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Notice of pendency cannot be extended after it expires.

On June 13, 2012, the Second Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York issued a decision holding that a lapsed notice of pendency cannot be extended.

In Ampul Electric, Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 96 A.D.3d 790 [2d Dept. 2012], the mechanic’s lien foreclosure action was commenced in October 2006 and a notice of pendency was filed at that time. A notice of pendency is required to extend a lien and to maintain a public lien foreclosure action, but it expires after 3 years unless an application is filed to extend the notice of pendency for another 3 years for good cause.

The Supreme Court judge stayed the lien foreclosure action in March of 2009 because one of the parties filed for bankruptcy. In June of 2010, the lienor withdrew its claims in the Bankrupcty Court. In July 2010, the lienor moved in the Supreme Court to extend the notice of pendency nunc pro tunc (i.e., “now for then”, or retroactively). The defendants filed a cross-motion to cancel the notice of pendency. The Supreme Court denied the lienor’s motion and granted the defendants’ cross-motion to cancel the notice of pendency.

The Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court, finding that an expired notice of pendency is a nullity and may not be revived. Pursuant to CPLR 6513, the notice of pendency had to be extended before it lapsed. Here, the notice of pendency expired in October 2009 such that the application to extend it was untimely. Since the stay of the action did not appear to apply to the notice of pendency, notices of pendency should be extended before they lapse even when an action has been stayed. Even though you may not be able to prosecute your action or lien, you will have to incur legal fees to maintain your action alive even during a stay.

N.B. This decision applies to Notices of Pendency in connection with PRIVATE liens. Those in connection with PUBLIC liens are extended 3+ years; i.e., permanently. See Yula, 342 NYS2 673 and Belt, 457 NYS2 632 (3rd, 1982); 469 NYS2 1023 (lv. to app. den’d).

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP.

Court Of Appeals Upholds Insurance Carrier’s Right to Deny Coverage to Additional Insureds Based on Misrepresentation by Named Insured

One of our prior Legal Alerts addressed the pitfalls of simply relying on a certificate of insurance with respect to coverage under insurance policies. A recent decision by the New York State Court of Appeals in Admiral Insurance Co. v. Joy Contractors, Inc. No. 93, NYLJ 1202559115718, at *1. June 12, 2012, underscores the need to obtain and review a full and complete copy of any insurance policy in which you or your company are named as additional insured so that you can confirm that you are actually covered.

Joy Contractors, Inc. was working as the concrete superstructure subcontractor on a luxury high rise condominium project located at 303 East 51st Street in Manhattan. A tower crane operated by Joy Contractors, Inc. collapsed on March 15, 2008 causing seven deaths, dozens of injuries and the destruction of a nearby building. Pursuant to its subcontract with the general contractor, Joy Contractors, Inc. was required to name the general contractor and project owner as additional insureds under its comprehensive general liability and excess policies.

At the time of the collapse, Joy carried a comprehensive general liability policy provided by Lincoln General Insurance and an excess policy provided by Admiral Insurance. The general contractor and project owner were named as additional insureds under the insurance policies. Apparently Joy Contractors, Inc. identified it as a drywall installer that did not perform exterior work in its application for insurance coverage.

Following the crane collapse, the general contractor and project owner sought coverage under the insurance policies obtained by Joy contractors, Inc., including the excess policy issued by Admiral Insurance. Admiral Insurance denied coverage to the general contractor and project owner because, among other things, the insurance policy was issued based on representations by Joy Contractors, Inc. in its insurance application that it was a drywall installer that did not perform any exterior work.

Admiral Insurance filed a lawsuit seeking a complete rescission of its insurance policy to avoid responsibility for any claims arising out of the crane collapse because the accident occurred as a result of Joy Contractors, Inc.’s work as a concrete superstructure subcontractor and not a drywall installer.

Initially, the lower courts held that issues regarding coverage of Joy Contractors, Inc. did not affect Admiral Insurance’s responsibility to provide coverage for the additional insureds (the general contractor and the project owner) based on the longstanding principal that an insurer has separate obligations to each of the insureds, and that wrongful actions or misleading information of an insured might relieve the insurer of its obligation to that particular insured, but not of its obligations to other insureds.

However, the New York State Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the lower courts and upheld Admiral Insurance’s right to deny coverage to the additional insureds because of the misrepresentations by Joy Contractors, Inc. in its insurance application. The Court of Appeals held that because Admiral Insurance believed it was providing coverage insuring for the risks associated with interior drywall installation and not the obviously much greater risk presented by exterior construction work with a tower crane at a height many stories above grade, it was not required to provide coverage for the general contractor and project owner.

Certificates of insurance do not tell the full story about what is and what is not actually covered in an insurance policy. Those certificates only identify the name of the carrier and the limits of liability. The policy and the endorsements are the only documents that identify who and what are actually covered and the circumstances under which a carrier is required to provide coverage.

It is highly recommended that you consult with your construction attorney and insurance broker to review your contracts and insurance policies under which you are named as an additional insured to ensure that you are obtaining the coverage and protection you need to avoid being left without insurance coverage.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Liquidation of First Sealord Surety, Inc.

On February 3, 2012, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania ordered First Sealord Surety, Inc. (“FSSI”), a surety licensed to do business in NY, NJ, and CT, into liquidation. Pursuant to the liquidation order, any FSSI surety bond, surety undertaking or policy still in effect as of February 3, 2012 will continue only until the earlier of the following: (1) thirty (30) days after the entry of the liquidation order, (2) the expiration of the bond, undertaking, or policy by its own terms, or (3) the date when the obligee or insured replaces the surety bond, undertaking or policy with equivalent coverage in another reinsurer or surety, or otherwise terminates the policy. All claims against FSSI, along with proof of said claims, must be filed on or before October 5, 2012. Claimants are barred from commencing actions against FSSI after the date of the of the liquidation order, unless express approval is obtained from the liquidator, and pending actions against FSSI are stayed.

Additional information about this liquidation and a copy of the proof of claim form are available at:

www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/offices___organizational_charts/9304/first_sealord/1088423.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

The Diversion of Trust Assets by a Public Owner Does Not Automatically Relieve a Surety from Its Obligations Under Its Performance Bond to the Owner.

Sureties should take note that where a public owner admittedly participates in a diversion of trust funds, by applying a progress payment owed to its Contractor to a debt owed by the Contractor on a different project, the obligations of the surety to the public owner, under the performance bond, are not automatically discharged. So says a divided Court of Appeals in a case decided April 3, 2012.

In this breach of contract action, the construction project was undertaken by a Contractor for a School District. As their agreement required, the Contractor secured a performance bond from a Surety, incorporating the terms of the construction contract. While the project was under way, the School District received a notice from the NYS Labor Department (DOL), requiring the School District to withhold money to cover sums owed by the Contractor on a prior project, unrelated to the present one. DOL later authorized the School District to release those moneys to the Contractor, except for $214,000 that the School District was to forward to DOL to satisfy the Contractor’s earlier debt. School District did forward the $214,000 to DOL, with Contractor’s consent.

Progress by Contractor on the project was then so slow that School District terminated Contractor and turned to Surety to complete the project. Surety refused, resulting in this breach of contract action. Surety defended the School District’s action on the ground that Article 3-A of the Lien Law made all of the moneys payable to Contractor a trust fund to cover claims by others that might arise out of this project and that School District’s payment of the money to the DOL on an unrelated project was a breach that canceled the Surety’s obligation. By a 5-to-2 majority decision, a divided Court of Appeals says no, the Surety is not discharged from its obligations under the performance bond.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that, “whether the School District’s payment of contract funds to DOL as [Contractor]’s assignee violated the Lien Law is irrelevant to [S]urety’s obligation, because [Surety] did not perform by funding completion of the work upon [Contractor]’s default as required under the performance bond. As such, and as found by the courts below, [Surety] is not subrogated to the rights of the article 3-A trust beneficiaries as a completing surety and lacks capacity to raise any alleged violation of the Lien Law.”

Sureties should now be aware that, as a result of this case, the decision not to complete a project, after its principal has been defaulted and terminated, may result in the surety’s liability to the owner for completion costs, despite that owner’s diversion of trust funds from the project.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Scaffold Law Only Encompasses Work at a Building or a Structure, Not Work Involving the Manufacturing of a Product to be Used in a Building or Structure.

You may recall our previous Legal Alert, Vol. 5, No. 10, in which we addressed how a general contractor can escape the clutches of liability that New York Labor Law § 240(1) can impose.

Labor Law ¬ß 240(1) (often called the “scaffold law”) requires that “[a]ll contractors and owners and their agents…who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect…scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes…[which are to be] constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.”

But what about companies that produce and/or manufacture products off-site that are later used at a project site? Can they be held liable under the scaffold law if they don’t protect their employees while they are on ladders, scaffolds, etc. and engaged in the manufacturing process? And can a contractor be liable too, since the product will ultimately be used at the project?

The answer is apparently no. The New York Court of Appeals recently held in Dahar v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., 18 N.Y. 3d 521 (2012), that the scaffold law does not impose such a wide liability net. And for a very simple reason: the product that is being manufactured is not a building or a structure, even if it’s going to be a part of it.

The plaintiff, Michael Dahar (“Dahar”) was an employee of third-party defendant West Metal Works, Inc. (“West”). West had manufactured a seven foot tall steel wall module for its customer, defendant Bechtel National, Inc. (“Bechtel”). Bechtel was going to use the module at a nuclear power plant, where it would provide support for piping.

The module had to be cleaned prior to its shipment. As you have likely surmised, Dahar is the West employee that was cleaning the module, who fell to the ground when the ladder that West had supplied him broke. Dahar sustained injuries serious enough to warrant a lawsuit.

So, Dahar sued Bechtel and West (as well as some other parties who are not relevant to this particular issue), arguing that they had violated the scaffold law, by virtue of West supplying a faulty ladder, and by virtue of Bechtel being the owner of the wall module. Dahar’s argument is straightforward: I was cleaning a product that was to be an integral part of a structure, and the ladder West provided broke, thereby causing my injuries – West and Bechtel should pay. Id. at 524.

This argument did not pass muster with the two lower courts, nor with the highest court of New York. While the term “structure” has been given a very liberal meaning by New York courts, the Court of Appeals drew the line at products, stating that “…the logic of plaintiff’s argument here would expand the protections of Labor Law ¬ß 240(1) even beyond manufacturing activities; the statute would encompass virtually every “cleaning” of any “structure” in the broadest sense of the term.” Id. at 526.

The good news here is that the courts have provided some favorable clarity for manufacturers and contractors. Manufactured products, even if integral to the project building or structure, are not within the purview of Labor Law ¬ß 240(1), and therefore, a manufacturer’s and/or contractor’s potential liability will not extend in a similar situation to that of Dahar.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

City Charter Bars Contractor’s Claim – Harsh Reminder of what to Know when Contracting with Municipalities

Statutes of limitations set time periods by which a lawsuit must be commenced. Under New York’s statute of limitations, a breach of contract claim must be brought within six years from the date upon which the cause of action accrued. Contractors should be aware that their contract may substantially reduce the statutory period to bring an action. Likewise, local and state laws may reduce the period to bring an action in a contract dispute against municipal corporations and public benefit corporations.

In Frank Tricarico Contractors, Inc. v. City of New Rochelle (2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 02450 [2012]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed, a dismissal of a breach of contract claim, by a contractor that performed work for the City of New Rochelle, as time-barred. In Contractors, the City of New Rochelle entered into contract whereby contractor was to provide trenching for underground services to install conduit at an agreed upon price. After partial completion of the job, the contractor submitted a requisition to the City of New Rochelle, and shortly thereafter filed a Notice of Claim with the City dated July 5, 2006, setting forth a claim for “a sum in excess of $500,000.” By letter dated July 19, 2006, the City rejected Plaintiff’s claim. Although, the Notice of Claim was rejected contractor continued work on the project until about May 2008, and during this time took no further steps to commence legal action. On August, 30 2008, contractor filed a Summons and Complaint seeking an unpaid contract balance of $200,688.03.

The City quickly moved to dismiss the claim based on the one year statute of limitations. The City of New Rochelle Charter Section 127, perhaps unbeknownst to contractor, states “all actions brought against the city upon a contractual liability, expressed or implied, must begin within one year from the time when the cause of action accrued.” The Trial Court dismissed the action rejecting contractor’s contention that his claim did not accrue, i.e., the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until completion of work on the project. The Appellate Division agreed stating that “the period of limitations began to run when its damages became ascertainable, which occurred in this case on or before the date on which plaintiff filed its initial notice of claim.” Thus, contractor’s breach of contract claim was barred.

Courts do not have discretion to extend the statute of limitations periods. Contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and materialmen far too often lose out on their right to bring a lawsuit. Acting quickly when disputes arise can make the difference between full recovery and a complete loss not to mention avoiding responsibility for attorney’s fees and litigation costs.

Please be advised you should contact an attorney to ensure proper commencement of an action due to the highly technical and rigidly enforced accrual dates (when the time to bring an action starts) and notice of claim requirements (how to notify a municipality). As of April 23, 2012, the table below provides a summary of the current notice of claim deadlines and the statutes of limitations for contract disputes with some local municipalities and authorities. Contractors have to be mindful of two periods of limitations: the Notice of Claim deadlines and the Statutes of Limitations. It is necessary to comply with both otherwise your claim will be lost.

MUNICIPALITY*NOTICE OF CLAIM DEADLINESSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONSSTATUTE / RULE
New York StateWithin 6 months of accrual6 yearsCourt of Claims Act § 10 CPLR § 213
TownsWithin 6 months of accrual & 40 days prior to commencing action18 monthsTown Law § 65
VillagesWithin 1 year of accrual & 40 days prior to commencing action18 monthsCPLR § 9802
School DistrictsWithin 3 months of accrual & 30 days prior to commencing action1 yearEducation Law § 3813
Fire DistrictsWithin 6 months of accrual & 40 days prior to commencing action18 monthsTown Law § 180
New York City1 month prior to commencing action6 yearsNYC ADC § 7-201 /CPLR § 213
City of New Rochelle30 days prior to commencing action1 yearCity Charter § 127
City of NewburgWithin 3 months of accrual6 yearsCity Charter § C6.47
City of Beacon30 days prior to commencing action1 yearCity Charter § 9.10
City of Port Jervis90 days prior to commencing action1 yearCity Charter § C11-1
NYCSCAWithin 3 months of accrual & 30 days prior to commencing action1 yearPublic Authorities Law §1744
MTA6 yearsCPLR § 213
NYCHA30 days prior to commencing action6 yearsPublic Housing Law §157
DASNY6 yearsCPLR § 213
PORT AUTHORITY60 days prior to commencing action1 yearUnconsol. Laws § 7107

* Accrual dates and notice of claim requirements not identified.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Recent Cases Breaching the Rule that “Willful Exaggeration” of a Mechanic’s Lien Can Be Determined Only at the Trial of the Action to Foreclose the Lien.

Articles 1 through 3-A of New York’s Lien Law have, as their bedrock purpose, the protection of those who perform labor, or furnish materials, for the improvement of real property in the State. Few things are simpler than to follow the checklist in Lien Law ¬ß 9 to complete a notice of lien (for a lien on a private improvement; the requirements for the contents of a notice of lien are found in Lien Law ¬ß 12) and to serve and file the lien notice.

While the lien notice must be prepared with some care, and the procedures for service and filing followed precisely within deadlines set forth in the statute, a facially valid, timely, and properly served notice is a powerful, and inexpensive, weapon for the unpaid contractor or supplier.

Moreover, once the notice of lien is on file, although to be sure it can be “bonded off” (or paid!) generally the party against whom the lien is filed will not readily be able to get rid of it. For the private owner, of course, a mechanic’s lien is a cloud on title, and may be an event of default under a mortgage. While publicly-owned real property cannot, of course, be foreclosed upon (public liens run only against unpaid contract balances) a general contractor, against whom a public or private lien is filed, may have funds withheld, which can cause problems in paying other “downstream” parties. Plus, the general contractor against whom a lien is filed may go into default under his contract by reason of the lien, incur difficulties with sureties, lenders, etc.

Because the notice of lien is so easily filed, and there is no judicial or other oversight (apart from a clerk who will verify only that the notice looks proper as to form) the device is sometimes abused. While the lienor is at liberty to insert any figure he wishes as the dollar amount for which the lien is filed, to deter undue exuberance in this regard, the Legislature has provided Lien Law ¬ß¬ß 39 and 39-a. Section 39 makes a “willfully exaggerated” lien void, forbids the lienor to file another or further lien for the same claim as one judicially determined to be void, and provides a summary procedure for the speedy vacatur of second or subsequent liens filed in violation of the prohibition.

Lien Law ¬ß 39-a goes further, and provides that, in an action in which the court shall have declared a lien to be void by reason of willful exaggeration, the lienor may be required to pay costs incurred to bond off the invalid lien (or interest on funds deposited to discharge the lien), reasonable attorneys’ fees, and an amount stated in the statute as being equal to “the difference by which the amount claimed . . . in the notice of lien exceeded the amount actually due or to become due thereon.” Notwithstanding the language just quoted, as it is willfulness, rather than error, which the statute is intended to deter, recent case law states that the damages recoverable will only correspond to the extent by which the lien was willfully exaggerated, not any greater amount by which the lien, although incorrect, was not willfully over-stated.

A problem with Lien Law ¬ß¬ß 39 and 39-a is that each section contains language that the finding of willful exaggeration must be “in an action or proceeding to enforce a mechanic’s lien.” Long ago, courts inferred from such language that a determination of willful exaggeration could only be made upon the trial of the action to enforce (foreclose upon) the lien. Since that the wheels of litigation grind slowly, not to mention that the statute allows a generous amount of time between the filing of the lien and commencement of the foreclosure action (which time may be extended, variously by court order or in some cases by a simple filing) often an unhappy result will be that the trial of a willful exaggeration claim may arrive only years after the lien notice was first filed.

At stages of the litigation prior to trial, generally liens will not be vacated on motion, other than for defects mentioned in Lien Law ¬ß 19(6) (private liens) or ¬ß 21(7) (public improvement liens). Essentially, these provisions allow the lien to be vacated only where “it appears from the face of the notice of lien that the claimant has no valid lien by reason of the character of the labor or materials . . . for which a lien is claimed,” or there is a clear formal defect in the lien notice, or the same was not duly and timely filed.

Based on the foregoing, courts have held – and some continue to hold – that absent one of the grounds stated in Lien ¬ß 19(6) or ¬ß 21(7), a court lacks “inherent power” to summarily discharge, on motion, a lien claimed to be willfully exaggerated, and that the requisite proof that the lienor “deliberately and intentionally exaggerated the lien amount,” which proof can be made only at trial.

Notwithstanding the numerous cases so holding, however, now and then there have been cases in which summary judgment finding willful lien exaggeration has been granted or, more significantly, upheld on appeal (as appellate decisions are more influential than trial-level decisions). If you have a strong case that a lien against you has been willfully exaggerated, and you would like to dispose of the lien without waiting months or years for the case to come to trial you should immediately contact your construction attorney.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Mechanic’s Liens – Lot Retitling & Subdivision

In a recent New York construction law case an issue arose when a Mechanic’s Liens was placed on retitled/subdivided lot. New York State Lien law Lien Law ¬ß 9 requires “that the notice of lien shall state…the property subject to the lien, with a description thereof sufficient for identification; and if in a city,…, its location by street and number, if known.” This case highlights the need for an experienced attorney to draft Notice of Mechanic’s Liens to avoid the potential that the lien be discharged, and further to avoid costly litigation over potentially defective liens.

HAI MING CONSTRUCTION CORP., Plaintiff, v. 258 DEVOE LLC, Defendant
2011 WL 5041802 (N.Y.Sup.)
October 19, 2011

The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the motion by a general contractor seeking discharge of record of Notice of Mechanic’s Lien, dismissal of lien foreclosure action, cancelation of the Amended Notice of Pendency, and request for costs and expenses for the action.

In HAI MING CONSTRUCTION CORP., v. 258 DEVOE LLC, defendant, 258 Devoe LLC was assigned rights under a general contractor agreement with plaintiff, Hai Ming Construction Corp. Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff demolished and constructed three new buildings on Lot 9 (Block 2920) located at 258 Devoe Street.

On March 15, 2007, defendant requested that Lot 9 be subdivided into Lots 15 – 18 with new addresses of 260, 264, and 268 Devoe Street. On October 24, 2007, plaintiff filed a Mechanic’s Lien for alleged non-payment under the general contractor agreement for the claimed amount of $386,614.48. The lien was subsequently renewed on October 17, 2008, and further extended by Notice of Pendency filed on September 29, 2009.

Defendant contended that plaintiff’s lien was invalid, it toto, because it did not comply with the provisions of Lien Law ¬ß 9 since it failed to adequately describe the property. Defendant contended the lots subdivision existed as on March 15, 2007. In support, defendant referred to the New York City Department of Finance “alteration book,” which reflected the subdivision into separate lots beforeplaintiff filed the lien on October 24, 2007. Plaintiff countered that the subdivision was not effective until December 5, 2008 supported by a certified copy of the Digital Tax Map which indicated the effective date was December 5, 2008.

The sole issue for the Court was whether the inclusion of the superseded Lot 9, and the omission of the new Lots 16-18 and the new street addresses of 260, 264, and 268. The Court found adequate precedent to determine that if a description that identifies the property is “in substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute sufficient to provide jurisdiction to the courts to enforce it.” The Court referenced SGS Assoc., LLC v. R.A. German Constr. Corp. (15 Misc.3d 1135) where an architect and a contractor were allowed to amend their Notices of Lien when property owner filed a declaration of condominium and subdivided three lots into nine new tax lots prior to the filing of a Notice of Lien.

The Court was unconvinced by defendant’s reasoning noting that while a search of the New York City Department of Finance Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) would have shown, under a single Lot 9, a April 20, 2007, mortgage against 258, 260, 264, and 268 Devoe Street the search provided insufficient notice as to the existence of a subdivision. The Court ultimately determined that the superseded lot numbers were nevertheless sufficient to identify the property and was not fatal to the validity of the liens. A fair and liberal reading of the lien law required the finding that the description of the property was in substantial compliance with Lien Law ¬ß 9.

While the plaintiff was granted leave to amend its lien, nunc pro tunc, it is important to remember to take the time to verify information in a Notice of Mechanic’s Lien, and search all available databases. Title work is easily performed by a competent lien company or attorney, and is well worth the money. As the Court pointed out a search of the proper database would have provided forewarning of the mortgage and pending address change so plaintiff could add specific language to account for these changes. This would have precluded that defendant from bringing the proceeding in the first place. Further, it is important to remember that the stakes are high because an incorrect address in your lien is usually a fatal defect that will result in the discharge of the lien.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Showing of Actual Supervision Required Before a General Contractor must Indemnify an Owner for Damages Paid to an Injured Person

Construction site accidents and related injuries are a constant concern to contractors and owners, as are the lawsuits that may follow. A general contractor's agreement with a property owner may provide that the general contractor supervise and direct work. But what happens when the owner seeks to be indemnified by the general contractor for injuries a worker sustained at the site? Must the general contractor indemnify the owner where they have contractual authority to supervise and control work? Does the answer change if the general contractor has contracted the work out to someone else and didn't actively supervise and/or direct the work?

The New York Court of Appeals has provided an answer in McCarthy v. Turner Const., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 369,953 N.E.2d 794 (2011).

Boston Properties and Times Square Tower Associates, LLC (the "Owners") own retail space at7 Times Square. Ann Taylor, a non party to this action, leases space from the Owners for its clothing store. In December of 2004, Ann Taylor contracted with John Gallin & Son, Inc. ("Gallin") to expand its retail space. The contract with Gallin required that Gallin "supervise and direct the [w]ork, using [its] best skill and attention[, and] be solely responsible for and have control over construction means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures for coordinating all portions of the [w]ork." Id. at 372, 796. Furthermore, Gallin was required to take "reasonable safety precautions to protect the workers from injury." Id.

Gallin then engaged Linear Technologies, Inc. ("Linear") to install phone and data cables, via a purchase order. Linear subsequently subcontracted its work out to Samuels Datacom, LLC ("Samuels") to perform all of the installation. The plaintiff, while performing electrical work for Samuels, failed to defy Newton's law and fell from a ladder, sustaining injuries. Id. at 372, 796-797.

The plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the Owners and Gallin, asserting common law negligence and violations of Labor Law § 200, 240(1) and 240(6). Id. at 372, 797. The Owners cross-claimed against Gallin for, in relevant part, common law indemnification. Gallin then implead Linear, who implead Samuels. Id.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the Owner's cross-moved, seeking contractual indemnification against Gallin. The Supreme Court refused to require Gallin to indemnify the owners, finding that Gallin did not have supervisory authority over Samuel's work and did not provide any tools or ladders to the subcontractors, nor would Gallin have directed Samuel on how to perform its work. Id. The Owners and Gallin then settled with the plaintiff for $1.6 million, contributing $800,000 each.

The Owners then moved for summary judgment on common law indemnification against Gallin, which was likewise denied due to their failure to establish Gallin's direct control over the work. This denial was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department. Id.

The case reached the Court of Appeals, who likewise affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Owners argued that Gallin did not need to directly supervise and control plaintiff's work, because Gallin's contract with Ann Taylor assumed sole responsibility and control, and likewise provided Gallin with the authority to exercise same. Id. at 374, 798.

The Court of Appeals refused to require that every general contractor owe a common law duty to indemnify the owner, where they aren't actively at fault. Id. New York case law does impose such a duty on ''parties who actually supervised and controlled the injury-producing work." Id. at 376, 799. However, the Court held that a contractual responsibility to supervise, ''where another party, with authority engaged in actual supervision of the injury-producing work", is insufficient to create such a duty. Id. at 377,800.

Therefore, "if a party with contractual authority to direct and supervise the work at a job site never exercises that authority because it subcontracted its contractual duties to an entity that actually directed and supervised the work, a common law indemnification claim will not lie against that party on the basis of its contractual authority alone." Id. at 378, 801. In conclusion, Gallin did not have to cover the Owners' $800,000 share of the settlement.

The take away lesson here is that if you are going to subcontract your authority to supervise, control and direct work at a site, do so completely. Do not subsequently engage in such supervision and direction if you want to avoid common law indemnification for sustained injuries, which in this case, is a savings of $800,000. Of course, the wording of your subcontract will control.

 

Dispute resolution procedure making contractor the sole arbiter of all claims and disputes under the subcontract was void for illegality under the law of trusteeship and was unenforceable

The facts of the case start out in a fairly common fashion. General Contractor, entered into a prime contract with the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York (DASNY) with respect to a public improvement construction project. General Contractor, then entered into a written subcontract agreement (the subcontract), with Subcontractor for the project.

The subcontract contained a not so uncommon “Dispute Resolution Procedure,” which made the General Contractor “the sole arbiter of all claims, disputes, and questions of any nature” subject only to limited judicial review if “the determination by the sole arbiter was made in bad faith or fraudulently.”

Subcontractor began its performance of the subcontract, and timely completed its installations. During the course of the project, General Contractor requested and directed Subcontractor to perform additional work, which was beyond the scope of the subcontract. Subcontractor alleges that despite due demand, General Contractor has failed and refused to pay it this outstanding subcontract balance in breach of the subcontract. Subcontractor also asserts a delay claim against the General Contractor. Subcontractor sued the General Contractor for breach of contract, to foreclose its mechanics’ lien, to enforce the Lien Law Article 3A Statutory Trust, and the General Contractor’s surety as a beneficiary of the statutory payment and performance bond.

The Subcontractor was able to overcome the General Contractor’s and Surety’s motion to dismiss by arguing that the Dispute Resolution Procedure in the subcontract is void for illegality under the law of trusteeship and is unenforceable as a matter of law. Under Lien Law ¬ß3-A, General Contractor, as a general contractor on a public improvement construction project, is a statutory trustee with respect to all funds it received from the owner, DASNY, for work performed on the project and that, as a subcontractor to General Contractor, Subcontractor is a statutory beneficiary of that trust. The Subcontractor noted and the Court agreed that the Dispute Resolution Procedure runs afoul of the General Contractor’s obligations to Subcontractor as a statutory trustee because it creates a conflict of interest in permitting General Contractor to determine whether to retain public trust funds for itself or compensate Subcontractor for work performed.

The Dispute Resolution Procedure was also found to run afoul of the Subcontractor’s mechanics’ lien rights. The Dispute Resolution Procedure creates three conditions precedent to the subcontractor’s right to recover compensation to which it would be entitled under the Lien Law: exhaustion of the described alternative dispute resolution procedure before an arbitrator controlled by defendant contractor; the filing of a notice of claim with the contractor; and the pleading of compliance with the preceding procedural requirements, without which the subcontractor is deemed to have waived the right to recover, all of which violate the public policy reflected in the Lien Law by providing for a waiver by the subcontractor of “all rights and remedies against the Contractor which are not expressly provided for by the said [Dispute Resolution Procedure]”, including “any claims of breach of contract or other alleged bases for damages or relief against the Contractor”.

Subcontractor’s claims against the surety bond also survived the motion to dismiss as the General Contractor’s attempt to apply the notice and alternative dispute resolution procedures contained in the subcontract to defeat Subcontractor’s rights under State Finance Law ¬ß137 is clearly in contravention of the public policy reflected in the statute and repeatedly recognized in the caselaw.

Subcontractor’s breach of contract claims were dismissed as the Court found the Dispute Resolution Procedure to be enforceable as it pertains to those specific causes of action. That portion of damages asserted for delay, as contained in the payment bond claim was also reduced on similar grounds.

It is important to note that the Court specifically found that the Subcontractor in this case had substantially complied with the Notice of Claim provisions in the agreement.

This case like others before it serves to highlight a contracting party’s need to consult experienced construction attorneys in negotiating and understanding their agreements and to then be vigilant in following the provisions of the contract. If those prerequisites are met you will have provided your construction litigation attorney with the ammunition needed to fight for your rights.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.