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Changes in the New York City Building and Administrative Code in the Aftermath of Hurricane Sandy

In light of the devastating effects of Hurricane Sandy on the New York City area, research and subsequent proposals have been requested by the New York City Council to try and minimize the harm that may be caused from any future events. At the request of the Council, Urban Green (which serves as the New York Chapter of the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC)), was tasked with researching how buildings might remain more sustainable and habitable during and after such severe weather. These proposals were released in a report by Urban Green’s Building Resiliency Task Force in June 2013. As of November 14, 2013, fifteen of the twenty nine suggested legislative changes have been passed into law by the NYC Council, with many others having been introduced and under consideration.

Many of these new laws pertain to changes in the building code, and apply to older structures as well as new construction. One of the first proposals passed into law requires that “vulnerable building elements”, of new or renovated buildings (such as electrical services, fire protection systems, compressed gas or material tanks, and vent piping), must be located above the flood line. In hospitals, these systems must be located above the 500 year flood elevation. Conversely, another accepted proposal eases current code requirements, to better allow for voluntary relocation of telecommunications systems and fuel oil storage, so that they can be moved above the flood zone. Specifically, fuel oil storage, which was limited to 330 gallons per story above the lowest floor, may now be increased to up to 3,000 gallons on the “lowest story above the design flood elevation.”

Additional code changes require that buildings having large common areas, or housing essential services, are now required to have ATSM compliant, impact resistant glass. This only applies to buildings being newly constructed or remodeled. In another change, all buildings are required to have rain and impact resistant louvers for ventilation and exhaust ducting.

The Task Force also recommended that natural gas be further promoted as a fuel system for generators, as natural gas delivery methods are traditionally more reliable during emergencies than heating oil, and because natural gas is cleaner burning. Based upon these recommendations, the City Council approved legislation that eases certain regulations which discourage the use of natural gas, and also allows buildings more versatility in determining what essential electrical based services to keep in service with generators during an emergency situation.

In addition, certain buildings will be required to install “quick-connect” hookups to ease the transition from regular service to that needed for temporary generators and boilers. This requirement, however, has fairly limited application, as it applies only to hospitals and nursing/group homes that are located in a designated flood zone. There is a twenty year window to comply with these measures.

Generally, these resiliency measures are aimed at passive changes, such as easing code barriers, rather than mandating change. In regards to the latter, one pronounced change is the requirement that buildings over five stories tall must now provide access to potable water in common areas. Such access cannot be in a bathroom, and must be over a sink or drain. This requirement is based on the limits of the NYC water supply, which only provides enough internal pressure to supply water up to the fifth floor of a building without additional building pumps. This law will apply to new and existing buildings; existing structures have eight years to comply with this requirement.

Additional legislation requires that where there are toilets or faucets that require electricity to function, that at least one faucet and one toilet in each bathroom must be capable of operating without external electrical power for at least two weeks. The law applies to both commercial and residential buildings. In dwelling units, however, only one faucet and toilet per unit (rather than one per bathroom) must comply with this regulation.

Other sanitary related measures require backflow valves to protect from overflows in buildings, and to protect plumbing systems and components that have openings below the flood level elevation. Additionally, new systems and components, including plumbing fixtures, will be required to be elevated above the flood elevation specifications.

Enacted changes also include an easing in outside barrier requirements, which allow building owners to be more proactive in diverting floodwaters by allowing flood shields to extend into the current public right of way in temporary situations. It further allows for use of temporary stairs and ramps to be used to access exits above the flood line.

Additional proposals will be passed into legislation in the coming months and Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, will continue to provide updates on the status of this legislation.

A Notice of Mechanic’s Lien is Void if it Fails to State the Date when Materials were Manufactured eventhough Not Delivered to a Project

Potential lienors must keep in mind that the categories of information required to be furnished in the contents for a notice of mechanic’s lien by the Lien Law must be provided, even under circumstances where a literal reading of that statute would not seem to require the information to be furnished. So found a lienor, who had its lien discharged by a court in a recent case.

In 40 West 53rd Associates Ltd. Partnership v. H. Weiss Equipment Corp., 2011 WL 3022207 (N.Y.Sup. July 18, 2011), a tenant occupied the subject project (the “Property”) and contracted with F.J. Sciame Construction Co., Inc. (“Sciame”) to perform construction work on the Property. Sciame subsequently retained the H. Weiss Equipment Corp. (“H. Weiss”) to perform additional work in connection with the Property. H. Weiss filed a mechanic’s lien against the Property alleging that it was owed $222,000.00 for materials manufactured but not delivered to the Property (specifically manufactured hoods for installation in a commercial kitchen).

The owner of the Property brought on a special proceeding to discharge the lien. In its petition, the owner argued that the lien was defective and invalid, because it failed to comply with the requirements of New York Lien Law ¬ß9(6) (“Lien Law ¬ß9”), which provides that a notice of lien “shall” state the “time when the first and last items of work were performed and materials were furnished.” New York Lien Law ¬ß9(6). Specifically, the owner argued that the information stated on the notice of lien was insufficient, because it failed to provide the required information regarding the time when the first and last items of work were performed and materials were furnished. In response, H. Weiss argued that its lien was valid, because the materials were never delivered to the Property and that, therefore, the required dates could not be provided in the notice of lien.

The court disagreed with H. Weiss, noting that a failure to set forth any date regarding when the first or last item of work was performed or materials supplied constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the notice of lien. The court also noted that Lien Law ¬ß9(6) exists in part to ensure the timely filing of a lien. In this case, the court found that because the notice of lien failed to provide the owner with any information regarding when the items were ordered, manufactured or produced, H. Weiss’ mechanic’s lien did not comply with the notice requirements of Lien Law ¬ß9(6) and, therefore granted the owner’s petition and discharged the lien.

Lienors should be aware that when filing a mechanic’s lien, all the categories of information required to be furnished by the Lien Law should be supplied, even if a literal reading of that statute would not seem to require the information. Of course, potential lienors should consult with an attorney knowledgeable in this field to be sure that their notice of mechanic’s lien complies with the Lien Law and is valid and enforceable.

Pay Attention to Those Notice Provisions in Your Contract

The importance of accurately following the notice provisions in your construction contract has been reiterated by the Appellate Division inDiPizio Construction Company, Inc. v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 2013 WL 2678511 (4th Dept. 2013). DiPizio Construction Company, Inc. (“DiPizio”) entered into a contract with the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (“NFTA”) to construct and/or renovate runways and taxiways at the Buffalo Niagara International Airport. DiPizio encountered delays during the project, and sought extensions of time from the NFTA to complete its work. The NFTA denied DiPizio’s requests for extensions, and DiPizio asserted delay claims for the extra costs it subsequently incurred.

Following the completion of the project, DiPizio sued the NFTA, seeking damages under several theories, including for breach of contract due to the NFTA’s refusal to grant DiPizio’s requested extensions of time. In a motion for partial summary judgment, the NFTA argued that DiPizio had failed to strictly comply with the requisite contractual notice provisions when it asserted its delay claims.

The contract specifically required that claims for extra costs “be in sufficient detail to enable the [e]ngineer to ascertain the basis and amount of said claims…any claim for equitable adjustment on account of delay for any cause must be accompanied by a revised schedule reflecting the effects of the delay and proposals to minimize those effects.” Id. at 1 (emphasis supplied).

The above-cited contractual provision clearly places a burden on DiPizio to first prove the amounts of any extra costs allegedly incurred because of a delay, and to further assist the NFTA in remedying the delay with minimization solutions.

DiPizio did not provide the requisite detail, and, in countering the NFTA’s argument of non-compliance with the notice provision, argued that it did not provide said detail because it was too difficult to precisely calculate those extra costs. It is unknown if DiPizio included such a statement in his actual notice. Unfortunately for DiPizio, the Court disagreed and upheld the lower court’s determination that DiPizio was not entitled to recovery under its breach of contract cause of action.

This is certainly not a new principle in New York. The oft cited Court of Appeals case, A.H.A. General Construction v. New York City Housing Authority, 92 N.Y.2d 20 (1998), held, in part, that strict compliance with contractual notice provisions was a condition precedent to suit or recovery for extra costs, where the contractor has not otherwise been prevented from complying. Notice provision for extra costs can impose even more stringent requirements than those in DiPizio’s contract – such as descriptions as to each laborer associated with the extra cost, the materials and equipment associated with the extra cost and daily reports for each and every day associated with the claimed delay, as inA.H.A. It is therefore necessary to refer back to the contract to remind oneself of those requirements.

DiPizio serves as a good reminder for all contractors: follow, to the letter, the requirements of notice provisions in your contracts, or else you may have to swallow those extra costs.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

In the Matter of the Liquidation of Ullico Casualty Company

On May 30, 2013, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware ordered Ullico Casualty Company (“Ullico”), a surety licensed to do business in NY, NJ and CT into liquidation. All insurance policies, surety bonds and contracts of insurance issued by Ullico shall be cancelled at 12:01 a.m. on the 31st day following the effective date of the Order of Liquidation or upon the specified expiration date, whichever is earlier. All claims against Ullico, along with proof of said claims, must be filed on or before June 30, 2014. Claimants are barred from commencing actions against Ullico after the date of the liquidation order and pending actions against Ullico are stayed. The liquidation order does not apply to other subsidiary companies that are part of Ullico, Inc. A copy of the liquidation order is available here. Additional information about this liquidation, including proof of claim form, will be updated here.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, L.L.P., at (914) 428-2100.

Connecticut Affirms Nullifications of Statutes of Limitation on Public Work Projects

The doctrine of Nullum Tempus is a legal doctrine whereby ordinary statutes of limitation do not apply to the government unless they are specifically made applicable. When the State had enacted its most recent statutes of limitation, it was presumed that the statutory language was broad enough to evidence the State’s intent to be bound by those time limitations.

Last November, in the case of State v Lombardo Brothers Mason Contractors, Inc. et. al., the Connecticut Supreme Court handed down a ruling which, it claimed, merely reaffirmed the common law doctrine of Nullum Tempus. However, as will be discussed below, by holding that nothing has changed, the Connecticut 1 Supreme Court has completely changed the way contractors, design and insurance professionals will have to approach public works projects.

The facts of the Lombardo Brothers case are relatively straightforward. The University of Connecticut system is a state-run university. The defendants were the various contractors who had worked on the design and construction of the library at the UConn Law School. Once the project was completed, the State found numerous defects with the construction which led to water infiltration. The state commenced its lawsuit in 2008 seeking reimbursement of the repair costs. It was not disputed that the case was brought well after the statutes of limitation expired. All parties moved to dismiss, and the State claimed that they were exempt under the Nullum Tempus doctrine. The Connecticut Supreme Court, relying on the “great public policy of preserving public rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers”, affirmed that Nullum Tempus has always existed in Connecticut common law, and that in the absence of specific statutory language making statutes of limitation applicable to the State (which was not present), they could not serve as a bar to these otherwise untimely claims.

In essence, the Connecticut Supreme Court held Nullum Tempus has always been a part of Connecticut law. However, the reemergence of this doctrine long presumed dead has led to concerns throughout the public works construction industry. For instance, as a result of the Court’s November 2012 decision, the design professional defendants here are defending a lawsuit relating to a building they designed between 18 and 20 years ago, and the contractor defendants are defending a lawsuit relating to a building they built between 16 and 18 years ago. The obvious issue which arises relates to records retention. In the digital age, this means not only retention of traditional paper records (which gets increasingly expensive when, as a practical matter, you cannot discard older records), but also the retention of obsolete software and computer systems capable of reading and showing plans, schematics and other documents which would be necessary to defend against these future claims.

Other practical considerations involve the sale and purchase of design firms. For instance, when you are purchasing a design firm, you are now purchasing (and effectively warranting) all of the past public work project designs the purchased firm undertook. Will the purchasing party’s insurance policy cover all of these projects? Does the subject of the purchase have any insurance that will cover these projects? Further, to the extent that a licensed individual sealed any of these plans, would liability follow the individual through death and the probate of his estate? If so, this would have to be addressed when the individual set forth his estate plans.

Contractors will have to deal with similar issues relating to insurance and bonding. As a practical matter, insurance agents and sureties, in calculating the amount of premiums to charge for a particular policy or bond, previously presumed that there would be some period after which they could be assured that they would no longer be exposed to liability. Now, with potentially perpetual liability, the premiums for these products is sure to be adjusted accordingly. Further, and similar to the issue faced by design professionals, potential perpetual liability will affect the sale or transfer of the contractor. The purchasing contractor will be assuming the liabilities of the purchased contractor and will have to effectively warrant the purchased contractor’s previous public work.

The above issues have been posed as open questions because the industry is only now coping with the effects of this decision. Clearly, each of the above issues, from document retention to effectively warranting the work of your predecessor to having to obtain insurance sufficient to cover claims made decades later, will impose a significant cost on design and construction firms undertaking state work. Accordingly, while the state may be trumpeting the Lombardo Brothers decision as a great victory, such a view may be shortsighted in light of the added costs which will necessarily find their way into competitive bids. As to the contractor or design professional looking to undertake such a project, they would be cautioned to discuss these perpetual liability issues with all those who they would normally involve in such a project (insurance and surety professionals, subcontractors and suppliers, amongst others) so as to ascertain the true cost of taking on the project so that these increased costs can be reflected in the bid.


1 New York and New Jersey courts have recognized the abolition of the Nullum Tempus doctrine in those states, while the doctrine is alive and well in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Lumbermens Mutual, American Manufacturers Mutual, and American Motorists Placed in Liquidation

An Order of Liquidation for Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. and American Motorists Insurance Co. was entered on May 8, 2013, by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. All direct policies and/or certificates of insurance and bonds issued by these companies shall be cancelled at 12:01 a.m. on the 31st day following the effective date of the Order of Liquidation or upon expiration date, whichever is earlier. These companies are licensed in 49 states and the District of Columbia. A copy of the liquidation order can be obtained here

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

The Prevailing Wage Loophole in Labor Law Section 220 is Closed…for Good

The New York Court of Appeals issued a decision on February 19, 2013, demonstrating that the prevailing wage loophole that once existed in Labor Law § 220 is officially closed.

In the Matter of M.G.M. Insulation Inc. v. Gardner, 2013 NY Slip Op. 01017 (2013), a not-for-profit volunteer fire department (the “Department”), located in the Village of Bath (the “Village”), sought financing for the construction of a new firehouse. Historically, the Department operated from a building that was owned and operated by the Village but had since grown inadequate for the Department’s needs. After the Village declined to take part in the construction of the new firehouse, the Department solicited bids for the job and selected R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. (“Taylor”) as its general contractor. Taylor then proceeded to hire a number of subcontractors to construct the various portions of the fire house.

Shortly thereafter, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued an opinion letter, concluding that the firehouse project was a public work and thus subject to the prevailing wage law. The subcontractors learned of the DOL’s determination and work on the project came to a halt. In an effort to keep the project on schedule, the Department agreed to indemnify Taylor and its subcontractors from any liability resulting from their failure to pay the prevailing wages. In the meantime, an administrative hearing was held on the question of whether the prevailing wage law applied to the firehouse project.

The Hearing Officer determined that the project was in fact subject to the prevailing wage law. Specifically, the Hearing Officer concluded that volunteer fire corporations, such as the one involved in this case, are the “functional equivalents” of municipal corporations making them “covered entities” under Labor Law ¬ß 220. Alternatively, the Hearing Officer concluded that the protection services agreement in place between the Department and the Village made the Department a public entity. Further emphasis was placed on the fact that the Village authorized and supported the firehouse project, the object of which was to provide protective services for the community.

Taylor petitioned for an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the Hearing Officer’s determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Hearing Officer’s decision and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the determination of the Hearing Officer.

In reversing the Hearing Officer’s determination, the Court of Appeals conducted an analysis using the framework of the two-pronged “Erie County” test arising out of Erie County Indus. Dev. Agency v. Roberts, 63 NY2d 810 (Ct App 1984). The first prong of the test considers whether the entity involved is a public agency as defined in the Labor Law, and the second prong considers whether the project meets the criteria of a public work.

In evaluating the first prong, the Court of Appeals noted that Labor Law ¬ß 220 covers contracts involving each of four specific entities: the State, public benefit corporations, municipal corporations, or commissions appointed pursuant to law. The Court found it undisputed that the Department was not one of the four entities listed in the statute and that it could therefore not be considered the “functional equivalent” of a municipal corporation. In dismissing the “functional equivalent” argument, the Court relied on its decision in the Matter of New York Charter School Assn. v. Smith, 15 NY3d 403 (Ct App 2010). There, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that charter schools are public benefit corporations because they serve a valuable public purpose and their existence is the result of a charter issued by a state or local municipal entity. Importantly, the Court of Appeals stated the following: “…while charter schools, like volunteer fire corporations, may be “quasi-public” in nature, they are not a specified public entity and thus, do not fit within the ambit of the statute.”

In finalizing its reversal, the Court of Appeals pointed out that in 2007, the Legislature expanded Labor Law ¬ß 220’s coverage to include contracts involving other types of entities, but only when it can be shown they were acting on behalf of the public entity. While under the amended statute the fire department likely would have been considered a public entity, the Court pointed out that the contract involved was entered into prior to 2007 when the amendment to the prevailing wage law did not exist. The Court of Appeals did not move on to the second prong of the Erie test since it determined the Department was not a public entity.

The importance of this case comes to life in Chief Judge Lippman’s dissenting opinion. There, Judge Lippman points out that the relevant provisions of the State Constitution and Labor Law have been judicially read as limiting the prevailing wage requirement to work contracted for by a public agency. Judge Lippman notes that despite this construction being addressed as mere dicta in Erie, such interpretation has stuck with unforeseen consequences. To highlight the misapplication of the prevailing wage law since Erie, and prior to its 2007 amendment, Judge Lippman briefly discusses the Matter of Pyramid Co. of Onondaga v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 223 AD2d 285 (3d Dept 1996). In that case, a highway ramp constructed by a private party pursuant to a State Department of Transportation permit was found to be a public work. However, the Appellate Division was compelled to deem it immune from Labor Law ¬ß 220’s prevailing wage requirement because, notwithstanding the State permit and the contemplated State ownership of the ramp once completed, the State had not itself contracted for the improvement.

The Onondaga case provides a prime example of the loophole that existed in Labor Law ¬ß 220 prior to its 2007 amendment. Specifically, the loophole allowed certain contracts to be exempt from the prevailing wage requirements simply because a public entity had not contracted for it. To address and essentially close this loophole, Labor Law ¬ß 220 was amended in 2007 to provide that the public agency contract requirement could be met not only by the already specifically enumerated public entities, but also by third-parties contracting for a public work on a public entity’s behalf. In Judge Lippman’s view, such amendment is on par with the Legislature’s original intent as to how the prevailing wage laws are to be applied.

In concluding his dissent, Chief Judge Lippman went on to state that had the contract between the fire department and R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. been entered into subsequent to Labor Law ¬ß 220’s amendment, it would have qualified as a prevailing wage trigger because (1) it was for the construction of a firehouse having as its purpose the provision of a quintessentially governmental service under municipal control; and (2) it was executed by a party (the fire department) contracting on behalf of a municipal entity.

Recommendation:

When entering into a contract that may at first glance appear private and therefore exempt from Labor Law ¬ß 220’s prevailing wage requirements, one must consider whether they are contracting with a third-party on behalf of a public entity. While such a situation would not act as a prevailing wage trigger in contracts entered into prior to Labor Law ¬ß 220’s 2007 amendment, as Chief Judge Lippman pointed out this loophole is now closed and the prevailing wage requirements are applicable to such contracts. The cases above highlight the importance of being completely aware of the status of the entity you are contracting with. Such awareness can prevent unnecessary project delays, litigation, and in extreme cases, criminal convictions.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Arbitration Award in Favor of Subcontractor

On February 13, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a decision holding that an arbitration award in favor of a subcontractor disposed of the general contractor’s claim that the subcontractor willfully exaggerated its mechanic’s lien.1

In 5 Bros., Inc. v D.C.M. of New York, LLC, 39 Misc 3d 711 [Kings Co. 2013], a subcontractor and general contractor arbitrated their claims pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause contained in their agreement. The arbitrator, Melvin J. Kalish, rendered a decision in favor of the subcontractor in the amount of $76,539.13 and indicated that the “monetary award … is intended to include all claims of [the subcontractor], its subcontractors, and suppliers” and directed the subcontractor to “simultaneously [with payment] provide … a Satisfaction of Mechanic’s Lien of the $207,000.00 Mechanic’s Lien.” Thereafter, the general contractor, who had a pending claim against the subcontractor for willful exaggeration of its mechanic’s lien in a separate lien foreclosure cause of action that was pending before the Court, moved to (1) vacate the arbitration award, (2) for summary judgment dismissing the subcontractor’s lien claim, and (3) for summary judgment on its lien exaggeration claim.

Among other things, the general contractor argued that (1) “the award [was] irrational because it [was] based on an exaggerated mechanic’s lien, pointing to the disparity between the award amount of $76,539.13 and the subcontractor’s lien amount of $207,000.00” and (2) “the award must [be] vacated as indefinite and contrary to public policy because the arbitrator was without authority to address the willfully exaggerated lien claim, thus precluding [the general contractor’s] recovery of treble damages” under Lien Law ¬ß 39-a.

Judge Demarest denied the general contractor’s motion for summary judgment on its lien exaggeration claim on the basis that the correct amount of the lien had already been determined in the arbitration. Judge Demarest determined that the arbitrator did not “irrationally” rely upon or endorse the subcontractor’s lien given the substantial documentary evidence, testimony, and briefs which the arbitrator relied upon to determine the amount of the arbitration award. Furthermore, Judge Demarest found that the arbitrator was within his authority to dispose of the claim for willfull exaggeration of the lien, and did so since the “issue [was] necessarily subsumed within the agreement to arbitrate” and since the arbitrator did not award any penalties. The Court determined that the arbitrator had assessed the relative values of each parties claims, weighed the contentions of both sides, made findings well-supported by the evidence, and that in finding the subcontractor’s claim meritorious, the arbitrator implicitly rejected the general contractor’s exaggeration claim. The Court ruled that the parties effectively waived litigation of the viability of the lien claim in agreeing to arbitrate the dispute as to compensation under the contract.

As demonstrated in this case, construction professionals and their counsel should take the time to understand the claims covered by mandatory arbitration clauses, and to raise all of their claims to the arbitrator during the arbitration.


Failing to Comply with the Timing Requirements Surrounding Discovery Demands may have Harsh Consequences…

In the course of a lawsuit each party is given an opportunity to inspect the other side’s documents and question key witnesses. This exchange of information is broadly referred to as discovery. New York’s rules of procedure and the judges charged with enforcing those rules provide guidance as to how and when this exchange is to occur. This is to ensure that our judicial process moves quickly and efficiently without sacrificing judicial integrity. On July 11, 2013, the Appellate Division, Third Department, issued a decision demonstrating the importance of strictly complying with the timing requirements surrounding discovery demands.

In Hameroff and Sons, LLC v. Plank, LLC, 2013 N.Y. Slip. Op. 05271 (2013), the parties negotiated a stipulation of settlement requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant $105,000 in satisfaction of its obligations under a construction contract and requiring Defendant to, among other things, complete the building. Neither party complied with the stipulation of settlement thus leading to litigation and eventually a discovery schedule being put into place by the court.

After Defendant, although having failed to comply with Plaintiff’s December 2010 discovery demands, moved for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff cross-moved to compel discovery. The Court denied Defendant’s motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the settlement agreement entered into was ambiguous, and granted Plaintiff’s cross-motion, directing Defendant to serve discovery responses within 20 days. Defendant again failed to comply and the Supreme Court set another deadline for discovery responses to be served.

While the Defendant again failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s discovery demands, it did allow Plaintiff to review documents. Defendant, however, did not provide written responses to the demands and Plaintiff complained of irregularities and missing documents without any response from Defendant. Finally, 15 months after initial service of the discovery demands, Plaintiff moved, pursuant to CPLR ¬ß 3126, for preclusion and issue resolution. After giving the parties extensive opportunities to submit additional papers, the Supreme Court partially granted Plaintiff’s motion and found that Defendant willfully failed to comply with discovery demands and was therefore precluded from offering evidence concerning the stipulation of settlement.

On Appeal, it was determined that the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant from offering certain evidence. Trial courts have “broad discretionary power in controlling discovery and disclosure, and only a clear abuse of discretion will prompt appellate action.” The Appellate Division placed emphasis on the fact that between December 2010 and March 2102, Plaintiff repeatedly requested that Defendant respond to its discovery demands. Despite such requests, established deadlines and three court orders, Defendant, without objecting to the demands, still failed to respond.

The Court further reasoned that an inference of willful non-compliance arose given that Defendant repeatedly failed to respond, and because of documentary evidence establishing that Defendant deleted certain electronic communications after being aware of the potential for litigation, and possibly after litigation had already begun. Although Defendant argued that the emails it deleted were irrelevant, the Court found that relevance of destroyed documents is presumed if the destruction was intentional or willful.

For these reasons, it was held that the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant from offering evidence on a particular issue.

Recommendation:

Whether plaintiff or defendant, a party to a lawsuit must always strive to strictly comply with the time requirements surrounding discovery demands. In the event that compliance is not possible, communication should always be maintained with your attorney and adversary to prevent situations such as the one presented above. Further, if litigation appears possible in the future, no matter how slight the chances and how irrelevant certain documents may seem, electronic records and correspondence should never be deleted. Such deletions may lead to an inference of relevance, willful non-compliance, and can result in sanctions disallowing the presentation of evidence on essential issues. For all of these reasons it is important to manage your time wisely and always produce documents to your attorney when requested. As in the case above, the failure to timely do so may have harsh consequnces.

Court Construes an “EIFS” Insurance Exclusion to Include all Work on Structure, Roofer Left without Coverage

Exterior Insulation and Finish Systems, or “EIFS”, is a multi-layer wall system attached to the exterior of a residential or commercial structure. EIFS generally consists of a substrate, an adhesive to adhere the system to the building, an insulating layer (generally stiff EPS foamboard), a reinforcing mesh and the exterior finish. Users of EIFS are attracted by the variety of exterior finishes which are available, many of which resemble stucco, at a relatively low cost. Also, because of the insulation component of the system, energy savings are touted. Further adding to EIFS’ popularity is its durability and need for only minimal maintenance.

Problems arise, nevertheless, where the EIFS system is not sealed properly. In such situations, water can infiltrate and reach the structure of the building. Perversely, because the EIFS system is a sealed system, the infiltrating water has no place to go and, instead of manifesting itself as a small leak, it remains in the structure-hidden-where it can cause rotting of the underlying structure. By the time the first rotting is discovered, the problem is actually widespread and the damage extensive.

Liability insurers came to the realization that the failure of an EIFS system was certain to lead to significant exposures. Accordingly, insurers issuing CGL policies began to draft exclusions of coverage related to EIFS systems, and many contractors ceased to install EIFS or any work which interfaced with an EIFS system. However, the recent case of First Mercury Insurance Company v. Miller Roofing Enterprises highlights just how a broad EIFS exclusion can be enforced.

The facts of Miller Roofing were not disputed. Miller Roofing was retained by the owner to replace three roofs in 1998. The structures on which the roofs were installed were clad in EIFS, although the roof did not interface with the EIFS system, and Miller Roofing performed no EIFS-related work. In 2006, one of the roofs began to leak, causing water infiltration into the owner’s showroom. Miller Roofing attempted some repairs but, after some heavy rain and snowstorms in 2007, significant amounts of water damaged the ceiling, walls, and product which was on the showroom floor.

The owner sued Miller Roofing for breach of contract and for negligence to recover for both the cost to remediate the roof, as well as the cost of the non-roof related items damaged in the flood. First Mercury accepted Miller Roofing’s defense under a reservation of rights, but then commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to disclaim coverage. The policy at issue contained the following EIFS exclusion:

This insurance does not apply to … “property damage” included in the “products-completed operations hazard” and arising out of “your work” described as … [a]ny work or operation with respect to any exterior component, fixture or feature of any structure if any “exterior insulation and finish system” is used on any part of that structure.

First Mercury moved for summary judgment on its complaint, contending that inasmuch as the building admittedly contained an EIFS system, the exclusion applied. Miller Roofing opposed, contending that the exclusion did not apply because the defective workmanship was to the roof, not the EIFS system and, in any event, Miller Roofing did no work involving the EIFS system. While the court credited Miller Roofing’s explanation that its work did not involve the EIFS-system, it held that such was irrelevant in light of the policy language triggering the exclusion if “any exterior insulation and finish system is used on any part of the structure” (emphasis supplied). As to Miller Roofing’s contention that First Mercury would be allowed to escape liability for any otherwise covered act at the building simply because EIFS cladding was placed on the exterior walls, the Court held that this was precisely the policy Miller Roofing paid for and signed, and the Court was constrained to apply the exclusion.

Clearly, a roofer is going to be performing work on the exterior of a structure. While insureds should always read the terms of their policies, a broker would be well advised that the best way to service such a client would be to see to it that exclusions such as the one the Court relied upon in Miller Roofing are removed or tailored as narrowly as possible so that the insured’s foreseeable work is not caught up in the breadth of the exclusion.