Skip to main content

Be Careful What You Lien For or You May Not Get It

Mechanic’s liens are a way for architects and engineers to protect themselves for work that they have performed and not yet been paid for. But what work can architects and engineers actually claim in a mechanic’s lien? When filing a lien in New York, the property owner against which the lien was filed has the right to ask for an Itemized Statement, outlining all the items, materials, and labor that are being claimed within the lien. (Lien Law § 38). Your description of the work performed or services provided can possibly form the basis for the lien to be disputed?

This type of dispute arose in a recent decision (1/6/16) in the case of Maverick Construction Services LLC v. 868 Broadway Corp.. The case began with an agreement between Defendants, Douglas Dey and 868 Broadway Corp., and Third-Party Defendant, Walter Sedovic Architects (WSA), whereby WSA agreed to provide certain architectural services for renovations and improvements to the premises at 868 Broadway, NY, NY. On July 7, 2011, WSA filed a Notice of Mechanic’s lien (the Lien) claiming that they were still owed $122,621.83 for services performed. On or about December 1, 2011, WSA assigned their rights, title, and interest in their claim against the Defendants, as well as the lien, to the Plaintiff, Maverick Construction Services LLC.

On August 27, 2013, in response to a Lien Law § 38 Demand, Maverick served an Itemized Statement setting forth the labor and materials for which WSA claimed a lien. On 1/24/14, per Lien Law§19(4) the mechanic’s lien was discharged by substitution of bond in the amount of $134,884, representing 110% of the amount claimed.  Upon Plaintiff’s filing of a motion per Lien Law §19(4) and CPLR §2508 for an order directing Defendants to post further security, the Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and argued that the Lien was defective and should have been cancelled and vacated pursuant to Lien Law § 19. Specifically, the Defendants argued that the work itemized by WSA and the Plaintiff, in its Itemized Statement, consisted almost entirely of generic charges for “construction administration” work, which does not qualify as “architectural work.” In order for the charges to be a valid basis for a mechanic’s lien filed by the architect, the Defendants argued that the work needed to specifically include supervision, management and control of the construction project. In opposition to the Defendants’ claims, the Plaintiff argued that the Lien is subject to a liberal construction, and that the validity of specific charges in the itemized statement are issues for trial.

The court ruled that the Lien met all the statutory requirements of Lien Law § 9; therefore the Lien was valid on its face. The court also concluded that because the Lien was valid on its face, the validity of specific “architectural service” charges under the Lien were to be determined at trial. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment to dismiss the lien was denied.

Although the architect in Maverick dodged the dismissal of its lien, the case serves to warn against filing a lien for services which do not fall under the Lien Law, and further demonstrates the importance of clearly itemizing the work that was performed and the services provided to ensure that it falls within the confines of the Lien Law.  In other matters, the courts have looked at statements provided by parties in support of liens. For example in Sperry v. Miller a statement furnished by a lienor which did not specify all items of skilled and unskilled labor furnished by the lienor and the various kinds of materials furnished for improvement failed to  comply with the requirements of Lien Law § 38. 5 N.Y.S.2d 249, 249-50 819 (App. Div. 1938). Additionally, itemized statements of the lienor consisting of copies of invoices, which the lienor asserted included all items of materials furnished, and lump sum statement of money representing labor furnished was also insufficient for the courts. Application of Seid, 219 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (Sup. Ct. 1961).

In order to protect your lien rights, make sure the services provided are allowable under the Lien Law and be very specific as to the services performed. Organization and proper documentation are the key.   

 

Selecting Counsel – The Right of an Insured Under a Reservation of Rights

Once an individual or business entity is sued, its first inclination is usually (rightfully so) to evaluate its available insurance policies and place its respective carriers on notice of the claim.  However, many times – especially in the complicated, litigious world of New York – Insurers agree to “defend” their insureds but “reserve their rights” with respect to indemnification or some other issue.  This leaves the insured in a precarious position:  Its defense is being funded, but it is unclear whose coffers will satisfy any eventual settlement or judgment.  Moreover, it risks insurance coverage – and conjointly carrier appointed defense counsel – “dropping out” at some point should the covered elements of a suit be severed from its uncovered components. 

Under these reservation of rights circumstances, where an insurer claims it is obligated to cover its insured only for certain particularized grounds asserted in the underlying law suit, New York courts conclude that an inherent conflict of interest is possible.  As a result, the law has become well settled:  An insured has the right to choose its own attorney and the reasonable fees associated with that representation must be paid by the insurer.1  This rule is so fundamentally entrenched that two judges of the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in the state) recently described it as “black letter law.”2  Moreover, even if the insurer chooses to file a separate law suit against the insured to declare the insurance policy inapplicable to the underlying claim, it must pay for the insured’s attorney’s fees to defend that separate suit as well, but only in the instance the insured is successful as against the insurer.3

Myriad benefits inure to an insured when it is allowed to choose its own counsel.  For example, it can select counsel:  1) experienced in a particular area of law (such as construction law); 2) familiar with representing individuals or business entities (regardless of size) as opposed to only advising insurers; 3) familiar with other aspects of its particular business; and 4) familiar with a geographic region, allowing for a “local counsel” advantage.  Moreover, the insured will have easier direct access to counsel, have the ability to work closer on the litigation decision making process, and will avoid the risk of the insurer appointed counsel “dropping out,” which necessitates the retention of new counsel who must “get up to speed” on the insured’s dime.  Finally, and most importantly, the insured may choose to be represented in the law suit by its own attorney who regularly represents it and is familiar with its business and key personnel.

However, all too often insureds are unaware of this right (and the concomitant advantages it bestows) because many insurers fail to advise of the entitlement.  In fact, there appears to be a split between certain jurisdictions in New York – apparently not yet resolved by the Court of Appeals – as to whether an insurer is obligated to advise the insured of its right to select counsel.4

Their insurers’ practices notwithstanding, insureds should be mindful of receiving a reservation of rights letter as it alters the relationship between the parties and upon receipt should seriously consider selecting their own counsel to represent them in the underlying litigation.


 

1 E.g., Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 401-02, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815 (NY 1981); First Jeffersonian Associates v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 262 A.D.2d 133, 134, 691 N.Y.S.2d 506, 506-07 (1st Dep’t 1999); City of New York v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 309 A.D.2d 779, 779, 765 N.Y.S.2d 802 (2nd Dep’t 2003); Elacqua v. Physicians' Reciprocal Insurers, 21 A.D.3d 702, 706-07, 800 N.Y.S.2d 469, 473 (3rd Dep’t 2005); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Ricci, 96 A.D.3d 1571, 1572, 947 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268 (4th Dep’t 2012).

2 QBE Ins. Corp. v. Jinx-Proof Inc., 22 N.Y.3d 1105, 1110, 983 N.Y.S.2d 465, 468 (2014) (Pigott J., Dissenting). 

3 Mighty Midgets, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 389 N.E.2d 1080 (1979) and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Ricci, 96 A.D.3d 1571, 1574, 947 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (4th Dep’t 2012)

4 See Elacqua v. Physicians' Reciprocal Insurers, 52 A.D.3d 886, 888-89, 860 N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 (3rd Dep’t 2008) (holding insurer has an affirmative duty to inform insured of right to direct counsel and ruling failure to do so a deceptive business practice in violation of GBL § 349), compare with Sumo Container Station, Inc. v. Evans, Orr, Pacelli, Norton & Laffan, P.C., 278 A.D.2d 169, 170, 719 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (1st Dep’t 2000) (commenting that cases cited by appellant due not impose an affirmative duty on insurer to advise of right to choose counsel).  See also QBE Ins. v. Jinx,  22 N.Y.3d at 1110 (Pigott J. Dissenting) (stating in dicta that insurer has an obligation to inform insured and citing to Elacqua, but failing to discuss Sumo or any other supporting authority). 

Another Battle Over Timely Proper Notice for Insurance Coverage

It happens.  Someone is injured on a construction site and everyone goes running to check on their insurance coverage.   We all know that insurance policies require notice of an accident, also known as an “occurrence”.  But what do you need to say in the notice in order to give “proper” notice?  That question was recently before New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals1.

It was a typical contractor- subcontractor relationship.  Contractor was performing a portion of its work with Subcontractor, when on October 20, 2008, Subcontractor’s employee was injured.  The subcontract required Subcontractor to name Contractor as an additional insured on Subcontractor’s commercial general liability policy and it also required Subcontractor to defend and indemnify Contractor for all personal injury or property damage claims arising out of Subcontractor’s work.  Contractor was first notified of the accident in late December 2009.    Contractor promptly notified its commercial general liability insurer, who, on January 27, 2010, sent a letter to Subcontractor, notifying Subcontractor that it agreed to defend and indemnify Contractor and hold Contractor harmless.  The letter also asked Subcontractor to notify its (Subcontractor’s) insurance company regarding the accident so Subcontractor’s insurance company could do its own investigation of the accident and claim.  On February 9, 2010, Subcontractor forwarded the letter to its insurance company along with a general liability notice of occurrence/claim form describing Subcontractor’s employee’s injury.  Additionally, by February 22, 2010, Subcontractor, at its insurance company’s request, also sent its insurance company a copy of the subcontract, which contained provisions requiring Subcontractor to defend and indemnify Contractor and to also name Contractor as an additional insured.

On April 15, 2010, after the injured employee sued Contractor and the property owner for damages arising from his injury, Contractor’s attorney wrote to Subcontractor’s insurance company demanding that it defend and indemnify Contractor in the injured employee’s lawsuit.   Contractor’s attorney noted in his letter that Subcontractor was required to defend and indemnify Contractor, and to name Contractor as an additional insured.  Contractor’s attorney also enclosed a certificate of insurance showing that Contractor was named as an additional insured on the Subcontractor’s insurance company’s policy which had been issued to Subcontractor by the insurance company.  Taking the position that the notice to it was late, Subcontractor’s insurance company denied coverage.  Subcontractor’s insurance company said that the initial letter it received from Contractor’s insurance company “framed” Contractor only as a claimant and not as an additional insured.

Contractor commenced a declaratory judgment action against Subcontractor’s insurance company to have the court declare that Subcontractor is obligated to provide insurance coverage to Contractor in the injured employee’s action.  Subcontractor’s insurance company moved to dismiss the action.  The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the action. Contractor appealed to the Appellate Division.  By a three to two decision the appellate court reversed the lower court and reinstated Contractor’s declaratory judgment action2.  The appellate court, concluded that the January 27, 2010 letter and form satisfied the requirements of the Subcontractor’s insurance policy to “see to it” that Subcontractor’s insurance company was notified of the accident “as soon as practicable”, and therefore the documentary evidence provided by Subcontractor’s insurance company did not establish a defense to Contractor’s claim as a matter of law. 

On further appeal to the Court of Appeals (based upon two dissents in the Appellate Division) the Court of Appeals wrote that “the rule in New York [was] that where a contract of primary insurance require[d] notice ‘as soon as practicable’ after an occurrence, the absence of timely notice of an occurrence [constituted] a failure to comply with a condition precedent which, as a matter of law, vitiate[d] the contract . . . [and][n]o showing of prejudice [was] required”.     The appellate court, said the Court of Appeals, properly set forth the issue as whether Contractor’s initial letter constituted notice of an occurrence under Subcontractor’s insurance policy.   That policy required that, “You must see to it that [Insurer is] notified as soon as practicable of an ‘occurrence’ or an offense which may result in a claim.”  Notice included, to the extent possible:  “(1) How, when and where the ‘occurrence’ or offense took place; (2) The names and addresses of any injured persons and witnesses; and (3) The nature and location of any injury or damage arising out of the ‘occurrence” or offense.”

The Court of Appeals rejected Subcontractor’s insurance company’s argument that the initial letter did not timely notify the Insurer of an occurrence.  The insurance company had argued that the letter only sought a defense and indemnification under the subcontract from the Subcontractor and that the letter did not expressly state that Contractor also sought coverage as an additional insured.  The Court of Appeals noted that the letter did not point to the indemnification provision in the subcontract; it simply requested a defense and indemnity under the contract, without specifically identifying either the indemnification or additional insured provisions.  Additionally, the Court of Appeals said, the letter requested that the Subcontractor put its insurance company on notice of the specific claim, and it also provided information about the identity of the injured employee, the date, the location and general nature of the accident, which is the information Subcontractor’s insurance company required in a notice from an insured about an accident. Given these circumstances, said the Court of Appeals, the evidence submitted by the Subcontractor’s insurance company did not conclusively establish a defense to the asserted clams as a matter of law. 

Thus, Contractor’s declaratory judgment action is allowed to continue in the lower court.  This does not mean that either side won or lost, just that the battle will continue, possibly to trial, with the end result being the lower court’s declaration regarding whether the Subcontractor is required to defend and indemnify the Contractor in the injured employee’s action.

Any accident or occurrence that involves personal injury or property damage on a construction project must be taken very seriously with respect to insurance coverage.  All contractors and subcontractors who could possibly be tied to the situation should immediately notify their attorney and seek advice and help to write proper and timely “notice” letters to all of the insurance companies that may possibly be called upon to provide coverage.  Contractors and subcontractors must remain vigilant and proactive in these situations so they avoid finding themselves battling with an insurance company over whether they provided the insurance company with timely and proper notice of the “occurrence”.  The risk of not being vigilant and proactive when it comes to construction accidents can be catastrophic to your company.  Don’t let that happen to you. 

 

1 Spoleta Construction, LLC v. Aspen Insurance UK Ltd., 2016 WL 1136297

2 Spoleta Construction LLC v. Aspen Insurance UK Limited, 119 A.D.3d 1391 (4th Dept. 2014)

An Explanation of New York’s Construction Workplace Safety Statutes

A common feeling of apprehension among contractors in New York State is compliance with New York’s workplace safety statutes.These statutes codify a common law duty of owners and general contractors to maintain a safe work environment.Labor Law §200 imposes a general duty on owners, general contractors, and/or their agents who have authority to control working conditions at the site to correct or protect construction workers from any unsafe conditions.If this duty is violated and such violations were a contributing factor to the cause of the accident, the owner(s) and general contractor(s) are liable for any resulting injuries.Labor Law §240(1), otherwise known as the “Scaffold Law”, imposes a specific duty on contractors and owners to provide appropriate scaffolding and other safety measures where workers are engaged in “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of building or structure”. Absolute liability is imposed under Section 240 if a worker is injured because such protections are insufficient.Finally, Labor Law §241(6) imposes a broader, nondelegable duty on owners, general contractors, and their agents to “provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety” to construction workers. These reasonable and adequate measures of protection are found in New York’s Industrial Code.

In the past, New York courts have been hesitant to dismiss claims involving violations of Labor Law §§200, 240 and 241.This trend continues, as reflected in the recent Court of Appeals decision in Barreto v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 25 N.Y.3d 426 (2015).In Barreto, the plaintiff was an asbestos handler employed by a contractor that was hired by the City of New York to perform asbestos removal from electrical cables underneath city streets.The contractor hired a site safety consultant, IMS Safety Inc. (IMS), to supervise the work and ensure that it was completed in a safe work environment.Plaintiff and several other workers climbed through a manhole and descended approximately 10 feet by way of a ladder while they completed the asbestos removal.The workers then exited the manhole and began to break down the containment enclosure surrounding the manhole.In doing so, plaintiff fell through the uncovered manhole. Plaintiff sued the City of New York, the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) on behalf of the Metropolitan Transit Authority, as well as the site safety consultant, IMS, alleging that the manhole should have been covered or surrounded by guardrails.

The trial  court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that he was the sole cause of his injuries because he disregarded his supervisor’s instructions by dismantling the containment enclosure before the manhole cover was replaced.   This decision was affirmed on appeal by the Appellate Division, but the Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the plaintiff’s claims and remitting the matter back to the trial court.  The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff could not have been solely responsible for his own injuries because it took at least two workers to lift and move the heavy manhole cover.   Therefore, plaintiff had established liability against the City, the NYCTA, and the MTA on his Labor Law §240(1) claims because 1) the accident was caused by a violation of the statute (here, the absence of an adequate safety device surrounding the manhole), and 2) the absence of such safety device contributed to the cause of the accident. 

The moral of the story: claims involving New York’s workplace safety statutes are rarely dispelled by the courts without a trial—particularly when a contractor fails to prove that it took adequate safety precautions to protect workers.  Thus, in order to avoid costly, complex litigation, contractors should pay particular attention to the obligations imposed by New York’s Labor Law.  Contractors not only have to make safety a priority, but in order to have any chance at staving off such a claim they must have the documentation to prove that safety was a priority, that workers were adequately protected from the usual hazards involved in construction and that but for the worker’s own actions the accident could not have happened. Good legal counsel can help you in advising you what documentation could be considered adequate to give your firm a chance at successfully defending such claims.

Public Owner Held Not Responsible for Contractor’s Escalation Costs

In Laws Construction Corp. v. Town of Patterson (135 AD3d 830, 2d Dept. 2016), plaintiff submitted a bid to perform work on a New York construction project and was deemed the lowest bidder. Thereafter, construction was delayed and plaintiff was given the option to withdraw its bid. However, plaintiff elected to not withdraw its bid after defendant’s Town Supervisor advised (in writing) that “there appears to be no prohibition regarding (the) application of contingency monies built into contracts toward potential increases in costs of material and labor due to the extended time factor.”

Plaintiff submitted fourteen applications for payment to defendant, none of which included escalation costs, and all of which were paid. Plaintiff’s fifteenth application for payment, however, sought reimbursement for increased labor and material costs caused by delay in construction, totaling $121,119.93, which defendant refused to pay. Plaintiff then commenced suit against defendant to recover the escalation costs.

In response to plaintiff’s suit, defendant argued that plaintiff was attempting to improperly modify a competitive bid after the fact. In response, plaintiff sought to impose the legal doctrine of promissory estoppel, which stands for the principle that a promise is enforceable by law when the promisor (i.e. defendant) makes a promise to the promisee (i.e. plaintiff), who relies on it to their detriment.

In affirming summary judgment for defendant, the Appellate Division held that barring “exceptional circumstances” involving wrongful or negligent conduct of a governmental subdivision, estoppel is generally not available against a municipal defendant with regard to the exercise of its governmental functions. The Appellate Division further held that the Town Supervisor’s written statement did not establish an agreement by defendant to pay for plaintiff’s increased costs. The Appellate Division also rejected plaintiff’s argument that an oral representation (made during construction) by an agent of defendant was sufficient to grant it rights by estoppel. Such an oral representation would be contrary to the terms of the relevant contract, which required changes in the contract sum and time to be effectuated via written change order.

The holding in Laws Construction Corp. v. Town of Patterson demonstrates the importance of complying with agreed-upon contractual mechanisms for adjusting contract sums and performance schedules. If and to the extent you are seeking an extension of time or additional compensation, whether by way of escalation or otherwise, such extensions or additions should be accomplished through valid written change orders, or, if possible, through fully executed amendments to the relevant agreements. As Laws Construction Corp. v. Town of Patterson illustrates, a vague written promise will not hold weight against a municipal owner.

Failure to Serve Proper Verified Statement of Trust Results in Contractor being Held Liable for Trust Fund Diversion

Article 3-A of New York’s Lien Law contains some of the most perilous legal requirements a construction contractor will face. Section 13 of the Lien Law makes it clear that the funds received on a construction project are trust funds for the benefit of contractors, subcontractors, laborers and suppliers. If those funds are not used exclusively to satisfy claims of contractors and suppliers for work performed on the project (“Trust Purposes”), contractors may be liable for trust fund diversion. Contractors have often heard of their obligations under Article 3-A, but usually lack a sufficient understanding of how to avoid the serious penalties that can arise from diverting trust funds (even inadvertently). New York’s construction trust fund statute is primarily intended to ensure that a contractor, subcontractor, supplier or worker (“Trust Beneficiaries”) involved in the improvement of real property, or of a public works project will be properly compensated for its services.

One overlooked tool in the arsenal of such beneficiaries to ensure payment is a Demand for a Verified Statement of Trust pursuant to Section 76 of the Lien Law. Under this section of the Lien Law, a beneficiary of lien trust funds on a construction project has the right to demand that the trustee provide a verified statement, in writing and under oath, setting forth the items contained in the books and records of the trust. A contractor has the statutory right to obtain a sworn statement from a trustee of the funds setting forth certain information including the dates and amounts of funds received and disbursed on the project, as well as the total amount of the funds still held. Moreover, a failure to serve a Verified Statement has been found by New York courts to be presumptive evidence that trust fund diversion occurred. A recent case shows the seriousness of the repercussions for failure to serve a proper Verified Statement.

In Anthony DeMarco & Sons Nursery, LLC v. Maxim Construction Service Corporation, et al., 130 A.D.3d 1409, (3d Dept 2015), the Appellate Division, Third Department, had an opportunity to examine the technical requirements of the Demand for a Verified Statement of Trust under Section 76 of the Lien Law. The underlying action involved a construction project at SUNY – Binghamton and a property owned by the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York. LeChase Construction Services, LLC (“LeChase”) was hired by the Owner as the general contractor. LeChase, in turn, hired Maxim Construction Service Corporation (“Maxim”) as the site contractor. Plaintiff subcontracted with Maxim to provide certain landscaping services for the project.

A payment dispute arose and Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit. Thereafter, Plaintiff served a Demand for a Verified Statement of Trust upon Maxim. Maxim failed to respond and Plaintiff filed a motion to compel a response, which was granted by the court. Maxim finally did serve a Verified Statement, but it was deficient. Plaintiff again moved to compel a response from Maxim. On that motion, the court found that Maxim’s response failed to comply with the requirements of Section 76 and, surprisingly, on its own motion awarded Plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of liability.  On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, agreed with the lower court and noted that Maxim’s Verified Statement failed to set forth “the dates and amounts of the trust assets receivable, trust accounts payable or trust funds received”, failed “to provide a sufficiently detailed breakdown of the total amount of payments made with trust funds” and failed to “provide a complete accounting of its trust assets receivable”. Interestingly, the Appellate Division also noted that while Maxim did provide a dollar figure for open change orders submitted to LeChase, the response lacked the requisite level of specificity.           

A beneficiary that successfully establishes a trust fund diversion is entitled to recover the diverted trust funds and receive damages for breach of the trust including interest, costs and attorneys’ fees expended in asserting a claim. In some instances a trustee may even be required to pay punitive damages. It is also important to note that corporate officers of a trustee may be personally liable for diverting trust funds. Further, such liability is not dischargeable in bankruptcy and, in extreme cases, can result in criminal prosecution that can include fines and even imprisonment for grand larceny. Contractors can safeguard against accusations of trust fund diversion by keeping accurate books and project records for every project. Clearly, given the perils of an improper response, it is advisable to contact a construction attorney to assist with the preparation of a Verified Statement.

Indemnified For Your Own Negligence? The Loophole in Action.

For years, since the enactment of Section 5-322.1 of the General Obligations Law, it has been known that an upstream party to a construction contract, such as an owner or a general contractor, cannot require a downstream contractor to indemnify the upstream party for its own negligence. The rationale is that the upstream party should not, through the use of greater bargaining power, be able to require the downstream party to serve as a substitute for its own insurance carrier. In such a situation, the upstream party would suffer none of the adverse consequences typically associated with its own negligence, such as having to incur the loss or place a claim against its insurance policy—and the consequences typically associated with a claim, such as having to pay a deductible, having the loss present on a loss run, and having its future rates take the loss into consideration and impact its ability to renew (or obtain a replacement for) the policy.

When the legislature enacted Section 5-322.1, it left a significant loophole open: the situation where the construction contract requires the downstream contractor to procure insurance and name all upstream parties as additional insureds on the downstream party’s insurance policy and insure and hold them harmless for all claims arising out of the downstream party’s work, including claims arising out of the that upstream party’s own negligence. This is a narrow loophole because, generally, when the claim arises out of the downstream party’s work, it is, at least in part, due to the downstream party’s negligence (or the negligence of one of its subcontractors). However, the recent case of Burlington Insurance Co. v New York City Transit Auth. (132 AD3d 127, [1st Dept 2015]) highlights that the loophole is not merely theoretical.

In Burlington, the named insured was the tunnel borer working for the NYCTA on a subway construction project. The construction contract required the tunnel borer to name the NYCTA and the lessor/owner of the property on which the project was located (which happened to be the City) as additional insureds on its general liability insurance policy, and to and have that insurance carrier hold them harmless from all claims arising from the borer’s work. The contract also required the NYCTA to identify all underground hazards, including buried pipes, cables, etc.

During the project, the tunnel borer bored into a live buried electrical cable, which caused an explosion and a serious injury to borer’s worker. Clearly, the borer had no way of knowing that it was boring into an unmarked cable and, therefore, cannot have been negligent. The NYCTA, on the other hand, was negligent in failing to identify hazard for the borer (and also breached the construction contract in that regard).

Both owner and the NYCTA were additional insureds under the borer’s policy, as was required under the construction contract. Upon the making of the claim, the borer’s carrier accepted the tender of owner’s defense and indemnification. The borer’s carrier also initially accepted the tender of the NYCTA, but only under a reservation of rights. The borer’s carrier later disclaimed as against the NYCTA when it came out that the borer was not negligent. The borer’s carrier ultimately settled the injured worker’s lawsuit on behalf of the owner for $950,000.

When the dust settled, the borer’s carrier, as subrogee of the City/owner, sued the negligent NYCTA to recover the monies it expended in settling underlying personal injury claim. In doing so, the carrier noted that the proximate cause of the accident was the NYCTA’s negligence in failing to mark the cable. In response, the NYCTA counterclaimed for coverage under the borer’s insurance policy.

After discovery, the parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to carrier, holding that the NYCTA, as the negligent party, owed it common law indemnification. The Appellate Division, however, reversed. In doing so, it held that the construction contract required the borer to procure insurance covering the NYCTA for all claims “arising out of” the borer’s work. Clearly, although the borer was not negligent, the injury arose out of its work—certainly, had the borer not been boring in that particular location, the accident would not have happened. Accordingly, since the injury “arose out of” named insured’s work, the additional insured NYCTA was entitled to coverage—even though it was solely negligent. Further, because an insurance carrier cannot seek subrogation from its own insured (even an additional, as opposed to a primary insured), the carrier here could not seek to recover its loss from the truly negligent party. In other words, the NYCTA—the sole negligent party—was held completely harmless for its own negligence by the borer’s insurance carrier. So, while the NYCTA got off scot-free, and although the borer could not be required to directly indemnify the NYCTA for its negligence, the borer had to suffer with a $1 million loss on its loss run and the corresponding increase in insurance premium (and difficulty in obtaining renewal coverage).

The lessons to be learned here are that the loophole is not merely theoretical, and that although a non-negligent party cannot be forced to directly indemnify a negligent party for such negligence, it can be required to procure insurance that would cover that negligence with no consequences to the truly negligent party—and suffer the resulting effects of having to do so. Various trade organizations are currently lobbying the state legislature to close this loophole. In the meantime, it would be advisable to consult with experienced construction counsel to review your construction contracts while they are still in the negotiation stage to try to tailor the insurance provisions so that they only cover situations arising out of the contractee’s negligence.

NYC’s New Crane Rules – Who’s Going to Pick Up the Tab?

By now, I am sure all of you have heard about the recent crane collapse in New York City, and many of you may have even seen the video. As a result of this incident, Mayor DiBlasio has unilaterally changed the operating rules for cranes within the City of New York. As many of you may know, the City previously required cranes to cease operating at wind speeds of 30 miles per hour or greater.
 
Following the recent crane collapse, Mayor DiBlasio has lowered the wind speed threshold at which crawler cranes must be shut down. Under the new set of rules currently in place, crawler cranes are to stop operating and go into safety mode under two scenarios:
  1. When there is a forecast of steady wind speed of 20 miles per hour or higher; or
  2. Actual readings of gusts of at least 30 miles per hour
Prior to the recent incident, cranes were allowed to operate until measured wind speeds reached 30 miles per hour or gusts reached 40 miles per hour. These parameters being self-monitored by the operator of the crane within the cab.
            
Additionally, in an effort to ensure compliance, Mayor DiBlasio increased the fine for failing to take precautions to $10,000.00 per infraction, up from the previous $4,800 level. To put this in perspective, according to data provided by the City, based upon 2015 weather data, under the old operating rules, cranes were only required to cease operating due to wind conditions for a total of seven (7) days during 2015. However, had the new rules been in place during 2015, cranes would have been required to cease operations due to wind conditions for a total of forty (40) days. Despite this estimate by the City, many in the industry feel this number is far too low. One NYC contractor already estimated that it would have lost 322 days on its current project over the last two years based on historical data had the Mayor's new rules been in effect. In response to this estimate, the Allied Building Metal Industries Inc. has authored an open letter to the NYC Building Commissioner, which is available (here).
            
Depending on how your contract reads, and whether you are working weekday or calendar day, that difference amounts, even by the City's conservative numbers, to anywhere between six to eight weeks of downtime that would have occurred during the 2015 construction year. Mayor DiBlasio has indicated that these new rules are only meant to be temporary, however the new rules are here now and must be dealt with on the many ongoing jobs across New York City until any further rules are announced.
            
Therefore, the question that comes to mind is, assuming 2016 weather is the same or near the same as 2015 weather, who is responsible for the cost of this additional significant downtime that is likely to occur if the new crane rules remain in effect? Before anyone panics, the first course of action is to consult your contract and see what your delay provisions provide for, and whether there is any mention of risk of regulatory or other governmental authority delays. Also, look over your contract for liquidated damages provisions and under what parameters you are entitled to an extension of time, be it compensated or uncompensated.
            
Given the potential cost impact, there is little doubt that there will be disputes as to responsibility for this downtime. In all likelihood, owners will take the position that this is an anticipated delay and therefore not compensable, while contractors will look at this as an uncontemplated delay for which they should be compensated. Regardless of what the ultimate answer to that question is, each contractor must examine its contract carefully, and make sure that when experiencing any of these delays, the contractual notice provisions are followed so as to preserve its rights down the road. Failing to do so may serve to prevent any possibility of recovery.

Contractor’s Failure to Follow DBE Requirements Results in a Hefty Back Charge

Any contractor who thinks DBE1(or MWBE2) requirements can be taken lightly, should read on.

In 2010 a paving contractor entered into a contract with Orange County to repave certain county roads.  The Notice to Bidders, which was part of the contract, told the bidders that at least 5% of the work on the project was to be performed by DBE subcontractors.  The general specifications to the contract also told the contractors that the work had to conform to the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) Standard Specifications for Construction and Materials dated May 1, 2008.   That specification indicated that the NYSDOT would decide whether the contractor’s efforts to obtain Disadvantaged/Minority/Women’s Business Enterprise were made in good faith in an effort to meet the DBE goals for the project.  The contract also entitled the County to make an equitable deduction from the contract price for any work not done in accordance with the project specifications.

The Contractor completed its work but did not satisfy the 5% DBE requirement.  NYSDOT advised the County that it was reducing federal financing for the project by the sum of $114,806.25, based upon its determination that the Contractor failed to carry out its DBE commitments in good faith.  The County, in turn, notified the Contractor that it was going to back charge the Contractor the same amount.  

The Contractor sued the County for breach of contract.  The County moved for summary judgment, and the Contractor cross-moved for summary judgment.  The Supreme Court granted the County’s motion dismissing the Contractor’s cause of action to recover $114,806.25, and it denied the Contractor’s cross-motion.  The Contractor appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department3.

In a short decision, the appellate court said that the County had established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as the evidence submitted by the County demonstrated that the contract required at least 5% of the work be performed by DBE subcontractors, and that the NYSDOT’s determination that the Contractor failed to carry out its DBE commitments in good faith, entitled the County to make a deduction from the contract price.  The Contractor, said the appellate court, failed to raise a triable issue of fact to defeat the County’s motion.

That meant that the Contractor was not able to demonstrate what, if anything, it did to comply with the DBE requirements for the project. 

That is the lesson to be learned here. 

If your construction business enters into contracts that contain DBE requirements (and almost all public work contracts do) and you do not want to find yourself looking down the barrel of a hefty back charge, you have to document, document and document again all of the steps you took and effort you went through to comply with the DBE requirements – pre-bid, during the bid, and post-contract.  That includes, prior to bidding, maintaining and updating listings of qualified DBE that can be solicited for construction, equipment, services and supplies in your geographic area, contacting appropriate sources in your geographic area and state to identify qualified DBEs, notifying the public agency you contracted with to let them know when you are having problems fulfilling DBE requirements and seeking their “advice”.  DBE and MWBE requirements are here to stay.  Approach them seriously and conscientiously, or pay the price for not doing so.       


1 Disadvantaged Business Enterprises

2Minority and Women Owned Business Enterprises

3Sullivan County Paving & Construction, Inc. v. County of Orange, 127 AD3d 959, 2d Dept. 2015.

Update: Reauthorization of Design-Build in New York Plus Contractor Selection Method for Design-Build Jobs Explained

Since my February 2015 article regarding the status of Design-Build contracting in New York, the legislature passed a new bill reauthorizing the use of the Design-Build project delivery system for certain authorized state entities. The new Bill, S4610A-20151, contains essentially the same language regarding Design-Build as the previous authorizing legislation. It was signed by Governor Cuomo on April 13, 2015 and is effective for two years.

If you missed my previous article2, Design-Build refers to a project delivery system allowing for a single agreement for project design and construction between the owner and the general contractor without the need for a separate design contract between the owner and a licensed design professional. In this system, the general contractor is responsible for retaining a licensed design professional of its choosing to perform the required design services on the project. Design-Build contracts would, potentially, be in violation of N.Y. Educ. Law § 7200 if not for the legislative and judicial authorization for its use in public and private contracts.

Those in favor of Design-Build tout its ability to cut costs on public projects while allowing for efficient project delivery. Since Design-Build is here to stay, at least for another two years, construction industry professionals should know that Public Design-Build Projects are governed by a different methodology for contractor selection than that provided in § 103 of the General Municipal Law.

Many construction professionals are familiar with § 103 of the General Municipal Law providing for the award of contracts for public work to the lowest responsible bidder after advertisement for sealed bids. Bill S4610A-2015 provides a different methodology requiring the authorized state entity relating the project to: (1) publicly advertise a request for qualifications; (2) generate a list of entities from the responses to said request from which the state entity will solicit proposals; and (3) the authorized state entity’s selection of the proposal which is the “best value” to the state. In generating the list and awarding the contract, the state must give preference to proposals submitted by and/or including certified minority or women-owned businesses under Article 15-A of the executive law. Furthermore, the authorized state entity may maintain a list of “prequalified” contractors who are automatically eligible to submit proposals on its design-build projects, which list must be continuously open to new entries.3

The Bill defines “best value” not just in terms of cost, but also in terms of quality, efficiency, diversity and reputation. In fact, the Bill sets forth a list non-exclusive considerations for making the “best value” determination including: the quality and timeliness of the contractor's performance on previous projects; the level of customer satisfaction with the contractor's performance on previous projects; the contractor's record of performing previous projects on budget and ability to minimize cost overruns; the contractor's ability to limit change orders; the contractor's ability to prepare appropriate project plans; the contractor's technical capacities; the individual qualifications of the contractor's key personnel;  the contractor's ability to assess and manage risk and minimize risk impact; and the contractor's past record of compliance with article 15-A of the executive law. However, the authorized state entity is not bound by these ten considerations. Their only restraint is that the bill calls for the selection of the proposal that “optimizes quality, cost and efficiency, and price and performance criteria… [based on], wherever possible, objective and quantifiable analysis.”

Once the Design-Build proposal of “best-value” is selected, the Bill provides that the contract can either be awarding based the proposal or, alternatively, on a cost-plus not to exceed maximum price or lump sum basis.   

Practice Tip:  Under this method of contractor selection, instead of a race to the bottom, authorized Design-Build contracts are, at least on the face of the Bill, more likely to be awarded based on merit. On the other hand, it is arguable that this selection method allows authorized state entities to exercise more favoritism than § 103 of the General Municipal Law with the result that Design-Build jobs may be awarded exclusively, or on a majority basis, to a few contractors. Only time will tell as design-build legislation is still relatively young. Ultimately, Construction professionals interested in taking lead on state authorized Design-Build projects should submit proposals intended to highlight not only fair cost, but also the quality workmanship and diversity of the design-build team. Likewise, subcontractors seeking a piece of the Design-Build action should keep a record of successful work to assist their team leads in submitting high-value proposals.  

http://nysspe.org/2015/05/22/nys-budget-update-2015-1016-design-build/


1 Text available at  http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S4610A-2015

2 Available at http://www.wbgllp.com/legal-alerts.php?id=97

3 An appeals process is available for contractors denied entry to the “prequalified” list