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Short Contractual Time Period Dooms Sub’s Claim .

Under New York’s Statute of Limitations, an action for breach of contract must be commenced within six years after the claim has accrued. ¬†No claim can be asserted beyond that six year period, but parties, by agreement, may provide for a much shorter period within which to start suit for breach of contract. ¬†An agreement to shorten the limitations period will be enforced provided the shortened period is reasonable. ¬†For example, a time period of 14 days has been held unreasonably short and therefore unenforceable. ¬† In Mulvihill Electrical Contracting Corp. v. NAB Construction Corporation, the contractor argued that the subcontractor’s breach of contract claim was time barred because it was not brought within the six month contractual limitations period within which an action must be commenced.¬†

Background

NAB Construction Corporation entered into an agreement with Metro North Commuter Railroad for the rehabilitation of the Park Avenue Viaduct.  In January 1994, NAB entered into a subcontract with Mulvihill Electrical Contracting Corp. to perform electrical work at the project.  A dispute over payment arose, with the subcontractor claiming that $722,135 remained due to it.   On July 12, 2004 Mulvihill sued the contractor, seeking to recover the unpaid balance.    

The subcontract stated that no action or proceeding may be commenced by the subcontractor for breach of contract or any other claim arising out of the contract, unless such action or proceeding is commenced within six months of the earlier contractor’s or the owner’s acceptance of the subcontractor’s work as complete or the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. ¬† ¬†

Based on this provision, NAB moved to dismiss Mulvihill’s claim. ¬†According to NAB, the owner accepted Mulvihill’s work as complete on September 28, 2001. T√ühe acceptance triggered the provisions of the subcontract regarding the six month period to commence an action, and the limitation period expired on March 28, 2002. ¬†Accordingly, the contractor argued that the subcontractor’s lawsuit, commenced on July 12, 2004, was untimely and must be dismissed. ¬† ¬†

The subcontractor argued that the contractor was never paid in full for the subcontractor’s work, thereby showing that the work was never accepted as complete by the owner. ¬†Mulvihill also noted that no certificate of occupancy was ever issued. ¬†Since NAB could not show that the owner accepted Mulvihill’s work as complete, or that a certificate of occupancy was issued, the subcontractor argued that NAB’s motion to dismiss should be denied.¬†

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the contractor, dismissing the subcontractor’s claim. ¬†The court acknowledged that NAB did not show that it received full payment from the owner. ¬†However, the court relied heavily on a memorandum prepared by the owner’s construction manager. ¬†The memorandum stated, “as of September 28, 2001, NAB Construction Corporation satisfactorily completed all outstanding items on the punch list, and submitted all deliverables to the Railroad.” ¬†The court also relied on the owner’s construction manager’s deposition testimony, which noted that no certificate of occupancy had been issued because certificates of occupancy are not issued in connection with a project of this type. ¬†Consequently, the court found that the owner accepted NAB’s work as having been completed as of September 28, 2001. ¬†Since six months from the date of acceptance was March 28, 2002, and the action was not commenced until July 12, 2004, the court held that the subcontractor’s action was time barred under the six month contractual limitations period. ¬†Accordingly, the court ruled that the subcontractor’s lawsuit was untimely and granted NAB’s motion to dismiss Mulvihill’s claim.any basis not to enforce the broad exculpatory disclaimer provisions of the contract. ¬†

Comment

Courts will strictly construe time limitations periods that are voluntarily agreed to by the parties.  This means that before even considering the merits of a claim, courts will dismiss a breach of contract claim if the claimant failed to comply with a shortened contractual limitations period. Courts will not rewrite or change the terms of an agreement that was freely entered into between the parties.  The unpaid claimant, or potential claimant, should make every effort to become thoroughly familiar with their contractual limitation period. A claim will be lost if a shortened limitations period is not complied with.    

About the author:  Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc.  Adam W. Downs, an associate with the firm, assisted with the preparation of this article. 

Contractor Denied Recovery for Unforeseen Site Conditions.

Claims by contractors for extra work arising from unanticipated subsurface or other physical conditions at the work site continue to be a major source of litigation.  A differing site condition is usually discovered during excavation or demolition, or is an otherwise concealed condition which is different from the conditions reflected in the contract documents.    

Many claims for unanticipated conditions are based on natural subsurface conditions, such as the presence of rock or the unusual characteristics of the soil, which are not shown on the site plans.  Claims for differing site conditions may also be based on the existence of artificial conditions, such as the existence of unknown underground utilities.    
In the case of CATCO v. State of New York, several of the claims brought by a contractor sought recovery for extra work arising from differing site conditions not contemplated by the contract documents.  

Background  

 

Concrete Applied Technologies Corporation d/b/a CATCO entered into an agreement in August of 2000 with the State of New York for the reconstruction of 3.6 kilometers of highway, together with the replacement of two bridges.  The contract price was $14,882,586.  The project was competed and accepted by the Commissioner of Transportation in February of 2003, at which time there remained twenty-one unresolved claims by the contractor for additional compensation.  Three of the claims were for differing site conditions.      

The contractor argued that it unexpectedly encountered subsurface rock formations while excavating for the installation of the project’s waterlines and drainage structure, which resulted in differing site conditions not contemplated by the contract documents.  According to the contractor, it was entitled to an additional $18,787 on account of the differing site conditions. In denying the contractor’s request for additional compensation, the State argued that the parties’ agreement clearly placed responsibility for determining subsurface conditions upon the contractor, that the parties’ agreement did not affirmatively indicate the subsurface conditions in the disputed areas, and that to the extent subsurface conditions were set forth in the bid documents, they were identified as estimates only.  When the State refused to pay, the contractor sued.  

Decision  

 

A trial was held and the court ruled in favor of the State.  According to the court, in order to prevail on a differing site condition claim, the contractor must prove six elements:  1.) the contract documents affirmatively indicated the subsurface conditions; 2.) the 
contractor acted reasonably in interpreting the contract documents; 3.) the contractor reasonably relied on the indications of subsurface conditions in the contract; 4.) the actual subsurface conditions encountered must have been reasonably unforeseeable; 5.) the subsurface conditions must be materially different than indicated on the contract documents and, 6.) the contractor’s claimed damages must be solely attributable to the different subsurface conditions.   

 Here, the contractor’s claim failed to satisfy the first element. The contract documents did not affirmatively indicate the subsurface conditions in the disputed areas.  Accordingly, the court held that the contractor failed to prove the elements of its claim, necessitating judgment in favor of the State.    

The court also noted that if the State were proven to have withheld relevant information concerning site conditions, or furnished inadequate or misleading information to bidders which did not fairly represent the conditions at the site, then the State could be held liable for breach of contract.  However, in this case, the court determined that the State did not conduct test borings to determine subsurface conditions, and did not make any affirmative representations as to those subsurface conditions.  Accordingly, the proof did not show that the State acted in bad faith, or provide any basis not to enforce the broad exculpatory disclaimer provisions of the contract.  

Comment  

 

This case follows well settled law which upholds disclaimer provisions where the owner makes all existing data available to bidders but warns them not to rely on the data furnished.  Faced with such express cautionary language, the contractor would be well- advised before bidding to analyze carefully all site conditions and information furnished by the owner, and to undertake an adequate pre-bid site inspection to ascertain the actual site conditions.  By doing so, the contractor can minimize the risk of having to bear the cost of unforeseen site conditions.      

About the author:  Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc.  Adam W. Down s, an associate with the firm, assisted with the preparation of this article. 

On December 28, 2009, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed comprehensive legislation dubbed the “Greener, Greater Buildings Plan.”

On December 28, 2009, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed comprehensive legislation dubbed the "Greener, Greater Buildings Plan." The purpose of this legislation is to reduce New York City's carbon footprint by five percent. In the first of this three part series, we will discuss several important provisions of the new New York City Energy Conservation Code (the NYCECC), and what it means to property owners and builders.  

The enactment of the NYCECC is intended to close what was perceived to be a loophole in the Energy Conservation Construction Code of New York State (the State Code), adopted in 2007. The State Code applies only to new construction and renovation work where more than half of a building's system of subsystems were replaced. Thus, everything from simple remodeling work to extensive renovations and additions (provided that the new work used more than half of the building's existing systems) were exempted from compliance with the State Code. As a result of the enactment of the NYCECC, now any construction which requires a building permit including residential construction must be analyzed for energy efficiency to the standards set forth under the State Code.  

In order to comply with the NYCECC, an applicant for a building permit must have the lead design professional submit three items along with the permit application: 1) a statement that to the best of [the design professional's] knowledge, belief and professional judgment; [the plans and specifications submitted] are in compliance with the NYCECC, or that the project is exempt from its requirements; 2) the results of an energy analysis (which must include the building's envelope, its service water heating, lighting and power systems, and its mechanical systems) comparing the proposed project to the requirements of the NYCECC and setting forth how the project meets the NYCECC requirments; and 3) construction drawings which demonstrate conformance with the NYCECC. It is important to note that this submission is an ongoing process. The analysis and construction documents must be updated to account for any substitutions and changes made during the course of construction.  

This Legal Alert is supplied for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice. You should consult competent legal counsel depending on the specific issues of your matter.  

1 Consult Real Property Tax Law § 1802(1) (Class One) for a full definition of exempt property.  

2 “Energy” is defined as electricity, natural gas, fuel oil, and steam.  

3 With some exceptions, a “city building” is a building that is more than 10,000 square feet that is owned by the city or for which the city regularly pays all or part of the annual energy bills.   

4 Ratings generated by the benchmarking tool for a covered building that contains a data center, television studio, and/or trading floor that together exceed ten percent of the gross square footage of any such building shall not be disclosed until the office of long-term planning and sustainability determines that the benchmarking tool can make adequate adjustments for such facilities.  

5 Not applicable to separately-metered dwelling units.   

Does equitable subrogation apply or did the second mortgage cease to be a valid lien so that it may be canceled as a cloud on title?

Question. Second Mortgage Bank seeks to foreclose on a second mortgage, arguing the conveyance of the premises from Owners to Buyers was void. Buyer and Buyer’s Bank seek to vacate and remove Second Mortgage Bank’s mortgage from the public records. Buyer argues Owner never informed him of the existence of the second mortgage (i.e. lack of actual notice) and point to an undisputed error in indexing to prove they were not on constructive notice. Second Mortgage Bank argued it was entitled to equitable subrogation, contending its predecessor in interest, paid off and satisfied at least $78,275 of prior liens. Does equitable subrogation apply or did the second mortgage cease to be a valid lien so that it may be canceled as a cloud on title?

Answer. NO Equitable subrogation does not apply. The second mortgage ceased to be a valid lien. The Second Mortgage may be canceled as a cloud on title.

On June 2, the Owner purchased the subject real property and their deed to the premises was recorded on June 16 with the proper tax map designation. The Owner made this purchase using a $96,000 loan giving in return a mortgage on the premises. The mortgage through a series of transactions was eventually assigned to Second Mortgage Bank. The assignment was recorded twenty eight years after the mortgage loan was originally made.

In year 16 Owner, as borrower, executed a note with Second Mortgage Bank, for $152,000. To secure this loan, the Owner executed a $152,000 mortgage on the premises in favor of Second Mortgage Bank. The Second Mortgage was recorded in March in year 17, but with the incorrect lot designation.

In June, a year later, Buyer purchased the premises from the Owner for $225,000, taking out a loan from Buyers’ Bank for $202,000, and giving in exchange a mortgage on the premises for that amount (Mortgage Three).

In August of year 23, Second Mortgage Bank sought to foreclose on Mortgage Two. Buyer and Buyer’s Bank, assert improper indexing of Mortgage Two and seek to vacate and remove Mortgage Two from record. Second Mortgage Bank replies that the conveyance of the premises from the Owner to Buyer is void, being a fraudulent conveyance for the purpose of avoiding claims and liens of creditors, including those of Second Mortgage Bank and its predecessors in interest, and that Second Mortgage Bank is entitled to equitable subrogation.

Buyer states that the Owner never informed him of the existence of Mortgage Two, and that he lacked actual notice of Mortgage Two. Buyer’s Bank, states Buyer’s Bank had no actual notice of Mortgage Two at the time it loaned the funds to Buyer to purchase the premises from the Owner.

The unchallenged claim of Buyer and Buyer’s Bank are proof that they were not on actual notice of Mortgage Two, and the undisputed error in indexing proves they were not on constructive notice, either. Buyers and Buyer’s Bank have, thus, established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Real Property Law ¬ß291).

Second Mortgage Bank asserts, in opposition, that it is entitled to equitable subrogation. The doctrine of equitable subrogation applies where the funds of a mortgagee are used to satisfy the lien of an existing, known encumbrance when, unbeknown to the mortgagee, another lien on the property exists which is senior to his but junior to the one satisfied with his funds. In order to avoid the unjust enrichment of the intervening, unknown lienor, the mortgagee is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the senior encumbrance.

Second Mortgage Bank states that it paid off and satisfied at least $78,274.50 of prior liens on the premises in year 23. At the time these payments were made, Mortgage Three (year 24) did not yet exist. Equitable subrogation, thus, does not apply in this case. Moreover, Second Mortgage Bank did not become the assignee of Mortgage Two until year 28, the date of the assignment from Accredited, and, thus, was on notice of Mortgage Three, which had been recorded in year 27, and which should have led Second Mortgage Bank to conduct further inquiry.

As Mortgage Two has ceased to be a valid lien on the premises, it may be canceled as a cloud on title.

Safety Policy: Where Is OSHA Enforcement Headed?

As OSHA nears its fortieth birthday, the agency and affected constituencies are taking stock of what OSHA and the OSH Act have accomplished, and the likely direction of enforcement efforts under the Obama Administration.

The OSH Act became law toward the end of the 30-year postwar period that followed World War II, and at the end of a decade that saw unprecedented initiatives intended to benefit minorities, working people and the disadvantaged.  The OSH Act was the product of bipartisan collaboration in Congress rarely if ever seen in recent years, and was signed into law by Republican President Richard M. Nixon.

Many changes in the economic and political landscape have come about since the 1970s.  I don’t think anyone would claim that OSHA has even approached the goals envisioned by its drafters.  Still, traumatic workplace deaths fell by half under OSHA (as the workforce grew by 60% and more), a substantial achievement.  And, through thick and thin, under Democratic and Republican administrations, since 1970 employee safety has always enjoyed at least some place on the national political agenda.

In the minus column, the OSH Act’s goal of assuring safe and healthful working conditions for American workers remains far from full realization.  Confirmation requires nothing more than pointing to the fact that, during OSHA’s first quarter-century, approximately 294,000 Americans died of traumatic injuries in the workplace.

Traumatic deaths, moreover, are just the tip of the iceberg:  most occupationally-related deaths are due to illness resulting from exposure to workplace chemicals or toxins.  They often become manifest years or decades after the exposure, and are seldom recorded in an employer’s OSHA 200 Log, or by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.1 

While some claim that OSHA trails only the IRS as America’s least-beloved federal agency, the lore concerning Kafkaesque regulations and over-zealous enforcement personnel is larded with propaganda.  What OSHA really does have in common with the IRS is the necessity to rely, for the most part, on voluntary compliance.  OSHA has never enjoyed ample staffing, or generous funding, but on the whole it does a creditable job of leveraging the limited assets that it has. Less than religious adherence to OSHA standards remains, certainly, widespread.  I have heard clients complain, sometimes rightly, about citations they believed lacked justification.  Nevertheless, while OSHA compliance is often fitful (and seldom enthusiastic) almost no one expresses contempt for the idea that employee safety is a good thing, or even that there is a government agency that works to promote it.

For several years, momentum has been gathering to increase the number of OSHA inspections and “SWR” (Serious, Willful and Repeat) citations, and to increase both monetary penalties generally, and criminal penalties — if only for “Willful” violations that result in employee fatalities.

One area which appears to be targeted for increased enforcement is OSHA’s (many) record-keeping requirements.  These are “low-hanging fruit” for OSHA inspectors (as few employers’ records are above reproach).  Moreover, brazen book-cooking is believed to be widespread, many employers keeping two sets of records (one for OSHA and the company’s Workers’ Comp insurer, and the other for its health clinics).

Locally, the word is that area OSHA offices are hiring considerable numbers of new enforcement personnel.  In our firm’s practice we are already seeing greater willingness on the part of compliance officers to cite OSHA violations as “Willful,” and less readiness to bargain such citations down to “Serious” ones.

We’re seeing also an uptick in the number of citations alleging violations of the many OSHA provisions requiring that employers train their forces to recognize and avoid health and safety hazards.  Not only is “failure to train” increasingly cited as an OSHA violation, but we detect at least some willingness on the part of OSHA to look to test the sufficiency of detail in an employer’s training program directed to a particular hazard (even where the extent of the regulatory mandate is uncertain).

I’ve always encouraged my clients and readers to train (and re-train) employees.  One reason I’m so adamant about repeat training is that it’s one thing to spend for a glossy, state-of-the-art company safety manual, but quite another to get your 21st century workforce to understand and observe even the fundamentals.

Critics of American educational and social institutions would argue that many young people have limited verbal skills, don’t comprehend complex instructions, and resist obeying them even if they do.

Also, employment relationships are in general more transient than they were circa 1970 when the OSH Act became law, and it’s not a given (certainly in the New York metro area) that a company’s workforce will even have a common language.

The Tower-of-Babel situation resulting from decades of high immigration levels obviously makes effective training more difficult.  An example of how pitiful the laws’ response to the diversity “explosion” has been is that defendants in certain kinds of civil litigation (notably, consumer collection and landlord-tenant matters) are required to be served with a bilingual summons, in both English and Spanish.

While such requirements are no doubt well-intentioned, it’s almost comical to see judges fretting over whether Gujurati, Yiddish and Fujian-speaking defendants have been duly served with papers written in Spanish.  And while it’s praiseworthy that some employers have paid to produce editions of their company safety manuals in Spanish, the last census counted 322 languages in daily use in American households.  Most of those linguistic groups are small and many are tiny, but if you’re running a substantial construction project in the NYC metro area, chances are that the workforce will include speakers of (in addition to English and Spanish) Korean, several varieties of Chinese, Haitian Creole, Urdu, Russian, Bengali, Arabic, Punjabi, Portuguese (European, Brazilian and African varieties) French (including its African varieties, plus Qu√©becois) and others.2 

A further complication is that OSHA regulations have an extensive and exotic jargon.  Not only have many regulations technical aspects not readily understood by laymen, but there lots of acronyms, specialized terms and “buzz words” in OSHA parlance.  

Studies as to how much of the information imparted during the OSHA 10-hour course is really absorbed have yielded discouraging results.  One tested not rank-and-file construction workers, but students in a master’s program in construction management.  The proportion who achieved a grade of Satisfactory or better, after sitting through the OSHA 10-hour course, was only about twenty percent.  A less highly-educated group of Spanish speakers produced no test-takers achieving “Satisfactory” scores.

While training employees effectively is a problem you can’t avoid wrestling with, policy should take into account both the harsh economic climate and the difficulties (most of them due to larger forces, over which employers have no control) of getting bang-for-the-buck, true comprehension, from safety training outlays.  This, I believe, is not an opportune moment to abruptly raise the bar, or to instruct OSHA compliance officers to issue large numbers of citations to push the limits of how much detail must be taught, especially as to hazards that account for few injuries and fatalities.

As your paramount goal should be to minimize employee injuries, not exposure to citations, consider focusing on your field supervisors.  Whatever difficulties there be in bringing your entire workforce to an optimal level of OSHA knowledge, you can give your field supervisors the most comprehensive training you can afford, plus an unambiguous mandate to enforce safety rules.  While priorities vary according to trades, the perennial evils are falls, excavation cave-ins, “struck-by” hazards, and electrocutions. If OSHA is stepping up inspections, it’s just plain dumb to have anyone, ever, working aloft without fall protection, or in an unshored trench.  A review of OSHA record-keeping requirements applicable to your firm should be on your “To Do” list as well.


1 The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health estimates that, for every worker killed in a sudden traumatic occurrence, as many as 15 may die each year from job-related exposure to chemicals and toxins.

2 Fears of retaliation among undocumented workers, or those from countries in which demands for a safe workplace are responded to not by OSHA inspectors but by dismissals (or by “death squads”) no doubt exert a degrading effect on OSHA compliance.  Also, given reports that U.S. counter-terrorism efforts are hampered by a lack of personnel fluent in just a handful of critical foreign languages, is it realistic that private employers — lacking Pentagon’s virtual blank check from the taxpayers — are expected to effectively teach OSHA to workers speaking (even if we ignore the smaller linguistic communities) dozens of different languages?

Second Mortgage Bank seeks to foreclose…

Question. Second Mortgage Bank seeks to foreclose on a second mortgage, arguing the conveyance of the premises from Owners to Buyers was void. Buyer and Buyer’s Bank seek to vacate and remove Second Mortgage Bank’s mortgage from the public records. Buyer argues Owner never informed him of the existence of the second mortgage (i.e. lack of actual notice) and point to an undisputed error in indexing to prove they were not on constructive notice. Second Mortgage Bank argued it was entitled to equitable subrogation, contending its predecessor in interest, paid off and satisfied at least $78,275 of prior liens. Does equitable subrogation apply or did the second mortgage cease to be a valid lien so that it may be canceled as a cloud on title?

Answer. NO. Equitable subrogation does not apply. The second mortgage ceased to be a valid lien. The Second Mortgage may be canceled as a cloud on title.

On June 2, the Owner purchased the subject real property and their deed to the premises was recorded on June 16 with the proper tax map designation. The Owner made this purchase using a $96,000 loan giving in return a mortgage on the premises. The mortgage through a series of transactions was eventually assigned to Second Mortgage Bank. The assignment was recorded twenty eight years after the mortgage loan was originally made.

In year 16 Owner, as borrower, executed a note with Second Mortgage Bank, for $152,000. To secure this loan, the Owner executed a $152,000 mortgage on the premises in favor of Second Mortgage Bank. The Second Mortgage was recorded in March in year 17, but with the incorrect lot designation.

In June, a year later, Buyer purchased the premises from the Owner for $225,000, taking out a loan from Buyers’ Bank for $202,000, and giving in exchange a mortgage on the premises for that amount (Mortgage Three).

In August of year 23, Second Mortgage Bank sought to foreclose on Mortgage Two. Buyer and Buyer’s Bank, assert improper indexing of Mortgage Two and seek to vacate and remove Mortgage Two from record. Second Mortgage Bank replies that the conveyance of the premises from the Owner to Buyer is void, being a fraudulent conveyance for the purpose of avoiding claims and liens of creditors, including those of Second Mortgage Bank and its predecessors in interest, and that Second Mortgage Bank is entitled to equitable subrogation.
Buyer states that the Owner never informed him of the existence of Mortgage Two, and that he lacked actual notice of Mortgage Two. Buyer’s Bank, states Buyer’s Bank had no actual notice of Mortgage Two at the time it loaned the funds to Buyer to purchase the premises from the Owner.

The unchallenged claim of Buyer and Buyer’s Bank are proof that they were not on actual notice of Mortgage Two, and the undisputed error in indexing proves they were not on constructive notice, either. Buyers and Buyer’s Bank have, thus, established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Real Property Law ¬ß291).

Second Mortgage Bank asserts, in opposition, that it is entitled to equitable subrogation. The doctrine of equitable subrogation applies where the funds of a mortgagee are used to satisfy the lien of an existing, known encumbrance when, unbeknown to the mortgagee, another lien on the property exists which is senior to his but junior to the one satisfied with his funds. In order to avoid the unjust enrichment of the intervening, unknown lienor, the mortgagee is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the senior encumbrance.
Second Mortgage Bank states that it paid off and satisfied at least $78,274.50 of prior liens on the premises in year 23. At the time these payments were made, Mortgage Three (year 24) did not yet exist. Equitable subrogation, thus, does not apply in this case. Moreover, Second Mortgage Bank did not become the assignee of Mortgage Two until year 28, the date of the assignment from Accredited, and, thus, was on notice of Mortgage Three, which had been recorded in year 27, and which should have led Second Mortgage Bank to conduct further inquiry.

As Mortgage Two has ceased to be a valid lien on the premises, it may be canceled as a cloud on title.

False Vendex Statements Doom Contractor’s Delay Claim


Municipalities are required by statute to award contracts to the “lowest responsible bidder.” In making its lowest responsible bidder determination, city agencies are directed to use information supplied by prospective contractors including VENDEX (acronym for Vendor Information Exchange) and prequalification questionnaire replies. VENDEX forms are completed by a contractor as part of the bid process, which a city relies on in evaluating the lowest responsible bidder designation.

A responsible contractor determination is normally made prior to the award of the contract to the contractor. But what if a city discovers that the contractor made false statements or withheld information on its VENDEX form after the contractor was paid for substantial completion of the work and the contractor sues the city to recover delay damages? Can the city disregard the contract and avoid payment based on the contractor’s false VENDEX statements? This question was addressed in the recent case of Omni Contracting Company, Inc. v. The City of New York. 

Background 

In June 2005 Omni Contracting Company, Inc. submitted a bid to contract for a public improvement project known as “Reconstruction of Thompson Street (Vesuvio) Playground.” The contract was awarded to Omni. In March 2006 the contractor entered into an agreement with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation to construct the project. The contract price was $2,127,000. The contractor was originally required to complete work within 270 consecutive calendar days. During construction the contractor requested, and the City approved, six time extensions, extending the project’s completion date by nearly seven months. The City paid the contractor $2,143,866 for its work under the contract. Thereafter, the contractor sued the City, alleging that it had fully performed the contract, but that its performance was delayed by the acts of the City, and those delays caused the contractor to incur $319,386 in additional costs.

In defense to the contractor’s lawsuit, the City argued that it was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract. According to the City, the contractor made false statements and withheld information on its VENDEX form originally filed with the City in April 2004, and reaffirmed those same false statements in July 2004, February 2005, and April 2005, in the contractor’s sworn “no change” certifications. Accordingly, it was the City’s argument that when the contractor submitted its bid for the playground project in June 2005, the contractor failed to make a required disclosure regarding its failure to pay employees a prevailing wage on several of the contractor’s other projects with the City. Based on the failed disclosure, the City argued that in was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract. The City moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the contractor’s claims.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the City. The court first noted the requirement that public projects be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. It went on to note that under the New York City Procurement Policy Board Rules, the “failure of a firm to provide relevant information specifically requested by the Contracting Officer may be grounds for a determination of non-responsibility.” Since the contractor failed to provide requested information relating to its past prevailing wage investigations and violations, which occurred in 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006, the court held that the contractor was not a “responsible” contractor. 

The court went on to state that contracts procured through fraudulent bidding are void as against public policy. Where work is done pursuant to such an illegal contract, the court held that the contractor is not entitled to recover on its claims. Additionally, the court pointed out that the municipality can recover from the contractor all amounts paid under the illegal contract.

The court accordingly dismissed the contractor’s delay claim for the $319,386. Given that the City was not seeking to recover the entire amount paid to the contractor, the contractor was permitted to retain the monies previously paid to it by the City.

Comment 

This case emphasizes the importance of accurately completing and updating VENDEX and prequalification questionnaire replies. The failure to do so may not only support a non-responsible determination, but, as shown, it may also be grounds for non-payment for work performed and the recovery of payments already made for work performed. 

Safety Policy: “Swing Radius” Hazards, OSHA%u2019s General Duty Clause, and the Infeasibility Defense

Although many construction hazards have their very own OSHA standards, even in the absence of a standard directly addressing a particular worksite hazard, the same may be subject to OSHA’S “General Duty Clause.”

 “Struck by” incidents being a major class of construction site injuries, OSHA compliance officers are attentive to the hazard of employees being struck by rotating or swinging parts of cranes, drilling rigs, and other types of heavy equipment.  A recent case illustrates one type of “swing radius” hazards not covered by any specific OSHA standard, but falling within the General Duty Clause.

OSHA has never pursued the unachievable elimination of all conceivable workplace dangers, but does requires workplaces free from recognized health and safety hazards.  One aspect of this policy is the “infeasibility defense,” which may apply where full, technical compliance with a standard is infeasible.  This defense is discussed in the second of the two cases discussed below.

In Secretary v. A. H. Beck Foundation Co., Inc., the employer was drilling 55-foot foundation pier holes for a bridge.  The employer was using a track-mounted mobile drilling rig.  After each dig, the operator would swing the bucket on the end of the rig arm 90 degrees to one side, to dump soil into a designated area.  

Although the employer was aware of red-tape barricades as a precaution against swing radius hazards, it had no such barricades in place in the area where its drilling rig was in use.  Its superintendent testified that such barricades were used only where there was too much activity, or too many pieces of equipment, to permit a “stim man” to safely act as monitor.  A. H. Beck’s “stim man” was responsible to constantly monitor the rig, and to ensure, by exchanging hand signals with the operator, that the rig did not rotate, unless and until all employees were clear of the swing radius area.  Employees were trained to position themselves outside the rig’s swing radius every time the drilling rig was about to rotate.  The rig rotated slowly — 3 RPM maximum — and had multiple, large warning signs stating “Danger.  Keep Out of Turning Area.”

Swing radius hazards on this type of equipment do not fall under any specific OSHA standard.  Because, however, they are a hazard recognized by the employer or its industry, they are governed under the OSH Act’s General Duty Clause.  Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act states that “each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.”  To sustain the citation alleging a violation of the General Duty Clause, the Secretary had to prove that (1) a condition or activity in the workplace presented a hazard to employees; (2) the employer or its industry recognized the hazard; (3) the hazard was likely to cause death or serious physical harm, and (4) a feasible and effective means existed to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard.

Elements (1) through (3) of the violation being conceded as obvious, the question of whether the employer had violated OSHA in A. H. Beck turned on whether it had sufficiently protected its employees by the use of a “stim man,” together with the warning signs and employee training.

At trial, the Secretary acknowledged two recognized (but not exclusive) means of protecting employees against swing radius hazards.  The first (“Abatement Method A”) is, essentially, to barricade all accessible areas of the swing radius of the rotating structure of the drilling rig.  An alternative, “Abatement Method B,” is recognized “during operations that require the equipment to be constantly moving,” and requires “any available alternative precautions” to include the posting of signs, instructing employees in the dangers of both swinging parts of the equipment and “pinch points,” instructing operators to swing only on signals from a foreman or designated signal man, and requiring employees not to move a rig, until they know the area is clear.

The Secretary’s argument in A. H. Beck was that “Abatement Method B” was not available to the employer, because its drilling rig was not “constantly moving.”

The Administrative Law Judge held that the Secretary had failed to demonstrate a violation of the General Duty Clause, rejecting its “constantly moving” argument on two grounds.

First, the ALJ stated, the rig in question was mobile.  It was “constantly moving,” as part of the digging and excavation process, and no piece of heavy equipment performs its primary function without stopping to perform other, associated activities.  The Compliance Officer had conceded that he would consider the rig to be “constantly moving” (and thus eligible for Abatement Method B)  if it were stopping repeatedly to drill a series of 6-foot deep holes, because it would not then remain in place for a long period of time.  The ALJ found arbitrary the Secretary’s position that “constantly moving” encompassed numerous stops to drill 6-foot holes, but not a single stop to drill a 55-foot hole.

The ALJ found also that the General Duty Clause does not limit employers to abatement methods recognized in prior cases, but not comprising part of the regulations.  It being conceded that the employer had essentially put “Abatement Method B” into effect, the ALJ found no reason to conclude that the same would be effective when the rig was mobile, but not when it was stationary.  After all, the judge observed, the mobile rig presents two swing radius hazard possibilities:  (1) that employees will walk into the swing radius of the rig’s rotating parts; or (2) that the rig itself will bring the hazard to employees, by maneuvering into an area where employees are present.  If one were to accept the argument that the rig in question was stationary, the ALJ concluded, given the Secretary’s concession that the use of signs, training and signaling watchmen would be effective abatement for a mobile rig, the same would necessarily be effective abatement for a stationary one.

In Secretary v. J. F. White Contracting Co., the employer was cited for a violation of 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.550(a)(9), which requires that “[a]ccessible areas within the swing radius of the rear of the rotating superstructure of the crane, either permanently or temporarily mounted, shall be barricaded in such a manner as to prevent an employee from being struck or crushed by the crane.”  The usual, approved method of barricading involves attaching 10-foot long pipes to the tracks of the crane, with caution tape placed at the ends of the pipes.

The employer pleaded the affirmative defense of infeasibility of compliance, arguing that the crane was not barricaded because it was to be used in an area where it was too narrow to place barricades in the usual manner, and still be able to rotate the crane.

The infeasibility defense requires proof that the means of compliance under the applicable standard were infeasible, in that (a) their implementation would have been technologically or economically infeasible, or (b) necessary work operations would have been rendered technologically or economically infeasible by their implementation.  In addition, the employer must show either (a) that is employed an alternative method of protection; or (b) that there existed no feasible alternative means of protection.

The ALJ in J. F. White found that the employer had successfully shown that technical compliance (using the usual method) was infeasible, but that the defense failed nonetheless, because its use of employee spotters provided a lesser margin of safety than the available alternative means of using PVC poles and yellow caution tape as a physical barricade.  By not   making the barricade, the ALJ found, the employee had failed to do everything it could to reduce employee exposure to the rotating superstructure of the crane.  Accordingly, it was not entitled to the benefit of the infeasibility defense.

Thus, whenever you recognize a hazard not covered by a specific OSHA standard, the General Duty Clause requires you to abate it, if feasible.  And, while there exists an infeasibility defense under the statute, it’s an issue on which the employer has the burden of proof, and it must prove not only the infeasibility of strict compliance, but that the best alternative means of protection were employed (or that no alternative means were feasible).

Contractor alleges Subcontractor’s union harassed…

Question. Contractor alleges Subcontractor’ union harassed and defamed him regarding a project. Contractor alleges Subcontractor erected a 12-foot inflatable rat in front of his offices and at a charity event, as well as handed out allegedly defamatory leaflets alleging Contractor exploited workers. Contractor filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the National Labor Relations Board against the union arising from the same conduct. May the Contractor also recover under a tortious interference claim?

Answer. NO. The claim is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act as Where the consequences of peaceful and violent conduct were separable, recovery may only be had for the latter. The Contractor did not allege any violence or threats of violence, thus, Contractor’s tortious interference claim was preempted by federal law.

Contractor alleges that the Union erected a 12-foot inflatable rat in front of Contractor’s offices. According to Contractor, The Union’s representatives shouted that Contractor exploits workers, and distributed allegedly defamatory leaflets which stated as follows:

SHAME!ON [CONTRACTOR] for allowing workers to be exploited.
Allowing contractors who pay workers in a fashion which permits them to bypass the City, State and Federal tax structure is not only against the law, it costs taxpayers millions of dollars in lost tax revenue.
Untrained and unskilled workers will always lead to an unsafe work-place, shoddy workmanship and a lower quality finished product.
While New York City construction workers rebuild our city, help show your support for their desire to work in a safe environment, receive a living wage, and be treated with the dignity and respect that they deserve.
Does [CONTRACTOR] think it’s worthwhile to exploit workers just so he can save a little money?
Call [CONTRACTOR] at [555-555-5555] and tell him that all workers deserve a living wage.

Contractor alleges that Subcontractor set up an inflatable rat in front of the building at an event where the Contractor was being honored and that Subcontractor’s representatives allegedly yelled that Contractor was a #&!* and a rat, exploits workers, and that he should be arrested. When Contractor arrived at the event, they allegedly surrounded Contractor and screamed #&!* and obscenities.

Later that month, Subcontractor allegedly appeared outside Contractor’s residence, where they again shouted that he exploits workers. On the same day, Subcontractor threatened to follow Contractor to California in order to disrupt an event at which Contractor would be addressing a large audience. Contractor also alleges that Subcontractor made telephone calls to Contractor’s receptionist in which they stated that Contractor exploits workers by paying below minimum wage and hiring non-union workers, and that on other occasions, Subcontractor called to imply that Contractor was in physical danger, because the speaker stated that he better watch his back. According to Contractor, Subcontractor threatened to go to Contractor’s son’s school, in order to humiliate and intimidate Contractor and his son. Contractor thereafter filed a criminal complaint against The Union and one of its members. It appears that the New York Police Department saw no criminal conduct and did not make any arrests.

When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by ¬ß7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under ¬ß8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. Therefore, state regulations and causes of action are presumptively preempted if they concern conduct that is actually or arguably either prohibited or protected by the Act. The purpose of the preemption is to prevent conflict between, on the one hand, state and local regulation and, on the other, Congress’ integrated scheme of regulation, embodied in ¬ß¬ß7 and 8 of the NLRA, which includes the choice of the NLRB, rather than state or federal courts, as the appropriate body to implement the Act.

Consequently, we must look at whether Subcontractor’ alleged conduct is arguably prohibited by federal labor law. Contractor alleges that Subcontractor tortiously interfered with Contractor’s prospective business relations. This conduct is arguably prohibited by the NLRA. Section 8 (b) (4) (B) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an unlawful labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to force or require any person to cease doing business with any other person (29 USC ¬ß158 [b] [4] [B]). Section 8 (b) (4) (D) states that it is unlawful to engage in forcing or requiring an employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization (29 USC ¬ß158 [b] [4] [D]). Section 8 (b) (4) (7) states that it is unlawful for a labor organization to picket any employer where any object thereof is to force or require the employer to bargain with the labor organization (29 USC ¬ß158 [b] [4] [7]).

However, the preemption does not apply where the activity: (1) touches interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act, or (2) involves conduct that would only peripherally implicate the concerns underlying the federal labor laws . Where the consequences of peaceful and violent conduct are separable, recovery may only be had for the latter. Where the consequences cannot be separated, recovery may only be had if the violent conduct was so pervasive that the proof might support that the conclusion that all damages resulting from the picketing were proximately caused by its violent component or by the fear which that violence engendered.

Applying the above principles to this case, the purported tortious interference with prospective business relations claim lacks merit. Contractor does not allege any violence or even threats of violence in connection with this alleged conduct. The sole basis for this claim is that The Union’s representatives erected an inflatable rat outside a hotel, and distributed allegedly defamatory leaflets in a restroom of the hotel. Therefore, Contractor’s tortious interference with prospective business relations claim is preempted by federal labor law.

Court Allows Contractor’s Work Claim Against Architect

An architect acts as the owner’s agent in some situations. The general conditions of a construction contract will determine in what areas the owner has designated the architect as his representative. In areas of shop drawings approval, construction schedules, material samples, and the like, an architect is typically considered the agent for the owner. 

But can a contractor make a valid extra work claim directly against an architect for nonpayment? This issue was raised in the recent case of Pulver Roofing Company, Inc. v. SBLM Architect’s P.C. 

Background 

Pulver Roofing Company, Inc. entered into a contract with the Rome City School District to install a roof on a school. The roof was to be installed in accordance with plans provided by SBLM Architects, P.C. According to the contractor, the architect requested that the contractor perform extra work, which was outside the scope of work originally agreed to. The contractor also claimed that the architect promised the contractor that it would be paid for the extra work. When the architect refused to pay the contractor for the extra work performed, the contractor sued the architect for the reasonable value of the extra work. 

The architect defended on the grounds that that the contractor’s agreement was with the School District, that the extra work was performed for the benefit of the School District, that the architect was simply acting as an agent for the School District, and that the architect was not responsible for ensuring that the contractor was paid. 

The architect moved to dismiss the claim by the contractor. The trial court ruled in favor of the architect, holding that the work was in fact rendered for the benefit of the School District rather than the architect. The contractor appealed. 

Decision

The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In so doing, the appellate court relied upon the elements necessary to state a claim for recovery in quantum meruit.

The legal theory of “quantum meruit” is available where there is no express contract, but rather a legal obligation is imposed in order to prevent a party’s unjust enrichment. The elements of a quantum meruit claim are: (1) the performance of services in good faith; (2) the acceptance of the services by the party for whom they were rendered; (3) the expectation of compensation for those services; and (4) a statement of the reasonable value of the services. While the appellate court agreed that the work was in fact rendered for the benefit of the School District, the court pointed out that the contractor is not required to establish that the architect received a benefit in order to recover in quantum meruit. 

According to the appellate court, the contractor performed the work at the architect’s request, pursuant to an express promise that it would be paid, and the contractor was accordingly entitled to recover the reasonable value of its work, regardless of whether or not the architect in any economic sense benefitted from the work. 

Where a contract covering a specified subject matter exists, recovery in quantum meruit is not permitted. Here however, because the work was extra work, beyond the scope of the contractor’s agreement with the School District, the appellate court permitted the quantum meruit claim. The case proceeded to trial because there is a dispute whether the additional work was outside the scope of the work originally agreed to.

Comment 

This case is unique in that a contractor traditionally has not been permitted to maintain a direct claim for nonpayment against an architect. The prudent contractor will require extra work approvals to be in writing before the work begins to help ensure that it will be paid for that work.