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Revisions to the NY DOT Standard Specifications: Section 100-Phase 7

The New York Department of Transportation utilizes its administrative document, the Standard Specifications, to provide a compilation of standard requirements for construction contracts. These specifications are written to the contractor. They define the contractor’s responsibility in meeting each specification, enumerate the Department’s expectations and how it is going to measure and pay, and explain what the contractor is expected to provide1.

Recently, the Department of Transportation released an Engineering Instruction, entitled Revisions to Standard Specifications: Section 100-Phase 7, which provides revisions and changes to Section 100 of the Standard Specifications, and consolidates all existing changes. These revisions apply to contracts submitted for bidding after January 9th, 2014.

The adoption of the revisions to section 100 warrant the review of the Standard Specifications, as many of these revisions have altered the general terms for bidding construction contracts and contracting with the Department of Transportation. Section 104-01, Scope of Work, for example, has had language added to it which requires a contractor to commence its work within 14 days of being awarded a contract by the Office of the State Comptroller, unless written consent of the Department of Transportation is given to begin at a later date.

The addition of vendor responsibility, section 105-05, is another example of a new addition to the document. This section establishes that a contractor shall at all times during the contract term remain responsible, and that if requested by the Commissioner of Transportation, or his or her designee, the contractor agrees to present evidence of its continuing legal authority to do business in New York State, integrity, experience, ability, prior performance, and organizational and financial capacity. The section also reserves the right for the Commissioner to suspend any and all activities of a contractor at any time when he or she discovers information that calls into question the responsibility of the contractor, and establishes the proper course of action if this were to occur (including written notice, termination, etc.).

More examples of additions to the Standard Specifications include the addition of Marine Protection & Indemnity and Pollution Liability Insurance to the insurance requirements of section 107-6, the establishment of what costs are recoverable for a contractor under acceleration compensation, and when a contractor will be reimbursed for additional costs associated with acceleration directed by the Department of Transportation in writing.

Failure to account for changes to the Standard Specifications in new bids will subject a contractor to potential liability and/or contract termination. The changes highlighted above, along with others, have altered various aspects of how contracts with the Department of Transportation are handled, including deadlines, timeframes, and necessary insurance provisions/required clauses, among other things. The changes cannot be ignored, as they have a large impact on contractors bidding for, and working under contracts with the Department.2


1 New York Department of Transportation, Standard Specifications (U.S. Customary Units) 3 (Jan. 9 2014).

2 Anthony Ruggeri, a third year law student and law clerk with the firm, assisted with the preparation of this article.

Failure to Obtain a Written Contract & Insurance Before Commencing Work May Subject Contractors to Unintended Liability

Too often, due to timing constraints, “this is how we do business attitudes” or just bad practice contractors fail to obtain signed contracts, submit written invoices and deliver contractual or statutory notices. Unfortunately, this opens a contractor to unexpected liability. Two recent cases provide an excellent example of how crucial it is to follow proper procedure and document construction projects every step of the way. This is especially important in the context of limiting liability for personal injury claims and obtaining contractual indemnification.

In DiNovo v. Bat Con, Inc. (2014 NY.Slip.Op. 02989 [3rd Dept. 2014]) defendant, Bat Con, contracted with the County of Onondaga to perform emergency repairs to a municipal sewer in the Spring of 2008. Bat Con, subsequently, solicited subcontractors to perform a portion of the emergency repair work and accepted a proposal from PGC. PGC immediately began work at the project and in May, 2008 PGC’s employee was injured when a drill rig tipped over into an excavation trench. Barred from suing his employer PGC’s employee sued Bat Con alleging violations of the New York State Labor Law. Bat Con, in short order, answered and commenced a third-party action seeking contractual indemnification from PGC. Thereafter, PGC moved for summary judgment on the contractual indemnification claims. The trial Court denied summary judgment as to PGC.

At issue, was whether there was an express written agreement between Bat-Con and PGC with an indemnification provision. In support of PGC’s motion for summary judgment it was established that the parties had never worked together. Moreover, it was undisputed that PGC’s proposal which was submitted and accepted prior to the start of work briefly defined the work to be performed, the price, and other details of the project. The proposal included an attachment containing what PGC's president described as “standard” terms and conditions, including an indemnification provision expressly limiting PGC's responsibility to its own negligence. . It was also undisputed, that after both PGC began work and the alleged accident occurred, Bat Con forwarded a contract to PGC that contained an indemnification provision. PGC acknowledged receipt but maintained that it never accepted or signed the subcontract. Bat Con countered that PGC expressly accepted that contract by both performing the work and obtaining insurance certificates. The Appellate Division, was ultimately unpersuaded, and issued a ruling in favor of PGC dismissing all claims by Bat Con and awarding PGC the costs of the appeal.

Bat-Con failed to provide any evidence that PGC knew of the subcontract or acted in conformity with it… Bat Con is stuck paying the costs of PGC’s appeal and the continuing costs and attorneys’ fees associated with defending the injured employee’s lawsuit.

Properly drafting and executing construction contracts can prevent situations like Bat Con. It is important to ensure that contracts are executed and insurance and indemnification are in place prior to permitting the commencement of any work…

Beware of the “Paperwork Breach”; it Can Prove Costly

 It is widely acknowledged that record keeping on a modern construction project can often seem as tedious and as difficult as the principal construction itself. Unfortunately, as a result, there are contractors who let paperwork requirements slip, preferring to focus on the construction itself. The mindset is often that building a good product is the best way to avoid litigation. However, the recent decision of the Appellate Division in High Tech Enterprises & Electrical Services of NY, Inc. v Expert Electrical, Inc. (113 AD3d 546 [1st Dept 2014]) highlights that a failure to adhere to “paperwork” requirements—even when there are no resulting or related problems—can support a claim for breach of contract and absolve the non-breaching party from the responsibility to pay for work actually performed.

The dispute in High Tech Enterprises arises out of a 2006 project for the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation. The Parks Department hired Expert Electrical as its prime contractor for the reconstruction of an electrical substation in Queens. Expert Electrical subcontracted certain work to High Tech, which High Tech performed in mid- to late-2007. High Tech submitted three payment applications to Expert Electrical, only two of which were paid.

During the project, city inspectors had visited the project site. This prompted Expert Electrical to perform an internal audit of its records. During this audit, Expert Electrical determined that High Tech failed to provide proper certified payroll records1 (the reports provided were not complete and had discrepancies in both the number of hours worked and the wage rate classifications), and that it failed to pay its workers prevailing wage and proper supplemental benefits. As a result, High Tech withheld the third payment—although the work addressed in the third payment application had been accepted by the owner and Expert Electrical had been paid for this work.

As a result of Expert Electrical’s failure to pay, High Tech ceased its work, asserted a mechanic’s lien and payment bond claim and, ultimately, commenced a lawsuit. Expert Electrical asserted counterclaims seeking to recover the excess completion costs it incurred after High Tech unilaterally suspended its work. In 2012, both parties moved and cross-moved for summary judgment. In support of its cross-motion and in opposition to Expert Electrical’s motion, High Tech contended that it had, in fact, properly paid its workers, and that this proper payment was best evidenced by the undisputed fact that that in the nearly five years since High Tech ceased its work at the project not a single one of its employees had complained about any alleged failure to pay wages, nor had any administrative agency issued a determination regarding any alleged violation of the prevailing wage statute (Labor Law §220).

In its decision, the trial court found in favor of High Tech. In doing so, the court held that “nothing in the contract may be interpreted as permitting Expert Electrical to withhold earned payment from High Tech, as the result of High Tech’s failure to pay prevailing wages, in any circumstances”. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the High Tech’s refusal to provide an affidavit stating that all labor and materials had been paid for in full was a material breach of the contract, and that such refusal justified Expert Electrical’s failure to pay. The Appellate Division reasoned that the contract made the provision of the documentation a condition precedent to payment, and that since High Tech never provided the required documentation, Expert Electrical’s obligation to pay never came into being.

High Tech Enterprises provides a warning to contractors that providing solid paperwork is often just as crucial as performing solid work. If the provision of certain paperwork is specifically set forth in a contract (here, certified payroll reports and affidavits of payment), it can be characterized as a condition precedent to payment. As was demonstrated in High Tech Enterprises, upon High Tech’s failure to meet the condition precedent in the contract, Expert Electrical’s obligation to make payment never arose, despite that: 1) the work was actually performed and accepted and paid for by the owner; and 2) the problem which the paperwork requirement was designed to guard against (here, failing to properly pay employees) never arose.


1Although not clear from either the trial court’s or the appellate court’s decision, it appears that the discrepancies with the certified payroll documents were only discovered after High Tech had been paid. Inasmuch as the requirement to submit accurate certified payroll documents is statutory, it ostensibly had an independent obligation to bring this to the Parks Department’s attention and refund the money it had been paid in reliance on those erroneous documents. It appears that both the trial and appellate court missed the inconsistency in permitting Expert Electrical to receive payment based upon the same incomplete documents that Expert Electrical used to deny High Tech its payment.

Contract Language May Affect the Limitations Period of a Bond

By: Rick Ward, Law Clerk, 3rd year law student at Pace Law School

Edited by: Thomas S. Tripodianos, Partner

The specific language of a performance bond can cause the limitations period for claims against the bond to run before the full contract amount is paid. In City of Yonkers v 58A JVD Indus., Ltd., the second department found that the performance bond claim accrued when final payment on a contract had been made, even though 1% of the contract price was still unpaid to the contractor. The City’s claim was dismissed.

In April of 2007, Yonkers contracted with JVD to perform the concrete and related work for its project, the McLean Avenue Streetscape Improvement Program. The contract required JVD to secure a performance bond in favor of the City, which it executed along with the Colonial Surety Company. The specific language of the bond included a limitation that claims on the bond must be made within two years after the date of Final Payment under the contract. JVD agreed to hold Colonial harmless for any claim arising out of the performance bond.

In October of 2007, the City notified JVD that several loads of concrete supplied for the project fell short of the contractual specifications. Notwithstanding this notification, in October of 2008 the city issued a certification that JVD was entitled to 80% of the retainage on the contract, and paid JVD accordingly.  By the terms of the construction agreement this was defined as final payment. The unpaid 20% of the retainage was withheld as security for faithful performance of JVD’s obligation pursuant to the terms of the contract. In March of 2009, the City informed JVD that portions of the project had rapidly and prematurely deteriorated and that the contract required JVD to repair, replace, restore or rebuild the affected areas. JVD failed to do so and the City filed a claim with Colonial, which Colonial rejected. In January of 2013, the city commenced an action against JVD and Colonial for breach of contract. JVD, as indemnitor of Colonial, moved to dismiss the action against Colonial on the ground that it was time-barred by the language of the bond.

The Supreme Court of New York initially denied the motion agreeing with the City that the limitations period did not begin to run until payment of the remaining 1% of the contract. However, on appeal, the Second Department reversed that determination. It found that two sections of Article 28 of the contract, when read together, establish that Final Payment under the contract occurred upon the City’s certification of the work as complete and tender of payment thereon. It also found that the October 2008 certification and payment indisputably met the contract definition of final payment, even though 1% of the contract price was still retained by the city pursuant to the security provision of the contract. Since the City brought its claim against the Surety more than four years later in January of 2013, the court dismissed the City’s claim.

Practice Tip: Contracting parties utilizing performance bonds must pay close attention to the detailed language of the bond and the contract, especially when dealing with time limiting language on a bond that incorporates a term defined by the underlying contract.

When a Corporation Changes Its Address, It Should Update Its Address with the NYS Department of State Twice

Yes, that’s right, TWICE!  We all know that whenever a corporation changes its address, it should notify the Department of State, so that the Department of State (“DOS”) will be able to forward to the corporation’s new address any process (lawsuits) it receives on the corporation’s behalf.  You can accomplish this update by filing a “Certificate of Change” with the DOS.

However, a “Certificate of Change” is used by the DOS only to make certain changes: 1) change of county location, i.e., from Westchester to Rockland county; 2) change the address to where the Department of State forwards process received on the corporation’s behalf and 3) change of information regarding the registered agent.

That’s it.  Oddly enough, the “Certificate of Change” will NOT change the location of the corporation’s new “Principal Executive Office”.  For the DOS to officially change this item of information, you have to request the corporation’s last “Biennial Statement” from the Department of State (e-mail: corporations@dos.ny.gov), update the information on that form and file it with the DOS. 

This is important to do because the DOS will mail Biennial Statements to the address of the corporation’s “Principal Executive Office”, regardless of where the DOS forwards process.  And, if the corporation fails to file its Biennial Statement, because it never received it, it faces dissolution by the DOS.

One last bit of information: it’s $30 to file the “Certificate of Change” and $9 to file the updated Biennial Statement.    

What a Bank Gives a Bank Takes Away

Everyone would love to obtain a mortgage with no personal liability for the debt ( a “non-recourse mortgage”). While at one time they were not unusual, those days are long gone. They are virtually unheard of in residential mortgages, and rare in commercial mortgages, where the borrower is particularly strong and/or the loan has a low loan to value ratio.

Even in those cases, however, it is not unusual for the bank to “carve out” certain scenarios in which the borrower and the guarantor may be personally liable, such as fraud, theft, collecting rents and taking the money without paying the obligations of the building or project. It is rare for a borrower to object to a provision rendering him personally liable for, in effect, being a crook, since he never intends to be one.

Needless to say, it is important to read those “carve out” provisions carefully, for the devil is in the details. A recent case in Michigan, Wells Fargo Bank, Na v. Cherryland Mall Ltd.1 demonstrates that even if a clause in a mortgage is entitled “Non-Recourse” it may not be. In that case the mortgage had the usual carve out provisions, and two other clauses which contradicted and cancelled out the non recourse language. In one, the borrower was required to maintain its status as a single purpose entity (meaning, it could only own this particular property, so financial difficulties in any other business would not drag this one into Bankruptcy or have it responsible for obligations outside of the particular project).  The other was an obligation to remain solvent, and insolvency would also violate the first provision.

In other words, if the mall lost some of its tenants and was unable to pay its bills due to market conditions and became insolvent, the guarantors would be personally liable for the debt, the very thing the borrower wanted to avoid in the first place. So, under that mortgage the loan was non- recourse provided it was paid in full; otherwise, it was fully guaranteed.

When the loan defaulted and the bank foreclosed, it sought a deficiency judgment against the guarantors for the difference between the foreclosure sales price and the amount due. The borrower and guarantors argued unsuccessfully that the provisions relied upon by the bank made no sense and were contradicted by the non-recourse provisions which were an integral part of the decision to give the mortgage in the first place. Not so said the lower Courts.

Luckily for the borrowers there was a new provision in the Michigan Statutes called the Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act which made such provisions unenforceable and the Act was found to be retroactive, so as to protest these defendants. We have no such Statute in New York. The moral is: do not assume because the Bank document calls the loan one thing that does not mean that other provisions make it something else. Your lawyer should read the loan documents very carefully to be sure tour non-recourse loan is just that.


1300 Mich. App. 361 (Court of Appeals 2013).

 

A lien is not timely filed if the lienor performs supervision within eight months prior to the filing of a lien, but there is no construction work for the improvement of the property during that time.

On January 15, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision holding that a lien is not timely filed if a lienor performs supervision within eight months prior to the filing of a lien, but there is no construction for the improvement of the property during that time.[1]

In 8th Ave. Recoveries Corp. v 111 Stellar 8 Owner, LLC,[2] the plaintiff sought to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien that had been assigned to it by a general contractor after it was filed on filed on February 2, 2011.  The contract between the owner and the general contractor required the general contractor to ensure that the site was safe.  The owner established that the general contractor did not perfom any construction work for the improvement of the property after April of 2010.  However, the general contractor’s employee testified that in his role as “construction supervisor,” he had continued to go to the project site everyday between April and November of 2010 and spent the full day there.  His duties consisted of “walking around and looking at the Property.”  The general contractor had not billed for these services in its final requisition for payment, including retainage, which was dated September 2, 2010 for the period through March 26, 2010.  However, the general contractor maintained that the supervisory services were the basis for the timely filing of the lien.

After discovery was completed, the owner successfully moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint and vacate the lien on the basis that it was not timely filed.  The Court found that “[w]hile supervision of construction work may be the basis of a lien, where the property is not being improved, there is nothing to supervise and thus no basis for a lien.”  The decision was based upon prior case law where valid claims for supervision had been for construction work that improved the property.  The owner’s counterclaim for wilfull exaggeration of the lien was also dismissed because such a claim was precluded where the lien was found to be invalid for any other reason other than wilfull exaggeration.

Based on this decision, potential lienors should ensure that they file their liens within eight months after they have completed construction for the improvement of the property, even if they provide supervisory services at the site after they have completed construction pursuant to their contract.  Furthermore, assignees should investigate the validity of a lien before accepting its assignment. 


 

[1] The decision was rendered by the Hon. Carolyn E. Demarest, J.S.C., a justice of the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County.

 

[2] 2014 WL 169764 (Table), 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 50027(U), 42 Misc 3d 1212(A) [Kings Co. Jan. 15, 2014].

 

Clarification sought on prevailing wage requirements

The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, has asked New York’s highest Court to answer the following two questions relating to prevailing wages:

  1.         What deference, if any, should a court pay to an agency’s decision, made for its own enforcement purposes, to construe section 220 of the NYLL [New York Labor Law]prospectively only, when the court is deciding the meaning of that section for a period of time arising  before the agency’s decision?
  2.        Does a party’s commitment to pay prevailing wages pursuant to NYLL section 220 bind it to pay those wages only for work  activities that were clearly understood by the parties to be  covered by section 220, or does it require the party to pay  prevailing wages for all the work activities that are ultimately  deemed by a court or agency to be “covered” by that portion of the statute? 

As the Court sates in Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP, 12-4901-cv, “This case raises two questions of New York State law that are  unsettled and of importance to the relationship between the State’s administrative agencies and its courts, as well as to the functioning of New  York’s labor law.”

This case was commenced against Simplex Grinnell for failure to pay prevailing wages for testing and inspection of fire alarm and suppression systems. During the litigation Simplex Grinnell separately asked the New York State Department of Labor for clarification as to whether the work was covered.  The DOL posted on its website certain matrices created by Simplex Grinnell indicating the work was not subject to prevailing wage requirements.   Subsequently however the DOL Commissioner ordered the matrices removed and issued an opinion letter indicating the work was indeed “covered” but would only enforce this interpretation prospectively.

The first question dealing with the “decision of how to treat agency determinations that are made separately  from a direct legal claim, and the extent to which the agency’s own prospective enforcement decision ought to bear upon that, separately brought, claim, will affect cases far beyond the particular question before us.”

The second question, deals with the question of intent of the contracting parties.  It is undisputed that Simplex Grinnell agreed to pay prevailing wages under the statute as interpreted by the agency and the courts at the time of contract.  What is not clear is whether Simplex Grinnell “also contracted to be bound by what the statute was ultimately read to require, even if that requirement was not clear to the parties when the contract was signed.”

The decision in this case can have far reaching effects in how contractors bid on projects involving prevailing wages and how they handle disputes involving prevailing wages.  We will continue to monitor this case and will report on the Court of Appeals’ decision.

 

Project Owner Not Covered by Supplier’s Insurance

Construction project owners usually draft contracts that require their direct contractors and their subcontractors and their suppliers to name the owner and the owner’s lenders as additional insureds in their general liability policies. When that does not happen, or when sufficient attention is not paid to the details of what is provided by lower tier subcontractors and suppliers when they arrive at the project site, upstream contractors and owners could find themselves without insurance they thought they had bargained for.  Whether such coverage is in place depends upon what is stated in the lower tier subcontractor’s or supplier’s insurance policy. 

In a recently reported case an owner hired a general contractor, who in turn hired a subcontractor, who in turn purchased concrete from a supplier.  When one of the supplier’s workers was injured, the worker sued upstream from the supplier, including the owner.  The owner demanded that the supplier’s insurance company defend and indemnify him. The supplier’s insurance company refused, so the owner commenced a declaratory judgment action against the subcontractor and its concrete supplier’s insurance company, seeking to have the lower court declare that the supplier’s insurance company must provide liability coverage to the owner as an additional insured.  The insurance company moved to dismiss the action and lost, so it appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department.

The supplier’s insurance policy provided that an organization is added as an additional insured:  

 

“when you (supplier) and such … organization have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement that such … organization be added as an additional insured on your policy.”

 

The supplier’s insurance company argued to the appellate court that because there was no written agreement between the owner and the supplier requiring that the owner be added as an additional insured to the supplier’s insurance policy, the policy did not require the insurance company to provide liability coverage to the owner.

The owner pointed out that the supplier’s insurance policy contained a provision with the following title:  

 

Additional Insured – Owners, Lessees or Contractors – Automatic status when required in construction agreement with you.

 

This, the owner argued, automatically made the owner an additional insured because the supplier and the subcontractor had previously entered into a purchase order for the concrete, in which the supplier agreed to “assume all the obligations and risks which … (the subcontractor) assumed towards (the owner)”. 

The appellate court was not persuaded, however, saying that the owner’s reliance on a title of an insurance policy provision, “cannot alter … the effect of the unambiguous language in the body of the clause itself”, which required a written agreement between the supplier and the owner requiring the supplier to name the owner as an additional insured on the supplier’s insurance policy.

The appellate court also rejected the owner’s argument that the incorporation by reference language in the subcontractor/supplier purchase order established the written agreement between the owner and supplier to name the owner as an additional insured.  The court said such a reading required the court to read terms into the policy that does not exist.  The supplier’s insurance policy did not say that there only be some writing. Rather, it said that there must be a written contract between the supplier and the owner requiring the supplier to include the owner as an additional insured. 

Because, such a contract does not exist here, the supplier’s insurance company is not obligated to provide insurance coverage for the owner.

Situations such as the one the owner found itself in here can be avoided by proper drafting of insurance provisions, including flow-down requirements, and, equally important, by verifying that those provisions are followed before access to the project site is granted by the owner to contractors, subcontractors and suppliers.

Changes in the New York City Building and Administrative Code in the Aftermath of Hurricane Sandy

In light of the devastating effects of Hurricane Sandy on the New York City area, research and subsequent proposals have been requested by the New York City Council to try and minimize the harm that may be caused from any future events. At the request of the Council, Urban Green (which serves as the New York Chapter of the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC)), was tasked with researching how buildings might remain more sustainable and habitable during and after such severe weather. These proposals were released in a report by Urban Green’s Building Resiliency Task Force in June 2013. As of November 14, 2013, fifteen of the twenty nine suggested legislative changes have been passed into law by the NYC Council, with many others having been introduced and under consideration.

Many of these new laws pertain to changes in the building code, and apply to older structures as well as new construction. One of the first proposals passed into law requires that “vulnerable building elements”, of new or renovated buildings (such as electrical services, fire protection systems, compressed gas or material tanks, and vent piping), must be located above the flood line. In hospitals, these systems must be located above the 500 year flood elevation. Conversely, another accepted proposal eases current code requirements, to better allow for voluntary relocation of telecommunications systems and fuel oil storage, so that they can be moved above the flood zone. Specifically, fuel oil storage, which was limited to 330 gallons per story above the lowest floor, may now be increased to up to 3,000 gallons on the “lowest story above the design flood elevation.”

Additional code changes require that buildings having large common areas, or housing essential services, are now required to have ATSM compliant, impact resistant glass. This only applies to buildings being newly constructed or remodeled. In another change, all buildings are required to have rain and impact resistant louvers for ventilation and exhaust ducting.

The Task Force also recommended that natural gas be further promoted as a fuel system for generators, as natural gas delivery methods are traditionally more reliable during emergencies than heating oil, and because natural gas is cleaner burning. Based upon these recommendations, the City Council approved legislation that eases certain regulations which discourage the use of natural gas, and also allows buildings more versatility in determining what essential electrical based services to keep in service with generators during an emergency situation.

In addition, certain buildings will be required to install “quick-connect” hookups to ease the transition from regular service to that needed for temporary generators and boilers. This requirement, however, has fairly limited application, as it applies only to hospitals and nursing/group homes that are located in a designated flood zone. There is a twenty year window to comply with these measures.

Generally, these resiliency measures are aimed at passive changes, such as easing code barriers, rather than mandating change. In regards to the latter, one pronounced change is the requirement that buildings over five stories tall must now provide access to potable water in common areas. Such access cannot be in a bathroom, and must be over a sink or drain. This requirement is based on the limits of the NYC water supply, which only provides enough internal pressure to supply water up to the fifth floor of a building without additional building pumps. This law will apply to new and existing buildings; existing structures have eight years to comply with this requirement.

Additional legislation requires that where there are toilets or faucets that require electricity to function, that at least one faucet and one toilet in each bathroom must be capable of operating without external electrical power for at least two weeks. The law applies to both commercial and residential buildings. In dwelling units, however, only one faucet and toilet per unit (rather than one per bathroom) must comply with this regulation.

Other sanitary related measures require backflow valves to protect from overflows in buildings, and to protect plumbing systems and components that have openings below the flood level elevation. Additionally, new systems and components, including plumbing fixtures, will be required to be elevated above the flood elevation specifications.

Enacted changes also include an easing in outside barrier requirements, which allow building owners to be more proactive in diverting floodwaters by allowing flood shields to extend into the current public right of way in temporary situations. It further allows for use of temporary stairs and ramps to be used to access exits above the flood line.

Additional proposals will be passed into legislation in the coming months and Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, will continue to provide updates on the status of this legislation.