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Court Construes an “EIFS” Insurance Exclusion to Include all Work on Structure, Roofer Left without Coverage

Exterior Insulation and Finish Systems, or “EIFS”, is a multi-layer wall system attached to the exterior of a residential or commercial structure. EIFS generally consists of a substrate, an adhesive to adhere the system to the building, an insulating layer (generally stiff EPS foamboard), a reinforcing mesh and the exterior finish. Users of EIFS are attracted by the variety of exterior finishes which are available, many of which resemble stucco, at a relatively low cost. Also, because of the insulation component of the system, energy savings are touted. Further adding to EIFS’ popularity is its durability and need for only minimal maintenance.

Problems arise, nevertheless, where the EIFS system is not sealed properly. In such situations, water can infiltrate and reach the structure of the building. Perversely, because the EIFS system is a sealed system, the infiltrating water has no place to go and, instead of manifesting itself as a small leak, it remains in the structure-hidden-where it can cause rotting of the underlying structure. By the time the first rotting is discovered, the problem is actually widespread and the damage extensive.

Liability insurers came to the realization that the failure of an EIFS system was certain to lead to significant exposures. Accordingly, insurers issuing CGL policies began to draft exclusions of coverage related to EIFS systems, and many contractors ceased to install EIFS or any work which interfaced with an EIFS system. However, the recent case of First Mercury Insurance Company v. Miller Roofing Enterprises highlights just how a broad EIFS exclusion can be enforced.

The facts of Miller Roofing were not disputed. Miller Roofing was retained by the owner to replace three roofs in 1998. The structures on which the roofs were installed were clad in EIFS, although the roof did not interface with the EIFS system, and Miller Roofing performed no EIFS-related work. In 2006, one of the roofs began to leak, causing water infiltration into the owner’s showroom. Miller Roofing attempted some repairs but, after some heavy rain and snowstorms in 2007, significant amounts of water damaged the ceiling, walls, and product which was on the showroom floor.

The owner sued Miller Roofing for breach of contract and for negligence to recover for both the cost to remediate the roof, as well as the cost of the non-roof related items damaged in the flood. First Mercury accepted Miller Roofing’s defense under a reservation of rights, but then commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to disclaim coverage. The policy at issue contained the following EIFS exclusion:

This insurance does not apply to … “property damage” included in the “products-completed operations hazard” and arising out of “your work” described as … [a]ny work or operation with respect to any exterior component, fixture or feature of any structure if any “exterior insulation and finish system” is used on any part of that structure.

First Mercury moved for summary judgment on its complaint, contending that inasmuch as the building admittedly contained an EIFS system, the exclusion applied. Miller Roofing opposed, contending that the exclusion did not apply because the defective workmanship was to the roof, not the EIFS system and, in any event, Miller Roofing did no work involving the EIFS system. While the court credited Miller Roofing’s explanation that its work did not involve the EIFS-system, it held that such was irrelevant in light of the policy language triggering the exclusion if “any exterior insulation and finish system is used on any part of the structure” (emphasis supplied). As to Miller Roofing’s contention that First Mercury would be allowed to escape liability for any otherwise covered act at the building simply because EIFS cladding was placed on the exterior walls, the Court held that this was precisely the policy Miller Roofing paid for and signed, and the Court was constrained to apply the exclusion.

Clearly, a roofer is going to be performing work on the exterior of a structure. While insureds should always read the terms of their policies, a broker would be well advised that the best way to service such a client would be to see to it that exclusions such as the one the Court relied upon in Miller Roofing are removed or tailored as narrowly as possible so that the insured’s foreseeable work is not caught up in the breadth of the exclusion.

The Uniform Notice of Claim Act Applies Solely to Notice of Claim Requirements for Tort Claims

On December 17, 2012, the New York Legislature passed bill S. 7641-B, also known as the “Uniform Notice of Claim Act” to become effective June 15, 2013. The Legislature stated that the purpose of the Act is to establish a uniform process for filing a Notice of Claim against any state or municipal entity, public authority, or public benefit corporation. However, the title and purpose of the Act is, in fact, misleading, as it applies solely to tort claims and does NOT apply to contract claims.

The act seeks to accomplish its purported goal by incorporating the Notice of Claim requirements set forth in General Municipal Law ¬ß 50-e to every action for damages or injuries to real or personal property, or for the destruction thereof, or for personal injuries or wrongful death against a public entity entitled to a notice of claim as a condition precedent of any such action and allowing service of such Notice of Claim on the Secretary of State as the agent of each such public entity. This change purportedly removes any confusion created by differing Notice of Claim requirements in the different statutes concerning public entities such as the Education Law, Town Law, Environmental Conservation Law and Public Authorities Law. However, because the requirements of General Municipal Law ¬ß 50-e relate solely to tort actions, the statute’s requirements do not apply to contract claims against public entities.

Thus, contrary to what may be the common belief, the Notice of Claim labyrinth remains intact when it comes to contract actions against a public entity. For example, the Town Law creates Notice of Claim requirements for contract claims against a Town which differ from those contained in the Education Law for contract claims against a governing body of a school district or certain state supported schools. In addition to statutory Notice of Claim requirements for contract claims against public entities, the specific terms of the contract likely include additional claim requirements, adding layers of complication and confusion to the Notice of Claim process for contract claims.

In the end, a company contracting with a public entity will be well served by contacting its construction attorney to discuss the applicable contractual and statutory Notice of Claim provisions to avoid forfeiting claims.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Insured, Insurer and the Attorney-Client Privilege

There is a common misconception that any and all communications between a client and their attorney are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. However, this is not always the case

In Melworm v. Encompass Indemnity Company, the insured plaintiffs, the Melworms, filed a lawsuit against their insurer due to the denial of a claim for vandalism to the Melworms’ boat. Prior to investigating the claim, the insurance company retained an attorney, who was to advise the insurance company of its rights under the policy and conduct an examination of the Melworms.

During discovery, the insurance company provided a redacted electronic claims diary and redacted letters to the Melworms’ counsel. The Melworms moved to compel the insurance company’s production of the redacted portions of the documents. The insurance company opposed the motion on the ground that the redacted portions were subject to the attorney-client privilege, as they entailed internal discovery conducted by counsel, and therefore were subject to the privilege (including the examination). The Melworms argued that the privilege did not apply for two reasons: 1) the investigation of their claim is itself not subject to the privilege; and 2) the privilege is exercised by the insured, and not the insurer.

The Nassau County Supreme Court granted the Melworms’ motion to compel based upon their first argument. New York law generally provides that in an insured versus insurer dispute pertaining to a claim, the claims file is generally not privileged. The basis for this is that the payment or rejection of claims is a part of the regular course of business of an insurance company. Therefore, reports that aid the insurer in this decision are likewise made in the regular course of business, even if the report is by an attorney. Furthermore, evaluating the extent of potential liability of the insured is also within the ordinary course of business, and therefore, the examination of the Melworms is not privileged either.

However, the Court disagreed with the Melworms’ second argument that the privilege is only exercised by the insured. This is only true in a situation where the insurance company is under a duty to defend the insured, and the insured later brings an action against the insurance company relating to the denial of the claim. Here, if the insurance company tries to invoke privilege, they will be unsuccessful because the privilege lies with the insured.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Amendments to the NYC Charter and the Administrative Code in Relation to Opportunities for Minority and Women Owned Business Enterprises and Emerging Business Enterprises in City Procurement.

On January 7, 2013, the Mayor signed Introductory No. 911-A into law (Law No. 2013/001). This Local Law amends the New York City charter and the administrative code of the City of New York, in relation to opportunities for minority and women owned business enterprises and emerging business enterprises in City procurement. The laws that are amended are: New York City Charter § 1304 and New York City Administrative Code § 6-129.

Summary of Amendments to New York City Charter § 1304

The 2013 amendments grant the commissioner of the division of economic and financial opportunity within the Department of Small Business Services a number of additional powers and duties in the implementation of the purpose of the division, including the power to:

(i) recognize firms, that are certified as minority owned and women owned businesses by other governmental entities, to be recognized as certified business enterprises by the City of New York;

(ii) perform site visits at businesses seeking certification; and

(iii) post on the division’s website, a directory of City certified business enterprises which must include information such as the business enterprise’s market sector, bonding capacity, contract price and tasks for its last 3 contracts, union affiliation, and the renewal date for its certification.

Summary of Amendments to New York City Administrative Code § 6-129

The definition of graduate MBE, WBE, and EBEs is no longer limited to entities that were previously awarded prime contracts. However, the qualifying contract size for these entities increased from fifteen to fifty million dollars and, to qualify, the size of the entities must exceed the size standards established by the US small business administration for three years. The amendments also add a definition for “human services” and state that participation requirements are not applicable for those services.

The participation goals for construction contracts are now applicable to all construction contracts irrespective of the amount of the contract, rather than being limited to contracts under one million dollars. The percentages per category of participant were redistributed and were increased to 44% from 27.69%. The categories of Asian Americans and Women were added to the citywide contracting participation goals for MBEs, WBEs and EBEs. The participation goals for construction subcontracts did not change.

The participation goals for professional services contracts, including architectural, engineering, and construction management services, are also now applicable to all construction contracts irrespective of the amount of the contract, rather than being limited to contracts under one million dollars. The percentages per category of participant were redistributed and were increased to 63% from 36.5%. Women were added as a category to the citywide contracting participation goals for MBEs, WBEs and EBEs. The participation goals for professional services subcontracts did not change.

The participation goals for goods contracts are now applicable to all goods contracts under one hundred thousand dollars, rather than one million dollars. The percentages per category of participant were redistributed and were increased to 51% from 41.52%. Women were added as a category to the citywide contracting participation goals for MBEs, WBEs and EBEs.

Going forward, and no later than 2015, the commissioner must review and adjust the City’s participation goals, as necessary, on a bi-yearly basis.

The division has also taken on additional tasks to offer assistance to MBEs, WBEs, and EBEs such as conducting meetings with MBEs, WBEs and EBEs to discuss what agencies look for in evaluating bids and proposals, and educating prime contractors on opportunities to partner or subcontract with certified MBEs, WBEs and EBEs.

Agencies are able to set differing participation goals for their annual agency utilization plans with higher, lower, or the same levels as citywide goals, subject to the approval of the commissioner. The agency’s plan and schedule must be published on the division’s website no later than July 31 of each year. Pursuant to the amendment, an “agency may establish a goal for a procurement that may be achieved by a combination of prime contract and subcontract dollars, a combination of construction and services performed pursuant to the contract, and/or a combination of MBEs, WBEs and/or EBEs. Alternatively, an agency may establish specific goals for particular types of services, and/or goals for particular types of certified firms.”

“A contractor that is an MBE, WBE or EBE shall be permitted to count its own participation toward fulfillment of the relevant participation goal, provided that the value of such a contractor’s participation shall be determined by subtracting from the total value of the contract any amounts that the contractor pays to direct subcontractors. A contractor that is a qualified joint venture shall be permitted to count a percentage of its own participation toward fulfillment of the relevant participation goal. The value of such a contractor’s participation shall be determined by subtracting from the total value of the contract any amounts that the contractor pays to direct subcontractors, and then multiplying the remainder by the percentage to be applied to total profit to determine the amount to which an MBE, WBE or EBE is entitled pursuant to the joint venture agreement.”

The contracting agency must require that the qualifying contractor submit a list of its intended subcontractors at least once per year. The contracting agency may also require the contractor to report periodically about the contracts awarded by its direct subcontractors to indirect subcontractors.

A bidder has the option of requesting that the contracting agency change the participation goals in light of the availability of firms to perform the services required, or by demonstrating that it has legitimate business reasons for proposing a lower level of subcontracting in its utilization plan. If the contracting agency agrees, it shall revise the solicitation and extend the deadline for bids and proposals. Furthermore, an agency may modify the participation goals when there are changes to the scope of work that affect the scale and types of work. The City chief procurement officer may also identify types of contract where payments to indirect subcontractors can be credited toward the participation goals. Contractors or subcontractors that are both MBEs and WBEs are only credited toward the goal for one of those categories.

There are also amendments that enhance the reporting and oversight requirements.

Impact

The most significant amendment to the law is the elimination of the $1 million cap on contracts that are covered by participation goals. This change will ensure that MWBEs are targeted bidders for larger contracts.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

General Duty Clause Sustains OSHA Citation for Use of “Grout Hog” on Forklift Without Skid Pins

In addition to its many specific standards for employee safety and health, OSHA also has what’s known as its “General Duty Clause.” It’s often described as a “catch-all,” covering any and all unsafe conditions for which there is no specific standard. It’s not quite that expansive, but you should be aware of it, and its elements.

The recent decision in Secretary v. Jesse Remodeling, LLC illustrates both the requisites for a violation of the General Duty Clause, and for a “Willful” OSHA violation. In that case, a masonry contractor was erecting a brick and block foundation for a fast-food restaurant in Savannah. OSHA’s Assistant Area Director, who was buying lunch at a restaurant across the street, observed employees on a scaffold platform lacking a guardrail system at its open sides. He summoned a Compliance Officer by telephone, who came to the site and initiated an inspection.

In addition to several scaffolding and fall hazard violations, the Compliance Officer observed employees on the scaffold platform pouring concrete from a “Grout Hog” into cells in the block wall. The Grout Hog was being lifted above the platform by a forklift operated by Jesse Gamble, the employer’s principal and “competent person.” The Compliance Officer observed that the forklift lacked skid pins to secure the Grout Hog on the forks, and that Mr. Gamble was not wearing a seatbelt.

The CO also observed that the scaffold platform, 13 feet above ground, lacked guardrails at its open sides and ends. As employees on the platform were filling the cells with concrete, two employees, standing on the scaffold’s cross-braces about seven feet above the ground, were cleaning concrete droppings from the wall below the platform. After the filling of the cells was complete, the CO saw the employees climb down from the scaffold using the cross-braces and uprights.

According to Mr. Gamble, his employees had started to dismantle the scaffold on the back wall when a truck, delivering an additional supply of concrete, arrived, enabling the crew to fill the cells in four blocks that remained to be filled. Mr. Gamble testified that, as the “competent person,” he instructed the employees to fill the cells from the platform, while he elevated the Grout Hog using the forklift. The requirements to have a guardrail system on a scaffold do not apply, while the scaffold is in the process of being dismantled. Mr. Gamble claimed that, in his opinion, there was a greater risk of falling while re-installing the guardrails than while filling the cells, which he estimated would only take about fifteen minutes.

OSHA’s Area Office issued a five-item citation, with three “Serious” items and one “Willful” item (no guardrail system on the scaffold platform). The Grout Hog violation was charged under the General Duty Clause.

The employer contested the violations and penalties, its primary arguments being that the scaffold requirements did not apply, because the scaffold was in the process of being dismantled; that the skid pins were inadequate to secure the Grout Hog to the forklift; and that Mr. Gamble’s skill, in maneuvering forklift, was adequate to prevent the Grout Hog from slipping off the forks. Following trial, the Administrative Law Judge vacated the seatbelt violation item, but affirmed all of the rest (and related penalties).

A violation of OSHA’S General Duty Clause has four elements (in addition to employee exposure, and actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the employer). The first is a “hazard,” defined as conditions or practices deemed unsafe, over which an employer can reasonably be expected to exercise control. The second is that the hazard be “recognized,” that is, known to the particular employer, or generally known in the industry. The third is that the hazard be likely to cause serious injury or death. The fourth is that the Secretary must identify a means of abatement, sufficient to eliminate, or materially reduce, the hazard.

The employer’s use of the Grout Hog without skid pins was easily found to constitute a “hazard.” The Grout Hog weighs 1,436 lbs. empty, and up to 4,526 lbs. loaded. The skid pins are provided by the manufacturer, and attached to the Grout Hog, to prevent it from sliding off the forks, injuring employees, and damaging equipment. Elevated above a scaffold platform, clearly the Grout Hog, if it slipped off the forks, would expose the employees working on the platform to struck-by, crushed-by, and fall hazards.

That the hazard here was “recognized,” the ALJ found, was plain from the warning label on the Grout Hog’s fork pockets, and instructions in the manual always to use skid pins and linch pins or safety chains, whenever the Grout Hog is on the lift forks. The likelihood of causing serious injury or death was obvious as well, as the Grout Hog, as used by Jesse Remodeling, was estimated to weigh between 3,000 and 4,000 lbs., and presented a clear danger, were it to slip off the forks, of causing serious injury or death.

The final element — the feasibility of abatement — was made out by showing that, the installation of the Grout Hog on the forklift using skid pins or chains, in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, would eliminate or reduce the danger of it slipping off the forklift.

The statement of the employer’s principal, Jesse Gamble, acknowledged that he knew the skid pins provided to secure the Grout Hog on the forklift were not in use, although he attributed this to an “oversight.” The ALJ was not convinced by Mr. Gamble’s argument that his skill in maneuvering the forklift mitigated the risk of the Grout Hog slipping off. The General Duty Clause violation, and the accompanying penalty, were therefore affirmed.

The ALJ did vacate the seatbelt violation, essentially because it was charged under the wrong standard. The two items for working from, and descending by use of, the scaffold’s cross-braces, were affirmed. The employer argued unsuccessfully that there was no violation, because the exception where employees are erecting or dismantling the scaffold applies only where the employees are “solely” performing one of those tasks. Jesse Remodeling’s employees apparently had started to dismantle the scaffold, but interrupted that effort, and went up to pour more concrete, when the concrete truck arrived. In addition, employees were at work cleaning dripped concrete from the walls. In affirming the item for descending from the platform using the cross-braces, the ALJ noted that there was a ladder on the scaffold, but the employees had not used it.

Finally — and most importantly, from the viewpoint of the employer — the lack of a guardrail system was found to be a “Willful” violation. The “dismantling” exception was found, from testimony and photographs, not to apply. Mr. Gamble acknowledged that the guardrail could have been re-installed before filling the last four cells, and indeed that he had instructed his employees, upon the arrival of the concrete truck, to go back up and fill the remaining cells. Gamble had been a masonry contractor for 26 years, and a “competent person” for 15 years. His company had previously been cited for a similar violation, and had unsuccessfully asserted the “dismantling” exception in contesting that violation.

An employee (himself an OSHA “competent person”) testified that “the scaffold wasn’t ready for filling grout . . . [Gamble] knew that the scaffold wasn’t complete but he told me to do it anyway . . . even though we didn’t have the scaffold properly erected.” The ALJ found that Gamble, concededly with knowledge of the guardrail requirements, had simply elected to ignore them. This, the ALJ found met the “willfulness” standard of showing an “intentional, knowing or voluntary disregard for the requirements of the Act, or . . . plain indifference to employee safety.”

 

Thomas H. Welby is a licensed professional engineer, as well as an attorney and managing partner of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, a construction law firm with its main office in White Plains. Geoffrey S. Pope, Esq., counsel to the firm, assists in the preparation of this series. Articles in this series are for general guidance only, and should not be relied upon as providing all information necessary for compliance with OSHA and other legal requirements.

New York City Launches “Rapid Repairs” Program in the Wake of Super Storm Sandy

In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, New York City has launched a “Rapid Repairs” program to quickly and efficiently make necessary repairs to damaged homes. Announced by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Director of Housing Operations, Brad Gair, the program sends teams of contractors and city inspectors into damaged neighborhoods to conduct free assessments of residential damage. In partnership with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), the program presents an unprecedented and innovative way of using government resources to streamline recovery efforts.

The program will be implemented by dividing the city into geographic areas and assigning a program manager to each area. Once homeowners and commercial residential property owners register for the program, they will then receive an appointment with a contractor serving their geographic area. The contractor will conduct a free assessment, prepare a work order, and the owner will make the final decision as to whether or not they want to proceed with the repairs. Homeowners that wish to participate in the program must have registered with FEMA for disaster assistance, and must have received a FEMA ID number. However, commercial property owners of residential, multi-dwelling buildings do not need a FEMA ID number to participate in the program.

Contractors that wish to assist in the recovery efforts can now register for the program online. A registration form can be found on the website of The Building Trades Employers Association of New York City. Interested contractors must also register with the FEMA Disaster Response Registry’s System for Award Management, and must complete the FEMA Vendor Profile Form. For a copy of the profile form, contractors should contact the Industry Liaison Support Center at FEMA-Industry@dhs.gov or call 206-646-1895.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Contractors Should Take Care When Relying on an Owner Appointed Architect

The right to indemnification may be express or may be implied in law to prevent a result which is regarded as unjust or unsatisfactory. Ordinarily, on large constructions projects an owner will hire a construction manager and/or general contractor as well as architects. The parties interact in fulfillment of their contractual duties (to the owner) but are not contractually obligated to one another so express indemnification is usually not available. If matters go awry common-law indemnification permits one who has been compelled to pay for the wrong of another to recover from the wrongdoer the damages it paid to the injured party. Contractors may be entitled to implied indemnification when they have committed no wrong but are held vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of another.

In Genesee/Wyoming YMCA v. Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. (2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 06407 [2012]), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, had an opportunity to examine common law indemnification. InYMCA, the owner (YMCA) retained the services of construction manager (Bovis) to administer the construction of a wellness facility including a pool. The owner also hired an architect (Thomas) to design the building roof and insulation system, and a general contractor (Whitney) to perform the work on the project. Bovis, over the objections of Whitney, further approved Thomas’s design, and materials selected, and directed work to begin. Shortly after the project was completed it was discovered the roof and insulation systems were defectively designed and the materials used were improper or inferior.

The YMCA was forced to repair and replace the roof and insulation system, and brought suit against Bovis to recover under a breach of contract and unjust enrichment theory. The YMCA maintained that Bovis breached its contractual obligations by failing to fully and effectively provide the required services under its contract in approving a defective proposed design by Thomas and permitting the use of inadequate materials. Bovis brought a third-party cause of action for contribution and indemnification against Thomas. Thomas immediately moved to dismiss the action by arguing that Bovis was not entitled, as a matter of law, to an award of common law indemnity. The Court agreed noting that indemnity permits a non-negligent party to shift its exposure to the culpable party. But, here, the allegations against Bovis were based on its own negligence and failure to honor the terms of its contract.

It is not clear from the Court’s opinion but it appears Bovis was contractually obligated to “review and approve design, constructability and materials” for the project. This will serve as a lesson that parties should take great care in negotiating a construction contract, and should be clear what responsibility they have undertaken. A construction manager will not normally take on the ultimate burden for approval of designs by an owner appointed architect. If this was indeed the agreement, the construction manager could have tried to insert risk shifting clauses into its contract with the Owner or negotiated a separate agreement with the Architect. Additionally, if Bovis was not contractually obligated to review and approve the project design and materials it illustrates that contractors should not go beyond the scope of their contractual responsibilities or they may be held liable for the resulting damages. If that was the case, Bovis’ affirmative act of approving the designs and directing work to commence, over the objections of the general contractor, was enough not only to allow YMCA to sustain a breach of contract claim but to preclude any indemnification from Thomas. Remember the party seeking common law indemnification must be free of any culpability.

YMCA further shows that a construction manager or general contractor will often face an uphill battle to offset liability. Bovis was sued for breach of contract so they may not be able to sustain a claim for contribution from the architect as this type of liability offset is only available under a negligence claim.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Subcontractors and Suppliers Do Business With Unlicensed Home Improvement Contractors At The Risk Of Their Lien Rights

In the case of Kamco Supply Corp. v JMT Bros. Realty, LLC, the Appellate Division, First Department re-emphasized the harsh effect that a failure to abide by New York City’s home improvement contractor licensing statute can have. In Kamco, which was argued on appeal by this author, the homeowner retained a general contractor who turned out not to have the home improvement license required by Sections 20-386 and 20-387 of the New York City Administrative Code. The plaintiff was a suppler who entered into a contract with the unlicensed general contractor to furnish windows to the project. There was no contractual or other relationship between the supplier and the homeowners. The homeowners eventually terminated the general contractor and asserted various backcharges against the contract.

Subsequent to the termination, the plaintiff asserted a mechanic’s lien against the homeowners’ property and started a lawsuit to foreclose that lien. Early in the lawsuit, the homeowners moved for summary judgment dismissing the lien foreclosure action. In doing so, the homeowners argued that inasmuch as the supplier’s lien rights were derivative of the general contractor’s (and even assuming that the backcharges did not subsume the amount otherwise left owing to the general contractor), the general contractor could not recover as a matter of statute and, therefore, there could be no lien fund from which subcontractors and suppliers could recover. The trial court dismissed the supplier’s lawsuit and the Appellate Division affirmed. Citing New York City’s home improvement contractor licensing requirements, the appellate court held that where a contract has been rendered unenforceable, there can be no funds due or owing from the homeowner to the unlicensed general contractor which would support a subcontractor’s (or supplier’s) mechanic’s lien. Accordingly, in the absence of a direct contractual relationship between the homeowners and the supplier, the supplier could not recover from the homeowners.

As affirmed by the Appellate Division’s holding in Kamco, the homeowners could not be compelled to remit payment to the unlicensed general contractor. As a subcontractor’s or supplier’s lien rights are derivative of the general contractor’s right to receive payment, where the general contractor has no right to receive payment as a matter of statute, there can be no lien fund from which subcontractors and suppliers may recover-even if those subcontractors and suppliers have their own licensing in order. Accordingly, a subcontractor or supplier would be well advised to research the licensing status of those entities with whom they contract because their lien rights may be adversely impacted.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

New York City Issues New BIM Standards

The New York City Department of Design and Construction (DDC) has become the most recent agency to issue building-information-modeling (BIM) technology standards. The standards issued relate to the design and construction of new public buildings and seek to establish a framework for the implementation of 3-D design technologies and BIM processes on DDC-managed projects. Specifically, the new standards require the use of BIM on projects valued between $15 million and $50 million. According to DDC Commissioner David J. Burney, “BIM strengthens collaboration by allowing all members of the design team to accurately add, to a shared database, information about how a building looks and functions.”

Similar to the DDC, this past April the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) established a program by which 3-D site safety plans are accepted in an attempt to expedite the permit approval process. The program presents DOB inspectors with the unique opportunity to take an interactive virtual tour illustrating how the City’s largest projects will be built. This allows the DOB to successfully evaluate a project’s safety measures and potential complexities prior to construction. With the launching of this program, New York City has become one of the first cities worldwide to accept 3-D plans for construction approvals.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Notice of pendency cannot be extended after it expires.

On June 13, 2012, the Second Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York issued a decision holding that a lapsed notice of pendency cannot be extended.

In Ampul Electric, Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 96 A.D.3d 790 [2d Dept. 2012], the mechanic’s lien foreclosure action was commenced in October 2006 and a notice of pendency was filed at that time. A notice of pendency is required to extend a lien and to maintain a public lien foreclosure action, but it expires after 3 years unless an application is filed to extend the notice of pendency for another 3 years for good cause.

The Supreme Court judge stayed the lien foreclosure action in March of 2009 because one of the parties filed for bankruptcy. In June of 2010, the lienor withdrew its claims in the Bankrupcty Court. In July 2010, the lienor moved in the Supreme Court to extend the notice of pendency nunc pro tunc (i.e., “now for then”, or retroactively). The defendants filed a cross-motion to cancel the notice of pendency. The Supreme Court denied the lienor’s motion and granted the defendants’ cross-motion to cancel the notice of pendency.

The Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court, finding that an expired notice of pendency is a nullity and may not be revived. Pursuant to CPLR 6513, the notice of pendency had to be extended before it lapsed. Here, the notice of pendency expired in October 2009 such that the application to extend it was untimely. Since the stay of the action did not appear to apply to the notice of pendency, notices of pendency should be extended before they lapse even when an action has been stayed. Even though you may not be able to prosecute your action or lien, you will have to incur legal fees to maintain your action alive even during a stay.

N.B. This decision applies to Notices of Pendency in connection with PRIVATE liens. Those in connection with PUBLIC liens are extended 3+ years; i.e., permanently. See Yula, 342 NYS2 673 and Belt, 457 NYS2 632 (3rd, 1982); 469 NYS2 1023 (lv. to app. den’d).

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP.