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Author: WB&G

Owner May be Liable for Sub’s Work Despite Disclaimer

A mechanic’s lien is a powerful tool to ensure contractors get paid for their work. Mechanic’s liens can also be used to secure payment for work performed by a subcontractor where that owner consented to the performance of the work. The question of what constitutes an owner’s consent to the work is frequently litigated. In the recent case of Murnane Building Contractors, LLC v Cameron Hill Construction, LLC, an appellate court once again addressed this issue.

Background

Cameron Hill Construction entered into a contract with Syracuse University to construct a building on its campus. The contract also called for Cameron to lease the ground on which the building was located and, once construction was complete, lease back certain parts of the building to the University, as owner. In an attempt to stave off the filing of any mechanic’s liens, the University included a provision in the contract providing that “[n]othing in this [l]ease shall be construed as the consent or request of [the University], express or implied, by inference or otherwise, to any contractor, subcontractor, laborer or materialman for the performance of any labor or the furnishing of any material for any improvement, alteration, or repair of the [p]remises, the [i]mprovements, or any part of either.”

Cameron entered into a subcontract with Murnane Building Contractors, LLC for the performance of certain work. During the project, construction was delayed. In order to keep work progressing, Cameron and the University entered into agreements which permitted specified construction work to go forward despite the delay. These agreements also required Cameron to obtain a mechanic’s lien waiver from Murnane. The document “waive[ed] and releas[ed] all liens or rights of lien now existing for work, labor, or materials furnished to 4/30/2014”. Ultimately, Murnane filed a mechanic’s lien to recover for unpaid work, and sued to foreclose that lien.

Decision

The University moved to dismiss Murnane’s lien foreclosure action, relying on both the provision of the contract disclaiming its consent to the work, as well as the lien waiver. The court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuit. Murnane appealed. The appellate court reversed and reinstated the mechanic’s lien and revived the foreclosure action.

The appellate court quickly dispensed with the University’s lien waiver argument. It found that, by its terms, the lien waiver only applied to claims that arose before April 30, 2014, and Murnane’s complaint included claims to recover monies earned after that date. The appellate court also cited well established case law which holds that “[w]here a waiver form purports to acknowledge that no further payments are owed, but the parties’ conduct indicates otherwise, the instrument will not be construed as a release”. Here, Murnane submitted affidavits indicating that the parties’ actions demonstrated that the waiver should not be construed as a release of claims.

As to the disclaimer of consent in the contract, the court held that the agreement for Cameron to construct the building, for which the University would benefit, was sufficient evidence of consent. In addition, the University was aware that Murnane was performing the work. The University specifically agreed that Murnane “is an acceptable contractor”, and that Murnane was to provide payment and performance bonds. Relying on established case law, the court rejected the University’s disclaimer, holding that the University and Cameron “cannot by any arrangement among themselves cut off the rights of lienors”.

Comment

The courts’ interpretation of what constitutes an owner’s consent to an improvement is narrowly tailored and requires that the owner either be an affirmative factor in undertaking the work, or that the owner consents to the work with the expectation that it would reap the benefit of the work. Courts will not tolerate sly attempts to use boilerplate disclaimers where the owner’s consent may be inferred by conduct which demonstrates that the owner consented to the work performed on the project.

Sub’s Claim of Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment are Rejected

Where there is no written or oral contract between the parties, a contractor cannot recover for work performed based on a breach of contract. The alternatives are to sue under the legal theories of either quantum meruit or unjust enrichment to recover the value of the labor and materials. To recover on a claim of quantum meruit, a claimant must establish the performance of the services in good faith, which were accepted, the expectation of compensation from the person who accepted the services, and the reasonable value of the services.

To recover on a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that the recipient of the work was benefitted at the contractor’s expense, a relationship between the parties, and equity and good conscience require restitution to the contractor.

In the recent case of Prime Rebar, LLC v Foundations Group, Inc., the court dismissed a subcontractor’s claims based on theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

Background

The facts of Prime Rebar arise out of a somewhat convoluted, but not altogether unforeseeable circumstance. The owner, 204 Forsyth LLC, entered into a contract with Foundations Group, Inc. In August of 2015, Foundations Group, as general contractor, entered into a subcontract with MR Builders Group, Inc. and Michael Rubenstein for the superstructure work at the project. In October of 2015, the claimant, Prime Rebar LLC, entered into a sub-subcontract with MR Builders, Rubenstein, and another entity, Professional Grade Construction, Group, Inc., to supply labor and materials for rebar and steel in connection with the superstructure contract. Prime Rebar performed work and provided materials to the project between October 13, 2015 and December 3, 2015, but was never paid. At some point during that period, Foundations Group terminated the superstructure subcontract with MR Builders and, by December 3, 2015, the replacement superstructure contractor was at work on the project.

Prime Rebar filed a mechanic’s lien, and later sued to foreclose its lien. In the lawsuit, Prime Rebar also asserted a quantum meruit claim directly against the owner, 204 Forsyth, and the general contractor, Foundations Group. Under this claim, Prime Rebar argued that the owner and general contractor allowed Prime Rebar to enter into a sub-subcontract with Professional Grade, MR Builders and Rubenstein despite the fact that they planned to terminate the superstructure subcontract, and that the owner and general contractor accepted Prime Rebar’s materials knowing that Prime Rebar would not be paid once the superstructure subcontract with MR. Builders was terminated.

Decision

The owner and general contractor moved to dismiss Prime Rebar’s quantum meruit claim, arguing that it did not set forth all of the necessary elements of the claim. The court agreed, holding that Prime Rebar did not, and could not, claim that it expected compensation from 204 Forsyth or Foundations Group—a required element of a quantum meruit claim—in light of its own sub-subcontract with Professional Grade, MR Builders and Rubenstein.

Prime Rebar also argued that it should have labeled its cause of action as an unjust enrichment claim. While the unjust enrichment claim, unlike the quantum meruit claim, does not require the expectation of compensation, it does require that Prime Rebar have some kind of relationship with the parties to show that Prime Rebar relied upon statements or actions of the owner or general contractor to induce Prime Rebar to deliver the materials or perform the work. It is not sufficient for an unjust enrichment claim to merely show that the owner or general contractor was aware of Prime Rebar’s work, or that they benefitted from such work. Accordingly, the court dismissed the claim, leaving Prime Rebar to continue its action for foreclosure of its mechanic’s lien against the owner, and its breach of contract and related claims against MR Builders, Rubenstein and Professional Grade.

Comment

Quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims, unlike breach of contract and related claims, are equitable claims. When a court undertakes an equitable analysis of such claims, it must weigh both the harm to the party who is asserting the claim, as well as the basis for making someone else pay for services they did not specifically contract for. Here, in the absence of some specific statements or actions relied upon by Prime Rebar, the owner and general contractor would not be equitably required to make payment to Prime Rebar for the services performed under a sub-subcontract with a third party. 

Contractor Not Liable to Owner for Delay Damages

A contractor who fails to complete performance by a fixed time set forth in the contract will be liable to the owner for the damages caused by the delay. Damages may be recovered by the owner via a liquidated damages provision in which the contractor is liable for a fixed sum for each day that the work is not finished.

In the recent case of Wavertree Corp. v Bellet Construction Co., Inc., the appellate court addressed the issue of whether the contractor was at fault for delay damages and attorney’s fees incurred by the owner.

Background

In August of 2006, Wavertree, the owner and manager of a cooperative apartment building, contracted with Bellet to restore and repair the building’s façade. Work was to commence on October 5, 2006, and the project was to be substantially completed within 120 days.  The contract further provided that the contractor would be liable for liquidated damages of $250 for each day that the work was not finished beyond the 120-day time limit. Ultimately, the project was not completed until December 5, 2008, 665 days after the agreed upon date.

In June of 2011, Wavertree sued Bellet for $166,250 in delay damages ($250 x 665 days), plus its attorney’s fees, as provided in the contract. Wavertree argued that the delays were primarily caused by Bellet’s delays in procuring needed equipment, its failure to timely pay its vendors, its failure to maintain an on-site supervisor, and its improper suspension of work when Wavertree refused to pay additional sums.

Bellet denied that it caused any delays, and argued that the delays arose due to the inevitable unforeseen issues that often arise during complex façade jobs, necessitating additional work. Bellet also attributed the delays to Wavertree’s failure to timely approve the additional expenses, its removal of the scaffolding over the winter—against Bellet’s advice—and to Wavertree’s requiring the replacement of bricks which it had initially approved.

Decision

Wavertree moved for summary judgment on its delay claim, arguing that it was entitled to delay damages at the $250 daily rate set forth in the contract. Bellet counter-argued that Wavertree was responsible for its own delays and, therefore, could not recover damages from Bellet. The trial court found that the conflicting factual arguments needed to be determined by a jury and, accordingly, denied the summary judgment motion. After the subsequent trial, the jury ruled in favor of Bellet. Judgment was entered on the jury’s verdict and Wavertree’s lawsuit was dismissed. Wavertree appealed.

On appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of the contractor, finding that the trial court properly found that the conflicting claims had to be left to a jury to decide, and that a rational jury could have found that Bellet did not breach the contract. Accordingly, Wavertree was not entitled to delay damages. The appellate court also found that a rational jury could have concluded that Wavertree, by issuing final payment in full without deducting the claimed liquidated damages, waived its claim to such delay damages.

Comment

A breach of contract action involving a delay claim requires that an aggrieved owner or upstream contractor establish that the defendant contractor was actually in breach of the contract; merely counting days and multiplying that number by the contract’s daily liquidated damages value is not sufficient. A party looking to assess delay damages needs to make certain that not only is its claim well documented, but that it is not in breach of the contract itself. As this case demonstrates, where the question of whether a party is in breach of the contract is determined by a jury, an appellate court will only set aside a jury’s findings of fact if those factual findings are implausible, illegal or without support in the trial record.

Court Rules on Rejection of Low Bidder for Non-Responsibility

New York’s competitive bidding statutes governing construction contracts for public works require contracts to be awarded to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. A “responsive” bidder is a contractor who has complied with the exact requirements of the bid invitation. A “responsible” bidder is a contractor who has the skill, integrity, experience, financial and technical resources to complete the work in a satisfactory manner.

In the recent case of Matter of Lunati Paving & Construction of NY, Inc. v Suffolk County Water Authority, the court determined whether good cause existed for the Water Authority’s rejection of the low bidder as a “non-responsible” bidder.

Background

In late-2015, the Suffolk County Water Authority solicited bids for a contract to replace certain specified concrete, bituminous patches and concrete curbs, and to perform other sidewalk restoration. On January 20, 2016, the Water Authority opened the bids, and Lunati Paving & Construction of NY was the apparent lowest bidder.

On February 5, 2016, the Water Authority notified Lunati that although Lunati was the lowest bidder, the Water Authority would recommend a determination of Lunati’s “non-responsibility” on the basis of Lunati’s unsatisfactory performance under a prior contract for substantially the same scope of work as the contract to be awarded. The Water Authority was dissatisfied with Lunati’s documented delays in completing work orders, as well as unprofessional conduct and behavior of Lunati’s personnel. Further evidence of Lunati’s unsatisfactory performance of the prior contract was the State’s having barred the Water Authority from performing work on State roads based on Lunati’s poor performance. Consequently, the Water Authority had to reassign to another contractor work that Lunati failed to perform in accordance with the prior contract specifications.

Despite the Water Authority’s concerns, it afforded Lunati several opportunities, in person and in writing, to address the issues of performance under the prior contract. However, after evaluating Lunati’s (late) response, the Water Authority’s Board rejected Lunati’s bid as having been submitted by a non-responsible bidder, and it awarded the contract to the next lowest bidder. Lunati initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Water Authority’s determination as arbitrary and capricious, and lacking a rational basis.

Decision

The court ruled against Lunati and denied its petition. In doing so, the court relied on well-established case law that permits a municipal agency to consider a contractor’s past unsatisfactory or inadequate performance of other public works in determining whether the bidder is sufficiently responsible to carry out the work in question. Here, because the Water Authority had a rational basis to determine that Lunati was not a responsible bidder (Lunati’s own past history), its determination could not be said to be arbitrary or capricious.

Comment

Challenging a contracting agency’s determination of non-responsibility as either arbitrary or capricious is a high burden to meet. Courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the agency unless its determination was irrational, dishonest, or otherwise unlawful. Public contracting agencies have broad discretion in determining whether a bidder is not responsible. As this case demonstrates, the agency is permitted to maintain an “institutional memory” and use a contractor’s past unsatisfactory performance to determine whether the contractor is a responsible bidder. Contractors should also bear in mind that one agency’s determination of non-responsibility often has to be disclosed when bidding on other public works projects, thereby potentially leading to a “snowball effect” of further determinations of non-responsibility. 

The Urgency of Filing Liens in Multi-Tier Contracting

Subcontracting is commonplace in the construction industry. The Owner contracts with a General Contractor (GC) who then contracts with one or more subcontractors (Subs) who, in turn, enter into agreements with suppliers and sub-subcontractors (Sub-Subs). While this multi-tiered approach to construction projects is meant to aid in the successful completion of projects by spreading risk and focusing talent, it also has serious implications in terms of the lien rights of the various contractors and subcontractors, especially to those at the lower tiers.

Unlike other areas of the law, the New York Lien Law and the case law interpreting it favors a policy of never forcing anyone to pay twice for the work it contracted to have performed. In order to enforce this policy, the current law provides that a lienor’s rights are derivative of each contracting tier above the lienor. In practice, this means that a lienor cannot recover on its lien if any single one of the following three conditions exist on the project at the time the lien is filed: (1) The Owner owes no funds to the general contractor, (2) the general contractor owes no funds to the subcontractor with whom the lienor contracted, or, (3) most obviously, no funds are owed to the lienor. The Supreme Court of New York, for Queens County, recently released a decision in the case of Trinity Products, LLC v. Carrickmore P&D, LLC1 reaffirming and elaborating on this principle.

Carrickmore was the GC on a project in Queens for demolition of an existing building and construction of a new two-story building on the same lot for approximately $2.6 Million (the “Project”). Carrickmore, in turn, subcontracted with J.J.’s Construction Corp. (“J.J.’s”) for J.J.’s to perform the earthwork, concrete and steel pipe piles work for the Project. J.J.s then created another tier in the contracting process by using various Sub-Subs on the Project, including the plaintiff in the action, Trinity Products, LLC (“Trinity”). For the early part of the Project, everything seemed to be moving along well. However, in the middle of the Project, J.J.’s began to fall behind in performing its work and paying its subcontractors. Eventually, Carrickmore was forced to terminate J.J.’s due to these, and other failures.

At the time Carrickmore terminated J.J.’s, it had already paid J.J.’s over $2 million (based on J.J.’s requisitions). There was still a balance of approximately $600,000.00 on Carrickmore’s contract with J.J.’s; however, J.J.’s had not earned any part of that balance. In fact, after terminating J.J.’s, Carrickmore quickly became aware that J.J.’s previously requisitioned work—for which it had been paid over $2 Million—was incomplete and/or defective in many respects. As Carrickmore still had to fulfill its obligations to the owner, it completed J.J.’s work on its own, utilizing completion subcontractors and suppliers. Carrickmore was able to complete J.J.’s work, although it cost Carrickmore much more than the $600,000 contract balance remaining on its subcontractor with J.J.’s.

After J.J.’s was terminated (and during Carrickmore’s completion of J.J.’s work), Trinity filed a lien based on payments it alleged were due and owing to it from J.J.’s. Carrickmore did not owe any funds to J.J.’s at the time the lien was filed due to back-charges associated with completing and correcting JJ’s work. Near the time that Carrickmore completed J.J.’s work, Trinity, J.J.’s supplier, brought an action to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien in Supreme Court, Queens County.

Carrickmore moved for summary judgment against Trinity, arguing that Trinity could never recover on its mechanic’s lien since Carrickmore could establish that it owed no funds to J.J.’s at the time Trinity filed is mechanic’s lien (and that nothing thereafter became due from Carrickmore to J.J.’s). The Court granted Carrickmore’s motion, reaffirming the caselaw holding that lower tier subcontractors’ rights are derivative of their upstream contractors’ rights. In essence, even though Trinity, the supplier, was owed money by J.J.’s, the subcontractor, it was unable to recover on a mechanic’s lien because J.J.’s had been fully paid by the General Contractor at the time the lien was filed. Trinity’s claim was doomed from the start based on the time it filed its lien. Had Trinity filed its lien earlier—prior to J.J.’s being fully paid—it is possible that Trinity could have recovered on its lien.

TAKEWAY: In multi-tier contracting, lower tier subcontractors and suppliers are best protected by filing a notice of mechanic’s lien as early as possible. This filing will put the upstream parties on notice of the fact that there are payment issues at one or more tiers of the project. It also potentially protects party filing the lien from a defense based upon full payment (payments made after the lien is filed generally do not constitute a defense to a lien claim, while payments made before the lien is filed do generally constitute such a defense). Lienors should also be aware of potential for recovery under payment bonds, which can provide relief to contractors who, for one reason or another, may not have rights under the Lien Law. If in doubt on whether and/or how to file a lien, contractors should contact their construction attorney.


1Trinity v. Carrickmore et. al., Supreme Court of the State of New York, Queens County, Index 708799/2015, Decision dated December 22, 2017.

 

Extension Agreement May Override Untimely Notice of Claim

Public Authorities Law Section 1744 provides for a three-month time limit after a claim accrues to file a contractor’s claim for monies due under a contract. The running of the three-month period for filing a notice of claim begins with the date that a construction project is substantially completed.

In the recent case of AMCC Corp. v New York City School Construction Authority, the court ruled on whether an agreement between the parties to extend the time to serve a notice of claim applies to the contractor’s untimely claim under Public Authorities Law Section 1744.

Background

In February of 2001, AMCC entered into a design-build contract with the SCA to construct a school in Queens. Over the course of construction, the SCA instructed AMCC to complete extra work, resulting in additional costs. AMCC, in turn, submitted change orders between October 18, 2001, and August 14, 2003, in order to recoup those increased costs. The SCA agreed to some, but not all, of those proposed increases. AMCC then executed a certificate of substantial completion on September 6, 2003, and it served a notice of claim on November 21, 2003 which itemized the claims for extra work and/or delays.

Between August of 2004 and August of 2011, the parties entered into a series of agreements extending the “time for [AMCC] to commence legal proceedings and/or serve notices of claim against the [SCA].” The last agreement in this series specified that, “[o]ther than the extension of time to commence an action and/or serve notices of claim and the raising of any notice of claim defenses, the parties hereto do not waive any rights or remedies that they may have under applicable laws.” Notably, the agreement made no distinction between claims that were already untimely when the notice of claim was served on November 21, 2003, and claims that were not.

AMCC sued the SCA to recover $4,838,245, which represented the unpaid portion of the contract price plus all of its unresolved change orders. The SCA moved to dismiss specific portions of the complaint, arguing that some of AMCC’s claims were untimely because they accrued when it submitted the disputed change orders—all of which preceded the notice of claim by more than three months. AMCC opposed, arguing that its claims were timely because they accrued on the date of substantial completion.

Decision

The trial court dismissed the AMCC claims which the SCA argued were untimely, citing the requirement under Section 1744 of the Public Authorities Law to serve a notice of claim within three months after the claim’s accrual. The appellate court reversed, finding that the parties’ agreement to extend AMCC’s time to serve a Notice of Claim and commence an action failed to distinguish between timely and untimely claims.  Accordingly, the extension agreement was subject to more than one interpretation “as they may have intended to apply [AMCC’s] untimely claims.”  In light of this ambiguity, the court ruled that the lower court improperly dismissed AMCC’s untimely claims.  The appellate court further relied on well settled case law that absent a strong countervailing public policy courts are bound to enforce whatever agreement the statutory or constitutional rights. 

Comment

It has long been a principle of contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are bound to enforce the agreement as written, absent a violation of public policy, bad faith or unconscionability.  In this case, the appellate court held that the extension agreement may be interpreted as the parties’ intent to apply the contractor’s untimely claims as well as its timely claims, thereby overriding the short statutory three-month limitation for serving a notice of claim. The appellate court sent the matter back to the trial court to take evidence as to the parties’ intent on this issue. 

Be Aware of Sovereign Immunity

When the average person hears the expression “sovereign immunity” they may think of situations where foreign diplomats are immune to civil suits and criminal law because of their “foreign diplomate” status. A wise contractor in the construction industry, however, also knows that throughout the state of New York and other states, sovereign nations exist with whom they may transact business. Whether known as “First Nations”, “Indian Nations” or “Indian Tribes”, doing business with them requires the astute contractor to be aware that he or she is dealing with a sovereign nation, who is not be subject to state judicial dispute resolution proceedings.

Such a situation was faced by Aron Security, Inc. when it performed security service work for the Unkechaug Indian Nation, located in Suffolk County, New York. When the Unkechaug’s failed to pay for the services performed, Aron sued them in the Supreme Court in Suffolk County. Judgement was entered in favor of Aron on May 22, 2014, and Aron served an information subpoena on a member of the Unkechaug’s. The Unkechaug’s made a post-judgment motion to dismiss the action based upon the Supreme Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the Unkechaug’s who are sovereign Indian Tribe. Aron also made a post-judgment motion to hold the Unkechaug person served with the information subpoena in contempt of court for failing to respond. The Supreme Court denied the Unkechaug’s motion to dismiss and it also denied Aron’s motion for contempt, with leave to renew. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department1.

The Appellate Court reversed and dismissed Aron’s action (including its motion for contempt).

In reaching a determination, the Appellate Court referred to U.S. Supreme Court and other federal court decisions, which held: “[T]hat Indian tribes possess common-law sovereign immunity from suit akin to that enjoyed by other sovereigns is part of this Nation’s long-standing tradition”; that, [T]his immunity extends to ‘suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation”; that, “[A]lthough a tribe may waive its sovereign immunity, such a waiver, while it need not use the words ‘sovereign immunity’, ‘cannot be implied by must be unequivocally expressed’”; and that, “[W]aivers of immunity are to be strictly construed in favor of the Tribe”.

The Appellate Court also noted (citing U.S. Supreme Court and other federal court cases) that unambiguous arbitration clauses in a contract with a tribe, requiring resolution of all contract-related disputes by arbitration and incorporating arbitration rules and state law for enforcement of arbitration awards in a court of competent jurisdiction, are considered as clear waivers of tribal sovereign immunity.

Aron tried to argue that the Unkechaug’s waived their sovereign immunity because the contract contained a choice-of-law provision that required the contract to be governed by New York law and, that the contract contained a venue provision that required any claim or controversy under the contract to be resolved in Suffolk County and no other jurisdiction.

The Appellate Court rejected Aron’s contentions. As to the contract’s venue provision the court held that the “any claim or controversy” language did not require resolution only by a state court. A party could bring a claim before a mediator, an arbitrator, a tribal court, a state or federal court said the Appellate Court.

With respect to the contract’s New York choice of law provision, the Appellate Court said that New York law could be applied in other forums besides a state of federal court. To the extent this provision is ambiguous, said the Appellate Court, the ambiguity must be resolved against Aron, who drafted the contract, and against waiver of immunity.

Under these circumstances the Unkechaug’s cannot be said to have expressed an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity said the Appellate Court.

When doing work for Indian Tribes or other sovereign nations, wise contractors recognize that they are in a situation where the rules of engagement may not be what they are used to operating under. A proposed contract, regardless of who drafted it, should be reviewed by an experienced attorney to provide guidance to the contractor regarding the rules that will have to be followed in the event a dispute arises requiring resolution.


1Aron Security, Inc. v. Unkechaug Indian Nation, 2017 NY Slip Op 04413, (2nd Dept. June 7, 2017)

Drones In Construction – Utility and Risk

In the past few years, we have witnessed fast paced technological development in the area of civilian use of unmanned aircraft systems, commonly referred to as “drones”. While many may be familiar with drones as popular recreational toys, their commercial applications have quickly progressed, reaching all the way to the construction site. This development of drone technology has created new questions of utility and risk for those seeking to reap its benefits. Additionally, as the commercial use of drones has expanded, so too have the regulations relating to the commercial use of drones.

One of the most common current uses of drones, in the construction context, relates to project management and inspections. For instance, a daily morning flyover with one or more drones equipped with cameras could help track progress, as well as accuracy of work being completed. Images taken by the drones can be compared to As-Planned models to determine when and if something has gone right, or wrong, on a project. Drones could also be used to track occurrences on site during working hours and could be helpful in determining the cause of accidents. Drones could also perform flyovers at jobsites during non-working hours to ensure there is no trespassing occurring at the jobsite. All of these functions can be accomplished with basic, lightweight drones, offering large benefits for low costs.

There are many other potential applications for drones that, while currently might be categorized as “space-age”, may not be as far off in the future as they seem. For instance, some large drones currently used in the military are capable of carrying heavy payloads. One could imagine the typical crane being replaced by a host of drones capable of quickly and efficiently transporting project materials directly to difficult-to-reach areas on the jobsite. Project duration, as well as environmental impacts, could potentially be greatly reduced through this technique. At some point, in the perhaps more distant future, drones could be used to fully accomplish certain project tasks, such as delivering and installing modular components, allowing completion of large modular projects at impressive speed. Most mind-boggling of all is the potential for single operators for multiple drones, or wholly unmanned operation of drones. Entire projects could be completed with a fraction of the previously required manpower.

Of course, all of this innovation in the world of drones must be kept in check by government regulation as concerns about safety, privacy, and environmental impact are paramount in our society. As the use of drones becomes more commonplace, there is potential for great benefits in all of these areas. However, as the technology develops, and potential uses are pushed to their limits, government must keep a close eye on the progress to protect the public.

To date, this regulatory role has been assumed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which enacted regulations meant to strictly govern the use of drones in both commercial and recreational contexts. The basic regulations governing use of drones are codified in the Code of Federal Regulation. (CFR). For the purposes of this article, we will focus solely on the regulations applicable to commercial use of drones in construction, as well as what liability issues are presented by commercial use1.

CFR 47 sets forth registration requirements for aircraft (including drones) and generally requires that any aircraft must be registered with the FAA2. Building on CFR 47, the FAA issued a notice issued in 2007 entitled “Unmanned Aircraft Operation in the National Airspace System”3. This notice required drone operators to obtain an FAA Special Airworthiness Certificate as required for commercial use of any other aircraft. In order to obtain a Special Airworthiness Certificate, an operator is required to submit information to the FAA meant to allow the FAA to ensure safety in the operation of the drone. This information includes: the intended use of the drone; the estimated number of flights the drone will undergo; estimated flight times; and the geographical area over which the drone will be operated. The operator will also be required to submit detailed drawings or photographs of the drone intended for use. Finally, an onsite review of the drone and demonstration of its use may also be required.

Since the 2007 notice, the FAA, due to concerns over time and labor burdens placed on the FAA due to large numbers of applications, issued a December 2015 Notice entitled “Registration and Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft”4, which implemented a new registration process for certain drones. The new system allows drones classified as small (weighing less than 55 lbs.), to be registered electronically, for a fee of $5.5 As such, the potential for employing drones of 55 lbs. or less on construction sites have improved greatly.

CFR 107 sets forth numerous operating requirements6 for drones. Some highlights include requirements that:

  1. all operators of drones for commercial purpose must obtain a remote pilot certificate,
  2. a remote pilot in command be designated for any drone flight;
  3. all flights occur during daylight;
  4. an operator may only operator a single drone at any time;
  5. the operator or visual observers must maintain line of sight of the drone at all times;
  6. the drone shall not be flown at a height higher than 400 feet from the ground or, if flown from a structure, within 400 feet of the immediate uppermost limit of the structure; and
  7. operation of the drone cannot interfere with airport traffic and/or operations.

Finally, there are many local city and state ordinances, both pending and enacted, dealing with the operation of drones for private and commercial purposes. The validity and effect of these ordinances are largely unknown as the federal government has already enacted comprehensive (potentially preempting) legislation. Ultimately, it would take a legal challenge to determine the limits of such ordinances. Accordingly, if possible, compliance with them is likely the safest option.

While the potential applications for use of drones are vast, as with most construction related activities, there is risk involved that will likely affect the content of insurance policies contractors using drones will need to obtain. Potential liability in connection with the use of drones in construction generally revolves around privacy and safety concerns. In terms of privacy, drones operate at heights which may allow line of sight to otherwise private areas such as high-rise apartment windows. This privacy violation could be exacerbated by the potential for cyber-attacks, providing unintended parties with access to such lines of sight. Most drones also currently make at least some amount of noise, and in certain cases can be quite loud. Accordingly, construction in residential areas could mean complaints from local constituents about the effects of drones on their ability to enjoy their homes. As for safety, drone use creates potential for serious injuries and/or property damage. For instance, if an operator loses control of a drone due to negligent use or maintenance of a drone or through some manufacturer or product defect, there is potential for a collision with persons, property, or even other aircraft. There is also the potential for drones causing contamination of protected areas through transference of pollutants.

As drones have only recently become more commonplace, and even more so in the commercial context, insurance coverage for the risk associated with their insurance policies is a bit of a grey area. Currently, it appears that the Insurance Services Office Inc. (ISO) general form insurance policies currently exclude coverage for bodily injury and property damage related to use of drones (due to their classification as “aircraft”), with certain exceptions. However, under the generic ISO form, coverage for products liability injuries related to drone usage will likely be covered, as those forms lack an aircraft exclusion. The ISO form also appears to provide some coverage for certain invasions of right to privacy, but generally only to the owner, landlord and/or lessor. There is also apparent coverage for publication of material, for instance, any photos obtained from a drone-related cyber-attack. The ISO recently introduced some additional options for customizing its forms which can affect the risk allocation for drone related injuries by incorporating the use of the term “unmanned aircraft”.7 Until these issues are settled, the takeaway is that contractors, professionals and/or owners intending to use drones for their project must be mindful of contractual insurance requirements and/or risk allocation related to drone operations.

As the uses of drones in construction industry becomes more widespread and technology develops further, there will surely be expansion of federal, state and local legislation that governs their usage, as well as innovations in applicable insurance coverage. Still, regardless of the risks and restrictions, with all of the potential applications currently known and those to be developed in the future, now could be the time for the construction industry to embrace these useful machines. It is important that anyone in the construction industry that intends to utilize the drone technology be prepared to do so safely, and in accordance with federal and local laws.


1 If you would like to learn more about regulation of recreational use, see the D.C. Circuit decision in Taylor v. Huerta, No. 15-1495 (D.C. Cir. 2017) at

2 https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?node=pt14.1.47#se14.1.47_13

3 See 72 Fed. Reg. 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007) at

4 80 Fed. Reg. 78,594 (December 16, 2016)

5 Registration and Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft 80 Fed. Reg. 78,594 (December 16, 2015).

6 https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=e331c2fe611df1717386d29eee38b000&mc=true&node=pt14.2.107&rgn=div5#se14.2.107_112

7 Information obtained from Professional Insurance Agents Industry Resource Center. Visit their website at https://pia.org.

Corporate Officers May be Personally Liable for Willful Exaggeration of Lien

The general rule is that an officer of a corporation is not ordinarily liable in his individual capacity for actions taken on behalf of the corporation.  However, there are certain exceptions where he may be held personally liable.  One of the exceptions to the general rule is when an officer of the corporation participates in a tortious act, even if the participation of the corporate officer is in the interest of the corporation.

In the case of Power Air Conditioning Corp. v. Batirest 229 LLC, the court ruled on whether a corporate officer can be personally liable for filing a willfully exaggerated mechanic’s lien. 

Background

In February of 2014, Power Air Conditioning entered into a subcontract with IBC Business Groups, LLC, then the general contractor for a construction project at the premises owned by Batirest 229, LLC. Eighteen months later, Batirest terminated IBC as general contractor and hired Lithos Construction Solutions, Inc. as its replacement contractor. Power A/C entered into a new subcontract with Lithos, and a separate agreement with Batirest itself. Power A/C’s agreement with Batirest incorporated its agreements with Lithos and also required Batirest to pay Power A/C certain amounts for its work on the project.

Batirest became delinquent in paying Power A/C, IBC and Lithos, and all three filed mechanic’s liens against Batirest’s property. These liens were personally verified by Don Emanuel, Rance MacFarland and Andreas Christofakis, in their capacity as officers of Power A/C, IBC and Lithos, respectively. Power A/C commenced a lawsuit seeking to foreclose on its lien against Batirest. In its answer, Batirest asserted counterclaims for, among other things, willful exaggeration of mechanic’s liens and injury to property under General Construction Law § 25-b against the three entities and their respective officers individually. The officers of the three contractors moved to dismiss the personal claims against them, arguing that they cannot be held personally liable for acts taken on behalf of the corporation.

Decision

The court denied the individuals’ motion to dismiss the claims against them for willful exaggeration of mechanic’s liens. In doing so, the court relied on well-established case law that although an officer of a corporation is not ordinarily liable in his individual capacity for actions taken on behalf of a corporation, such insulation does not extend to corporate officers who participate in the commission of a tortious act—even if it is within the scope of his duties and for the benefit of the corporation. The tort here was the improper filing of willfully exaggerated mechanic’s liens by intentionally inflating the amounts of the liens, including by adding amounts for work the corporations did not perform, and subsequently verifying and filing the liens in their capacity as officers of their respective corporations.  

As to the claim for violating Section 25-b of the General Construction Law (which provides that “injury to property” is an actionable act), the court held that the sanctions set forth in Sections 39 and 39-a of the Lien Law for the willful exaggeration of a mechanic’s lien were exclusive remedies, and a claim on a different theory could not be maintained.

Comment

Although intentionally inflating the amount of a mechanic’s lien may be a good way to get someone’s attention, it has long been known to be a bad strategy because not only is the lien void (and it cannot be re-filed in the correct amount), the damages recoverable against the exaggerating lienor include the amount of any lien bond premium to discharge the lien, reasonable attorney’s fees and an amount equal to the difference by which the willfully exaggerated amount exceeds the amount actually due to the lienor. 

How to Comply with the New York City Construction Safety Training Law

On October 16, 2017, Mayor Bill de Blasio signed Local Law 196, formerly known as Intro 1447-C, construction safety training legislation sponsored by New York City Councilmen Jumaane Williams (D-Flatbush) and Carlos Menchaca (D-Sunset Park).

The New York City Building Code now requires that “each permit holder at a building site for which a construction superintendent, site safety manager or site safety coordinator is required” (a “Permit Holder”) is responsible for documenting that their workers have adequately completed the requisite safety training. The way to comply with Local Law 196 is to document that every worker at the building site possesses an appropriate OSHA Site Safety Training (“SST”) Card, and that at least one responsible person at the  job site has an OSHA SST Supervisor Card.       

New Construction Safety Training Mandates for Workers and Supervisors

The safety training mandates of Local Law 196 are going to be phased in gradually over the course of 2018 and 2019. The ordinance was drafted to authorize the New York City Department of Buildings (“DOB”) to have some flexibility in administering rulemaking by establishing a Joint Task Force composed of the DOB Commissioner, representatives from labor unions, unionized contractors, non-union contractors, minority-owned businesses, women-owned businesses, and day laborers. The City Council has delegated authority to the Joint Task Force to determine the content of the safety training, the final safety training hours requirements, and the implementation dates.

If implemented as intended, Local Law 196 mandates will apply to the Permit Holder at every “building site for which a construction superintendent, site safety manager, or site safety coordinator is required” (a “Covered Building Site”). Now construction superintendents are required for all “major construction projects”, including:

  1. new building construction
  2. full demolitions of existing buildings
  3. alterations of over 50% of existing building floor area that requires special structural stability inspection
  4. demolitions of over 50% of an existing building floor
  5. the complete removal of an entire floor
  6. horizontal enlargement
  7. vertical enlargement
  8. any type of work that requires special inspection for support of excavation or underpinning   

The only exception to the 2016 DOB construction superintendent mandate is for 1, 2, and 3 family homes.                                       

In addition, the Local Law 196 construction safety training mandates apply to all Workers at a Covered Building Site. “Workers” include people working in several phases of construction, including renovations, excavation, and demolition. Workers also include all employees of the prime contractor and any subcontractors alike, or anyone acting on behalf of the Permit Holder.

By December 1, 2018 (the “Interim Compliance Date”), Permit Holders will have to ensure that every Worker at every Covered Building Site has completed at least 30 hours of safety training (the “Interim Worker Safety Training Mandate”). An OSHA-30 card will be the standard during an interim period from December 1, 2018 to the Final Compliance Date. During this interim period, a Worker who has completed the OSHA-10 will be able to obtain a temporary card that will allow them to complete the rest of their OSHA-30 while they are working at the Covered Building Site.

By March 1, 2019 (the "Final Compliance Date"), Permit Holders will have to ensure that every Worker at every Covered Building Site has completed at least 40 hours of safety training. By the Final Completion Date, Permit Holders will have to ensure that each Worker has either an OSHA SST card or a temporary OSHA SST card. Limited SST cards will no longer suffice.

In addition to the Safety Training Card Mandate, by December 1, 2018, the Permit Holder will have to comply with the “Superintendent Training Mandate”. The Permit Holder will have to document that at least one person at the job site has a SST supervisor card, specifically every worker who is serving as construction superintendent, or as site safety manager, site safety coordinator, concrete safety manager, or otherwise “a competent person at such site” (the “Superintendent”). 

Recordkeeping and Reporting Mandates for Permit Holders

Keep in mind that the construction safety training mandates do not apply only to individual workers; Local Law 196 establishes recordkeeping and reporting mandates on every Permit Holder for a Covered Building Site.

By March 1, 2018, each Permit Holder must comply with the “Recordkeeping Mandate” by doing the following:

  1. certify that each worker at the job site has complied with the Interim Worker Safety Training Mandate, the Final Work Safety Training Mandate, and/or Superintendent Training Mandate.
  2. maintain a daily log at each job site that identifies each Worker and includes a copy of their respective OSHA safety training card;
  3. upon request by NYC DOB, provide the safety training log for inspection.

It is imperative that the Permit Holder for every Covered Building Site strictly comply with the Recordkeeping Mandate. Even if everyone working at the Covered Building Site has complied with the training mandates, a Permit Holder found to be lacking proper logs for a given work day is presumed to be noncompliant.

Consequences for Non-Compliance with Local Law 196

Denial of DOB Permits        

Going forward, NYC DOB will make granting permits for construction and demolition work conditional on the permit applicant’s compliance with Local Law 196. If the applicant for construction or demolition work does not certify that all of the workers will be compliant with the Local Law 196 construction safety training mandates, DOB will deny  permits.  

Violations for Worker’s Failure to Complete Safety Training

If the NYC DOB Commissioner determines “that a worker at a building site is not in compliance” with any of the new training mandates, the Commissioner will issue a notice of violation to the Permit Holder, the non-compliant worker’s Employer (if the Employer is different from the Permit Holder), and the Owner of the job site. Even if they are separate entities, DOB can charge each of the Permit Holder, Employer, and Owner with separate violations and issue separate civil penalties.  

In the event that DOB determines that a Permit Holder is in violation of Local Law 196, the Permit Holder will have to pay for the costs of the Worker to obtain the required safety training or “otherwise arrange” for the Worker to receive the safety training at no cost to the non-compliant Worker. The non-compliant Worker will have to remain employed at the Building Site under the same terms and conditions, and must be paid as though he or she were working at the job site 40 hours each week at the same wage.

Violations for Failure to Maintain the Daily Compliance Log

If a Permit Holder at a Covered Building Site has not maintained a daily log recording the names of each Worker at the site and each Worker’s respective safety training cards, that is a per se violation of Local Law 196.  If DOB determines that a Permit Holder failed to maintain a log, it establishes a rebuttable presumption that each Worker for whom the Permit Holder is responsible for ensuring compliance “is not compliant”, and it will result in notices of violation for each unrecorded day worked by each Worker. 

Civil Penalties

For “lesser violations” of Local Law 196, DOB can impose a penalty up to $500 for each violation. For “major violations”, DOB can impose a penalty up to $10,000 for each violation. To boot, DOB can impose an additional penalty of up to $250 for each month that the “major violation” is not corrected. For “immediately hazardous violations”, DOB can impose a civil penalty up to $25,000 for each violation. DOB can also impose an additional penalty up to $1,000 for each day that the “immediately hazardous violation” is not corrected.

At present, the statute is unclear as to what precisely constitutes a “lesser violation” versus a “major violation” or an “immediately hazardous violation” of Local Law 196, and it appears that DOB will have wide discretion in meting out civil penalties.             

In Practice    

If you have reason to believe that any members of your work force are lacking an OSHA-30 card, it would be wise to start planning for the Interim Compliance Date which will most likely come into effect on December 1, 2018. Also, do not forget that your superintendent, safety supervisor, or another “competent person” will have to comply with the Superintendent Training Mandate by December 1, 2018 as well.

By May 1, 2019, however, all of your Workers are going to need to have 40 hours of safety training.  Instead of doing it piecemeal, it might be more effective to make sure that your work force undergoes all of their construction safety training at once to comply with the mandate for the Final Compliance Date.

Remember that if you are the Permit Holder for a Covered Building Site, you are responsible for not only your own employees, but also for every one of your subcontractor’s compliance with the safety training mandates. Do not expose yourself to risk by hiring subcontractors whom you know are lacking their OSHA cards.