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Author: WB&G

Corporate Officers are not Directly Personally Liable for the Company’s Failure to Comply with New Jersey’s Prevailing Wage Act

In the case of Joseph Palmisano, et al. v. CrowderGulf, LLC, et al., the United States District Court for the District Court of New Jersey held that corporate officers are not individually liable for a failure to pay prevailing wages under New Jersey’s Prevailing Wage Act (the “PWA”).

In January 2013 Defendant CrowderGulf, LLC (“Contractor”) contracted with the State of New Jersey to perform “waterway debris removal services” from damage caused by Hurricane Sandy (the “Project”). In turn, Contractor subcontracted certain portions of the work to, among others, Defendant Bil-Jim Construction Co., Inc. (“Subcontractor”).

The Plaintiffs in the action brought suit individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, alleging that Contractor and Subcontractor failed to pay the prevailing wage for work performed on public projects, including without limitation full prevailing wages, shift differentials, overtime, and double-time for work performed on Sundays and Holidays. Importantly, Plaintiffs also named Subcontractor’s President, Vice President and Secretary/Treasurer (the “Individual Defendants”) in the action, claiming that, as “officers, principals, directors, supervisors, or managers”, the Individual Defendants are personally liable for Subcontractor’s failure to comply with the PWA. The Individual Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, contending that the PWA does not impute personal liability to corporate officers.

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court is required to accept as true all allegations in the Complaint, and to view the same in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ultimately, a complaint should be dismissed only if the well-pleaded alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim. While applying this legal standard, the Court granted the motion of the Individual Defendants, thereby dismissing the claims against them.

Plaintiffs argue that the PWA applies the New Jersey Wage Payment Law’s (“WPL”) definition of “employer”, which would result in the Individual Defendants being held personally liable. Plaintiff asks the Court to invoke the doctrine of in pari materia1. The Court, however, disagreed with Plaintiff, stating “the doctrine is not invoked to engraft the terms of one statute onto another merely because the general subject matters of the two enactments are similar.” The Court further noted that, unlike the Fair Labor Standards Act and the WPL, both of which impose individual liability on officers of a corporation, the PWA “employs the narrowest definition of employer, providing for no individual liability”. In further support of its holding, the Court noted the purpose of the PWA is “to establish a prevailing wage level for workmen engaged in public works in order to safeguard their efficiency and general well-being and to protect them as well as their employers from the effects of serious and unfair competition resulting from wage levels detrimental to efficiency and well-being”.

Conclusion:

New Jersey’s PWA does not impute personal liability on principal officers of a corporation for a failure to pay prevailing wages. Though the PWA does not specifically define “employer”, the regulations promulgated under the authority of the PWA define “employer” as any natural person, company, firm, subcontractor or other entity engaged in public work”. Under this definition, an “employer” under the PWA is limited to the entity or individual that obtains and performs work under the contract, which is the actual contracting entity and not its individual officers.

In the event an employee of your corporation brings an action under the PWA and individually names the corporate officers as defendants, thereby seeking to impose personal liability upon them, such action should be immediately met with a motion to dismiss on behalf of the individually named defendants.

Note that, notwithstanding the case law discussed herein, there may be indirect personal liability pursuant to an indemnity agreement entered into in connection with the issuance of a payment bond on a public project, provided a successful claim is made against any such bond.


1The general principle of in pari materia, a rule of statutory interpretation, says that laws of the same matter and on the same subject must be construed with reference to each other. The intent behind applying this principle is to promote uniformity and predictability in the law.

Corporate Owner Personally Liable for Fraudulent Transfers of Money

New York’s Debtor and Creditor Law prohibits the transfer of assets in an attempt to evade creditors. A corporate representative who participated in the fraudulent transfer may be held personally liable, regardless of whether the representative acted on behalf of the corporation in the course of his official duties.

In the case of Eastern Concrete Materials, Inc. v Allstar Ready Mix Corp., et. al., the court addressed the issue of personal liability by a 50% corporate shareholder for participating in fraudulent transfers of money.  The transfers were intended to evade enforcement of a judgment against a corporate ready-mix concrete supplier.

Background

In September of 2014, petitioner Eastern Concrete Materials, Inc. obtained a default judgment against Allstar Ready Mix Corp., in the amount of $82,739.40. Allstar was 50% owned by respondent Dominick P. Frantelizzi (“Dominick P.”), who also owned respondent City View Contracting Corp.  His son, Dominick M. Frantellizzi, owned Transit Mix Corp. and his father, Dominick Frantellizzi, Sr., owed DF, LLC.  These companies, including Allstar, maintained bank accounts at Chase Bank, and Dominick P. was a signatory on all of the accounts.  Transit Mix was formed one month after the judgment was entered against Allstar.  All of these entities were located at the same address as Allstar.  Within days after the judgment was entered, Allstar transferred a total of $82,850.00 to City View, Transit Mix, and DF, LLC.  

Based on these facts, Eastern moved for summary judgment against all respondents in the amount of $38,988.48, the amount left outstanding on the Allstar judgment, plus attorney’s fees, claiming that the money transfers out of Allstar’s bank accounts into other entities that either Dominick P. or a close family member controlled, were fraudulent acts intended to defeat Eastern’s right to enforce the judgment entered against Allstar.

Decision

New York’s Debtor and Creditor law protects judgment creditors from attempts by judgment debtors to frustrate collection of judgments.  The law provides that any transfer undertaken with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors is fraudulent and, therefore, void. The “badges of fraud” which evidence that intention include a close relationship between the parties to the transaction, the inadequacy of consideration for the money transfers, the transferor’s knowledge of the claims and its inability to pay them, and the effective retention of the property after the transfer. The law also provides that all transfers made without fair consideration by a defendant or a judgment debtor are per se fraudulent.

The court granted summary judgment to Eastern against Allstar, Transit Mix and Dominick P. for the full remaining amount of the judgment, plus $42,875.91 in attorney’s fees. In doing so, the court focused on the post-judgment transfer of money without consideration after Allstar ceased doing business and for no apparent purpose, the overlapping common control of the companies, the close family members’ disregard of separate corporate identities, and their existence at the same location.  

In its judgment, the court pierced the corporate veil of the corporate entities to impose liability upon Dominick P. personally.  His actions in undertaking the fraudulent transfers, failing to respect separate corporate identities, and in gifting Allstar’s assets to his son were found to be evidence of fraud sufficient to hold him personally liable for the full amount of the judgment.

Finally, the Debtor and Creditor law provides for an award of attorney’s fees where the fraudulent transfers demonstrate “actual intent”. The court held that Dominick P. and the corporate respondents failed to prove any legitimate purposes for these transfers.  Under the circumstances, the court found there was actual intent to defraud.  Therefore the court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Eastern.

Comment

The Debtor and Creditor Law is a powerful tool for creditors to use against debtors who seek to frustrate enforcement of judgments.  Here the court did not hesitate to declare the money transfers null and void and award attorney’s fees—which exceeded the principal amount of the judgment.  Courts will pierce the corporate veil between corporations and individuals and hold corporate representatives personally liable for fraudulent transfers designed to evade the collection of a money judgment.

What Contractors Need to Know About Prevailing Wage Rules Under the “New 421-a” Program

If you work in the New York City construction industry, you have probably heard about the “421-a” tax benefit program for real estate developers. However, what most people don’t know is that the policy now includes prevailing wage standards for construction contractors. Even though you might never be the one applying for 421-a tax benefits, construction contractors need to know whether the prevailing wage standard applies to them, and if so, how to comply with the rules.

Developers may claim tax exemptions for properties in New York City used for new construction of residential housing with at least some portion of the units reserved for below-market rate housing for eligible middle-to-low income households (“Affordable Housing”). This tax policy was based on Section 421-a of the Real Property Tax Law.

Section 421-a was enacted in 1971 to subsidize the New York construction industry during a period when the city’s population was declining by 85,000 people a year and residential construction was at an all-time low. Over the years, the legislature added Affordable Housing requirements for the 421-a tax benefits. “The Old 421-a” expired in January 2016, and the New York legislature codified a revised version of Real Property Tax Law § 421-which the administration calls the “Affordable New York Housing Program”, or unofficially, “The New 421-a”.

According to the New 421-a, the New York City Department of Finance (“DOF”) grants tax exemptions to developers. Developers can generally apply for a “20 Year Benefit” or a “35 Year Benefit” of property tax exemptions, depending on a number of factors including what percentage of their units are rented at below market rate, how many percentage points rents for those units are below market rate, etc.

If a project both (1) contains 300 or more units; and (2) is located in the “Enhanced Affordability Area”, the project can be an “Enhanced New Eligible Site” and the developer can apply to DOF for an “Enhanced 35 Year Benefit” – which is a very desirable exemption. If a developer receives an “Enhanced 35 Year Benefit”, then the developer can receive a 100% property tax exemption for the construction period plus an additional 35 years.

In Manhattan, the Enhanced Affordability Area includes all residential construction south of 96th Street. In Brooklyn and Queens, the Enhanced Affordability Area generally includes neighborhoods within one mile of the East River waterfront: Brooklyn Heights, Downtown Brooklyn, Vinegar Hill, Dumbo, Navy Yard, Boerum Hill, Williamsburg, Greenpoint, Long Island City, and Astoria.

If the construction is for a building with 300 or more units in the designated “Enhanced Affordability Area”, then the contractors must comply with the “Prevailing Wage”1 standards. In its first year of implementation after enactment in 2015, the Prevailing Wage for the Manhattan Enhanced Affordability Area was an average of $60 an hour, and the Prevailing Wage for the Brooklyn and Queens Enhanced Affordability Area was an average of $45 per hour. However, the Prevailing Wage is set to gradually increase in increments of 5% as of April 2020, and every three years thereafter.

The New 421-a also establishes a few exceptions to the Prevailing Wage for otherwise covered tax exemption applicants. The Prevailing Wage does not apply to (1) projects subject to a project labor agreement; (2) condominiums and cooperatives; (3) multiple family housing where at least 50% of the dwelling units are affordable housing restricted to residents with no more than 125% of Area Median Income.

Even if a given project is not bound by the Prevailing Wage because it is not in the Enhanced Affordability Area, but it has 300 or more units, a developer could still elect to comply with the 421-a Prevailing Wage in order to receive New 421-a benefits.  

Compliance with the New 421-a Prevailing Wage Mandate

In order to receive tax exemptions under the New 421-a, developers must hire an “Independent Monitor” (a licensed accountant) to submit a “Project-Wide Certified Payroll Report” to the Comptroller within one year of the completion date of the construction project, to certify that construction workers were paid appropriately, and that construction workers were paid the Prevailing Wage where it applies. If the developer was required to pay construction workers the Prevailing Wage but failed to do so, the Project-Wide Certified Payroll Report must state the aggregate amount of the deficiency. If the Project-Wide Certified Payroll Report is not submitted to the Comptroller on time, the developer will be subject to a fine of $1,000 per week, with a maximum fine of $75,000.

In addition to the payroll report obligations of the developer, each contractor and subcontractor to a developer receiving New 421-a tax benefits must submit a “Contractor Certified Payroll Report” to the Independent Monitor no less than 90 days after the completion of their own work.2 If the contractor or subcontractor does not submit the Contractor Certified Payroll Report within 90 days, the Comptroller can fine the contractor or subcontractor $1,000 per week, with a maximum fine of $75,000.

Though a contractor may not have paid its construction workers the full Prevailing Wage, the statute contains mechanisms for contractors and developers to rectify the deficiency without having to incur any fines. If the construction workers were still paid an average hourly wage within 15% of the Prevailing Wage, the developer must pay to the “Fund Administrator” the difference between the Prevailing Wage and the wage actually paid to the construction workers (the “Deficiency Payment”). The Deficiency Payment must be made within 120 days from the developer’s submission of the Project-Wide Certified Payroll Report to the Independent Monitor. The Comptroller will then distribute the deficiency payment to the construction workers.

However, if the construction workers were paid an average hourly wage more than 15% below the Prevailing Wage, the developer will not only have to rectify the deficiency, but will also be subject to fines and civil penalties. In such cases, the developer will be subject to a fine of $1,000 per week, with a maximum fine of $75,000, until the deficiency is cured. The developer must pay the Deficiency Payment within 120 days from the date of the submission of the Project-Wide Certified Payroll Report to the Independent Monitor. The Comptroller can then distribute the deficiency payment to the construction workers and impose a civil penalty on the developer equal to 25% of the amount of the deficiency (unless the building was “the subject of a job action which results in a work delay”).

If construction workers were paid less than the Prevailing Wage, the developer applicant for the New 421-a tax benefits is generally obligated to pay for deficiencies in the payments to the workers, fines, and penalties. However, there is an exception in the case that the developer was the victim of the contractor’s (1) “fraud, mistake or negligence”; (2) “fraudulent or inaccurate contractor certified payroll reports”; or (3) “fraudulent or inaccurate project-wide certified payroll reports”. In such case, the developer can still be eligible for the New 421-a tax benefits so long as (1) the contractor or subcontractor must still cure the underpayment of the construction workers, and (2) the Comptroller determines “that the underpayment was the result of, or caused by, contractor fraud, mistake, negligence and/or for fraudulent or inaccurate contractor certified payroll reports and/or project-wide certified payroll reports.”

In Practice:

If you are a contractor or a subcontractor on a residential building project in the five boroughs, you need to know whether the Prevailing Wage Mandate applies to you. A smart owner would put this explicitly in the contract documents, but you cannot rely on the owner to inform you of your legal obligations. You should consult with an attorney to determine whether the Prevailing Wage Mandate applies to you on any new project. 

Even though it is the owner/developer who applies for the tax exemptions, some of the obligations under the New 421-a law apply directly on the contractor or subcontractor. If the law applies, you may need to submit a Contractor Certified Payroll Report to the Independent Monitor within 90 days of completion of the project.


1 Note that in the context of this legal alert, the Prevailing Wage Mandate only refers to the wage standards set by the “New 421-a” – and does not refer to prevailing wages as defined by the New York Department of Labor.

2 Note that the Contractor Certified Payroll Report submitted by the contractor and the Project-Wide Certified Payroll Report submitted by the developer are two very different things; the latter is not just a summary of the former.

Court Rejects Enforceability of Contractual One-Year Time to Sue Limitation

Although New York’s statute of limitations provides for a six-year time limit to commence an action for breach of contract, parties are allowed to contractually reduce this period, provided that the shortened period is fair and reasonable under the particular circumstances of each case.

In the recent case of D&S Restoration, Inc. v Wenger Construction Co., Inc., an appellate court addressed the enforceability of a contractual one-year time limitation period.

Background

Wenger Construction Co., Inc. was the general contractor on a construction project with the New York City School Construction Authority. In March of 2011, Wenger subcontracted with D&S Restoration, Inc., for D&S to remove certain material on the project believed to contain asbestos and PCBs.  The subcontract identified the price that would be paid for the removal of the specified materials.  It also provided that should the materials later be determined to not contain asbestos or PCBs, the quantity would be deducted from the scope of the work with a credit change order, and the subcontract price would be reduced accordingly.  The subcontract further provided that the payment from the SCA was a condition precedent to payment by Wenger to D&S, and that final payment to D&S was subject to any credit changes as determined by the SCA.  The subcontract also contained a provision that no lawsuit could be maintained by D&S against Wenger unless commenced within one year after the substantial completion of D&S’s work.

D&S completed its work on the project in June of 2012, and it submitted an invoice to Wenger with its proposed credit changes.  D&S also submitted its proposed credit changes to the SCA. Wenger, however, did not advise D&S as to the amount agreed upon by the SCA until March of 2014.  According to D&S, despite D&S’s repeated inquiries, Wenger did not confirm or send any documentation confirming the credit to the SCA.  The final change order for the asbestos work was not signed off by Wenger until May of 2016, while the SCA did not sign off on it until June of 2016.

D&S commenced this action for breach of contract in March of 2016, alleging that Wenger had not paid D&S the amount due under the subcontract.  Wenger moved to dismiss the complaint based on the reduced contractual time limitation period, arguing that the lawsuit was time-barred because it was not commenced within one year of the date of D&S’s substantial completion of its work. The trial court granted Wenger’s motion to dismiss D&S’s lawsuit based on the expiration of the contractual time limit for D&S to commence a lawsuit, which was within one year after D&S’s substantial completion of its work in June of 2012.

Appellate Decision

On appeal, D&S argued that the one-year limitations provision beginning upon substantial completion should not be enforced because it is unfair and unreasonable.  According to D&S, it was unable to bring any claim within a year of substantial completion because the final payment was not yet due from Wenger as the SCA had not yet confirmed the credit or provided payment to Wenger.

The Court pointed out that the subcontract provided that payment from the SCA to Wenger was a condition precedent to payment by Wenger to D&S, and that the final payment amount was subject to any credit changes as determined by the SCA.  Here, the SCA did not sign off on the credit and final approved change orders for the asbestos work performed by D&S until June of 2016.  Therefore, it was impossible for D&S to bring any claim for breach of contract within one year of substantial completion as final payment was not yet due from Wenger because the SCA had not yet confirmed the credit or provided payment to Wenger.

Comment

As the D&S court held, “[t]here is nothing inherently unreasonable about the one-year period of limitation, to which the parties here freely agreed”. In fact, the July, 2017 Attorneys’ Column reported a case where the court enforced an agreed upon six-month contractual limitation period. However, an analysis must be undertaken as to whether the shortened limitations period is fair and reasonable, and whether it still provides a claimant with redress for its claims. Where the accrual date for the claim and the dates for the performance of any conditions precedent to payment are not specifically linked, there is a danger that, as occurred here, the time to sue on the claim would have run before the claim itself accrued. As the D&S court reminds us, courts will not enforce an unreasonable limitation period, even if contractually agreed to by the parties.

Contractor Held Liable for Diversion of Trust Funds

Article 3-A of the Lien Law, also known as the Lien Law trust fund provisions, provides that (1) funds receive by an owner of a construction project from a lender, (2) funds received by a contractor from an owner, and (3) funds received by a subcontractor from a contractor, are trust funds held by them as trustees to be used for the cost of improvements on a project.  The trust fund statutes are designed to prevent trust funds received on a project from being diverted for purposes other than for payment of labor and materials furnished to the project.  For example, a contractor can be found liable where it diverts payments that it receives on a project by paying creditors on another project.  Unpaid subcontractors and materials suppliers as trust beneficiaries on a project may commence a lawsuit against the contractor for diversion of trust funds.

Where trust monies are diverted, individual officers and directors of the contracting corporation may be personally liable for the unpaid claims of subcontractors and material suppliers if they knowingly participated in the diversion.   

In the recent case of H & L Ironworkers Corp. v. McGovern & Co. LLC, the court addressed the issue of whether the contractor was liable for a trust fund diversion.

Background

10 E. 53 LLC, the owner of a building and construction project in Manhattan, hired McGovern and Co. as a general contractor for the project.  H & L Ironworkers Corp. subcontracted with McGovern to perform work at the project.  H & L furnished labor and materials under the project, but was not paid.  McGovern received $17,590,802 from the owner for work performed on the project.

H & L sued McGovern and argued that it is entitled to summary judgment for trust diversion violations under Article 3-A of the Lien Law because McGovern as a trustee, diverted trust monies received from the project’s owner for purposes other than to pay for the costs of construction on the project.  H & L also sought to impose personal liability on Daniel G. McGovern, a managing member of the company, pointing out that he had financial control over the company.

McGovern opposed H & L’s motion by arguing that the evidence on the record does not support actual trust diversion.

Decision

The court granted summary judgment to H & L for trust fund violations by McGovern.  The court found that the trust funds received by McGovern were improperly diverted.  Specifically, McGovern’s bank records show that the project funds paid by the owner were deposited into McGovern’s bank account and $11,519,604 of trust money were paid to various contractors not connected with the project.  The court also found that McGovern paid $1,535,052 to labor union fringe benefits not related to the project.  In addition, the bank records also showed that the company transferred $1,176,236 to McGovern’s wife, $296,320 to McGovern’s brother and $92,418 to his attorney.

As for McGovern’s exposure to personal liability, the court ruled that there is no evidence at this stage of the proceeding to establish that McGovern knowingly diverted trust funds.  Accordingly, the court denied H & L’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of McGovern’s personal liability, but allowed H & L to conduct pre-trial discovery to determine whether McGovern knowingly diverted trust funds.

Comment

The trust fund provisions provide a valuable tool for collecting money for labor performed or materials supplied to the project.  This remedy may be the only source of recovery where a trust fund beneficiary failed to file a mechanic’s lien and labor and material payment bond rights are not available or where the contractor is insolvent.  It is worth repeating that an individual officer, manager or other control person of a corporation may be personally liable if it is shown that he/she knowingly participating in the diversion.  Notably, a judgment based upon a diversion is not discharged in bankruptcy.   

Contractor’s Failure to Comply with Contractual Conditions Precedent Not Fatal

Disputes over construction “change orders” on public works projects are a frequent source of litigation. The contractor submits change order proposals seeking payment for “extra work”—construction work beyond that which is explicitly set forth in the initial contract. Provisions in the contract governing change orders and extra work are normally contained in the project’s “General Conditions”, a document incorporated by reference in the parties’ contract.

In the recent case of Danco Electrical Contractors, Inc. v Dormitory Authority of the State of New York, the appellate court addressed the issue of whether the contractor’s claim for extra work should be dismissed due to its failure to comply with the contractual condition precedents of verification, timeliness, and the requirement of a “notice to proceed” set forth in the contract.

Background

 

Danco Electrical Contractors was the prime electrical contractor on a project on which the Dormitory Authority (“DASNY”) undertook to construct for the City University of New York at Brooklyn College.  The contract between Danco and DASNY provided, in relevant part, that: “no claims for Extra Work shall be allowed unless such Extra Work is ordered by [DASNY] via a written Notice to Proceed”; if Danco disputed any matter relating to the Extra Work it had to provide a written notice of the dispute within 15 days after commencing the work, or 15 days after DASNY’s act or omission giving rise to the dispute; and if DASNY ordered Danco to undertake change order work that was not agreed to by Danco, then Danco had to submit a verified (sworn) statement of objections to DASNY’s forced pricing or outright change order rejections.  

During the course of the project there were numerous disputes between Danco and DASNY relating to change orders, and their pricing. On several occasions, DASNY directed Danco to perform extra work at DASNY’s price because the parties could not reach any mutually acceptable agreement. Danco ultimately sued DASNY to recover payment for several rejected change orders, and the price difference between Danco’s change order proposals and DASNY’s forced prices. DASNY moved for summary judgment dismissing the change order claims, citing the above conditions precedent contained in the contract, and arguing that Danco waived its right to seek payment on these change orders by not adhering to the required conditions precedent for change order approvals set forth in the contract.

Decision

The trial court granted DASNY’s motion to dismiss the extra work claims, finding that Danco’s failure to follow the contractual conditions precedent constituted a waiver of its change order claims. Danco appealed. On appeal, Danco argued that it would suffer a disproportionate forfeiture if these conditions precedent were strictly applied. The appellate court agreed with Danco’s argument, and distinguished prior settled case law by finding that Danco’s non-compliance was minimal, and that it did not result in any prejudice to DASNY.

In doing so, the court noted that DASNY does not argue that the contractor failed to document the costs of the extra work, provide timely notice of its claims for extra work, or provide timely notice of its objections to DASNY’s rejections and forced price reductions on the claimed extra work. The court also pointed out that DASNY does not argue that the contractor’s failure to submit verified written statements was prejudicial to DASNY.

Comment

It has been a long standing rule of law that where a contract set forth conditions precedent, such conditions had to be strictly complied with or else the claims would be dismissed. While the results of such a rule have often been harsh, the courts have been consistent in requiring strict performance of conditions precedent. Now, it appears that at least one appellate court has adopted a more flexible approach to the rigid requirements of conditions precedent by entertaining arguments of whether non-compliance with the conditions precedent was minimal or material, and whether there was any resulting prejudice to the party claiming the protection of the conditions. We will have to await further development of case law through further litigation to determine whether courts will follow the reasoning of this case on the issue of enforceability of a condition precedent.

In the meantime, contractors and subcontractors would be well advised to simply comply with the contractual conditions precedent rather than take the risk that a court may find that their non-compliance with conditions precedent, unlike Danco’s, was material or prejudicial to the other party. 

Court Rejects Contractor’s Motion to Dismiss Sub’s Claim

Construction contracts often provide for a condition precedent to the right of a subcontractor to commence a legal action against a general contractor. An example of a condition precedent is the requirement of a subcontractor to give timely notice of a claim to its general contractor prior to the subcontractor’s right to commence a lawsuit for non-payment for work performed.

In the recent case of Walsh Electrical Contracting, Inc. v Aurora Contractors, Inc., the court ruled on a general contractor’s motion to dismiss a subcontractor’s action to recover monies claimed to be due because of the subcontractor’s alleged failure to comply with two condition precedent clauses in the subcontract.

Background

Aurora Contractors entered into a contract for the construction of a FedEx facility in Queens. Aurora, in turn, subcontracted with Walsh Electrical Contracting to perform the electrical scope of work necessary for the project. Walsh performed the work, and then claimed that it was not fully paid for its work.

Walsh’s subcontract provided that notice of any claim by the subcontractor for damages, extra or additional compensation, or an extension of time had to be provided to Aurora within five days of the time that the claim accrued, and that such notice had to provide specific details about the claim or else such claim would be waived and Walsh shall have no right to recover upon it. The subcontract also set forth a dispute resolution procedure which provided that any claims “may be mediated by the parties” in accordance with the Construction Industry Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

Walsh ultimately commenced suit against Aurora based on Aurora’s failure to remit full payment on Walsh’s invoices. Aurora moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Walsh failed to comply with the subcontract’s notice of claim requirement, and that Walsh also failed to participate in mandatory mediation before commencing litigation.

Decision

The court denied Aurora’s motion, finding that the provisions relied upon by Aurora were not conditions precedent to Walsh’s commencement of its lawsuit. In doing so, the court followed well settled case law that a contract should be interpreted and applied as written by the parties, and that courts will not rewrite a contract after the fact. Here, the court found that the notice of claim provision only applied to claims for damages, extra or additional compensation, or extensions of time, and that a claim for failing to pay invoices submitted by Walsh was not encompassed within the notice of claim provision.

As for the issue of mandatory mediation, the court found that the mediation provision used the word “may” in describing the mediation process, and that such word showed that mediation was optional, rather than mandatory. Accordingly, the court held that the two contractual provisions were not conditions precedent to Walsh’s commencement of an action to recover monies for its work on the project.

Comment

It is a long-standing rule of law that a court’s function is to interpret and apply the contract, as written by the parties. A court will not rewrite or remake a contract after the fact. Contracting parties should ensure that essential terms of a contract are drafted with clarity and precision to reflect the true intentions of the parties so that contingencies that may arise will be covered and dealt with in accordance with the parties’ intentions at the time of contract. 

What Type Of “Pre-Construction” Services Can You Lien For?

In a recent New York case, an interesting question arose as to the type of pre-construction services for which a construction professional can file a lien. Generally speaking, if you perform work and you are not paid for labor or services utilized “for the improvement of real property” you are permitted to file a mechanic’s lien. A mechanic’s lien is a powerful tool to secure payment, but is equally fraught with perils if not carefully prepared. In the pre-construction context, you can file a lien for certain services even if a project never proceeds to completion. However, determining what type of services you can lien for is often tricky. An improper description of your work or services provided can result in the lien being challenged and, ultimately, dismissed.

In The Matter of the Application of Old Post Road Associates, LLC, 2018 WL 2209500 (Sup Ct, Westchester County, 2018), petitioner, Old Post Road Associates, LLC (“Old Post Road Associates”), sought to summarily discharge a lien filed by LRC Construction, LLC (“LRC”), pursuant to Lien Law § 19(6). LRC, in its lien, claimed it provided “pre-construction management services” for the owner, Old Post Road Associates. The owner did not dispute that it engaged LRC to perform certain “pre-construction management services” in connection with a planned construction project on its property. LRC claimed the services it performed included updating the project budget, attending meetings with consultants to discuss construction phasing and reviewing documents in connection with the site plan approval. Old Post Road Associates argued that LRC provided these services “gratis” in the hope of being retained as the project construction manager. LRC disagreed, claiming that it provided these services for eleven (11) months until it was terminated, and it should be compensated. Obviously, LRC was not retained as the project construction manager, and both parties unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a settlement. LRC then filed a mechanic’s lien for the services in the amount of $225,000, and Old Post Road Associates filed a petition to discharge the lien.

Supreme Court acknowledged that little guidance exists as to what type of work falls within and outside the category of “improvements” for which a lien can be filed. Analyzing an almost one-hundred-year-old case, the Court noted that the Lien Law does not cover services associated with procurement of subcontractors and “applying for permits and approvals”, as that type of work is not “the work of improving property”. Old Post Road Associates argued that the description of labor and services in the lien did not provide the basis to file a lien and, thus, the lien should be discharged. LRC countered that the Lien Law is subject to a liberal construction in favor of contractors. The Court ultimately concluded that LRC’s description in the lien for “pre-construction management services” does not automatically render the lien defective. Interestingly, the Court permitted LRC to submit an affidavit further describing the services it provided for the Project and found that the more detailed description in the affidavit was sufficient to permit the lien to stand—although some of the described work may be non-lienable.

Although LRC was able to dodge dismissal, the case should serve as a warning against filing a lien that contains any description of services which do not fall under the Lien Law. All mechanic’s liens filed in New York must contain a concise statement describing the work, labor or services that were provided for the benefit of a construction project. It is important to remember that the stakes are high because even one mistake can render your lien fatally defective. For pre-construction services, make sure the services you provided are allowable under the Lien Law, and be very specific as to the services performed. Often, being overly detailed, rather than using generalizations, can help avoid an early challenge to the lien and, as discussed above, can even result in the lien surviving an attempt at dismissal.

Contractor Liable to Sub for Failing to Timely Pursue Sub’s Claim Against Owner

A subcontractor has no direct contractual relationship with a project owner; that relationship is between the general contractor and the owner.  Accordingly, the subcontractor cannot sue the owner directly if it sustains money damages caused by the owner.  Consequently, in response to this lack of contractual privity, the subcontractor and the general contractor may enter into a liquidating agreement, or pass-through agreement, where the sub assigns its claim to the general contractor. The general contractor, in turn, would then prosecute the subcontractor’s pass-through claim against the owner, and then give the subcontractor any recovery.

Generally, a liquidating agreement is designed to limit or liquidate the general contractor’s liability to the subcontractor to the amount the general contractor recovers from the subcontractor.

In the recent case of Rod and D’Aprile, Inc. v. Arnell Construction Corp., the appellate court addressed the general contractor’s duty of good faith and fair dealing under a liquidating agreement.

Background

In June of 2001, the New York City Department of Sanitation entered into a contract with Arnell Construction Corp., as general contractor, to construct two new sanitation garages in Brooklyn. Arnell’s contract with the City required that any claims against the City be brought within six months of the City’s issuance of the certificate of substantial completion for the project. In August of 2001, Arnell subcontracted with Rad & D’Aprile, Inc., for Rad & D’Aprile to perform certain masonry work on the project.

In August of 2010, pursuant to a liquidating agreement it had entered into with the subcontractor, Arnell filed a notice of claim with the City seeking damages on behalf of Rad & D’Aprile for additional costs that the subcontractor incurred due to various delays caused by the City. In September of 2010, Arnell commenced an action against the City on those claims.  The City moved to dismiss that lawsuit on the ground that it was untimely under the six-month limitations period provided for in Arnell’s contract. The court granted the motion, finding that the City had notified Arnell in December 2007 that the project was substantially complete, and that any lawsuit had to be commenced no later than June of 2008.

After that lawsuit was dismissed, Rad & D’Aprile sued Arnell directly for the same damages. In its second cause of action, Rad & D’Aprile alleged that Arnell had a duty to make a good-faith, diligent effort to prosecute the claim it asserted against the City on the subcontractor’s behalf, and that Arnell breached that duty by failing to commence the lawsuit against the City within the applicable six-month limitations period.

Decision

Arnell moved to dismiss Rad & D’Aprile’s complaint, arguing that it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court denied the general contractor’s motion to dismiss the subcontractor’s second cause of action for the breach of the liquidating agreement, finding that Rad & D’Aprile set forth facts sufficient to establish that Arnell had a duty of good faith and fair dealing independent of the subcontract, and that the general contractor breached that duty by failing to commence the underlying action before the six-month limitations period expired.

Arnell appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the dismissal of the breach of the liquidating agreement claim. The appellate court relied on well established case law that the liquidating agreement, like every other contract, contained a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Here, the appellate court held that duty of good faith and fair dealing “require[d] the general contractor to ‘take all reasonable steps so that the [subcontractor’s] right to an eventual recovery, if any, from the [owner] w[ould] be protected”. The facts set forth in the complaint sufficiently alleged that Arnell breached that duty by failing to timely prosecute the subcontractor’s claims.

Comment

Liquidating agreements are an effective way to address the problem of a subcontractor’s lack of a contractual relationship with a general contractor by having that general contractor essentially admit the validity of the subcontractor’s claims, confess liability on those claims, and then prosecute those claims on behalf of the subcontractor with the promise that the recovery would be passed along to the aggrieved subcontractor. The benefit to a subcontractor is that claims which would otherwise be barred because of the lack of privity of contract with the owner can be adjudicated. The benefit to the general contractor is that its liability is limited to the amount it ultimately recovers on the liquidated claims. However, as we can see from Rad & D’Aprile, in order to enjoy the protection of that limitation of liability, the general contractor must be diligent in prosecuting the subcontractor’s liquidated claims. General contractors and prime contractors would be well advised to take their responsibilities under a liquidating agreement seriously or else be prepared to be held responsible for the subcontractor’s claims.

How to Comply with Notice Requirements for the Safe Construction Bill of Rights and Tenant Protection Plans

Suppose you are a general contractor, hired by a landlord to renovate the atrium of an apartment building in Bushwick. It looks like a simple job that will take a month, but it will generate significant noise and dust, and it will require interruption of the hot water and gas lines. In this case, you need to make sure that the landlord has provided sufficient notice to the occupants of the building.

In 2017, the New York City Council enacted a package of ordinances dubbed as the “Stand for Tenant Safety”. These laws were enacted to curb egregious abuses like the case of Daniel Melamed, a Crown Heights landlord so determined to evict rent-stabilized tenants that he hired contractors to perform illegal construction work. Melamed hired his contractors to conduct partial demolition of the building while tenants were still living in it, exposing tenants to friable asbestos and toxic concentrations of lead dust, and intentionally cutting off heat in the dead of the winter. The Attorney General filed criminal charges, and Melamed was ultimately convicted on three counts of unlawful eviction.

The City Council’s stated intent in enacting these new notice requirements is to provide tenants with relevant information when their Landlord conducts significant renovations in the building, and to deter the misuse of construction contractors for the ulterior purpose of harassing rent-stabilized tenants.

The Safe Construction Bill of Rights

One ordinance in the “Stand for Tenant Safety” package is Intro-960 sponsored by Rosie Mendez (D-Lower East Side), more colloquially known as the “Safe Construction Bill of Rights” (or in this legal alert, “SCBOR”). Substantively, the only thing that SCBOR does is establish an affirmative obligation for landlords to provide written notice to their tenants about any significant construction or renovations on the premises. It is a best practice for every contractor to take care that the landlord follows this new notice rule.  

In any such situation in which a Landlord’s obligations attach, the Landlord must make available a document titled the “Safe Construction Bill of Rights” to all of the Occupants (“SCBOR Notice”). For new buildings, the SCBOR Notice requirements attach whenever a landlord applies for a temporary certificate of occupancy. For existing buildings, the notice requirement attaches “contemporaneously” when a landlord applies for a work permit for any work significant enough that it requires a permit; i.e. anything more than mere “ordinary repairs” or “minor alterations”.  Note, however, that if the landlord applies for an emergency work permit, the notice requirement attaches “immediately.”

According to the Safe Construction Bill of Rights, the SCBOR Notice must inform occupants of the following information:

  1. A description of the construction work being conducted (“Work”)
  2. The location of the Work
  3. The projected timeline for completion of the Work
  4. A description of the services anticipated to be interrupted during the Work, such as hot water, an elevator, a stairwell, an entrance, etc.
  5. Contact information for an agent or an employee of the landlord who can be reached for emergency matters and non-emergency matters
  6. Contact information for 311 or other city or state agencies

The Landlord can comply with the Notice requirements by distributing the SCBOR Notice to each occupied dwelling unit. The Landlord can also comply by posting the SCBOR Notice “in a conspicuous manner” in the building lobby next to the Housing Information Guide required to be posted on every floor next to every elevator and every stairwell.

The Tenant Protection Plan

A separate ordinance, Intro-936-A, establishes the requirements of a valid Tenant Protection Plan (“TPP”). New York City landlords will also have to provide a TPP (“TPP Notice”) in any scenario in which there will be construction or demolition work in “buildings containing occupied dwelling units”. This includes buildings that are partially occupied while contractors are still conducting construction work elsewhere in the building.

At minimum, the TPP Notice must include specific, detailed provisions for:

  1. Egress. The TPP must include how tenants can exit the building during construction
  2. Fire Safety. The TPP must include how construction will comply with the Fire Code
  3. Health Requirements. The TPP must specify means and methods to be used to control dust, disposal of construction debris, pest control, maintenance of sanitary facilities, and limitation of noise. The TPP must include a statement of “means and methods” of compliance with applicable laws on lead and asbestos.
  4. Housing Code. The TPP must state how to comply with the NYC Housing Maintenance Code and the New York State Multiple Dwelling Law (if applicable)
  5. Structural Safety. The TPP must state that no structural work shall be done that may endanger the occupants.
  6. Noise Restrictions. The TPP must state the limitations where the hours of the day or days of the week in which construction work may be undertaken are limited pursuant to the NYC Noise Control Code.
  7. Maintaining Essential Services. The TPP must specify the “means and methods” to be used for maintaining heat, hot water, cold water, gas, electricity, or other utility services; if such “essential services” are anticipated to be disrupted, for how long what “means and methods” will be employed to minimize the disruption of “essential services”.

The TPP Notice must contain a statement that “the building contains dwelling units that will be occupied during construction” and must list those units. The TPP Notice must also include the specific “means and methods” which the contractor will employ to safeguard the safety and health of all occupants throughout the construction. You have to explain your safety and health procedures  with particular detail – a bare recitation of the law, or writing “legal” or “code compliant” will not suffice.

Once the TPP Notice responsibilities attach, the landlord will have to make the TPP Notice available to all of the tenants. The TPP Notice can also be distributed to each occupied dwelling unit, or posted “in a conspicuous manner” in the building lobby and on each floor next to the elevators or stairwells.  Landlords will have to use the DOB-approved form.  

In Practice

The next time you have to conduct any significant work on a residential building, make sure that the Landlord has complied with the Notice requirements of the Safe Construction Bill of Rights and a Tenant Protection Plan. Otherwise, DOB can issue fines to the landlord on the order of a Class 1 Violation – and if that happens, there is a good chance that many landlords are going to try to pin the blame on the contractor.

Remember that the Tenant Protection Plan is not a toothless notice requirement; it is a part of your “Contract Documents”. The owner must provide written notice to DOB at least 72 hours before the contractor commences any work requiring a TPP. The contractor is obligated to comply with the TPP upon issuance of work permits.

When drafting a contract, you may want to specifically provide that the landlord is obligating to provide due notice of the Safe Construction Bill of Rights and a Tenant Protection Plan to all tenants and to DOB. If you get to the job site, and you do not see the Notice posted at entrances, stairwells, and elevators, make sure to get in writing from the Landlord that Notice has been distributed directly to all of the tenants.

According to the ordinance, DOB is going to conduct inspections of at least 5 percent of all building sites to determine compliance with the TPP. DOB is also going to conduct inspections after receiving a complaint about any such work. If DOB determines that work is noncompliant with the approved TPP, DOB can issue a stop work order.

Be wary of contracting with unscrupulous landlords. If you have any reason to believe that a potential client has ulterior motives in hiring you to do construction work, think twice about signing that contract.

If you are already on the job site, and your client asks you to do anything suspicious, give your lawyer a call. It is better to err on the side of caution than to be named as a defendant in a messy, highly-publicized lawsuit that could result in major liabilities and jeopardize your ability to obtain future work permits and future public contracts in New York City.