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Author: WB&G

Can You Avoid Liability for OSHA Violations by Calling Your Workers Independent Contractors?

Since OSHA protects employees, companies sometimes try to avoid its reach by depicting workers as independent contractors.  In Secretary v. Fama Construction, OSHA issued citations for multiple violations (including “Repeat” and “Willful” items) and recommended almost $200,000.00 in penalties. 

In contesting the citations, Fama’s primary defense was that its roofing crews were not Fama employees, but subcontractors.  Fama claimed it merely secured roofing contracts, and that the work crews were employees of subcontractors, which were solely responsible to comply with OSHA’s standards.

After trial, the Administrative Law Judge held, in a 29-page decision, that the workers exposed to the violative conditions were Fama’s employees.  Even if they were not Fama’s employees, the ALJ found, Fama was a ”controlling employer” at the worksite and was required to inspect the worksites to satisfy its duty of reasonable care.  Over $280,000.00 in penalties were assessed accordingly.

It weighed against Fama that the inspections before the ALJ were not Fama’s “first time at the rodeo,” and the same Compliance Officers kept encountering the same workers, some of them for the third or fourth time.  Worse, most of the workers unhesitatingly described themselves as Fama employees.

According to Fama’s sole owner, Francisco Martinez, Fama had no employees, other than 3-4 home office employees.  Martinez testified that Fama worked mostly with four building companies, which gave it contracts for roofing work.  Martinez testified that Fama subcontracted the roofing work, for lump-sum prices, to one or more of a roughly stable collection of four work crews, about 12 to 15 workers in all.  Additional crews, for brick flashing work, were sometimes supplied by Francisco’s brother, Daniel Martinez.  Francisco testified that he came to the jobsites before work began, and after it was completed, but did not direct the crews as they did their work.

Francisco’s daughter testified that she had worked for Fama for 15 years, throughout which the roofers  were paid weekly, with the price of tools and supplies bought on Fama’s credit being deducted.  A company rule against hiring new, inexperienced roofers, somebody “from the street or from Home Depot,” was not always observed.  Safety training was provided every 4-5 months, and, assertedly, crews failing to attend, or whose persistent violations came to Fama’s attention, were given less work (one crew being cut off entirely).  Fama forbade its workers to use their cell phones while working on roofs, or driving company vehicles.  Its solicitude for worker safety, Fama claimed, was not in furtherance of an employment relationship, but was based on friendship, and concern for the roofers.

Daniel Martinez claimed that while he considered himself semi-retired, “it’s Fama I work for” in directing the flashing crews (generally, Daniel plus a single helper).  Daniel never formed a company, but contacted Fama whenever in need of work.  Fama paid Daniel, based on the number of linear feet of flashing installed, and Daniel shared the money paid to him with his helper.

Roofer Antonio Cardenas, although testifying that he had worked for Fama for approximately 15 years (in addition to sporadic “temporary work” for an unrelated individual) did not consider himself an employee.  He worked together with Carlos Galicia, and stated that, while previously the two men were issued separate weekly paychecks, since about 2014 Fama issued but a single check (for a non-negotiable fixed price for each job).  A single 1099 form was given to Cardenas, who would then give Galicia a share of the money.  At times, and for various reasons, Cardenas’s two-man crew turned down Fama projects.  Fama supplied Cardenas with safety glasses and a fire extinguisher, and safety kit for his truck.  Cardenas attended mandatory safety training sessions, although there were no morning toolbox talks, or safety inspections, performed by (or on behalf of) Fama.  Cardenas’s testimony about the two men who were on the roof with him and Galicia at the time of the OSHA inspection was that they were friends, hired on a casual basis, to help on a handful of occasions.  Galicia denied knowing these “helpers’” names.

Ultimately, however, when a Form 1099 for 2016, in the total sum of $220,667, was introduced, Galicia admitted that the latter sum (minus expenses) had been split four ways, to include the two “helpers” — who, it turned out, had worked on Fama jobs for “probably” ten years.  Each of them had performed a share of the overall work in 2016 equal to that performed by Cardenas and Galicia, and had each received one-fourth of the money.  The ALJ found that Cardenas and Galicia had deliberately misled the Court, under oath.

Standards that courts use to distinguish between employees and independent contractors are not uniform nationwide.  However, well-known standards were enunciated in the Darden case, an ERISA matter decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992.

The ALJ in Fama found that, while on the evidence presented, certain factors mentioned in Darden (the skill required to perform the job, the location of the work, and the extent of the workers’ discretion over when and how long to work) were neutral,  three of the Darden factors favored Fama’s claim of a contractor-subcontractor relationship) and five (as well as additional factors) favored finding that the workers were Fama employees.

The factors that favored Fama’s argument that the workers were subcontractors were the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; that the men were not provided with any vacation, health, or retirement benefits, and that 1099 tax forms (and not W-2s) were given to Daniel Martinez, Cardenas, and Galicia.

To the contrary, factors weighing in favor of the conclusion ultimately reached by the ALJ — that the roofers were Fama employees — were the 5 remaining Darden factors.  These were:  the provision of instrumentalities and tools; the long-standing relationship between the parties; that Fama had the right to assign the crews additional projects; the issuance of paychecks (and that at least one member of each crew was required to pick the paychecks up at Fama’s office); and that the roofing work performed by the crews was Fama’s chief line of business.

A further, non-Darden factor stressed by the ALJ was the high degree of control that Fama exercised over the roofers.

The violations were all affirmed, and penalties exceeding over $230,000.00 were imposed.

While the status of your workers (for OSHA purposes) as employees or independent contractors depends on multiple factors, you should be aware that the definition of “employee” for OSHA is broader than under the common law.  You can’t dodge OSHA responsibilities simply by paying workers on 1099s.  Flimsy arguments on this point are likely to fail, and you should not want to risk being seen by OSHA as a company that cares little about the safety of those who perform its work.

Get Ready for Winter: Severe Weather Precautions for the Construction Jobsite

Summer has flown by and away, and already Halloween stuff is appearing in the stores.  Before you know it, the year-end holidays will be upon us.  If your field operations involve outdoor work over the winter, you need to do some advance planning, to avoid being left unprepared.  Even if you have experience working in snow and very cold temperatures, it’s a good idea to work with your supervisors, and your rank-and-file employees, to do the planning and refresher training needed to minimize the risks associated with working under wintry conditions.

Primary hazards. obviously, include hypothermia and frostbite.  These are invisible, but potentially lethal, dangers.  To avoid them, work only during the warmest hours of the day.  Wear warm, layered clothing (with synthetics that wick away perspiration closest to the skin).  Warm gloves, hats and hoods are essential, and footwear should allow for one thick or two thin pairs of socks.  PPE should also include eye protection, as ice and snow produce excessive ultraviolet rays.  Job tasks should be planned to as to break them down into component parts, to allow frequent breaks to be taken.  Hot foods and drinks (but not caffeinated beverages) should be consumed.  With appropriate caveats for any who are diabetic, or have high blood pressure (most prepared soups are loaded with sodium) caloric foods, such as pasta and hot soups, are recommended. Heated, sheltered warm-up/break areas should be provided, and a “buddy system” implemented.  It’s important to avoid having workers off by themselves, working alone. 

All should be trained to recognize the following as symptoms of hypothermia, and emergency responders summoned at once if they are detected:  cool skin, slow, irregular breathing, reduced pulse, uncontrollable shivering, severe shaking, rigid muscles, drowsiness, exhaustion, slurred speech, and memory lapses.  As on any job, supervisors should know where the nearest medical facilities are located, and should have the numbers of emergency responders on their cell phones.

Similarly, the following are symptoms of frostbite, which should be taught to all:  paleness of the skin, sensation of coldness and pain that subsides as the tissues freeze, and increasing whiteness and hardness of the skin.

Generally, workers who have hypertension, diabetes, or cardiovascular disease are at greater risk of experiencing cold stress.  Any who are ill, or taking medication, should be directed to consult a medical professional.

Supervisors should walk the site before the start of each shift, and problems requiring immediate attention addressed at once.  Snow shovels and gloves must be kept convenient to where they will be needed.  Snow and ice must not be permitted to accumulate on surfaces, especially walkways, entrance steps, scaffolds, and roofs.  Snow and ice must be cleared off at once (or work suspended if it’s coming down too fast to be cleared without delay, or if visibility drops below acceptable levels) and sand or salt applied.  In addition to removing snow and ice where it could produce falls, it’s necessary to ensure that accumulated snow — and icicles — be kept off overhead areas.  Footwear must be non-slip or non-skid, and hard hats should always be worn.  The use of ladders should be kept to a minimum; and, if used, they must be free of ice, snow, and other materials that may cause slips or falls.  If temperatures are to fall below freezing, ladders should be stored indoors, or covered at the end of the shift.

If portable heaters are employed, care must be taken to ensure electrical safety or adequate ventilation, as applicable.  Heaters must be placed on fire-resistant surfaces, and their hoses must remain clear and unobstructed.  Combustible materials must be kept at a safe distance, as well.

Falls are the #1 cause of fatalities (and OSHA citations) on construction sites.  Neglecting fall protection is always a bad idea, but to do so in winter weather is simply insane.  Consider a “belt and suspenders” approach, requiring the use of both individual fall arrest systems and safety rails (especially if work must be performed on elevated surfaces for extended periods).  

Snow shoveling is itself a hazardous activity, and poses risks of exhaustion, dehydration, back injuries, and heart attacks.  Workers should be required to warm up before shoveling, to scoop snow in small amounts, and to push instead of lifting to the extent possible.  This is generally not a task for older workers, and workers of all ages should “lift with their legs,” and take frequent breaks while performing it.

If you use electric snow blowers, make sure that they are properly grounded.  Users must be trained not to clear jams while the equipment is powered on.  Fuel should be added before using the equipment, not when the engine is running or hot.

Vehicular safety and work zone traffic control require extra attention under winter conditions.  OSHA has a “Safe Winter Driving” page you should consult, but particular attention should be given to vehicular and equipment maintenance, hazards associated with driving on snow-covered or icy surfaces, and deploying signs, cones, barrels and barriers to protect workers.  Workers commuting to and from the jobsite in their cars should have blankets, water, food and emergency equipment in their vehicles, and be instructed to remain in a disabled vehicle (unless help is visible within 100 yards) and to ensure that the exhaust pipe is kept clear of snow, and a downwind window cracked slightly for ventilation.  Of course, work zones where vehicles or equipment are operated in proximity to persons on foot must be well-lit, and high-visibility vests should be worn.

Work in harsh winter weather is very challenging.  Some measures required are obvious as a matter of common sense, but advance planning and training are essential nonetheless.

Contractor and Bank Accused of Trust Fund Diversion – Contractors Take Heed

Article 3-A of the New York Lien Law contains some of the most perilous legal requirements a construction contractor can face. Section 13 of the Lien Law makes it clear that the funds received on a construction project are trust funds held for the benefit of subcontractors and suppliers. If those funds are not used exclusively to satisfy claims of subcontractors and suppliers for work performed on the project, contractors, as statutory trustees, may be liable for trust fund diversion. Contractors have often heard of the obligations imposed by Article 3-A of the Lien Law, but may lack a sufficient understanding of those obligations to avoid the serious penalties that can arise from diverting trust funds (even inadvertently). New York’s construction trust fund statutes are primarily intended to ensure payment for labor and material furnished to a particular project.

In Price Trucking Corp. et al. v AAA Environmental, Inc. et al., (111 AD3d 1315 [4th Dept 2013]), a subcontractor brought suit alleging, among other things, that both the general contractor and its bank diverted trust funds. The general contractor, AAA Environmental, entered into a contract with the project owner, Norampac, to perform certain environmental remediation services. In furtherance of its general contract with Norampac, AAA Environmental entered into subcontracts with various entities, including Price Trucking. AAA Environmental had in place with First Niagara Bank an automatic transfer of funds from its operational account to pay down amounts owed on its line of credit. When funds earned on a particular project were deposited, they would be transferred that same night to reduce what was owed on the line of credit. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all similarly situated subcontractors on the project, sued AAA Environmental and First Niagara Bank for diversion of trust funds created by this financial arrangement. As alleged, by utilizing funds received from Norampac to satisfy a line of credit, both AAA Environmental and First Niagara Bank diverted trust funds. The Supreme Court, Erie County, upon Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, agreed and granted the motion as to the trust fund diversion claims against First Niagara Bank. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, determined that the bank was not a “statutory trustee” within the meaning of New York State Lien Law and, therefore, could not be held liable for trust fund diversion under that theory.

Contractors often rely on their relationship with local banks in order to ensure that they can receive continued financing and weather “slow periods” where payment is delayed. While First Niagara Bank was determined to not be a statutory trustee on the motion for summary judgment, the suit nevertheless was permitted to continue so that if the subcontractor could prove First Niagara Bank knew that it was receiving trust funds from a construction project, the subcontractor would be permitted to recover on its trust fund diversion claims as against First Niagara. Importantly, the trust fund diversion claims as against the contractor continued. While the Appellate Division determined that the Bank was not liable for trust fund diversion, the relationship between the contractor and its bank was clearly strained.

The consequences of trust fund diversion can be dire. A Court may order that the trust funds be repaid by the general contractor. Further, a diversion of trust funds exposes the trustee to potential punitive damages and attorneys' fees awards. It is also important to remember that corporate officers may be liable personally for diverting trust funds. Further, liability is not dischargeable in bankruptcy and, in extreme cases, could result in criminal prosecution that can include fines and even jail. Contractors should be certain what they can and cannot use trust funds for on a project. It is advisable to discuss with an attorney how monies received on a construction project can be disbursed consistently with the requirements of Article 3-A of the New York Lien Law. Moreover, contractors can further safeguard against accusations of trust fund diversion by keeping accurate books and records for every project.

Fall Protection Citations Vacated Due to Lack of Proof of the Employer’s Knowledge of the Violations

Every OSHA violation has four necessary elements, each of which must be proved by the Secretary, by a preponderance of the evidence, if the employer contests the citation:  (1) the applicability to the facts of the standard cited; (2) the employer’s failure to comply with the standard: (3) employee exposure or access to the hazard: and (4) the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of the violative condition.

 “Constructive knowledge,” a sufficient substitute for actual knowledge of the violation, means that, if the employer exercised reasonable diligence, it could have resulted in the employer learning of the violation.

In Secretary v. Bergelectric Corp, the employer was engaged in installing the electrical system for the renovation of a 20,000 square foot casino on tribal lands in California.  One of its employees, while installing conduit above the ceiling, fell 24 feet to the casino floor, and suffered broken ribs and fractures to his spine.  It was federal OSHA (and not California’s state-administered “little OSHA”) that investigated, as federal OSHA has jurisdiction where the alleged violations occur on tribal lands.

Following its inspection, OSHA tagged the employer for a single, “Other Than Serious” paperwork violation (for failing to correctly document the worker’s fall on an OSHA 300 log) and three “Serous,” fall-protection violations.  The three items were (1) failure to protect the employee by the use of guardrail systems, safety net systems, or personal fall arrest systems, while he was working at a height of six feet or more; (2) two workers having connected their lanyards to a single anchorage connector while installing conduit; and (3) a worker having tied off by wrapping his lanyard around a structural member of the building, and then using a non-locking snaphook to hook the lanyard directly to itself.

The fall-protection citation items were “grouped” for adjudication, it being uncontroverted that all three related standards applied, had been violated, and that the respondent’s employees had been exposed to the hazard of a fall of 24 feet or more.

The fall had occurred on the third day of a three-day period, during which there occurred several disconcerting incidents, in which employees were at risk of falls.  On the first day, an employee assigned to hang conduit below the hard lid was instructed to use a scissor lift to access the ceiling, and string the conduit from the bottom.  Instead, the employee opted to use the lift to go above the hard lid and, while walking the beams above the hard lid, he slipped, and his foot broke through the drywall.  Fortunately, this employee, because he was equipped with appropriate fall-arrest equipment, fell no further.  The errant employee had not installed decking prior to working above the hard lid, but the foreman remedied that, by having the decking installed later on the same day.  The employee was reprimanded for working above the hard lid without permission, and a “tailgate talk” was directed for the following day.

At the trial of the citations issued two days later, the Secretary sought to characterize the foregoing incident as a “near miss” (and violative conduct) but the ALJ viewed it as an incident not involving any fall protection violations.

On the second day, two employees – Ron Castro, and “R.S.” (the employee who would be injured on the following day) were instructed to stage conduit and materials above the hard lid for installation the following day.  This involved putting all the necessary materials into the lift, unlading them onto the beams just above the lid and next to the scissor lift, and securing them to the framework.  The testimony was that neither Castro nor “R.S.” needed to exit the lift the complete the tasks assigned.

However, Castro did get out of the lift to install a beam strap at a location close to where work would be performed on the following day.  To do this, Castro attached a lanyard to his harness, looped the lanyard around a beam, and attached the slip back onto itself.   Castro then crawled along the beams above the hard lid, attached the beam strap, and returned to the scissor lift.  Castro spent about 5 minutes outside the lift, and affixed his lanyard in a manner forbidden by one of the standards that would be cited on the following day, but he completed his task without incident.

On the day of the accident, per the trial testimony of Pete Evans, a foreman, Evans was checking on various crews at work at about 7:45 A.M., when he viewed R.S. crashing through the hard lid, and falling 24 feet to the casino floor.  R.S. and Castro had been above the hard lid for approximately one hour.  Post-accident investigation revealed violations of both the project’s Activity Hazard Analysis, and three OSHA fall-protection standards.  R.S. and Castro had connected their lanyards to the same anchor point, no plywood decking had been installed in the work area above the hard lid, and R.S.’s lanyard was found hanging from a notice in an angle beam, indicating it was neither attached to the beam strap, nor to the D-ring on the back of R.S.’s harness.

The foreman testified he had not completed his “competent person” inspection of the decking and fall protection being used, because he had awaited Castro’s call to go up in the lift to do so, but Castro never called.

Since all of the other elements of the violations were conceded, and actual knowledge of the hazard was not alleged, constructive knowledge became the determinative issue.  The Secretary argued that respondent’s foremen should have been aware of the violations occurring above the hard lid, because employees broke fall protection rules on three consecutive days.  This, the Secretary concluded, proved that Respondent had failed in at least one of:  clearly defined rules, adequate training, timely and thorough inspections, or a progressive disciplinary program.

The respondent countered by arguing that it could not have known about the violations committed by R.S. and Castro, because they were out of view while above the hard lid, its foremen provided frequent fall protection training, and it had a documented history of progressive enforcement of its safety rules.

In deciding whether the employer had exercised reasonable diligence, the ALJ engaged in a detailed examination of the evidence.  Ultimately, he vacated all three fall-protection citation items. 

The Court was unpersuaded that the incidents of the preceding days established deficient work rules and training.  The ALJ found that R.S. and Castro could not have been observed from the ground 24 feet below, through a hole in the ceiling, with a view obstructed by the scissor lift.  The ALJ found Bergelectric’s training regime to address the violations cited, and overall to be “thorough in terms of its content, regularity, and utilization of classroom and on-the-job, practical training.”

Following a detailed examination of the evidence concerning both the inspections performed by Bergelectric (which the ALJ found to be “thorough and responsive to the hazard present”) and its disciplinary program.  As to the latter, the ALJ set Bergelectric apart from the many employers who have an admirable “paper policy,” but seldom act upon it, and concluded that the respondent’s disciplinary program was “thorough and well-implemented.”

You should not be liable for an OSHA  violation, if you neither knew, nor could reasonably have been expected to know of it.  You must keep in mind, of course, that actual knowledge, including that of any supervisory personnel, will support a violation, and it is imperative that the employer exercise, at all times, reasonable diligence, directed to discovering and correcting safety and health violations.

While defenses such as a lack of constructive knowledge (and the “unpreventable employee misconduct” are easy to assert, but challenging to establish, you should discuss with counsel whether they are realistic grounds for a contest proceeding, anytime your company is cited for an alleged OSHA violation.

New Jersey Expands P3 Law Paving the Way for New Infrastructure Projects: How to Prevent Opportunity From Becoming the Road to Ruin

Effective February 10, 2019, the New Jersey Legislature has greatly expanded the pool of public entities authorized to enter into Public-Private Partnerships (P3), including local governments, school districts and public authorities. The New Jersey Legislature, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:11-52 (“P3 Law”), defines a P3 project as a contractual agreement between a public agency and a private entity in which the private entity designs, finances and builds a large-scale project “of, or for the benefit of” the public agency. After a P3 project is completed, the private entity operates and maintains the project for a period before turning it back over to the public agency. Prior to the new P3 Law, only state and county colleges, as well as the New Jersey Transit Authority could enter into P3s, but only under certain limited circumstances. With billions in upgrades needed throughout New Jersey, the new P3 Law is expected to generate a significant number of new projects throughout the Garden State.

While many celebrate the potential benefits of the new P3 Law, contractors should not be lulled into complacency. Foremost, because a P3 project is not strictly a private or a public project but, rather, a sort of hybrid, the availability of long-established payment protections, such as the right to file a construction lien, are sometimes difficult to assess. A recent New Jersey case provides a clear warning to contractors to not sleep on their rights.

In Morris County Improvement Authority v. Power Partners MasTec, LLC et al., 2014 WL 1125378 (App. Div. 2014), the New Jersey Appellate Division had occasion to review a series of mechanic’s lien filings on a hybrid project. The project involved the construction of seventy-one (71) solar facilities in three (3) counties to be constructed on publicly owned land. A private entity was listed as the “Developer” of the project, and the project was financed by a total of $88.8 million in municipal bonds issued by the three (3) counties. MasTec, as contractor, became embroiled in a dispute with the Developer and the “operator”, alleging that it performed more than $80 million worth of “construction services”, but was paid only $33 million. MasTec filed a series of Municipal Mechanic’s Liens totaling almost $50 million. The Morris Improvement Authority, acting on behalf of the public agencies, filed suit seeking to discharge the Municipal Mechanic’s Liens. The trial court determined the Municipal Mechanic’s Liens did not meet the requirements to file a lien on a public project. Thereafter, MasTec filed Construction Lien Claims but the trial court limited those private liens to the “Developer’s” interest in the real property—which effectively rendered the liens powerless to affect the disbursement of the project funds. On appeal, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed (on different grounds) the discharge of MasTec’s Municipal Mechanics’ Liens. Moreover, the Appellate Division was clear that a Construction Lien can only attach the “real property”, and not the public funds or funds generated by operation of the facilities. As such, MasTec was effectively left without any enforceable lien rights. As a result, unless the New Jersey Legislature amends the P3 Law, contractors performing work on a P3 project may not have enforceable lien rights.

However, all hope is not lost for securing payment for labor and materials furnished on a P3 Project. One takeaway is that while a contractor/supplier on a P3 project may not have lien rights, they do have two (2) potential avenues of recovery. The first avenue for recovery, and perhaps anticipating this issue and in an proactive attempt to keep the finances on a P3 project above board, the New Jersey Legislature requires the private entity on a P3 project to appoint a “third-party financial institution” to “act as a collateral agent, and manage the construction account, and maintain a full accounting of the funds and instruments in the account”. The account is effectively held in trust for the benefit of the contractor, construction manager and design-build team. In that sense, on a P3 project the moment a payment issue arises, written notice should be delivered to the “collateral agent” to hopefully ensure funds are not improperly disbursed.

The second avenue for recovery, and an even more important tool for ensuring payment is the potential ability to file a payment bond claim on a P3 project. In order to properly assert a payment bond claim you need to be knowledgeable of the many technical requirements and statutory loopholes in both the P3 Law and the Public Works Bond Act. For example, a contractor/supplier cannot recover against the bond for any “extra work” that is not the subject of a written change order between the Owner and General Contractor. Additionally, pursuant to the Public Works Bond Act, only “subcontractors or material suppliers in contract with the contractor” or “subcontractors or material suppliers in contract with a subcontractor to the contractor” may submit a payment bond claim. For P3 projects in New Jersey, a contractor would be advised to ensure the inclusion of key terms and conditions in its contract, and to provide proper written notices, which efforts culminate in the submission of a timely and proper payment bond claim immediately after a contractor defaults in its payment obligations. Given the risks, you should consult a competent construction attorney to assist with payment issues as early as possible on any P3 project.

Court Enforces Sub’s Lien Claim Against Owner

New York’s Lien Law provides that contractors, subcontractors and material suppliers have the right to file a mechanic’s lien against the property improved upon.  Where public projects are involved (state, county, city and municipalities) a subcontractor or supplier can file a mechanic’s lien against the money due to the contractor from the public entity.

The lien rights of a subcontractor or supplier in either a private setting or a public improvement, however, are restricted to money due to the contractor from either the private owner or public entity.  The lien claim will be dismissed if no funds are owing to the general contractor.

In the recent case of C.C.C. Renovations, Inc. v Victoria Towers Development Corp., the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision that ruled in favor of the subcontractor on the critical issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that there were funds due from the owner to the general contractor at the time of the filing of the subcontractor’s lien.

Background

Victoria Towers Development Corp. entered into a contract Blue Diamond Group for Blue Diamond to act as general contractor to make repairs at Victoria Towers’ property in Queens, which had been damaged in September of 2010. C.C.C. Renovations entered into four separate subcontract agreements with Blue Diamond to perform roofing, pipe scaffolding, electrical scaffolding, and sidewalk scaffolding work at the property. After the work was performed, C.C.C. remained unpaid under its subcontracts.  In November of 2011, C.C.C. filed two mechanic's liens against the property, seeking $59,500 for unpaid roofing work and $698,185 for unpaid sidewalk bridging, pipe, and electric scaffolding work. In January of 2012, Blue Diamond, as general contractor, filed its own mechanic's lien against the property, seeking $5,325,557 for unpaid work at the property. C.C.C. sued to foreclose its mechanic’s liens and, ultimately, moved for summary judgment.

Decision.

C.C.C. argued that it established both its right to recover for the subcontracted work that it performed, and that there was sufficient money owing to the general contractor, Blue Diamond, to cover the amounts of the liens. The lower court agreed and granted C.C.C. summary judgment. Victoria Towers appealed.  The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

In affirming the grant of summary judgment to the lienor-subcontractor, the appellate court relied on Section 3 of the Lien Law, and the case law interpreting that statute, holding that the mechanic’s lien remedy is limited by the principles of subrogation.  The subcontractor essentially steps into the shoes of the general contractor (in effect becoming “subrogated” to the general contractor’s claims against the owner), and those claims cannot exceed whatever claims the general contractor itself could assert against the owner.  If the general contractor is not owed any amount under its contract with the owner at the time the subcontractor's notice of lien is filed, then the subcontractor may not foreclose on its mechanic’s lien.

Here, however, the lower court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that C.C.C. established its entitlement to summary judgment because it established both the amounts owed for the work it performed at the property under the subcontracts, and that those amounts did not exceed the amount owed by the owner to the general contractor. The appellate court noted that Victoria Towers, in opposition, failed to demonstrate that a triable issue of fact existed to deny C.C.C. enforcement of its mechanic’s lien claim.

Comment

As this case demonstrates, the rights of subcontractor and material supplier lienors are derivative of the rights of the general contractor, and those rights are limited by the amount remaining due from the owner to the general contractor.  The subcontractors and suppliers cannot recover more than the amount owed from the owner to the general contractor.

A critical issue in the enforcement of liens is whether the owner had paid the general contractor in full at the time of the filing of the subcontractor’s or materialman’s lien.  Obviously, a mechanic’s lien filed without delay increases the likelihood that the lien will attach to monies due from the owner to the contractor.  The prudent subcontractor or material supplier should promptly file a mechanic’s lien once it becomes apparent that there is a problem with payment on the project.

Court Enforces Out-of-State Forum Selection Clause of Supply Contract

Contracts between parties frequently contain provisions specifying that litigation relating to the contract may be initiated only in a specified forum.  Courts generally enforce these forum selection clauses, and there is a high bar to challenge their enforceability.  In the recent case of Somerset Fine Homes Building, Inc. v Simplex Industries, Inc., a New York home builder challenged the validity of a sales agreement with a supplier which provided that any disputes would be litigated in a Court in Pennsylvania and determined by the law of Pennsylvania

Background

Somerset Fine Homes, a home builder in Suffolk County, entered into a sales agreement with Simplex Industries, a manufacturer of modular homes in Scranton, Pennsylvania, for Simplex to manufacture and transport a house to a site in Bridgehampton, New York, where Somerset was to erect the home for the homeowners. The agreement between Somerset and Simplex provided that any disputes would be determined by the law of Pennsylvania and that the exclusive forum for any action to enforce the agreement would be the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.

Somerset commenced a lawsuit against Simplex in Supreme Court in Suffolk County, claiming that Simplex breached the contract, breached the warranty, and committed fraud because it failed to deliver conforming, merchantable goods pursuant to the sales contract.  Simplex moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the parties’ agreement provides for the litigation of their dispute in the Pennsylvania court. In opposition to the motion, Somerset argued that the forum selection clause should be set aside as unconscionable, unreasonable and unjust, because it is a small company and traveling to Pennsylvania would cause it financial distress. In support of its argument, Somerset characterized itself as the weaker bargaining party and claimed it “had no choice” but to agree to the contract, as drafted by Simplex.

Decision

The court granted Simplex’s motion to dismiss, holding that parties to a contract may freely select their forum in the absence of unconscionability. The court, citing well established case law, held that a party claiming unconscionability bears a heavy burden of making a “strong showing” that the consenting party had no choice, and that the contract unreasonably favored the other party. According to the court, “the fact that the parties do not possess equal bargaining power does not invalidate a contract”. Moreover, the court noted that “the parties acknowledged in the agreement that they had the opportunity to obtain the assistance of counsel in the negotiation, drafting and execution of the agreement.” The court further ruled that simply claiming financial distress does not warrant setting aside a valid forum selection clause.  The court pointed out that there was no evidence that the cost of commencing an action in Pennsylvania would be “so financially prohibitive that for all practical purposes, [Somerset] would be deprived of its day in court”.  

Comment

It is well established that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable.  To set aside a forum selection clause, the opposing party must show that enforcement of the clause is unreasonable, unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching.  This case demonstrates the high bar that a party must meet to convince the court that enforcement of a forum selection clause is unconscionable.

It must be noted that if this were a contract which required the performance of construction work in New York, the result would have been different by statute. Section 757 of the General Business Law specifically declares any attempt to change the venue of a construction contract dispute, or the law to be applied to such a dispute, void and unenforceable. Accordingly, in the construction context, forum selection clauses in New York are valid only with regard to supply contracts. For contracts which require any work, as opposed to contracts for the supply of goods only, the venue and choice of law will be in New York.

When is a Restrictive Covenant Not Enforceable

It has been common practice, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, for owners of residential subdivisions (hereinafter referred to as “grantors”) to include in the deeds to individual lots various restrictions on development. These could include minimum or maximum home sizes, type of homes which could be built, roofing material to be used (usually slate) or restrictions on use such as prohibition against farm animals, storing of recreational vehicles or prohibitions against commercial usages. Often approval of building plans would be reserved to the grantor, which created a problem when that person or entity was no longer in existence.

More recently, these restrictions have taken the form of recorded Declarations of Restrictive Covenants which are binding on “heirs, successors and assigns”, in other words, all future owners. As often happens, some of the provisions of the restrictions become obsolete over time or are simply ignored by future owners and the ancient deed restrictions may not be included in later transactions. If there is no interested entity insuring compliance with the original restrictions they may be frequently ignored by later generations.

When there is no enforcement of the restrictions by a grantor or successor in interest to the grantor the question arises as to whether an owner in the chain of title can enforce the restriction against a neighbor who has or is threatening to violate it. The answer, as in most legal issues, is a definite maybe. A recent case in which we represented a defendant (Shehan v. Commisso and Cassano, Supreme Court, Suffolk County) explores that issue. The issue was whether a neighbor (Shehan) could enforce a 1929 deed restriction purportedly prohibiting further subdivision of a lot owned by the defendants, as to which the Planning Board had approved a subdivision of a lot into two building lots.

The Court ruled that he could not and dismissed his suit. In so doing the Court relied on existing law which allows a neighbor to seek enforcement of a deed restriction only if that neighbor can prove that the restriction was part of a common scheme or plan throughout the subdivision intending to benefit all owners. In this case there was ample evidence that no such common scheme existed. First, not all of the lots in the subdivision contained the same original deed restriction, and some of them had restrictions which expired by their terms in 1933. Additionally, the grantor had retained the right to impose other or different restrictions in future deeds. Also, the original 28 residential lots, through various re-subdivisions, had now grown to over 40, with three of them improved by a school.

Thus it was found that despite the deed restrictions being said to “run with the land” and inuring to the benefit of subsequent owners, they were not part of a common scheme or plan, so could not be enforced by one owner against another. It may also have been significant that the deeds for both plaintiff’s and defendants’ properties, going back to at least 1950 did not contain any reference to the original restrictions.

The lesson here is that when dealing with ancient deed restrictions, especially ones which seem to make no sense in contemporary times, it is important to consult with an attorney and thoroughly research the history of and current conditions within the subdivision.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Alan D. Singer at asinger@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6460

Landlord Liable to Contractor Where It Consented to the Work

The general rule is that a contractor who performed work for a tenant cannot file a mechanic’s lien on the real property unless the owner-landlord consents to the improvement. Such consent may be actual or implied. Generally, the owner must have indicated, through some affirmative act, a willingness to have the improvement made.

In the recent case of Ferrara v Peaches Café, LLC, decided by the Court of Appeals, consent was found in a lease which requires or permits a tenant to make improvements to the leased premises. Therefore, the court permitted the contractor to foreclose on the lien.

Background

COR Ridge Road Company, LLC owns commercial property that it leased to Peaches Café LLC, where Peaches intended to operate a restaurant. The written lease required Peaches to supply “[a]ll electrical work other than items furnished by [COR].” The lease further provided that Peaches could not commence construction work on the property without COR’s consent, and that Peaches could only use contractors approved by COR. Finally, the lease stated that any alterations, additions, or improvements to the premises “shall at once become a part of the realty and belong to [COR] and shall be surrendered with the Premises.”

Ferrara was retained by Peaches to perform the electrical work on the property, which it performed satisfactorily. Peaches failed to pay Ferrara, and Ferrara filed a mechanic’s lien against the property. Ferrara sued to foreclose on the lien.

Ferrara moved for summary judgment on its lien foreclosure cause of action, and COR moved for summary judgment dismissing that claim. COR argued that it did not have any dealings with the contractor and did not “expressly” or “directly” consent to the performance of the work. According to COR, liability could not be imposed on the owner for the debts of the tenant.  The trial court granted COR’s motion and dismissed the contractor’s foreclosure action.  Ferrara appealed.

Appellate Decisions

On appeal, Ferrara argued that Section 3 of the Lien Law permits a contractor to file a lien for improvements made with the consent of the owner, and that COR consented to the work set forth in the lease, which required Peaches to make certain alterations to the rented space. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision and granted Ferrara summary judgment against COR, relying upon well settled case law which holds that the landlord’s consent need not be specifically granted, but can also be implied from the terms of a tenant’s lease. Here, the requirement in the lease that Peaches make certain improvements is sufficient to imply the owner’s consent. The Appellate Division also rejected COR’s argument that a clause in the lease that disclaims liability for any mechanic’s lien arising as a result of work by Peaches extinguishes the Owner’s liability for the lien. The court found that the disclaimer provision was merely an indemnification clause meant for Peaches to ultimately repay COR for any monies COR had to pay out to a lienor. COR appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division, rejecting COR’s argument that a direct relationship between the landlord and the contractor was necessary to impose liability on the landlord. The Court noted that Peaches not only was obligated to make improvements, but COR also retained supervision over the work in the form of a veto over the contractor chosen and Peaches’ proposed plans. Based on these facts and well settled case law, the Court of Appeals found that the owner’s implied consent for the improvement, as spelled out in the lease, is sufficient to establish COR’s consent to the improvement.

Comment

Although the interpretation of what constitutes an owner’s implied consent to an improvement is a fact-based determination that will vary from case to case, it does not require a direct relationship between the owner-landlord and the lienor contractor. All that is required is that the owner either had taken an affirmative act or a course of conduct establishing such consent.  Here, the lease obligated the tenant to make specific improvements to the property. This “affirmative act” was sufficient to establish the owner’s consent to the work performed under the lease so as to allow the contractor to enforce the lien as against the property owner.

Court Interprets Conflicting Contract Provisions in Favor of Subcontractor

Cases involving conflicting provisions in a contract are some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. Where there are competing provisions in a contract, the court must identify the actual intent of the parties to determine which provision is the controlling language. In the case of Matter of Sciame Construction, LLC v Re:Source New Jersey, Inc., the court interpreted a subcontract which contained inconsistent provisions, one in the body of the subcontract and the other in the riders or exhibits to the subcontract.

Background

Sciame Construction, LLC, was the general contractor for a construction project on Laight Street in Manhattan. Sciame entered into a subcontract with Re:Source New Jersey, as a subcontractor, on September 9, 2013. The subcontract signed by the parties was an AIA form prepared with a computer program. Article 6 of the subcontract, under “Mediation and Binding Dispute Resolution” requires the parties to manually check a box in Article 6.2 to indicate how the parties agreed to resolve disputes. There is an option to resolve disputes via arbitration; that box is checked. Likewise, there is an option to resolve disputes through litigation in a court; that box is not checked.

Attached to the subcontract as Exhibits A and B were pre-printed riders that were not negotiated by the parties and were not signed by anyone from Re:Source, nor did the exhibits name or make any reference to Re:Source.  These riders made reference to litigation as the method of dispute resolution, and provided for the dispute to be litigated in the New York State Supreme Court or Federal District Court in Manhattan as the means to resolve disputes.

Re:Source claimed that it was owed payments for work performed at the Laight Street Project, and it initiated mediation and arbitration proceedings with the AAA.  Sciame petitioned the court to permanently stay the arbitration commenced by Re:Source, arguing that the exhibits to the subcontract designate litigation as the exclusive means of dispute resolution. The lower court dismissed Sciame’s petition to stay the arbitration. The court held that the provision in the subcontract, which requires the parties to arbitrate, controls, and the parties must arbitrate their dispute. Sciame appealed.  

Decision

The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the typewritten terms of the subcontract regarding binding arbitration of disputes “represents an express manifestation of the parties’ actual intentions and take precedence over any inconsistent provisions in the printed form[s]”.  The court pointed out that the conflicting provisions in the exhibits is, by its plain terms, inapplicable to the parties subcontract; “to construe it otherwise would impermissibly rewrite the provision under the guise of contract construction.”

Comment

Parties are free to negotiate and incorporate many different provisions into their contracts, and unless these provisions violate law or public policy they will generally be enforced. An obstacle to enforcement is where there are conflicting provisions in a contract, leaving the courts with the unenviable task of deciding the meaning of the contract.  This decision underscores the importance to contractors and subcontractors of carefully reviewing the proposed contract language and seeking clarification or modification to ensure that the contract reflects the true intent of the parties.