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Author: WB&G

Six Month Contractual Time to Sue Bars Sub’s Claim

The Attorney’s Column has cautioned contractors of short contractual limitation periods within which to commence a lawsuit. The generally applicable New York statute of limitations provides for a six year time limit to start an action for breach of contract. Contractors, however, should be made aware that a construction contract may provide a much shorter time limitation within which the lawsuit must be commenced. Shortened contractual time periods are often written into construction bond and insurance contracts. The contractual time period will be enforced by the courts, provided the time period is not unreasonably short.

In the recent case of AWI Security & Investigations, Inc. v Whitestone Construction Corp., the court addressed a contractual six month time to sue limitation.

Background

Whitestone entered into four contracts with AWI for security services at school or housing project worksites. All four contracts contained the following provision:

Limitation on Suit:

No claim or action by [plaintiff] arising out of or related to this Agreement shall lie or be maintained against [defendant] unless such action is commenced no later than six (6) months after either (a) the cause of action accrues, (b) the termination or conclusion of this agreement, or (c) the last day [plaintiff] performed any physical work at the Project site, whichever of the proceeding [sic] events shall occur first.

AWI performed its services at the four jobsites through April of 2012. In July of 2014, AWI sued Whitestone, claiming that it was not paid for its services. Whitestone moved to dismiss the action based on the six month contractual time to sue limitation. AWI opposed the motion, arguing that: (1) Whitestone had a continuing obligation under Section 106 of the General Municipal Law to remit to AWI payments that Whitestone received from the City of New York on account of AWI’s work; and (2) Whitestone’s counsel acknowledged in writing, in June of 2012, that the amounts owing to AWI were not then due.

Decision

The court granted Whitestone’s motion and dismissed the complaint, finding that the lawsuit was indeed commenced more than six months after the earliest of the first of the three triggering events. In doing so, the court noted that AWI made no challenge to the shortened six month time to sue limitation period as being unreasonably short or the product of overreaching by Whitestone. With no such challenge having been made, the court went on to rule that Section 106 of the General Municipal Law, which requires prompt payment to subcontractors after receipt of payment from public owners, did not effectively extend the contractual limitation period. In a like vein, the court rejected the argument that the June, 2012 letter of acknowledgement from Whitestone’s counsel acted to extend the time limitation period, holding that the written acknowledgement would have had to have been of an existing debt, and the debt was not existing at the time of the acknowledgement.

Comment

The courts continue to enforce agreed-upon shortened contractual time to sue limitations. There is little else in the law that can destroy a case so quickly as a short time to sue period. The courts do not have any discretion to extend the short contractual time limitation period, even though there may be good reasons for delay in starting the lawsuit. An unpaid claimant is well advised to become familiar with the contractual time to sue limitation period. A claim will often be lost if the limitation period is not complied with. 

Court Rules on Town’s Use of Second Contractor to Complete First Contractor’s Work

The recent case of CTS Contracting, Inc. v Town of Cheektowaga, raises the issue of whether a town could engage a second contractor to perform emergency snow removal work without competitive bidding where the town already completed the competitive bidding process and awarded a contract to the first contractor.

Background

The Town of Cheektowaga undertook a competitive bidding process to retain an emergency snow removal contractor, and awarded a contract to CTS Contracting, Inc. CTS  used seven subcontractors in the course of carrying out a portion of the work under the contract.  In addition to CTS, the Town thereafter engaged another contractor to perform snow removal work.

CTS commenced a lawsuit against the Town, claiming that the Town, by retaining another snow removal contractor, had breached CTS’s contract. The Town  moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that: (1) section 103(4) of the General Municipal Law permits municipalities to let contracts without public bidding where there is a public emergency arising out of unforeseen circumstances; (2) CTS’s subcontracting of its contract work to other subcontractors violated the anti-subletting provisions of section 138 of the State Finance Law and section 109 of the General Municipal Law; and (3) CTS’s contract was non-exclusive, and therefore, the Town had the right to engage  other contractors to perform the snow removal work.

The lower court denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment and the Town appealed the decision.

Decision

The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the Town's motion for summary judgement dismissing the complaint.  First, as to the “public emergency” argument, the court held that the public emergency had to be unforeseeable such that the municipality did not have time to advertise for bids for emergency snow removal.  The fact that the Town had already solicited competitive bids and awarded a contract to CTS covering the same “emergency” snow removal work demonstrates that the “emergency” work performed by the second contractor was reasonably foreseeable by the Town and, therefore, did not qualify as an exception to the competitive bidding requirement for public work.  

As to the Town’s “anti-subletting” argument, the court found that the Town’s knowledge of CTS’s use of subcontractors and its failure to object to the subcontracting indicated that there were questions of fact to be determined at trial as to whether the Town had waived the protection afforded by the anti-subletting statutes.  The court pointed out that “a party may not, with full knowledge of all the facts, have the benefit of work done… by a subcontractor without objection, and then urge as an excuse for not paying for the same that the sub-contractor was not consented to by him.” The court also found that notwithstanding the waiver issue, there were factual questions as to whether the use of subcontractors violated the anti-subletting statutes.

Finally, as to the “non-exclusivity” argument, the court followed well settled law that the contract must be interpreted to give effect to, and not nullify, it’s primary purpose. In doing so, the court found that the Town’s awarding a second contract to perform the same work would render  CTS’s contract meaningless.

Comment

The CTS court applied established case law to hold that a Town could not award a second contract covering the same scope of work as an existing contract. While the Town had argued that CTS did not have the capacity to handle a major snowfall, the Town improperly retained the second contractor to perform all of CTS’s work, and not just the “excess” work that CTS could not handle. 

When Can a Contractor Stop Work for Non-Payment? (Connecticut)

A recurring question for construction contractors is whether they can stop work if they have not been paid on time. Contractors need to be very careful about suspending performance due to non-payment. If contractors strictly follow the rules, and the terms of the contract, they can protect their rights. However, if contractors stop work prematurely without providing proper notice, or otherwise fail to comply with any applicable laws, they can expose themselves to liability for breach of contract.

When determining whether you have the right to stop work, the first place to look should be the terms of the contract. In many instances, the contract may be the only applicable law.

General Contractor Agreements based on form AIA A201 should include Paragraph 9.7, which provides the following:

 

[I]f the Owner does not pay the Contractor within seven days after the date established  in the Contract Documents … then the Contractor may, upon seven days’ written notice to the Owner and Architect, stop the work until payment of the amount owing has been received.

 

Subcontractor Agreements based on form AIA A401 should also include Paragraph 4.7, which states as follows:

 

If the Contractor does not pay the Subcontractor through no fault of the Subcontractor, within seven days of the time payment should be made as provided in this Agreement, the Subcontractor may … upon seven days written notice to the Contractor, stop the Work of this Subcontract until payment of the amount owing has been received.

 

Even if the construction contract is based on an AIA model, it is quite common for parties to modify the terms of Paragraphs 9.7 and 4.7. For example, the notice requirements might be adjusted; the drafting party might tack on additional requirements, or they may remove the provisions altogether. Every contract needs to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.

The Connecticut Statutes

Section 42 of the Connecticut General Statutes (“CGS”) requires prompt payment to construction contractors. Specifically, upon receipt of an invoice from a prime contractor, an owner must tender payment within 30 days. Likewise, the general contractor must pay its subcontractors within 30 days of being paid by the owner, subcontractors must pay their sub-subcontractors within 30 days of being paid by the prime contractor, and so forth down the line. A different section of the CGS, § 4(a)-71, requires the State of Connecticut and its subdivisions to make timely payments to contractors within 45 days of their receipt of the invoices.

We must caution, however, that although CGS sets forth timelines for payment, it does not grant construction contractors a right to stop work. Rather, CGS only grants unpaid contractors a statutory right to pursue claims against the non-paying party. Accordingly, unpaid contractors will only have a right to suspend performance if that right is contained in their respective contracts, whether based on forms AIA A201, A401, or otherwise. If that right is not in the contract, it does not exist.

In Practice

It is crucial that contractors fully understand their contracts. A well-written contract may protect your rights, while a poorly-written contract might be unenforceable—or worse. While many contracts will refer to the AIA language, parties can always agree in writing to different standards for prompt payment, and different procedures for the unpaid contractor to stop work. In that regard, always make sure to consult with an attorney before stopping work because of non-payment, or for any other reason. Even if you have a contractual right to suspend, it is absolutely imperative to give proper notice and take proper steps before doing so. If you do it the right way, you can be in the clear. If you do it the wrong way, you can be found to be in breach of contract and potentially liable for damages.  

Court Reinstates Subcontractor’s Fraud Claim Against Contractor

It is a general rule of law that a party induced by fraud to enter into a contract may, upon discovery of the fraud, elect either to rescind the contract or continue his performance and seek recovery for any damages he may have suffered as a result of the fraud.

In the recent case of Pike Company, Inc., v Jersen Construction Group, LLC, a subcontractor claimed that the general contractor made intentionally false statements in order to induce the subcontractor to enter into the contract.

Background

Pike was the general contractor for a construction project at SUNY Plattsburgh. Pike entered into a subcontract with Jersen under which Jersen would perform masonry work after the “concrete foundations were installed, structural steel was in place, metal framing was erected and the concrete floors had been poured.” Before Jersen began work on the project, Pike was informed by at least one of its other subcontractors that its substrate work was not “accurate, flat or level,” and was deficient. Nevertheless, prior to entering into the subcontract, Pike represented to Jersen that the substrate work “had been erected in accordance with the contract requirements and was plumb, level, and true and that [Pike] had performed a professional survey of the structural steel to confirm the same.”

Pike commenced a lawsuit against Jersen, and Jersen asserted a counterclaim for fraud and breach of contract. In support of its fraud claim, Jersen alleged that Pike’s representations to Jersen were false, and that Pike “concealed and recklessly withheld from Jersen knowledge that the substrate was not dimensionally accurate, flat or level.” Additionally, Jersen alleged that Pike made those false representations “in order to deceive Jersen and induce Jersen to commence installation upon the substrate.” Jersen further alleged that it relied on Pike’s representations and would not have commenced installation of the masonry work had Pike not misrepresented to Jersen that the substrate had been installed in accordance with the contract requirements. Jersen suffered damages as a result of its reliance on Pike’s false representations.

Pike moved to dismiss Jersen’s fraud claim, arguing that it was barred by Section 1.8 of the contract, which provides that “[Jersen] accepts responsibility for the inspection of conditions that could affect the Subcontract Work at the Project site, and based on that inspection, and not in reliance upon any opinions or representations of [Pike], its officers, agents or employees, acknowledges its responsibility to satisfactorily perform the Subcontract Work without additional expense to [Pike].” The trial court agreed and dismissed Jersen’s fraud claim, and Jersen appealed.

Decision

On the appeal, Jersen argued that Section 1.8 is a typical site investigation disclaimer, which “attempts to place the risk of changed conditions on the [sub]contractor by requiring it to investigate the site before bidding and to familiarize itself with all conditions under which the job will be performed”.  According to Jersen, this disclaimer language applied only to site inspections and representations that occurred before execution of the subcontract, and not to any representations made after execution of the subcontract. Jersen pointed out that Section 1.8 is written in the past tense and concerns conditions of the site, rather than referring to conditions of the work performed by others.

The appellate court reinstated Jersen’s fraud claim, holding that although fraud claims can be barred by the existence of a specific disclaimer and the corollary failure to exercise reasonable diligence, the subcontract was ambiguous as to whether the disclaimer clause in Section 1.8 precluded Jersen from relying on any opinions or representations concerning work performed by others after Jersen executed the subcontract. Accordingly, in light of the ambiguous language in Section 1.8, Pike could not conclusively establish its defense at the motion to dismiss stage that the clause “specifically disclaims representations concerning the very matter to which the fraud claim relates”.

Comment

The key factor in determining whether a fraud in the inducement claim can survive a contractual disclaimer is whether the disclaimer is sufficiently specific to match the alleged fraud. Here, the Pike court held that the disclaimer clause was not sufficiently explicit to match Jersen’s fraud claim. In other words, the boilerplate disclaimer provision was not a bar to the fraud in the inducement claim because it did not specifically disclaim reliance by Jersen on Pike’s representations concerning the substrate work. It is worth noting, however, that the denial of the motion to dismiss only preserved Jersen’s claim for the meantime; Jersen still has to prove the claimed fraud at trial.

Court Dismisses Contractor’s Extra Work and Delay Claim

Public works construction contracts normally contain one-sided and onerous provisions favoring the governmental authority. Since bidding contractors have no leverage in negotiating unfair provisions of a contract, it is faced with a “take it or leave it” situation. The contractor should carefully review the contract provisions and be aware of the provisions that a governmental agency may use to reject a legitimate claim for payment.

In the recent case of Lakhi General Contractor, Inc. v New York City School Construction Authority, the Court relied upon two contract provisions to dismiss the contractor’s extra work and delay claims.

Background

In June of 2011, the SCA solicited bids to perform exterior masonry work on a school building in Brooklyn. The notice to bid urged all prospective bidders to attend a pre-bid meeting, which Lakhi did not do. Lakhi similarly did not submit any written request to the SCA for a clarification of any ambiguity in the design drawings, contract drawings or contract documents regarding the scope of work.  Lakhi submitted the low bid, which was accepted by the SCA, and was awarded the contract.

 After it was awarded the contract, Lakhi submitted several Requests for Information concerning the replacement of certain terra cotta panels and a pre-cast stone band.  Lakhi claimed that it was not clear from the drawings whether the terra cotta decorative panels had to be replaced.  Lakhi also claimed that the drawings did not provide for replacement of a pre-cast stone band.  

The SCA responded that the replacement work was included in the scope of work under the contract, which Lakhi disputed and submitted a change order for the work. The SCA issued a notice of direction for Lakhi to perform the replacement work. In denying Lakhi’s change order, the SCA interpreted the drawings and contract documents to provide that Lakhi would perform the disputed replacement work.

Lakhi filed a notice of claim with the SCA, seeking $824,000 for the extra replacement work performed outside the scope of the contract.  Lakhi also filed a claim seeking $323,000 in delay damages caused primarily by the extra time required to perform the replacement work. Lakhi ultimately started a lawsuit to recover its damages.  The SCA moved to dismiss the claims as barred by the specific terms of the contract.

Decision

The lower court dismissed Lakhi’s lawsuit, finding that the terms of the contract prohibited the extra work claim. The delay claim was also barred by the “no damages for delay” clause in the contract, which provided that the contractor’s sole remedy for any delay was an extension of time.

As for the extra work claim, it was barred by the provision of the contract which provides that in case of any discrepancy or inconsistency between the drawings and the contract documents, the decision of the SCA shall be final. The court pointed out that Lakhi failed to seek a pre-bid clarification from the SCA about the perceived ambiguities concerning the replacement work.  The court noted that Lakhi sought clarification of the contract drawings and documents concerning the replacement work only after it was awarded the contract.   Accordingly, Lakhi was bound under the stated terms of the contract by the SCA’s interpretation that the disputed extra work was within the scope of the contract.

Lakhi appealed, but fared no better before the appellate court. In affirming the dismissal of Lakhi’s complaint, that court held that the bid documents mandates that the bidding contractor discover and inquire about any claimed ambiguity prior to the submission of a bid, and that by failing to seek such clarification its extra work claims were barred.

The appellate court further agreed with the lower court that Lakhi’s delay damage claims are barred by the contract’s “no damages for delay” clause described above.

Comment

Disputes over the scope of the work defined in the contract are a major source of construction litigation.  However, the contractor may avoid scope of work issues by thoroughly reviewing the contract provisions and documents concerning possible ambiguities and inconsistencies in the scope of the work prior to submission of its bid.

In the Lakhi case, had the contractor followed the bid instructions by examining the contract documents and obtaining an SCA clarification prior to submission of its bid. Lakhi probably would have avoided unnecessary litigation over the scope of the work.

Do You Know About the Notice Provisions in Your Contract?

There are many provisions in a construction contract which must be adhered to. However, few of these provisions are so easy to overlook—and so costly when you do—as the provisions requiring you to notify your upstream contractor or owner of any claims you have relating to the contract. The case of Adonis Construction, LLC v. Battle Construction, Inc. (103 AD3d 1209 [4th Dept 2013]) serves as a warning to those who fail to pay attention to those provisions.  

Adonis Construction was a subcontractor to Battle Construction, the prime contractor on a building renovation. During the course of the work, Adonis was directed by Battle’s superintendent to remove certain walls (which were not included in the plans for removal).  The removal of the walls was in error, which error was discovered at a meeting several weeks later.  Adonis was not aware at the time that it removed the walls that the construction plans showed that those walls were to be left intact. Approximately six weeks after Adonis learned that the walls were removed in error, and following Battle’s notice to Adonis that it would back-charge Adonis for the cost of replacing the walls, Adonis submitted a claim to Battle requesting payment for removing the walls.  The claim also requested payment for extra work related to a concrete floor and the removal of light fixtures.

With respect to the work on the concrete floor and the removal of the light fixtures, the court noted that Adonis’ subcontract provided that it was bound by the terms of the prime contract.  The prime contract required approval of extra work before it was commenced, “but in no event any later than three days from the event giving rise to the claim.”  Because of Adonis’ failure to timely notify Battle, Adonis was barred from pursuing the concrete floor and light fixture portion of its claim.

With respect to the wall removal portion of the claim, the court looked to the subcontract.  The subcontract provided “Subcontractor shall, within five days of receiving a direction or encountering a condition, it regards as a change, alteration or extra work, submit to Contractor a written cost or credit proposal; otherwise, Subcontractor shall be bound by such increase or credit as Contractor is able to obtain from Owner.  Subcontractor waives any claim against Contractor for compensation law equitable adjustment for any claims, changes or extra work, except to the extent the same is allowed and paid to Contractor by the Owner.” The court found that where the parties have set down their agreement in a clear, complete document, a writing should be enforced according to its terms.  Since the subcontract governing demolition work requires strict compliance with the notice provisions, such compliance is a condition precedent to recovery in an action seeking compensation for extra work. The court concluded that Adonis was obligated to seek compensation for the extra work pursuant to the terms of the contract when it learned that a removal of the walls constituted extra work, and that Adonis failed to do so in a timely manner.  Because conditions precedent will be strictly enforced, the clear direction by Battle’s superintendent to Adonis with respect to removal of the walls was not sufficient to excuse Adonis’ failure to comply with the notice provisions of the contract.

CONCLUSION:

Your contract (and any contracts incorporated into that contract) can contain a number of provisions that can be easily overlooked, including crucial notice provisions. It is important that you read all of the contract documents and be knowledgeable of the deadlines they impose. If you have any questions about your obligations under the contract, or how best to preserve your rights, you should consult with counsel.

Contractor Rejects Supplier’s Motion to Dismiss Contractor’s Fraud Claim

Claims for fraud often involve intentional false statements.  Generally, a party who suffers money damages as a result of fraud may seek a recovery in court.  In the case of North Shore Stone Architectural Stone, Inc. v. American Artisan Constr., Inc., a contractor sued its supplier of stone, claiming that he relied upon an intentionally false misrepresentation by the supplier, resulting in financial injury to the contractor.  The supplier’s president was also sued personally for his fraudulent misrepresentation.

Background

North Shore is an installer of stone in residential, commercial and industrial buildings. In April of 2013, North Shore entered into an agreement with American Artisan, a stone wholesaler, to supply a specific and unique type of limestone, which was to be installed at certain property owned by Joseph Vitacco. The agreement was subsequently amended in January of 2014 to account for three additional shipments of limestone, some of which had to be colored and polished due to the owner’s rejection of earlier deliveries as nonconforming. Following the installation of half of the limestone, the property owner refused to release any funds, claiming that some of the limestone was missing, or had been stolen from the property. North Shore reordered the limestone, but Artisan subsequently refused to abide by the price schedule and charged North Shore thousands of dollars more for the replacement stone. Thereafter, North Shore discovered that the missing limestone had not been stolen, but that some of the stone had never been shipped by Artisan.

North Shore sued Artisan for breach of contract.  It also sued Artisan and John Cina, its principal, for conversion, claiming that North Shore was the rightful owner of the stone and that Artisan and Cina interfered with North Shore’s rights to the stone.  The lawsuit also included a claim for fraud against Artisan and Cina, personally. North Shore claimed that Artisan has refused to refund the amount that North Shore paid for the replacement stone. According to North Shore, the property owner and Artisan colluded to make North Shore pay for the extra limestone, which was needed and used by the property owner.

Cina moved to dismiss the conversion and fraud claims brought against him personally, arguing that at all times he acted in his capacity as Artisan’s president, that he did not personally benefit from the fraud, and that North Shore had no factual basis to pierce Artisan’s corporate veil and hold him personally liable. Similarly, Artisan moved to dismiss the fraud claim against it, arguing that the factual allegations to support the fraud claim were duplicative of the allegations contained in the breach of contract claim and, therefore, the allegations are insufficient to support the independent fraud action.

Decision

The court dismissed North Shore’s conversion and fraud claims against Cina, but not the claims against Artisan.  The court followed long settled case law which holds that before a plaintiff can seek to hold a corporate defendant’s officer personally liable it must allege facts that indicate that the shareholder exercised complete domination and control over the corporation and abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form to perpetuate a wrong or injustice.  Among the factors to be considered in making this determination are (1) the failure to adhere to corporate formalities, (2) inadequate capitalization, (3) the commingling of assets, and (4) the personal use of corporate funds. The court found that North Shore’s allegations were insufficient to pierce the corporate veil and hold Cina personally liable.

As for the fraud claim against Artisan, the court found that North Shore sufficiently pleaded a fraud cause of action, notwithstanding the fact that some of the factual allegations also supported a cause of action for breach of contract.  North Shore’s complaint satisfied the elements of a fraud claim by asserting that (1) Artisan falsely represented that some of the stones were missing; (2) that North Shore intended to and justifiably relied on the misrepresentations when re-ordering and paying for the “missing stone” and the representation caused damages to North Shore by paying an inflated amount for the replacement stone.   

Comment

North Shore filed an appeal from the lower court’s dismissal of the claims against Cina personally. It’s primary appellate argument will be that the lower court erred in dismissing the claims against Cina because North Shore failed to plead the facts needed to pierce the corporate veil.  According to case law cited by North Shore, however, a corporate officer who participates in a wrongful or fraudulent act on behalf of the corporation, is personally liable, regardless of whether the corporate veil must be pierced.  Consequently, North Shore argues that it does not have to make an allegation that the corporate veil must be pierced to hold Cina personally liable.  North Shore’s appeal is expected to be heard by the appellate court during the Spring Term.

Contractor Waived Claims Not Set Forth in Request for Extension of Time

New York courts have consistently enforced waivers of claim in connection with a contractor’s request for an extension of contract time to complete the work on a public project. Under some government  contracts, if a contractor does not seek to waive its claims in its application for an extension of time, it must provide a statement in detail of its claims in its request .

In the recent case of Matter of LAWS Construction Corp. v Contract Dispute Resolution Board, an appellate court held that a contractor waived its claims because the contractor did not specifically set forth its claims with clarity in its request for an extension of time.

Background

In July of 2009, LAWS entered into a contract with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation to build a  golf course at Ferry Point Park in the Bronx, atop a former landfill. The contract required LAWS to backfill trenches that were dug to install the irrigation system. It was anticipated that LAWS could utilize material excavated from the site to use as fill. However, the excavated material turned out to be full of rocks and debris and was unsuitable for use in the top 10 inches of the trenches, which had to be filled with clean fill. Accordingly, LAWS sought a change order for the additional cost of the clean fill. In November of 2011, the Parks Department’s construction manager issued a construction change directive to LAWS directing it to provide the clean backfill at no cost to the Parks Department, advising that the contract provides that LAWS was responsible for these costs. LAWS promptly filed a dispute with the Parks Commissioner disputing the construction change directive, arguing that it was entitled to be compensated via a change order.

Nearly two years later, in August of 2013, LAWS submitted its sixth request for an extension of time to the Parks Department.  The contract states that if the contractor does not seek to waive a claim in its extension of time request, it must provide a statement of the particulars of its claims.  In submitting its request for the extension of time, LAWS did not specifically set forth its claim for the change order seeking compensation for the clean backfill. The Parks Department granted the time extension on September 4, 2013.

Less than two weeks after granting the extension of time, the Parks Department denied LAWS’s 2011 change order for the clean backfill, adopting its construction manager’s view of the contract that LAWS was responsible for those costs because they were included in its lump sum bid. LAWS promptly filed a notice of claim with the City Comptroller, maintaining that it was entitled to compensation for the change order for various reasons, including the argument that the parties past practice that the Park Department approved five prior extension requests and the contractor’s claims were approved without raising the waiver of claims argument.  The Comptroller denied LAWS’s claim, finding that LAWS waived its claim to the clean backfill change order when it sought the extension of time without specifically setting forth and preserving that claim.  LAWS appealed  the Comptroller’s determination before  the Contract Dispute Resolution Board.  The CDRB similarly found that LAWS waived its claim because it did not sufficiently set forth the claim in its extension of time request.

LAWS commenced an Article 78 proceeding challenging the CDRB’s findings, arguing that it never intended to waive its claim for the clean backfill, and that the CDRB’s determination is inconsistent with the parties’ past practice of seeking and granting time extensions without raising the issue of waiver.

Decision

The lower court agreed with the CDRB and denied the petition. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the CDRB had a rational basis—specifically, the contract language itself—to find that LAWS had waived its right to pursue claims not set forth in the extension of time request.

As for LAWS’ argument that the Department of Park’s past practice of failing to raise a waiver argument in connection with claims paid to LAWS following the approval of five prior extension requests, the Court held that the parties past practice does not estop the Park’s Department from raising wavier as a defense.  The Court relied upon the contractual provision stating that the “City of New York and its agents may not be estopped by any decision made by the City’s agents, as well as the general unavailability of estoppel against governmental entities.”

Comment

As this case demonstrates, courts will not hesitate to strictly enforce contractual provisions requiring the contractor to set forth the particulars of any claims which they contractor does not agree to waive.  Contractors would be well advised to consult with counsel to review the contract and make sure that its claims are submitted and preserved in accordance with the contractual requirements.  

Court Rules on Low Bidder’s Rejection for Lack of Work Experience

Public construction contracts in New York are subject to the state’s competitive bidding statutes, which provide that the contract shall be awarded to the “lowest responsible bidder”. Although the law does not define “responsible”, it has been interpreted as meaning that the low bidder has sufficient skill, experience, financial resources, and integrity to perform the contract.

In the recent case of Matter of Metro Paving, LLC v Incorporated Village of Hempstead et. al., the court held that the low bidder was not entitled to a preliminary injunction staying the Village from awarding the contract to the second low bidder. The low bidder failed to show a probability of succeeding on its argument that Village lacked a rational basis for requiring that bidders have at least five years of work experience.  

Background

The Village solicited bids for certain road and drainage work to be performed at various locations.  Although Metro Paving submitted the lowest bid, the Village Board awarded the contract to Roadwork Ahead, Inc., the second lowest bidder, because the Board determined that Metro Paving was not a responsible bidder.  The Village rejected this bid because Metro Paving did not meet the bid requirement that it have at least five years of  work experience with the type of work specified for the project.  Upon notification of the bid rejection, Metro Paving requested an opportunity to be heard on the determination.  The Village denied this request.

Metro Paving commenced an Article 78 proceeding and sought a preliminary injunction preventing the Village from awarding the contract to Roadwork. In support of its request for a preliminary injunction, Metro Paving argued that it had been deprived of due process as a result of the Village’s failure to provide it with an opportunity to be heard as to whether Metro Paving was a responsible bidder. Metro Paving also argued that the five year experience bid requirement in the solicitation to bid was arbitrary and capricious.  It further argued that the Village violated the bidding procedures required under the competitive bidding statue, pointing out that the award of the bid was not on the  published agenda for the Village Board’s meeting, but was rather an “add-on”.  The Court granted the preliminary injunction.   The Village, thereafter, provided Metro Paving with the opportunity  to present proof at a public hearing that it satisfied the five year bid qualifying requirement.  Following the presentation, the Board again determined that Metro Paving did not meet the five year requirement.   

After the Board’s determination, the Village moved to vacate the injunction and Metro Paving cross-moved for its continuance. In support of its cross motion, Metro Paving once again argued that the five year experience requirement was arbitrary, and it added that the Village’s failure to consider documents submitted by Metro Paving at the Village hearing held by the Village subsequent to the preliminary injunction was  arbitrary and capricious.

Decision

The court’s decision was a mixed bag.  It held that the five year requirement had a rational basis because. the “Project includes road work at a variety of different sites, requiring the contractor to implement traffic coordination and to address drainage issues.  Drainage work which requires special expertise is a critical part of the Project.”

The court applied well settled case law related to injunctions, which required that Metro Paving show a probability of success on the merits of its claims, rather than a possibility of success of the merits.  Because the court held that the five year requirement had a rational basis, it found that Metro Paving had no probability of success on the merits sufficient to support an injunction.  The court stated that given the complexity of the project and the narrow timetable for its completion, “the requirement that eligible bidders must have at least five years of relevant experience was rational.”  Accordingly the court vacated the preliminary injunction and permitted the Village to award the contract to Roadwork.

Nevertheless, the court conceded that Metro Paving had a possibility of success on its claims that the Village generally violated bidding requirements under the General Municipal Law, that the five-year work experience is arbitrary per se, and that the award of the bid and the results of the public hearing were arbitrary and capricious, and therefore, “are worthy of consideration and will be fully reviewed by the court in determining these ultimate issues.”

Comment

The equivocal language of the Metro Paving court may give the low bidder some solace with the continuation of the lawsuit challenging the award of the contract to Roadwork, even though it vacated the injunction.  Metro Paving, however, bears a heavy burden in contesting the Village Board’s quasi-judicial determination that a bidder is not “responsible” within the meaning of the competitive bidding statute.  Public agencies have broad discretion in conducting the bidding process and awarding contracts.  Case law establishes that the determination of a public agency responsible for awarding contracts may not be disturbed by the courts unless it can be proven that the decision is irrational, or arrived at through actual impropriety or unfair dealing.  

One Year Contractual Time Limit Bars Subcontractor’s Claim

New York’s statute of limitations provides a deadline of six years for when a lawsuit for breach of contract must be filed. The clock normally starts to run when the claim arises; in other words, at the time when the plaintiff has a claim or basis to sue. What is not commonly known is that the parties, by contract, can shorten the six year limitations period—provided the shorter period is reasonable.

In the recent case of D&S Restoration, Inc. v Wenger Construction Co., Inc., the court addressed the issue of the validity of a contractually agreed upon one-year statute of limitations period included in a construction contract.

Background

In January of 2011, Wenger entered into a contract with the New York City School Construction Authority to perform construction at P.S. 29 in Staten Island. Two months later, Wenger and D&S entered into a subcontract for D&S to perform certain required asbestos abatement work at the project. The subcontract between Wenger and D&S provided that “No action or proceeding shall lie or shall be maintained by Subcontractor against Contractor, CM, or Owner unless such action shall be commenced within one (1) year after Substantial Completion of Subcontractor's work herein or, if this Subcontract is terminated unless such action or proceeding is commenced within six (6) months after such termination.” The contract also provided that “final payment to Subcontractor shall be made after completion and acceptance of the premises by Contractor & Owner of Subcontractor's work, documentation and acceptance and payment thereof by the CM/Owner”, and that “receipt of payment from the CM/Owner for the Subcontractor’s work is a condition precedent to payment by the Contractor to the Subcontractor * * * [p]ayment of this amount is subject to additions or deductions within the provisions of this Subcontract and the other documents to which this Subcontract is subject”.

D&S’s last work on the project was on June 11, 2012. The SCA certified that the project was substantially complete on October 5, 2012, and signed off on the completed work in December of 2012. Accordingly, under the one-year limitations provision of the subcontract, the time to sue ran out on October 5, 2013—one year after substantial completion. However, under the payment terms of the subcontract, because final close-out negotiations were not complete until June 24, 2016, the date on which the SCA signed off on various credits, D&S’s payment was not due until then. Consequently, according to D&S, the one-year time limit to sue was triggered on June 24, 2016 and not the substantial completion date.

When D&S commenced a lawsuit to recover the unpaid balance, Wenger moved to dismiss, arguing that D&S’s lawsuit was barred by the contractual one-year limitations period ending on October 5, 2013. D&S opposed, arguing that the limitations period was unreasonably short in light of the need to comply with the payment terms of the contract. D&S was forced to wait for final negotiations between the SCA and Wenger to be completed on June 24, 2016 before it was entitled to be paid under the subcontract. Therefore, it was impossible for D&S to bring a claim within the one-year window that closed on October 5, 2013.

Decision

The court dismissed D&S’s lawsuit, relying upon the one year limitations period in the subcontract. According to the court, since it was common knowledge in the construction industry—and admitted by D&S’s counsel—that there can be an extended period of work and payment negotiations after the certification of substantial completion, those events making it impossible to timely bring its claims within the one-year limitation period were in fact foreseeable by D&S. The court held that impossibility excuses a party’s performance (timely bringing its claim) only where the “impossibility [is] produced by an unanticipated event that could not have been foreseen or guarded against in the contract”.

Comment

The D&S Restoration court relied on long standing case law to hold that where a party makes a claim that performance was impossible, it must establish that the impossibility was unforeseeable or unanticipated. In doing so, the court did not see the need to reconcile the two seemingly conflicting provisions of the contract, the one that started the one-year limitation clock running upon substantial completion, and the other which required the subcontractor to await the general contractor’s close-out negotiations with the owner before getting paid.

Counsel for D&S informed the author that D&S will file an appeal from the court’s decision. We will report the appellate court’s decision to you in a future column.