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Recent Statutory Amendments Expand the Remedies Available for Non-Payment on Both Public and Private Construction Projects.

Two recent statutory amendments have expanded the remedies available for non-payment on both public and private construction projects. Consequently, owners', sureties', and contractors' exposure has been likewise expanded.

Lien Law Section 10 has been amended by adding a provision that states "and provided further where the notice of lien is for retainage, the notice of lien may be filed within 90 days after the date the retainage was due to be released." [A05022 / S. 3179]. Lienors on private projects now have up to 90 days to file a mechanics' lien after their retainage was due to be released. Prior to the amendment, lienors had as little as four months to file a lien "dating from the last item of work performed or materials furnished". Previously, lienors were arguably unable to file a lien for their unpaid retainage where the contract did not make retainage due until sometime after the old deadline to file a lien.

Section 1. Paragraph (b) of subdivision 4 of section 137 of the State Finance Law has been amended to read as follows: "b) Except as provided in section two hundred twenty-g of the labor law, no action on a payment bond furnished pursuant to this section shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the date on which the public improvement has been completed and accepted by the public owner." [S. 3182 / A. 5025] Prior to the amendment the statute of limitations for initiating public work payment bond claims was measured from the date on which final payment under the claimant's subcontract became due. Very often an early completing trade found that its time for commencing an action on a payment bond had expired even though the project had not been completed. The amendment makes the date for calculating statute of limitations periods uniform for all claimants on any given project.

 

Power NY Act of 2011

On June 22, 2011, the New York State legislature passed the Power NY Act of 2011 (“Act”) and it was signed by Governor Cuomo on August 4, 2011. This Act is meant to further the Green Jobs, Green New York Act that was passed in 2009. The Act amends the Public Service Law, the Public Authorities Law, the Real Property Law, the State Finance Law, and the Environmental Conservation Law to (1) establish a procedure for administering the existing revolving loan fund, (2) create an on-bill recovery program, (3) enact a simplified procedure for the siting of new major electric generating facilities and for increasing the capacity of existing electric generating facilities, and (4) mandate a study with respect to increasing energy generation from photovoltaic devices (i.e. solar energy generation).

The Green Jobs, Green New York revolving loan fund provides loans to finance the cost of approved qualified energy efficiency services for residential structures, multi-family structures, and non-residential structures. With a few exceptions, the loans are capped at $13,000 per applicant for residential structures and $26,000.00 per applicant for non-residential structures.

The on-bill recovery program is a billing and collection service that will be operated by large electric and gas companies as a way to recover the re-payment of its customers’ revolving loans. Under this program, a charge will be collected on the customer’s monthly utility bill. The electric corporation will collect such charges unless the qualified energy efficiency services at that customer’s premises result in more projected energy savings on the customer’s gas bill than the electric bill. In that case, the charge will be collected by the gas company. The program is set up such that the monthly bill payments will be less than the energy cost savings associated with the efficiency upgrades.

With on-bill recovery, the charge stays with the meter upon transfers of the property so that the efficiency measures are paid over the useful life of the equipment and customers can pay for the cost of the loan through reductions in energy bills. Prior to accepting a purchase offer, a seller of real property that is subject to an on-bill recovery charge has to provide the prospective buyer with a notice stating (1) that the property is subject to an on-bill recovery charge, (2) the total amount of the original charge, (3) the payment schedule, (4) the approximate remaining balance, (5) a description of the energy efficiency services performed, including improvements to the property, and (6) an explanation of the benefit of the qualified energy efficiency services.

The law also enacts a simplified procedure for the siting of new, major electric generating facilities and for increasing the capacity of existing electric generating facilities pursuant to the new certification process outlined in the new article 10 of the Public Service Law. Lastly, the Act calls for a study with respect to increasing energy generation from photovoltaic devices (i.e. solar energy generation) including an analysis of the net economic and job creation benefits of achieving increased development and usage of photovoltaic devices.

These changes are expected to develop the state’s clean energy economic sector including the creation of jobs for construction professionals in the energy retrofit industry business and new high technology jobs related to increasing energy from photovoltaic devices. The Act is also expected to spur the construction of new electric generation including commercial wind facilities.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100. 

Second Circuit clarifies the standard for reversal of an arbitral award in connection with an arbitrator’s alleged manifest disregard of the law:

STMICROELECTRONICS, N.V.,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES
(USA) LLC, Respondent-Appellant.

In June 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified the standard for reversal of an arbitral award in connection with an arbitrator’s alleged manifest disregard of the law.

STMicroelectronics, N.V. (“ST”) manufactures semiconductors. Due to be cyclical nature of its business the company is required to have large amounts of cash or cash equivalents on hand to meet its needs. In April 2006, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“Credit Suisse”) approached ST offering a type of investment called auction rate securities which are debt instruments whose interest rates are reset by auctions at periodic intervals. Credit Suisse explicitly proposed, and ST explicitly accepted investing only in auction rate securities backed by federally guaranteed student loans.

Credit Suisse adhered to this plan for only a few days. Almost immediately Credit Suisse began buying other securities which carried a higher yield and a higher average commission for Credit Suisse. Those other securities had no government guarantee. By November 2006, the account contained no government-backed securities. After January 2007, none of Credit Suisse’s purchases for ST involved student loans at all. Instead, Credit Suisse bought securities backed up by a wide variety of the assets, some of which turned out to be risky. Credit Suisse brokers responsible for the account sent false email confirmations in which they replaced the names of securities with neutral terms like “funding”.

In July 2007, an ST employee noticed that Credit Suisse had purchased securities that deviate from ST’s instructions and asked Credit Suisse to “stick to the mandate to buy only at Student Loan” securities. In August 2007, the auction rate securities market began to fall apart. By September 2007, all of the securities in ST’s portfolio – worth over $400 million – had failed at auction.

In February 2008, ST filed an arbitration claim against Credit Suisse. In February 2009, after four days of pre-hearing conferences, fifteen days of hearings, and voluminous briefing, the arbitration panel ruled unanimously in favor of ST. The arbitrators’ award undid the trades: ST would return the failed securities (with a par value of $414,975,000) to Credit Suisse upon the payment by Credit Suisse of $400 million in compensatory damages, plus $1.5 million for financing fees, $3 million to cover ST’s attorneys and expert witnesses, and interest. These figures, though substantial, were all lower than the amounts ST had requested in each category.

Naturally, ST quickly petitioned to confirm the award in the Southern District of New York. Credit Suisse opposed ST’s petition and sought to vacate the award in connection with the arbitrators’ alleged “manifest disregard of the law.”

The basic purpose of arbitration is to dispose of disputes quickly and avoid the expense and delay of extended court proceedings. A searching review by the Court would make an arbitration award the commencement, not the end, of litigation. A Court will not vacate an award because of “a simple error in law or a failure by the arbitrators to understand or apply it” but only when a party clearly demonstrates “that the panel intentionally defied the law.” Consequently, where the arbitrators do not explain the reason for their decision, the Court will uphold it if it can discern any valid ground.

In prior decisions the Supreme Court of the United States had basically dismembered the concept of “manifest disregard of the law” in connection with arbitration awards. This decision puts the final nail in the coffin, at least in connection with arbitration awards in New York.

Credit Suisse made a tactical error in attacking only the fraud-based claims of ST, while ignoring the other claims which ST raised, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and failure to supervise. The Second Circuit has stated that, “where an arbitral award contains more than one plausible reading, manifest disregard cannot be found if at least one of the readings yields a legally correct justification for the outcome.” Because ST’s award does not specify claim or claims upon which it rests, Credit Suisse must show manifest disregard of the law for all the claims.

To demonstrate manifest disregard, Credit Suisse must first point to law that is “well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable” to the case. While Credit Suisse pointed to two different lines of precedent it claims were disregarded, those precedents are inherently fact bound. While broader principles may be extrapolated from similar cases, it does not follow that all cases dealing with similar issues must reach the same result. In reviewing an arbitration award, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals does not require that a distinction be correct, only that it be at least “barely colorable”.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals easily concluded that the arbitrators did not manifestly disregarded the law.

THE BASIS OF THE DECISION:

WHERE AN AWARD CONTAINS MORE THAN ONE PLAUSIBLE READING, MANIFEST DISREGARD WILL NOT BE FOUND AS LONG AS ONE READING YIELDS A LEGALLY CORRECT JUSTIFICATION FOR THE OUTCOME.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100. 

Preparing an Itemized Statement of Lien to Avoid Litigating its Sufficiency.

Once a Mechanic’s Lien has been filed, the Lienor may receive a demand for an itemized statement pursuant to Lien Law § 38.  Essentially, this statute obligates you to submit a verified itemization of the amount of your lien with sufficient detail to allow a contractor or owner to verify your claim for labor performed and materials and equipment furnished for a project.  There are a few components to the Itemized Statement:

1. The amount of your contract balance (presumably, this amount includes approved change orders);  
2. The amount claimed for extra work which has not been approved as a change order;   
3. For the extra work that is included in the lien amount which has not been approved as a change order, you will need to provide specific information including:  
a. The items of labor (i.e. a description of labor, hours, rates, and dates);  
b. The items of material (i.e. a description of materials furnished, costs of the materials, and dates); and  
c. Any other charges that make up the value of the lien for extra work (i.e. rental charges).  
4. A verification from a corporate representative as to the accuracy of the Itemized Statement; and  
5. A copy of the contract including approved change orders.  If you choose, you can also provide copies of invoices and other supporting documentation.

 
Your attorneys can assist you in compiling the Itemized Statement if you provide them with the underlying information (i.e., as a starting point, a copy of the contract, change orders, extra work invoices and requisitions for payment).  Additional information may be required as you itemize the details of the extra work that has not been approved as change orders.

 
You must furnish the Itemized Statement within five (5) days after you receive the demand for it or within an extended period of time if the requesting party allows you additional time to respond.  If you do not provide the Itemized Statement, or if the Itemized Statement that you provide is insufficient, the requesting party may start a court proceeding to compel you to comply with the lien law to serve an Itemized Statement.      
Once a Court proceeding is commenced, a judge will review the application and issue an order that requires you to comply with the lien law or, if your Itemized Statement is deemed sufficient, the judge will deny the petitioner’s application.  If the judge orders you to comply with the lien law, the judge will set a new time frame for you to do so.  Thereafter, the other party can make an application to cancel your lien if you do not comply with the Order at all or if it appears that your further Itemized Statement is still insufficient.  To protect your lien rights and avoid litigating the sufficiency of your Itemized Statement, you should provide a detailed Itemized Statement. 

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP. 


This alert provides general information only.  It is not intended to provide legal advice.  We encourage you to contact an attorney should you desire to discuss specific situations for which you may need legal advice.   

KUHN Construction, Inc. v. Diamond State Port Corp.

In March 2010, the Supreme Court of Delaware determined that a construction contract referee clause, similar to that found in Westinghouse and its progeny, did not clearly and unambiguously reflect the parties’ intention to arbitrate disputes arising out of the project. 

Defendant, Diamond State Port Corp.(“DSPC”) is an instrumentality and a corporate entity of the State of Dela- ware which owns and operates the Port of Wilmington.  DSPC solicited fixed price bids to reconstruct a wharf at the Port of Wilmington.  Plaintiff and responsible bidder, Kuhn  Construction, Inc. (“KUHN”) submitted the lowest, responsive bid and was awarded the contract.   

The referee clause in question stated: “The Director, or his designee, shall act as referee in all questions arising under the terms of the Contract between the parties hereto, and the Decision of the Director shall be final and binding.  On all questions concerning the interpretation of Plans and Specifications, the acceptability, quality and quantity of materials or machinery furnished and work performed, the classification of material, the execution of the work and the determination of payment due or to become due, a decision of the Director, or his designee, shall be final and binding.” 

The contract did not define “questions”, as used in the referee clause; but did define “claims”.  The contract con- tained a number of standardized forms one of which included a provision setting out the rights of parties in arbitration.  While DSPC included the form, it struck the arbitration provision along with any other substantive arbitration provisions. 

Disputes arose.  KUHN requested assistance from DSPC.  The disputes were not resolved and KUHN began to invoice DSPC, which rejected the invoices.  DSPC then attempted to initiate a multiparty hearing under the ref- eree clause.  KUHN objected claiming that DSPC did not have authority to arbitrate claims under the applicable statutes or under the referee clause which only governed day-to-day dispute resolution issues.  It was the position of KUHN that neither party intended the referee clause to act as an arbitration provision. 

Note the procedural development: DSPC then sent KUHN a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. KUHN filed a com- plaint for injunctive relief.  DSPC filed motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss the complaint.  After oral argument on the motions, DSPC agreed to withdraw the multiparty proceeding and to proceed with arbitration solely with KUHN.  The lower court granted the motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss. 

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware, the lower court is reversed.  The Supreme Court held that the policy of the State will allow the State’s agent to act as arbiter in connection with during the performance of the contract.  “This inherent conflict of interest creates the perception – if not the reality – of unfairness and injustice.”  However, the Court notes that: “[w]hen sophisticated parties enter into agreements, we grant them the power to bargain away their right to an impartial arbiter.  However, the contract must reflect that the parties clearly and intentionally bargained for whether and how to arbitrate.”

 The Court noted that it would not enforce a contract that unclearly or unambiguously reflected an intention to arbitrate.  The Court adheres to the “objective” theory of contracts; i.e., a contract’s construction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third-party. 
The Supreme Court found that the contract did not clearly and unambiguously reflect the parties’ intent to arbi- trate. 

If you would like more information regarding this topic, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100 ***** This Legal Alert is supplied for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice. You should consult competent legal counsel depending on the specific issues of your matter.

False Vendex Satements Doom Contractor’s Delay Claim.

Municipalities are required by statute to award contracts to the “lowest responsible bidder.”  In making its lowest responsible bidder determination, city agencies are directed to use information supplied by prospective contractors including VENDEX (acronym for Vendor Information Exchange) and prequalification questionnaire replies.  VENDEX forms are completed by a contractor as part of the bid process, which a city relies on in evaluating the lowest responsible bidder designation.    

A responsible contractor determination is normally made prior to the award of the contract to the contractor.  But what if a city discovers that the contractor made false statements or withheld information on its VENDEX form after the contractor was paid for substantial completion of the work and the contractor sues the city to recover delay damages?  Can the city disregard the contract and avoid payment based on the contractor’s false VENDEX statements?  This question was addressed in the recent case of Omni Contracting Company, Inc. v. The City of New York.  

Background  

In June 2005 Omni Contracting Company, Inc. submitted a bid to contract for a public improvement project known as “Reconstruction of Thompson Street (Vesuvio) Playground.”  The contract was awarded to Omni.  In March 2006 the contractor entered into an agreement with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation to construct the project.  The contract price was $2,127,000.  The contractor was originally required to complete work within 270 consecutive calendar days.  During construction the contractor requested, and the City approved, six time extensions, extending the project’s completion date by nearly seven months.  The City paid the contractor $2,143,866 for its work under the contract.  Thereafter, the contractor sued the City, alleging that it had fully performed the contract, but that its performance was delayed by the acts of the City, and those delays caused the contractor to incur $319,386 in additional costs.   

 In defense to the contractor’s lawsuit, the City argued that it was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract.  According to the City, the contractor made false statements and withheld information on its VENDEX form originally filed with the City in April 2004, and reaffirmed those same false statements in July 2004, February 2005, and April 2005, in the contractor’s sworn “no change” certifications.

 Accordingly, it was the City’s argument that when the contractor submitted its bid for the playground project in June 2005, the contractor failed to make a required disclosure regarding its failure to pay employees a prevailing wage on several of the contractor’s other projects with the City.  Based on the failed disclosure, the City argued that in was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract.  The City moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the contractor’s claims.  

Decision  

 

The court ruled in favor of the City.  The court first noted the requirement that public projects be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.  It went on to note that under the New York City Procurement Policy Board Rules, the “failure of a firm to provide relevant information specifically requested by the Contracting Officer may be grounds for a determination of non-responsibility.”  Since the contractor failed to provide requested information relating to its past prevailing wage investigations and violations, which occurred in 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006, the court held that the contractor was not a “responsible” contractor.    

The court went on to state that contracts procured through fraudulent bidding are void as against public policy.  Where work is done pursuant to such an illegal contract, the court held that the contractor is not entitled to recover on its claims.  Additionally, the court pointed out that the municipality can recover from the contractor all amounts paid under the illegal contract.      

The court accordingly dismissed the contractor’s delay claim for the $319,386. Given that the City was not seeking to recover the entire amount paid to the contractor, the contractor was permitted to retain the monies previously paid to it by the City.  

Comment  

 

This case emphasizes the importance of accurately completing and updating VENDEX and prequalification questionnaire replies.  The failure to do so may not only support a non-responsible determination, but, as shown, it may also be grounds for non-payment for work performed and the recovery of payments already made for work performed.    

About the author:  Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc. 

The New New York City Energy Conservation Code

On December 28, 2009, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed comprehensive 
legislation dubbed the Greener, Greater Buildings Plan. The purpose of this legislation is to 
reduce New York City’s carbon footprint by five percent. In the first of this three part series, we 
will discuss several important provisions of the new New York City Energy Conservation Code 
(the ANYCECC), and what means to property owners and builders. 
 
The enactment of the NYCECC is intended to close what was perceived to be a loophole in the 
Energy Conservation Construction Code of New York State (the State Code), adopted in 2007. 
The State Code applies only to new construction and renovation work where more than half of a 
building’s systems of subsystems were replaced. Thus, everything from simple remodeling work 
to extensive renovations and additions (provided that the new work used more than half of the 
building’s existing systems) were exempted from compliance with the State Code. As a result of 
the enactment of the NYCECC, now any1
 construction which requires a building permit 
including residential construction must be analyzed for energy efficiency to the standards set 
forth under the State Code. 
 
In order to comply with the NYCECC, an applicant for a building permit must have the lead 
design professional submit three items along with the permit application: 1) a statement that to 
the best of the design professional’s knowledge, belief and professional judgment; the plans and 
specifications submitted are in compliance with the NYCECC, or that the project is exempt from 
its requirements; 2) the results of an energy analysis (which must include the building’s 
envelope, its service water heating, lighting and power systems, and its mechanical systems) 
comparing the proposed project to the requirements of the NYCECC and setting forth how the 
project meets the NYCECC; and 3) construction drawings which demonstrate conformance with 
the NYCECC. It is important to note that this submission is an ongoing process. The analysis and 
construction documents must be updated to account for any substitutions and changes made 
during the course of construction. 
 
 
1The following buildings are exempt from the NYCECC: buildings which use small 
amounts of energy; buildings which contain no conditioned space; buildings which receive all of 
their from renewable energy sources; historic buildings; and nonresidential farm buildings. The 
following construction work is exempt from the NYCECC: installation of storm windows; the 
replacement of glazing in an existing sash and frame; exposing existing ceiling, wall or floor 
cavities during construction, provided that such cavities are filled with insulation prior to 
reclosure; and any construction where the existing roof, wall or floor cavities are not exposed. 

Incorporation of a Prime Contract Into a Subcontract by Reference: What Comes Over?

Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”), including mediation and arbitration, is an 
efficient way of resolving disputes at an early stage, without the need for an expensive and costly 
litigation. This is particularly true in the construction industry, where the disputes are often 
technical and require the involvement of persons with specialized knowledge or training. Aside 
from its cost and time benefits, ADR offers the participants the opportunity to place their dispute 
before a neutral who has experience in the construction industry, rather than 6 random people 
from the community whose excuses for getting out of jury duty weren’t acceptable to the judge 
that day. 
 
 In electing to go the ADR route, it must be noted that parties are giving up their 
Constitutional rights to bring their dispute to the Courts, and to have the substantive and 
procedural laws of the state (or nation) applied. Accordingly, it has long been settled that any 
agreement to arbitrate must be clear, explicit and unequivocal. This is normally not an issue 
where parties to an existing dispute agree to go to arbitration. However, many cases which are 
ultimately resolved by ADR were designated to be sent to that forum long before any dispute 
arose; they were sent to ADR pursuant to agreements which were made months, or perhaps years 
ago. 
 
 In the subcontracting context, many contractors see the expediency in signing a short 
agreement between the subcontractor and the general contractor (which contains specific clauses 
relevant only to those parties, such as the value of the subcontract), and incorporating the general 
contractor’s prime contract for the remaining provisions. Well, what happens when that prime 
contract contains an ADR provision? The Appellate Division, Second Department, in Navillus 
Tile, Inc. v Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. (74 AD3d 1299, 1302, 904 NYS2d 207, 211 [2010]), 
reminds us that: 
 
“Under New York law, incorporation clauses in a construction subcontract, 
incorporating prime contract clauses by reference into a subcontract, bind a 
subcontractor only as to prime contract provisions relating to the scope, quality, 
character and manner of the work to be performed by the subcontractor.” 
 
 Because an ADR provision in a contract does not relate to the “the scope, quality, 
character and manner of the work to be performed by the subcontractor”, and, more importantly, 
because an ADR provision involves the waiver of significant, Constitutional rights (to proceed 
before a Court of Law), a subcontract incorporating a prime contract with an ADR provision 
must be clear that the parties are specifically intending to incorporate that ADR provision, and 
that they specifically intend to arbitrate or mediate their disputes. 
 
 Examples of other clauses of prime contracts which do not relate to the “the scope, 
quality, character and manner of the work to be performed by the subcontractor”, and, 
accordingly, are not incorporated by reference absent a specific indication of the intent to be 
bound by such provisions are: specific record keeping requirements (see Navillus Tile, supra); 
indemnification requirements (see Waitkus v Metro. Housing Partners, 50 AD3d 260 [1st Dept 2008]); obligations to procure insurance (see Bussanich v 310 East 55th Street Tenants, 282 
AD2d 243 [1st Dept 2001]); clauses setting forth a specific forum in which to bring a lawsuit (see 
George Hyman Construction Co. v Precision Walls, Inc. of Raleigh, 132 AD2d 523 [2d Dept 
1987]); and provisions relating to the termination of the contract (see Gulf Ins. Co. v Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 16 Misc3d 1116[A][Sup Ct, NY Co. 2007]). 
 
 In closing, contractors and subcontractors should be reminded that not every provision of 
a prime contract will make the jump over to the subcontract, despite a clause in the subcontract 
purporting to do exactly that. 

Court Allows Recovery For Verbal Extra Work Claim.

Most construction contracts have a standard provision requiring changes in the work or directions to perform extra work to be made in writing.  Courts generally hold that a contractor who fails to obtain the required written authorization will not be paid for such work.   

 However, a contractor or subcontractor who performs extra work will not automatically lose his extra work claim just because he failed to follow the contract provision requiring written authorization.  Courts are hesitant to deny a just claim for extra work and have found that contractual requirements for written orders can be waived under certain circumstances.   

 In the recent case of Penava Mechanical Corp. v. Afgo Mechanical Services, Inc., an appellate court ruled on whether recovery may be had for orally directed extra work despite the contract provision that an extra work claim must be supported by written authorization.  

Background  

Absolute Electrical Contractors, Inc. entered into a subcontract with general contractor Richter & Ratner Contracting Corp.  The parties’ subcontract contained a so-called “no- oral modification clause.”  Pursuant to the clause, all changes in the work or directions to perform extra work were to be made in writing or were otherwise not compensable.    

During the course of construction, representatives of the general contractor verbally directed the subcontractor to work overtime.  The representatives also orally agreed to pay for this premium time over and above the contract price, as they had previously paid for other overtime work throughout the project.

 The promised overtime payment was in lieu of an extension of time to finish the work.  In addition, the general contractor’s project manager testified that he instructed the subcontractor not to bother with the “tickets” that were usually prepared by the subcontractor for such extra work and formed the basis for change orders issued, but rather directed the subcontractor to “just get the work done.”  The subcontractor sued when the general contractor refused to make payment for the subcontractor’s overtime.   
In defense, the general contractor argued that the subcontract’s no-oral modification clause barred any claim by the subcontractor, since the direction to perform overtime work and promise to pay at a premium rate were made orally, and were not in writing.  In addition, the general contractor argued that the subcontractor had waived any claims to the overtime pay pursuant to the express language of the lien waivers signed by the subcontractor.    

The general contractor moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.  The subcontractor appealed.  

Decision  

The appellate court reversed the trial court, denying the general contractor’s motion for summary judgement and directing a trial on whether the subcontractor had been paid in full for the overtime work performed.    

According to the appellate court, under New York law, oral directions to perform extra work, or the general course of conduct between the parties, may modify or eliminate contract provisions requiring written authorizations or notice of claims.  The appellate court relied heavily on the verbal directions by the general contractor to the subcontractor to perform the overtime work and verbal promises to pay the subcontractor.

 The court also relied on the general contractor’s verbal direction that the subcontractor not bother with the work tickets that would form a written basis for a formal change order.  Under these circumstances, the court held that the general contractor cannot argue that it did not have to pay for the overtime.    
As to the general contractor’s argument that the claims had been released, the appellate court held that since the subcontractor was required to sign these waivers whenever it received partial payment, and since payments were made after waivers were given, the parties treated the waivers as mere receipts of the amounts stated in the waivers, not as complete waivers of all claims to that point.  

Comment  

While courts routinely seek to enforce the express terms of an agreement that was freely negotiated, courts also seek to prohibit bad-faith dealings.  Here, where the general contractor verbally promised payment, and verbally stated that written work tickets were not necessary to protect the subcontractor’s right to payment, the court would not allow the general contractor to rely on the subcontract’s provisions to the contrary.     

A prudent contractor or subcontractor, however, should not ignore the contractual requirement for written extra work orders in the hope that a court may make an exception and find a waiver of the contract provisions under particular circumstances.  He should insist on a written order in the form specified by the contract provisions before he performs any extra work.  A written extra work order will ensure his right to be paid for performing such work.    

About the author:  Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc.  Adam W. Downs, an associate with the firm, assisted with the preparation of this article.