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Subcontractor Not Entitled to Delay Damages

The “no-damage-for-delay” clause by which a party denies liability when it is responsible for delays has been the subject of much litigation. The clause is found in both private construction contracts and public works contracts and is generally upheld as valid by the courts. There are exceptions, however, to the enforceability of this clause. 

In the recent case of Premier-New York Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp., a court ruled on the enforceability of a no-damage-for-delay provision contained in a subcontract.

Background 

Trataros Construction, Inc., a prime contractor, subcontracted with Premier-New York, Inc. to perform the roofing work at Baruch College located in Manhattan. The project was significantly delayed and the subcontractor sued the prime contractor for its delay damages. 

The subcontractor argued that as a result of changes to the project schedule and re-sequencing of the work, it was entitled to reimbursement for its additional costs since it was forced to: a) work in winter conditions; b) perform additional and extra work as a result of the installation of the curtain wall prior to the start of roofing work; c) stop and start work as other trades had material stored on the roof or were working in areas needed for the sucontractor’s work; d) move materials by elevator rather than by the hoist; e) have inadequate storage area for its materials; f) work in an inefficient and disrupted fashion; and g.) work for a prolonged period of time during which time there were prevailing wage increases mandated for its workforce. 

The prime contractor moved to dismiss the claims for delay damages. The prime contractor did not dispute that the subcontractor incurred extra costs as a result of project delays. Rather, the prime contractor argued that the subcontract’s no-damage-for-delay clause barred the delay damage claims against the prime contractor. The provision stated, “should the Subcontractor’s performance of this Subcontract be delayed‚Ķthe Subcontractor‚Ķshall not be entitled to any increase in the Subcontract Price or to damages or additional compensation‚Ķ” 

The subcontract further required the subcontractor to waive any claim for additional compensation arising from any of the following site conditions: (1) the work was hindered by delays or accelerations of the project schedule; (2) the work was rescheduled; (3) the work was re-sequenced; and (4) the work was interrupted and re-started. 

The subcontractor argued that the no-damage-for-delay provision was not enforceable because it fell within the four recognized exceptions to a no-damage-for delay clause. These exceptions are: (1) delays caused by the prime contractor’s bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct; (2) uncontemplated delays; (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract by the prime contractor; and (4) delays resulting from the prime contractor’s breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract. 

Decision

The trial court dismissed the delay claims against the prime contractor. The court held that all damages claimed by the subcontractor were a result of project delays, which were expressly waived under the plain language of the subcontract’s no-damage-for-delay clause. 

The court relied heavily on established case law upholding the validity of no-damage-for-delay clauses. The court addressed the four exceptions to the enforceability of a no-damage-for delay clause, and held that none of them applied in this case. 

With respect to the subcontractor’s claim that the delays were caused by the prime contractor’s bad faith, willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, the court found no evidence to suggest that the prime contractor made intentional misleading representations or withheld material information from the subcontractor before submitting its bid. The court further relied on the subcontract provisions which obligated the bidder to inspect site conditions and investigate the requirements of its work.

In rejecting the subcontractor’s further argument that the delays were uncontemplated, the court noted that “the uncontemplated delay exception only applies if the claimant can demonstrate that the delays were wholly unanticipated.” The court stated that “if the alleged delays were foreseeable under a project’s particular circumstances, or were discussed in the contract, damages arising from those delays are barred.” In relying upon prior case law, the court held that slow or poor performance by other project subcontractors is foreseeable, and that the general contractor’s inept administration of its contract is also foreseeable. According to the court, the subcontractor’s allegations fell within these categories, and therefore the delays were foreseeable risks of construction. Since the delays were anticipated at the time the subcontract was signed, the court ruled that they did not fall within the “uncontemplated delay” exception to the no-damage-for-delay clause. 

The court also found no evidence regarding the subcontractor’s claim that the delays were so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract. 

Finally, the court rejected the subcontractor’s argument that the prime contractor’s conduct constituted a fundamental breach of the contract that would render the no-damage-for-delay clause unenforceable. In support of this argument, the subcontractor claimed that the “sample CPM schedule” provided by the prime contractor with the bid package had been changed and the work was re-sequenced without notice to the subcontractor, forcing the subcontractor to incur additional costs. The court held that the subcontractor’s reliance on the sample CPM schedule was unreasonable, pointing out that the subcontract clearly identified the document as being only a “sample” schedule.

Comment 

In New York, the no-damage-for-delay clause is generally enforceable, unless it falls within the four recognized exceptions to its enforcement. The courts are not permitted to rewrite the contract; they will ordinarily enforce the plain language of the no-damage-for-delay clause as written. Contractors and subcontractors should be wary of this clause when negotiating contract terms and conditions. 

Amendments to The New York City School Construction Authority Act Allow Subcontractors to Elect a Remedy for Nonpayment

I. Background  

Section 101 of the General Municipal Law, also known as the Wicks Law, sets forth requirements for public construction contracts.  The Wicks Law requires public works owners to prepare separate specifications and award separate contracts for general construction, plumbing, HVAC, and electrical work when the total value of the contract exceeds three million dollars for public construction within New York City.  

The Wicks Law provision was preempted by Section 1735 of the New York City School Construction Authority Act (“Act”) for contracts awarded by the New York City School Construction Authority (“Authority”) between July 1, 1989 and June 13, 2014.  Unlike Wicks Law contracts, the Authority can award one contract.  Contractors submitting bids with the Authority during this time period must identify the names of the subcontractors they intend to use for the performance of the plumbing, HVAC, and electrical work.    

Contracts that come within the Act are also subject to its payment protection clause.  Under Subsection Six of the Act, contractors are required to pay subcontractors within seven (7) days of receiving payment from the Authority.  The contractors must pay their subcontractors the portion of the proceeds of the payment they receive representing the value of the work performed by their subcontractors which has been approved and paid for by the Authority.  Contractors may hold back an amount necessary to satisfy any claims, liens or judgments against the subcontractor which have not been suitably discharged and they may hold retainage.  Retainage is set at either five or ten percent depending on whether the subcontractor has posted a performance and/or a labor and material payment bond.   

If a subcontractor notifies the contractor and the Authority that the contractor failed to make a required payment, the contractor must provide the Authority with either proof of the payment to the subcontractor or a notice that the amount claimed by the subcontractor is in dispute.  The contractor must do so within five (5) calendar days of receiving the notice of nonpayment from the subcontractor.  If the contractor fails to respond to the subcontractor’s notice or notifies the Authority that the payment to the subcontractor is in dispute, the Authority withholds money from the contractor’s payment.  If the contractor disputes the payment owed to the subcontractor, the Authority deposits the amount withheld into an interest bearing account.  Any amounts owed together with interest will be paid to the party ultimately determined to be entitled to payment.  The Act also contains provisions for determining priority and distribution of amounts withheld in the event of multiple withholdings.  

Amendments to the Act became effective on September 17, 2010 (“Amendments”).  The purpose of the Amendments the Amendments will significantly impact the amounts withheld from contractors by the Authority, contractors’ ability to bond the payment amounts disputed by subcontractors, and subcontractors’ remedies for payment protection.   

Pursuant to the Amendments, the Authority will now withhold one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the portion of the Authority’s prior payment to the contractor which the subcontractor claims to be due from the contractor.  Notably, the amendment does not alter that portion of the statute that provides that if the contractor fails to dispute the withholding the Authority will remit the amount withheld (i.e. the 150%) to the subcontractor and deduct such payment from the amounts then otherwise due and payable to the contractor.  Such payments by the Authority are deemed a payment by the Authority to the contractor. Prior to the Amendments, the Authority held an amount equal to the prior payment to the contractor which the subcontractor claimed to be due from the contractor.  

To avoid the Authority’s one hundred fifty percent (150%) withholding, the contractor can file a bond or undertaking in the amount(s) withheld by the Authority.  This remedy was added by the Amendments and is new to the Act.  

The Act was also modified so that subcontractors must now choose between filing a lien or seeking payment protection from the Authority under the one hundred fifty percent withholding clause of Section 1735.  Going forward, a subcontractor can file a lien for the amount disputed in the event the Authority does not withhold the required amounts within sixty (60) days after the Authority’s receipt of written notification from the subcontractor of the contrator’s failure to make a payment.  Significantly, such a lien will be the subcontractor’s sole remedy in lieu of the remedies provided by the Act.  This election of remedies clause was added to avoid the financial burden placed on a contractor when the Authority withheld a percentage of the amounts owed to a subcontractor in addition to one hundred fifty percent of its lien amount.  The Authority will stop this double withholding by limiting the amounts withheld to either one hundred fifty percent of a subcontractor’s lien or one hundred fifty percent of a subcontractor’s claim under the special payment protections of section 1735.  

These provisions do not apply to subcontractors acting as primes (i.e. subcontractors whose contract is limited to the performance of a single scope of the plumbing, electrical or mechanical work for the project). These Amendments are already effective and certain contractors and subcontractors currently performing work for the Authority are already subject to these provisions if their contracts come within the Act rather than the Wicks Law. 

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP. 

This Legal Alert is supplied for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice. You should consult competent legal counsel depending on the specific issues of your matter. 

Safety Policy: Rules Aren’t Enough: Training, and Repetition, Are Critical

Having comprehensive general and project-specific safety manuals and formal safety policies are fine and necessary elements of an effective safety program.  However, your workforce isn’t going to stay up nights reading and re-reading your safety manual.  And, studies have shown, even engineering students (a group arguably more sophisticated than your labor force) have trouble understanding terms and acronyms as basic as those used in the OSHA 10-hour course.  Other studies suggest that workers whose first language is one other than English can sit through the OSHA 10-hour course, and come away having understood almost nothing of what they have been taught.

As an administrative law judge pointed out in Secretary v. David H. Elliot Construction Co., Inc., while rules are essential, “no rule can cover all contingencies.  That is the responsibility of a training program.”  The repetition of key concepts is critical, as is taking effective steps to discover and to discipline workers who violate safety rules.  Both from my firm’s OSHA practice, and from the research that goes into preparing these articles, I frequently see cases in which lapses, often by experienced workers who certainly had been trained to know better, have resulted in serious injury or death.
In Elliot Construction. the employer contracted to tear down an old power distribution system, encompassing 4000 poles extending over 226 miles, that had been badly damaged in an ice storm.

To minimize service interruptions, the existing lines were transferred (while still energized) from the old poles to hot rollers on the new poles.  The old poles were then torn down, and new lines strung.  This required the contractor to clean off everything attached to the old lines, and to reconnect customer connections with temporary jumpers which would then be removed when the new lines were pulled into place.

By the time of the fatal occurrence, the contractor was ready to remove the old lines, and to string new ones.  Two four-man crews, headed respectively by foremen Howard Hall and Randy Wood, were combined to form a single crew, with Hall being placed in charge.

The expanded crew removed the old phase and neutral wires, and then strung and sagged the new phase and neutral wires.  After sagging, the conductor had to be tied or clipped to the insulators.  This was done from a lift bucket or, where the poles were set away from the road, by climbing the pole.  Late in the day, Hall, working with part of the crew at Pole 64, sent two linesmen, Morris and Angel, to work on Poles 50 and 51, roughly half a mile away.

Hall directed Morris and Angel to find the groundman, Dixon, and take him to Poles 50 and 51.  They were further instructed to inform Wood of their assignment, so that Wood would be able to inform Hall when Morris, Angel and Dixon were clear of the lines prior to energization.  Angel and Morris found Dixon at Pole 42, and proceeded to Poles 50 and 51.  However — and here occurred the fatal lapse — Angel and Morris disregarded Hall’s order, and failed to tell Wood of their assignment.

When Wood’s group had finished their work, Wood radioed Hall to report that everyone at his end was clear.  However, due to Angel’s and Morris’s having neglected to tell Wood that they (and Dixon) would be working at Poles 50 and 51, Wood was not aware that Hall would assume, when he got Wood’s “all-clear,” that Wood’s signal included Angel, Morris and Dixon.

Hall told Wood to remove the ground at Pole 42, install a jumper and energize the line.  Morris — who, unbeknownst to Hall, was still working on Pole 50 —  was electrocuted when the lines were energized.

The ALJ’s decision (which sustained only two citation items out of seven charged against the employer) had to consider and resolve a number of thorny issues.  While space does not permit all of them to be analyzed here, I will remark that the ALJ addressed each of the technical legal issues thoughtfully and painstakingly.  Although the ALJ did not accept every argument advanced by the contractor, my reading of Elliott Construction reinforced my long-standing belief that, notwithstanding that the administrative law judges draw paychecks from the Department of Labor, they are (certainly as a general proposition) knowledgeable, conscien¬≠tious, and fair.

One citation item alleged was that:

At the jobsite, the employer did not ensure that employees performing a stringing operation were trained in procedures, such as but not limited to:  placing grounds at all job locations, placing tags on deenergized lines, and accounting for all workers prior to re-energizing lines, thereby exposing employees to an electrical hazard.

The ALJ found persuasive the contractor’s arguments that neither point of work grounding nor tags were required.  The generalized standard (requiring that grounds be installed at each work location, where work was being performed at more than one location on the line) was pre-empted, the ALJ found, by standards that apply specifically to stringing operations.  These standards, 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.955(c)(10) and (d)(9), which provide that transmission clipping crews must work “between grounds” when working on bare conductors, and that grounding at every work location is mandatory only when there is a possibility of “dangerous induced voltage,” had been observed by the contractor.  The crew worked between grounds, and there was no danger of a dangerous induced voltage.

Tagging was not necessary, the ALJ agreed, because the cited standard, 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.950(d), only requires it when “the means of disconnecting from electric energy is not visibly open or visibly locked out.”  Although at Pole 42, where a mechanical jumper had been removed as part of the process of de-energizing the line, no tag had been placed to indicate that men were working on the line section, there was a large visible gap between the energized line on one side of the pole, and the de-energized line on the other.

Tagging is intended to prevent an employee from accidentally turning the switch or disconnector.  On Pole 42, there was no switch or connector to attach the tags to.  Once the jumper was removed, no one would be working at that pole anyway.  As the means of disconnect was visibly open, there was no way that an employee could have inadvertently energized the line.  Tagging, therefore, was not required.

This citation item was upheld, and a monetary penalty assessed, however, on the third and final ground:  that the contractor had insufficient procedures to account for all employees prior to the re-energization of the lines.  While the standard does not specify exactly what instructions must be given for that purpose, an employer must instruct its employees in the recognition and avoidance of those hazards of which a reasonably prudent employer would be aware.

The contractor’s foreman, Hall, simply assumed that Morris and Angel had followed his instruction to inform Wood that they had been assigned to work on Poles 50 and 51.  Had Hall been properly trained to avoid the hazards inherent in making such an assumption, the ALJ found, the hazardous condition would likely have been avoided.  (I would observe that Morris and Angel might also have been better trained that lives are placed in danger whenever the individual responsible to authorize the re-energization of the line lacks knowledge of where each crew member is, and what he is doing).

The ALJ denied the Secretary’s motion to amend the citation to upgrade to “willful” the item alleging that the designated employee in charge failed to ensure that all employees were clear of the line prior to re-energizing it.

Nevertheless, this item was affirmed as a “serious” violation, as the evidence was undisputed that Hall had failed to determine that all crew members were clear of the lines, and “unpreventable employee misconduct” was rejected as a defense, because of the insufficiency of the employer’s training of its foremen.

Safety training in construction is one of those problems that can’t be solved, but must be wrestled with anyway.  It’s no small challenge, and getting the message across, so that potentially lethal employee lapses are minimized, requires persistent effort.

Lien Law and Bankruptcy

Question. Mechanics lienor entered into a contract with the debtor whereby lienor was to be a general contractor providing contracting services in the construction of certain improvements on real property owned by the debtor.

The debtor is the owner of the premises with respect to which the lienor desires to perfect its mechanic’s lien. Debtor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Lienor alleges that its services for the debtor are near completion and that under Sections 9 and 10 of the New York State Mechanics’ Lien Law, a mechanic’s lien must be filed within four months of the last day of work or furnishing of materials to the debtor in order to sustain its validity. May the lienor file the mechanics lien without first seeking relief from the automatic stay?

Answer. Yes.

This case illustrates the manner in which the relation-back principle for lien perfection under 11 U.S.C. s 546(b) operates as an exception to the automatic stay by reason of its incorporation by reference in 11 U.S.C. s 362(b)(3).

The automatic stay imposed under the Bankruptcy Code ordinarily prevents the perfection of a lien after the petition has been filed. Code s 362(a)(4) expressly stays “any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” The reason for such restraint is stated in 1 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice, s 20.08, Part 20-Page 9 as follows:

“The restraint on creating postpetition liens against the debtor’s estate was intended to prevent the giving of preferential treatment to certain creditors by making them secured instead of unsecured. Thus the automatic stay operates to restrain unsecured prepetition creditors from improving their position as against the trustee.”

Consistent with the restraint expressed in Code s 362(a)(4) the courts have uniformly held that the post-petition filing of liens are not only stayed but any such filings are null and void.

However, Code s 362(b)(3) makes an exception for post-petition filing “to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title.” Hence, reference must be made to the latter section, which concerns the limitations placed on the trustee’s avoiding powers and reads in relevant part as follows:

“s 546. Limitations on avoiding powers.

(b) The rights and powers of the trustee under section 544, 545, or 549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of such perfection.”

Under s 10 of the New York Mechanics’ Lien Law, the notice of lien must be filed in the clerk’s office where the property is situated.

There is a relation-back provision that is set forth at s 13(5) of the New York Mechanics’ Lien Law, which provides in pertinent part that:

“(5) No instrument of conveyance recorded subsequent to the commencement of the improvement, and before the expiration of four months after the completion thereof, shall be valid as against liens filed within four months from the recording of such conveyance, unless the instrument contains a covenant by the grantor that he will receive the consideration for such conveyance and will hold the right to receive such consideration as a trust fund to be applied first for the purpose of paying the cost of the improvement and that he will apply the same first to the payment of the cost of the improvement before using any part of the total of the same for any other purpose.”

“An examination of s 13 of the Lien Law indicates that the mechanic’s lienor will have priority over any type creditor, unrecorded or recorded, after commencement and within four months of completion of improvements to the property except for the case where there is another mechanic’s lien. In such case, the liens will be on a parity. N.Y. Lien Law s 13(1).

Since the availability of the relation-back procedure under the Mechanics’ Lien Law is recognized under Code s 546(b) as effective against a debtor in possession in its capacity as trustee under 11 U.S.C. s 1107(a), so as to allow mechanics lienors to perfect their liens within the statutory four month period, notwithstanding the intervention of a Chapter 11 petition, it follows that the lienor should be allowed to file its notice of lien in accordance with the state law. The automatic stay is no bar because Code s 362(b)(3) expressly exempts such filing from the conduct otherwise proscribed under Code s 362(a). In referring to Code s 546(b).

However, the lienor may take no action to enforce its mechanic’s lien, since any conduct beyond the perfection of the lien may tend to interfere with the reorganization process and is stayed under Code s 362(a)(5).

Accordingly, the lienor is permitted to file its mechanic’s lien as provided by the applicable New York Mechanics’ Lien Law, but is not authorized to take any further enforcement action.

Court Rules Owner Waived Contract Requirement for Written Extra Work

When the contract documents require changes and extras to be in writing, courts generally hold that a contractor who fails to obtain a written change order or extra prior to performing the change or extra will not be paid for that work. In some instances however, courts have allowed a contractor to recover, regardless of the existence of a provision in the contract documents requiring changes and extras to be in writing. 

In the case of B. Reitman Blacktop, Inc. v. Missirlian, a court allowed the contractor to recover for extra work despite a standard contract provision requiring modifications to the contract to be made in writing.

Background 

A paving contractor entered into a written agreement with a homeowner to install a driveway. The agreement stated that the contract price was to be determined by the final square footage of the installed driveway. The agreement also contained a provision requiring that modifications to the agreement must be in writing to be enforceable. During the course of construction, the homeowner requested the installation of Belgium blocks on part of the driveway. The written agreement did not address the installation of Belgium blocks. When the contractor sought to recover additional moneys from the homeowner on account of the increased costs associated with the Belgium block, the homeowner refused, and the contractor sued. 

According to the homeowner, it only had to pay for the end square footage of the driveway, in accordance with the pricing set forth in the parties’ written agreement. The contractor, however, argued that the homeowner verbally requested the Belgium block upgrade and was responsible for paying for the added costs associated with the installation. The trial court ruled in favor of the contractor and the homeowner appealed. 

Decision

Decision The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision. In so doing, the court stated that normally the law bars oral modifications to a contract which expressly provides that modifications must be in writing. However, the court also noted that an exception applies when there is part performance by the party disputing the existence of the subsequent agreement. In this case, the homeowner was willing to include the square footage of the Belgium block in the final square footage calculation of the driveway. In the court’s eyes, this provided clear evidence that a later agreement for the use of Belgium block was entered into between the parties. Since there was clear evidence that the homeowner requested a Belgium block upgrade, and the contractor supplied the Belgium block in response to the request, the court awarded the contractor its increased costs associated with the installation. 

Comment 

Where an owner consents to upgrades and modifications without written authorization, the consent may constitute a waiver of the written authorization requirement. The holding in this case, however, is an exception to the rule of law that a contract clause requiring written authorization for changes and extras is valid and enforceable. There is much more judicial support for the general rule that a contractor who fails to obtain the required written authorization for changes or extras will not be paid for that work. The prudent contractor should refuse to perform any changes or extra work until it receives a written order in the form specified by the construction documents. 

NYC Building Owner Can Recover All Rent Stabilized Apartments for Personal Use

In a decision that will surely make NYC rent stabilized tenants unhappy, the New York Court of Appeals has ruled that the husband and wife owners of a five story, 15-unit apartment building in Manhattan, have the right to recover possession of all six of the rent stabilized apartments in the building (located on different floors) for the husband’s personal use as his primary residence.

Employers take notice. Governor Paterson has signed legislation affecting the obligations of employers vis-a-vis their employees. Here is what this means to you, as an employer.

Past Due Wages: As of November 24, 2009, the Commissioner of Labor will be empowered to prosecute claims to collect underpaid or unpaid wages before administrative judges within the Department of Labor. This process is similar to that which is used to determine contested unemployment eligibility claims. The legislation also permits the judge to impose an additional assessment against the employer (“liquidated damages”), unless the employer can demonstrate that it had a good faith basis to believe that its underpayment of wages was legal. Previously, the Commissioner of Labor was required to prosecute such claims by starting a civil lawsuit, and the burden required to recoup liquidated damages was the employee’s (by demonstrating that the employer’s underpayment was willful).  

Employer Retaliation: In connection with the past due wage legislation, there has been an increase in the penalties which can be imposed upon an employer who is determined to have retaliated against an employee for complaining of a wage or other Labor Law violation (by, for example, firing the employee or reducing the employee’s work hours or benefits, or by reassigning the employee to a less favorable task or position). These penalties, which previously had a range of $200 to $1,000, now range from $2,000 to $10,000. The penalty provision has also been expanded to include officers and agents of limited liability companies and partnerships.  

New Hire Notice: Commencing October 26, 2009, employers will be required to notify all newly hired employees, in writing, of: 1) their base rate of pay; 2) their overtime rate of pay; and 3) the employer’s regular paydays. The employer must also obtain from the new employee a written acknowledgment of the receipt of this notice.  

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 
914-428-2100.  Please understand that this alert provides general information only.  It is not intended to provide legal advice. We encourage you to contact an attorney should you desire to discuss specific situations for which you may need legal advice.   

Home Improvement Contractor License – New Home.

Do you need a home improvement contractor license when you perform work associated with the construction of a new home? The appellate Division, Second Department says yes, if the work you are performing, in this case landscaping, is not part of the construction of the new home’s envelope. 

New Law Protects Subcontractor’s and Supplier’s Right to Payment

Governor Patterson recently signed legislation which limits subcontractors and suppliers exposure of a general contractor passing along the risk of non-payment by an owner on a construction project. The new law, contained in the New York State General Obligations Law, voids as against public policy any contract clause which attempts to condition a subcontractor’s or supplier’s right to file and pursue a claim against a labor and material payment bond until after the exhaustion of mechanic’s lien remedies. 
 
Prior to the 1995 New York State Court of Appeals case, West-Fair Electric Contractors, Inc., et al v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company of America, et al (argued successfully by Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP), construction contracts routinely contained clauses which conditioned a subcontractor’s or supplier’s right to payment on the general contractor’s receipt of payment from an owner. In West-Fair, the New York State Court of Appeals ruled that any clause which attempted to pass along the risk of non-payment by an owner to a subcontractor or supplier was void. 
 
Subsequent to West-Fair, clauses have appeared in construction contracts attempting to circumvent the Court’s decision by requiring subcontractors and suppliers to exhaust their mechanic’s lien rights before they are able to pursue collection against a labor and material payment bond, which traditionally offered an independent remedy. As many in the construction industry know, mechanic’s lien enforcement proceedings are both lengthy and costly. In many cases, by the time the mechanic’s lien proceedings concluded, there was no money available for payment to the subcontractor and supplier and the statute of limitations to pursue claims against the labor and material payment bond expired, thereby eliminating the subcontractor’s or suppliers ability to collect payment. 

Although this new law makes it easier to pursue claims against labor and material payment bonds, you must be sure that you comply with all statutory and bond provisions with respect to timely and adequately providing notice and commencing a lawsuit to preserve your rights for payment under the bond. In essence the new law underscores the independent and alternative remedy the payment bond offers to subcontractors and suppliers. For peace of mind, it is also wise to contact a construction attorney should you need any assistance.  

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, please call Anthony P. Carlucci, Jr. at 914-428-2100. Please understand that this alert provides general information only. It is not intended to provide legal advice. We encourage you to contact an attorney should you desire to discuss specific situations for which you may need legal advice. Under the ethical rules that govern the practice of law, this communication may be considered as attorney advertising. 

 

Worker Notification – Wage Rates

If you do public works contracting in New York, be aware of the new wage rate notification requirement under section 220 of the Labor Law, which became effective on February 24, 2008, even though it was not approved until April 23, 2008.