working nearby, both men ran away from the building, and thus avoided being struck as it collapsed.

The Secretary grouped together two related violations, one for performing excavation adjacent to a foundation wall without providing adequate support, and the other for failing to ensure that a “competent person” inspect the work area as needed throughout the shift.  A single, $2,500 penalty was assessed.  The employer contested the citation, which was upheld by the ALJ at trial.  The OSH Review Commission upheld, on appeal, the grouping of the two citation items.1

While reported decisions don’t always tell the entire story, my sense is that the employer in JPC Groupcould have handled this matter more advantageously.

First, either there occurred a grave communications breakdown within the company, or a decision was made to proceed with the soil removal and application of Gunite without adequate supervision, and without adequate instructions to the crew.

Every OSHA citation — this point  recurs here often — is largely about your next violation.  Although, certainly, you should consider every legitimate defense that may be available, winning today’s battle is seldom the main thing.  Citations should be used as an opportunity to improve your company’s safety performance, and your reputation with OSHA (and your workforce) as a conscientious, safety-conscious employer.

Frankly, upon reading the ALJ and Commission decisions in the JPC Group case, I was at a loss to figure out why the employer had not owned up to the violations, paid the modest penalty, and done some in-house training, considering itself lucky indeed that its employees had escaped injury.  The “background” elements (status as employer, project in interstate commerce, applicability of the regulations cited, etc.) all were in place.  The substantive elements, too, were clearly present, as no support system was in use, and no competent person inspected the work area.

Given the laborers’ testimony that they avoided being struck by the collapsing building only by running away, it was hardly open to the employer to argue that no employees had been exposed to the unsafe condition.

The ALJ easily turned aside JPC’s attempt to argue that its work in connection with the Gunite application had not threatened the stability of the foundation walls.  Project manager Boyce’s testimony that he had had “no concerns” about exposing the walls, and that there were no restrictions on uncovering them for waterproofing them was discredited by his admission that he had suggested putting a tieback through the wall, or even pouring another foundation wall.  Further, the Compliance Officer testified that Boyce had told him that he was greatly concerned about the wall’s stability, and that the plan had been to uncover the walls in 20′ lengths, apply the rebar, mesh and Gunite, and then replace the soil.

The employer took a weak stab, also, at disputing constructive knowledge, but given that its consulting engineer, project manager, and site foreman had all attended the meeting at which the condition of the wall was discussed, the underpinning put on hold, and a plan formulated to remove the soil berm in 20′ sections, the ALJ easily found that the employer knew, or should have known, of the condition.

The rest of the employer’s defense was chiefly Hartley’s testimony (seconded by the two laborers) that he had not used the backhoe on either building on the day of the collapse.  If believed, this testimony would have done little for the employer’s cause, as it was plainly doing excavation work close to an unshored foundation wall.  The testimony was not believed, among other things as the employer had stipulated that Hartley had removed the soil berm from building 1910 with his backhoe on the day of the collapse.  

Employee safety training should include instructing your workers that OSHA violations will likely occur, and that they are not to misstate facts to OSHA personnel, or at any hearing as may be held.  In the JPC Groupcase, the ALJ decision featured prominently a five-paragraph discussion on why the employer’s witnesses (its project manager as well as the three workers) had been disbelieved.  Counsel, it would appear, failed to properly prepare the employer’s witnesses — and, if the facts making out the violations are readily established, and the ALJ finds your witnesses unworthy of belief, you’re probably going to lose.

Contesting OSHA citations is expensive.  Except, perhaps, where the violation alleged is “Willful,” or the citation includes an uncommonly large number of “Serious” items, the costs of taking a contest through trial (let alone appeal) is likely to be a multiple of the penalty first assessed.

Lawyers like to impress clients with their fighting spirit, but that’s not always called for in the OSHA context.  “Scorched earth” is a dubious strategy given, especially, that you will probably be seeing OSHA again in years to come.  Contests should be maintained only where there is an honest basis, and a substantial prospect of having the citation vacated.


1 I am guessing that the OSH Review Commission chose to review the grouping on its own initiative, as it’s not apparent to me why either the Secretary or the employer would have appealed, based only on that issue.

Does a renewal judgment lien secured for a second 10-year period take effect nunc pro tunc on the expiration date of the original lien, cutting off the property interests of intervening mortgages?

Question. In 1991, plaintiff Judgment-Creditor obtained a default judgment against Judgment-Debtor for approximately $470,000 due on a note. On October 23, 1991, the judgment was docketed and acted as a lien on a Manhattan condominium owned by Judgment-Debtor. While a money judgment award is enforceable for 20 years, a real property lien resulting from the judgment is viable for just 10 years. But a renewal action may be brought between the same parties to the original action during the tenth year to extend the lien for an additional 10-year period.

Judgment-Creditor was unable to foreclose on the condominium and collect on the judgment and his other efforts to collect from Judgment-Debtor failed. So, on October 22, 2001-one day before the 10-year lien was to expire-Judgment-Creditor initiated the action to renew his lien. In February 2005, the Supreme Court granted Judgment-Creditor’s motion for summary judgment, granting him a judgment lien nunc pro tunc [retroactive] to October 23, 2001, the day the original 10-year judgment lien had expired.

Does a renewal judgment lien secured for a second 10-year period take effect nunc pro tunc on the expiration date of the original lien, cutting off the property interests of intervening mortgagees?

Answer. NO.

A renewal judgment does not have retroactive effect to the original lien’s expiration date. Nunc pro tunc treatment is inappropriate where, as here, additional lenders relying on the public record acquired rights in the property. The renewal lien becomes effective when granted by Supreme Court.

After Judgment-Creditor’s original lien had expired but before Supreme Court granted the renewal judgment-during the “lien gap” period two mortgage companies loaned Judgment-Debtor money in return for secured mortgages on the Manhattan condominium.

The mortgagees had no knowledge of Judgment-Creditor’s lien because a search of the public record revealed only the expired 10-year lien.

Because a lien on real property is only effective for 10 years and a money judgment is viable for 20 years the statute allows a judgment creditor to apply for a renewal of the judgment lien. To avoid expiration of the judgment lien at the end of 10 years real property lienholders may seek timely renewal of the judgment lien during the last year of the pendency of the original lien.

Those seeking to secure any interest in real property must be able to rely upon a public record to furnish full and complete information of any conveyances, liens or encumbrances affecting such property. They should not be penalized for failing to unearth an expired lien or not investigating the prospect that it might be subject to a pending renewal request. Nunc pro tunc treatment under these circumstances would be inimical to New York’s record notice based upon the certainty of a docketing system that alerts potential purchasers and lienholders to encumbrances upon real property.

The statute affords a judgment creditor a full year to renew his or her lien without suffering a lien gap. Where a judgment creditor diligently files at the beginning of this period and alerts the court to the applicable time constraint, a lien renewal application should be resolvable before the original lien expires.

Union Challenges Prevailing Wage Rate Determination

New York Labor Law Section 220 requires contractors to pay its workers the appropriate prevailing wages and benefits on public works projects. Collective bargaining agreements are used as a means of determining the prevailing wage rate, provided such agreements cover at least thirty percent of the workers in a particular trade. 

How is the prevailing rate determined where there are two unions covering the same work in a given locality? This question was answered in the recent case of Matter of International Union of Elevator Constructors Local No. 1 AFL-CIO v. Thompson, where the trade workers were represented by two unions, each of which had collective bargaining agreements containing different wage rates and benefits. 

Background 

In New York City, Local 1 and Local 3 are two main labor unions that represent elevator repair and maintenance workers. Local 1’s collective bargaining agreement provides for a higher rate of pay than that of Local 3. The Comptroller of the City of New York is responsible for establishing prevailing wage rates which must be paid to workers on public projects in New York City. This differs from projects outside of New York City, where it is the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor who is responsible for establishing prevailing wage rates. 

The City Comptroller used the rates set forth in Local 3’s collective bargaining agreement, rather than the higher rates set forth in Local 1’s collective bargaining agreement, in determining the prevailing wage rates for New York City elevator repair and maintenance workers for the period of July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009.

The City Comptroller conducted a survey to determine which union had the most members. Mailings were sent to 78 contractors previously identified as employing Local 1 members and 27 contractors previously identified as employing Local 3 members. Only 12 of the Local 1 contractors responded, indicating 130 members performed elevator work. Of the 27 Local 3 contractors, 20 contractors responded, indicating 1,331 members performed elevator work. The City Comptroller concluded that Local 3 had more members and therefore its rates were the “prevailing” wage rates among elevator repair and maintenance workers.

Local 1 learned of the Comptroller’s determination and sued to annul the determination. According to Local 1, the Comptroller’s survey method and determination were arbitrary, capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. Local 1 argued that it actually had 1,608 members to Local 3’s 1,331 members. It was Local 1’s position that when more than one union represented a particular type of worker, it was the historical practice for the Comptroller to use the rates set forth in the collective bargaining agreement for the predominant union for the trade, with the predominant union to be measured by the number of each union’s members. Since Local 1 claimed to have more members performing elevator work than Local 3, Local 1 argued that its rates should apply and the Comptroller’s determination should be annulled. 

Decision

The court agreed with Local 1’s argument that the Comptroller’s reliance upon the survey data was based on flawed data since so few Local 1 contractors responded. The court held that the use of a survey with such a poor response from contractors identified by Local 1 resulted in a determination that “is without foundation in fact.” In evaluating the meaning of the term “prevailing”, the court relied on past judicial decisions interpreting the word to mean “commonly accepted or predominant” and “most frequent.” Based on its analysis of the term “prevailing”, the court held that the larger union’s collective bargaining agreement should establish the prevailing wage rate. However, the court stopped short of annulling the determination of the City Comptroller to use Local 3’s rates. With the limited evidence presented, it could not be sure of which union truly had the greater number of members. The court ordered that a hearing take place with the taking of testimony and submission of evidence to determine which union had more members performing elevator work. The predominant union’s collective bargaining agreement would establish the prevailing wage rate. 

Comment 

The prevailing wage statute does not set forth how the “prevailing rate” is to be determined where there is more than one union representing a particular type of work. This case shines a light on how the prevailing wage rate should be determined in such a case. 

Safety Policy: Eye Safety Fundamentals

The construction industry leads all occupations in the incidence of time-lost eye injuries.  Construction accounts for more than one-fifth of all significant eye injuries suffered in the U.S. workforce each year.  Workers in the various trades are at risk from exposure to nearly every known threat to the eyes:  impact, ultraviolet radiation, liquid splash and infrared radiation.  From overexposure to the sun, flying wood, paint chips, cut wire ends and nails, toxic cleaning chemicals and paint to infrared exposure from torch welding and cutting, vision hazards can be found nearly everywhere on the jobsite.  While fall hazards, trench cave-ins, crane accidents and electrocutions due to contact with live wires rightly deserve attention as principal causes of construction fatalities, the loss of vision is devastating.  Eye safety, given the ubiquity of the hazards, requires constant attention.

Perhaps the most startling thing about eye safety in construction is that, despite the occurrence of nearly a thousand injuries per day, barely half of the workers in building construction and special trades, and barely a quarter in heavy construction, regularly wear non-prescription safety glasses or goggles while working.  Since safety glasses with “ANSI Z87” certification can be bought for as little as $10 a pair, clearly this is a source of injuries and lost time that could be drastically reduced, at very modest expense.

The observance of five simple rules can greatly reduce the frequency and severity of construction site eye injuries.

Rule #1, obviously, is that protective eyewear should always be worn while workers are performing tasks, or in locations where potential eye hazards are present.  Although, to be sure, protective eyewear is not a 100% guarantee against injury to the eyes, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that approximately 60% of lost-time eye injuries occur when the affected employee is not wearing any eye protection. 

Rule #2 is that eyewear should be of the right kind, and must fit properly and comfortably.  Although contact with chemicals is a major source of eye injuries (accounting for roughly a fifth of those experienced in construction) by far the greatest source is flying of falling objects or sparks.  Nearly 70% of all eye injuries result from such causes and, in nearly three-fifths of those cases, the objects striking the worker’s eye are smaller than a pinhead.

Goggles should always be worn, if dust, liquids, or gases will be present.  Goggles must fit over any prescription glasses (or prescription goggles may be worn).  Eye protective devices should allow air to circulate between the eye and the lens (although unvented goggles are indicated for use with contact lenses).  A clear, plastic face shield is required for work with corrosive chemicals, grinding, chipping, the use of a wire brush on welds, flying particles and, of course, sandblasting.

Even where an enhanced degree of protection is not indicated, workers on construction sites should always wear goggles or, at least, safety glasses having side shields.  Special care is required, of course, for workers engaged in welding and flame cutting.  Several variables (the intensity of radiant energy, background lighting — mainly, whether one is working indoors or outdoors — and the difference between standard or reflective lenses) will affect the minimum shade number of lens that must be used.

While most welders are well-trained in the use of appropriate protection against UV rays, “welder’s flash” may affect the vision of others working close by.  Workers should be trained not to look at the welding arc, or reflections of the arc, unless they are wearing a welding hood with the same lens as the welder’s.  OSHA further requires the use of a flameproof screen around a welder, to protect others from UV rays.

Not only must protective eyewear be matched to the job to be performed, it must also be properly maintained.  Most eyewear will not withstand repeated impact or abuse, so regular inspection, and the replacement of badly scratched or broken eyewear, are required.

Rule #3 is that engineering controls and industrial hygiene must be employed where practicable.  Notably, the use of local-exhaust ventilation or fans will often be indicated to blow away fumes or dust.  OSHA requires, also, that eyewash stations be available if there are materials that could injure employees’ eyes.   

Rule #4 is that both rank-and-file workers and supervisors should be instructed concerning what to do when eye injuries occur.

Where an irritating or dangerous chemical comes into contact with the eye, the workers should immediately commence to rinse it out for at least 15 to 20 minutes.  Flowing tap water, if available onsite, should be used (and contact lenses, if worn, should first be removed).  This first-aid measure should be followed up at once with professional medical attention.

If an employee is struck in the eye area, a cold compress (ice cubes in a plastic bag or clean cloth) may be used to reduce swelling, but pressure should not be applied to the eye.  If pain persists or blurred vision occurs, the employee should be seen by a doctor.

If a worker is struck in the eye by flying metal, wood, or material from a power tool, if the eye is cut or punctured or the worker experiences eye pain from any impact-type injury to the eye, he or she should be taken to an emergency room or doctor at once.  Immediate medical attention is often critical in preventing or limiting permanent damage to the worker’s eyesight.

Workers should be instructed that, if the eye is cut or punctured, they should not push on it, wash it out, or try to pull out anything that has become lodged in the eyeball.  Instead, get that worker to a doctor!

Rule #5 is that you must be persistent —you’ve got to be willing to nag.  Nearly all construction workers know, generally, that eye hazards are all around them on the jobsite, but half or more neglect to use protective eyewear.  Just as no one should be able to get into a lift bucket without a harness and lanyard, workers exposed to eye hazards must be required to don protective eyewear before beginning work.  A sizeable minority of workers, unfortunately, will not religiously use eye protection unless made to do so — and, if workers see that eye protection is not insisted on by management, many will not use it consistently.  Quite simply, the minor discomfort or inconvenience associated with the regular use of protective eyewear must be perceived by workers as a lesser irritant than being nagged, told to return to the changing area to retrieve eyewear, or being disciplined for failing to use proper eyewear.

 Studies show, in fact, that although most employers furnish eye protection at no cost to employees, most workers suffering eye injuries do so while performing their regular jobs and claim not to have been aware that eye protection was needed.  About 40% of construction workers claim a lack of instruction regarding where and what kind of eyewear should be used.   The nationwide cost of eye injuries on construction sites is estimated to exceed $300 million annually in lost production time, medical expenses and workers’ compensation.  The impact on individual workers suffering partial or total loss of vision from such incidents is incalculable.

It’s in your employees’ interest, and your own, to make the modest efforts necessary to prevent and reduce the severity of eye injuries in construction activities.

Court Rejects Bid for Unresponsiveness

Public construction contracts in New York are subject to the statutory competitive bidding requirements. They provide that the contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and responsive bidder. A “responsible” bidder is a contractor who has the skill, integrity, experience, financial and technical resources to complete the work in a satisfactory manner. A “responsive” bidder is a contractor who has complied with the exact requirements of the bid invitation. 

Bid protests frequently arise when the contractor’s bid is rejected because it was found to be “non-responsive”, as shown in the recent case of E.W. Tompkins Company, Inc. v. State University of New York. 

Background 

In January 2008, the State University of New York advertised for bids on a project involving the upgrade of a heating and cooling plant at its Albany campus. The work included asbestos abatement, demolition of parts of the existing system, installation of new equipment, new piping and extensive electrical work. The bid specifications required the successful contractor to have “completed at least three similar projects within the immediate past five years involving centrifugal chillers, boiler house controls, HTW generator burner replacement with controls, and replacement of large diameter piping over significant distances.” The specifications further stated that “references must be submitted with the bid, documenting the scope of work completed, the contract value, the time frame it was completed under, and the name of the client.” 

E.W. Tompkins Company, Inc. submitted its bid for the project on February 2008. After reviewing the bid, SUNY’s Associate Director of Architecture, Engineering & Construction sent a letter to the contractor requesting additional information with respect to the three projects that the contractor listed in its bid as evidence that it had the requisite prior work experience. After supplying its response to SUNY’s request, the contractor was notified that although it was the lowest bidder, its bid had been deemed “non-responsive” and the contract would be awarded to a competitor. 

SUNY based its non-responsive determination on the contractor’s failure to provide the requested information and SUNY’s inability to verify that the contractor’s prior work experience met the requirements of the specifications. Additionally, SUNY noted that the three projects listed by the contractor in its bid as evidence of this prior work experience had, in fact, been performed by another firm, Albany Specialties, Inc. 

Upon receipt of the non-responsive determination, the contractor had its attorney send a letter to the SUNY representative that, for the first time, advised that the contractor had merged with Albany Specialties, Inc. in 2005, which had the requisite experience. Based on the supplemental information, the contractor asked that its bid be reconsidered. SUNY denied the request to reconsider, awarded the contract to the second bidder and the contractor sued SUNY. 

The trial court held that SUNY had a reasonable basis to conclude that the contractor’s bid was non-responsive and dismissed the case. The contractor appealed. 

Decision
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s holding. In so doing, the court relied on well established case law stating, “judicial review of an agency’s decision denying or awarding the contract is limited to ascertaining whether there is a rational basis to support the agency’s determination.” In addition, the court stated that “an agency, when composing bid specifications, may establish requirements – as long as they are rationally based – that set forth criteria for experience and qualifications that must be met for an entity to be an eligible bidder and, it may disqualify a bidder for failure to comply with these requirements.”

In applying the law to the facts, the court simply recounted the contractor’s original failure to provide any description of the scope for work completed for each project it identified as relevant, the contractor’s insufficient clarification, the performance of the relied upon work by a separate entity, and the contractor’s failure to indicate in any of its bid documents that it had merged with the company who did perform the work. Based on these facts, the appellate court found SUNY’s decision of “non-responsiveness” to have a rational basis. 

Comment 

Courts give broad discretion to public entities when reviewing a responsiveness determination. Where the agency’s insistence upon strict compliance with the bid specifications has a rational basis, the courts will uphold the determination of non-responsiveness.