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Author: WB&G

Federal Contracts, the Boards of Contract Appeals, and Federal Liability under Integrated Design and Construction Contracts

Those of you who work regularly at West Point, at Picatinny Arsenal, or for the General Services Administration know that most federal agencies employ informal in-house procedures to resolve contract disputes.  But what if those in-house procedures fail, and that the contractor must proceed against a federal agency?  What is the route for dispute resolution? 

In order to litigate a federal government contract claim, the contractor must proceed either in the United States Court for Federal Claims in Washington, D.C. or in one of the many Boards of Contract Appeals, such as, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the General Services Board of Contract Appeals, or the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals.  The advantage of appearing before Boards of Contract Appeals is that the trials are held in the general locale of the project.  The judges come to you.

These Boards of Contract Appeals, although administrative in nature, are not as favorable to the government agency as their status as a fellow government agency may suggest. One such case where the contractor prevailed in front of a Board of Contract Appeals was Kiewit-Turner, a Joint Venture v. Department of Veterans Affairs, which involved the construction of a Veteran Affairs (VA) medical center campus in Colorado.  The VA had awarded a contract for preconstruction services to Kiewit-Turner, a Joint Venture (KT) with an option for performance of construction services.  However, the design was already 50% complete when the VA hired KT.  All funding decisions had been made and the VA had established construction costs at $582 million.  At the 65% design phase, KT advised the VA that construction would cost $664 million.

The Board found that the VA knew that the design was over budget by approximately $200 million.  It found in addition that the VA failed to control its design team, failed to process change orders, failed to make timely payments, and drove up the costs of construction.  The Board found that under these circumstances, KT was entitled to stop work. The Board cited an engineer’s description of the VA team as the “least effective and most dysfunctional [VA] staff on any project that [he] had ever seen.”

Following the Board’s decision, the VA found additional funding to cover more than $150 million in delinquent payments to KT.  KT has resumed construction work on the project on a cost-reimbursable basis.

Prevailing on any claim, before a court or before a Board of Contract Appeals, requires properly documenting that claim and presenting it in such a manner as to show entitlement under the contract. You should contact your construction counsel as soon as you believe that you may have an issue so as to be able to sufficiently document your claim during the project, and so that you can have it properly presented afterwards.

Town is not Estopped from Denying Contractor’s Delay Claim

The legal doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents one party from taking advantage of another when, through misrepresentation or misconduct, the other party relied upon the misrepresentation to his or her detriment, resulting in an injustice. In the recent case of LAWS Construction Corp. v Town of Patterson, a contractor sought to rely on the Town Supervisor’s statements for payment of escalation costs caused by the Town’s delay in starting the project.

Background

In July of 2005, LAWS submitted a successful bid to perform work on a Town construction project. When construction was subsequently delayed, LAWS (and the other successful bidders) were given the option to withdraw their bids. At a meeting shortly thereafter, the Town Supervisor was asked whether the Town would reimburse the bidders for increased costs in labor and materials that would be incurred due to the delay. In response, the Town Supervisor wrote a letter advising all bidders that “there appears to be no prohibition regarding application of contingency monies built into the contracts toward potential increases in costs of material and labor due to the extended time factor.”  In reliance on this representation, LAWS declined to withdraw its bid, entered into a written contract with the Town, and ultimately performed the required work. LAWS was later told by a Town agent during construction to request payment for the increased costs at the completion of the work. 

During the course of the project, LAWS submitted 14 requisitions for payment, none of which included cost escalations. All of these requisitions were paid. LAWS’s requisition No. 15, seeking reimbursement for the increased costs of labor and materials caused by the delay in construction in the sum of $121,119.93, was rejected by the Town. LAWS commenced this action against the Town to recover for the increased costs of material and labor associated with the delay in construction.  LAWS claimed it would not have entered into the contract if it was not assured that its increases in labor and material would be paid.  The Town moved for summary judgment dismissing LAWS’s complaint.

Decision

The court granted the Town’s motion and dismissed LAWS’s complaint, relying on the well settled principle of law that the theory of estoppel is generally not available against a municipality, absent a showing of “exceptional circumstances”.  The appellate court affirmed, finding that the exceptional circumstances involving wrongful or negligent conduct of a governmental agency subdivision, or its misleading nonfeasance, did not exist here.  According to the court, the Town Supervisor’s letter indicating that there was no prohibition in the contract preventing the awarding of delay damages did not constitute an agreement to specifically do so. Absent such a specific agreement, the Town was not estopped from denying payment for the increased cost of labor and materials. 

Comment

This case demonstrates the heavy burden of establishing equitable estoppel against a governmental agency.  Only in rare circumstances have the courts found that a municipality engaged in misleading conduct that would support equitable estoppel.  Accordingly, contractors would be well advised when dealing with a governmental contracting agency to support its claims based on the explicit language of the contract document, rather than relying upon the equitable theory of estoppel.

Court Rejects Subcontractor’s 31 Month Delay Claim

Delay claims are a frequent source of construction litigation. To reduce the risk of delay claims, many owners, construction managers and general contractors include a “no damages for delay” clause in their contracts. This provision exonerates them from liability to a contractor or subcontractor for damages resulting from delays in the performance of their work.

New York courts continue to rigidly enforce the no damages for delay clause, as demonstrated in the case of J. Petrocelli Contracting, Inc. v The Morganti Group, Inc.

Background

In April of 2008, the New York City Department of Design and Construction entered into a contract with Morganti for construction management and other related services for the construction of the Kings County Criminal Courts Building. Morganti subsequently entered into a subcontract with Petrocelli for certain construction work at the project. Paragraph 6(a) of the Subcontract provided that “[Morganti] shall not be liable to [Petrocelli] for any damages resulting from delays caused by any entity”, and that “[Petrocelli]  expressly agrees that apart from recovery from said entity, [Petrocelli’s] exclusive remedy for delay shall be an extension of the time for performance of [Petrocelli’s] work”. The subcontract provided that Petrocelli’s work was to have been completed by November 15, 2010.

After work commenced, Petrocelli encountered considerable delays in performing its work. Substantial completion was not achieved until June of 2013—31 months late. In its lawsuit against Morganti to recover delay damages, Petrocelli claimed that the delays were caused, among other things, by: (a) Morganti’s failure to comply and enforce their own contract bid phasing plan; (b) Morganti’s review or issuance of change orders, constant revision of change orders and execution of same; (c) Morganti’s failure to make the bid document phasing plan available to Petrocelli, which materially affected the date for final completion; (d) differing site conditions that were not known by Petrocelli but reasonably ascertainable by Morganti prior to bid requests; (e) numerous changes in the original scope of work provided for and agreed to by the parties as set forth in the bid and contract documents; and (f) other uncontemplated delays by the parties. Petrocelli claimed that these delays prevented it from working for extended periods of time and caused Petrocelli a complete loss of sequencing and continuity. Morganti moved to dismiss Petrocelli’s lawsuit based on the exculpatory language of the no damages for delay clause.

Decision

The court agreed with Morganti and dismissed Petrocelli’s delay claims, finding that it was barred by the broad language of the no damages for delay clause in its contract. The court rejected Petrocelli’s argument that the causes of the delays fall within the exceptions to the enforceability of a no damages for delay clause for bad faith or willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct. The court found that, at most, Morganti’s conduct constituted inept administration and improper scheduling of the work of different trades. The court also found that Petrocelli failed to demonstrate that the delays were uncontemplated at the signing of the contract, were so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract by Morganti, or resulted from Morganti’s breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract. The court noted that the inclusion of the no damages for delay clause was evidence that such delays were specifically contemplated. 

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the delay claims, relying on the contractual language which plainly provides that the construction manager “shall not be liable to the [subcontractor] for any damages resulting from delays caused by any entity”. The court also looked to the clause where the subcontractor expressly agreed that its sole remedy for delay shall be an extension of time to complete its work.

Comment

The harsh consequence of a no damages for delay provision is that the contractor or subcontractor must absorb all of its monetary damages arising out of delays caused by others. They generally do not have the bargaining power to change or delete the oppressive language of the no damages for delay clause.

Here, the court once again reminds us that the exceptions to the enforceability of such a clause are extremely limited. Similar to the cases highlighted in previous Attorney’s Columns, where the courts found that delays of 27 and 32 months have been contemplated by the contract, one is left to wonder whether any categories of delay can be found not to have been contemplated by the parties at the time of contract.

Another Battle Over Timely Proper Notice for Insurance Coverage

It happens.  Someone is injured on a construction site and everyone goes running to check on their insurance coverage.   We all know that insurance policies require notice of an accident, also known as an “occurrence”.  But what do you need to say in the notice in order to give “proper” notice?  That question was recently before New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals1.

It was a typical contractor- subcontractor relationship.  Contractor was performing a portion of its work with Subcontractor, when on October 20, 2008, Subcontractor’s employee was injured.  The subcontract required Subcontractor to name Contractor as an additional insured on Subcontractor’s commercial general liability policy and it also required Subcontractor to defend and indemnify Contractor for all personal injury or property damage claims arising out of Subcontractor’s work.  Contractor was first notified of the accident in late December 2009.    Contractor promptly notified its commercial general liability insurer, who, on January 27, 2010, sent a letter to Subcontractor, notifying Subcontractor that it agreed to defend and indemnify Contractor and hold Contractor harmless.  The letter also asked Subcontractor to notify its (Subcontractor’s) insurance company regarding the accident so Subcontractor’s insurance company could do its own investigation of the accident and claim.  On February 9, 2010, Subcontractor forwarded the letter to its insurance company along with a general liability notice of occurrence/claim form describing Subcontractor’s employee’s injury.  Additionally, by February 22, 2010, Subcontractor, at its insurance company’s request, also sent its insurance company a copy of the subcontract, which contained provisions requiring Subcontractor to defend and indemnify Contractor and to also name Contractor as an additional insured.

On April 15, 2010, after the injured employee sued Contractor and the property owner for damages arising from his injury, Contractor’s attorney wrote to Subcontractor’s insurance company demanding that it defend and indemnify Contractor in the injured employee’s lawsuit.   Contractor’s attorney noted in his letter that Subcontractor was required to defend and indemnify Contractor, and to name Contractor as an additional insured.  Contractor’s attorney also enclosed a certificate of insurance showing that Contractor was named as an additional insured on the Subcontractor’s insurance company’s policy which had been issued to Subcontractor by the insurance company.  Taking the position that the notice to it was late, Subcontractor’s insurance company denied coverage.  Subcontractor’s insurance company said that the initial letter it received from Contractor’s insurance company “framed” Contractor only as a claimant and not as an additional insured.

Contractor commenced a declaratory judgment action against Subcontractor’s insurance company to have the court declare that Subcontractor is obligated to provide insurance coverage to Contractor in the injured employee’s action.  Subcontractor’s insurance company moved to dismiss the action.  The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the action. Contractor appealed to the Appellate Division.  By a three to two decision the appellate court reversed the lower court and reinstated Contractor’s declaratory judgment action2.  The appellate court, concluded that the January 27, 2010 letter and form satisfied the requirements of the Subcontractor’s insurance policy to “see to it” that Subcontractor’s insurance company was notified of the accident “as soon as practicable”, and therefore the documentary evidence provided by Subcontractor’s insurance company did not establish a defense to Contractor’s claim as a matter of law. 

On further appeal to the Court of Appeals (based upon two dissents in the Appellate Division) the Court of Appeals wrote that “the rule in New York [was] that where a contract of primary insurance require[d] notice ‘as soon as practicable’ after an occurrence, the absence of timely notice of an occurrence [constituted] a failure to comply with a condition precedent which, as a matter of law, vitiate[d] the contract . . . [and][n]o showing of prejudice [was] required”.     The appellate court, said the Court of Appeals, properly set forth the issue as whether Contractor’s initial letter constituted notice of an occurrence under Subcontractor’s insurance policy.   That policy required that, “You must see to it that [Insurer is] notified as soon as practicable of an ‘occurrence’ or an offense which may result in a claim.”  Notice included, to the extent possible:  “(1) How, when and where the ‘occurrence’ or offense took place; (2) The names and addresses of any injured persons and witnesses; and (3) The nature and location of any injury or damage arising out of the ‘occurrence” or offense.”

The Court of Appeals rejected Subcontractor’s insurance company’s argument that the initial letter did not timely notify the Insurer of an occurrence.  The insurance company had argued that the letter only sought a defense and indemnification under the subcontract from the Subcontractor and that the letter did not expressly state that Contractor also sought coverage as an additional insured.  The Court of Appeals noted that the letter did not point to the indemnification provision in the subcontract; it simply requested a defense and indemnity under the contract, without specifically identifying either the indemnification or additional insured provisions.  Additionally, the Court of Appeals said, the letter requested that the Subcontractor put its insurance company on notice of the specific claim, and it also provided information about the identity of the injured employee, the date, the location and general nature of the accident, which is the information Subcontractor’s insurance company required in a notice from an insured about an accident. Given these circumstances, said the Court of Appeals, the evidence submitted by the Subcontractor’s insurance company did not conclusively establish a defense to the asserted clams as a matter of law. 

Thus, Contractor’s declaratory judgment action is allowed to continue in the lower court.  This does not mean that either side won or lost, just that the battle will continue, possibly to trial, with the end result being the lower court’s declaration regarding whether the Subcontractor is required to defend and indemnify the Contractor in the injured employee’s action.

Any accident or occurrence that involves personal injury or property damage on a construction project must be taken very seriously with respect to insurance coverage.  All contractors and subcontractors who could possibly be tied to the situation should immediately notify their attorney and seek advice and help to write proper and timely “notice” letters to all of the insurance companies that may possibly be called upon to provide coverage.  Contractors and subcontractors must remain vigilant and proactive in these situations so they avoid finding themselves battling with an insurance company over whether they provided the insurance company with timely and proper notice of the “occurrence”.  The risk of not being vigilant and proactive when it comes to construction accidents can be catastrophic to your company.  Don’t let that happen to you. 

 

1 Spoleta Construction, LLC v. Aspen Insurance UK Ltd., 2016 WL 1136297

2 Spoleta Construction LLC v. Aspen Insurance UK Limited, 119 A.D.3d 1391 (4th Dept. 2014)

Contractor Liable for Failure to Pay Prevailing Wages

New York’s Labor Law Section 220 requires that contactors and subcontractors working on public works projects are required to pay their workers the prevailing wages and to provide supplemental benefits such as employee retirement benefits and health insurance benefits.  The law protects bidding contractors who pay proper wages prevailing in the area by preventing contractors from submitting their bids based on wages and fringe benefits that are lower than those prevailing in the area.

In the recent case of Matter of Central Roofing Co., Inc. v. Musolino, an appellate court reviewed a Department of Labor’s determination that a contractor willfully failed to pay prevailing wages and supplements.

Background

In May of 2008, Central City Roofing Co. contracted with a school district to install a new roof on a high school building. Work on the project commenced on June 30, 2008 and was completed the following May. During that time period, Central City paid its workers according to the wage rate schedule included in the project specifications. That schedule, however, was valid only through the end of June of 2008. A newly issued wage rate schedule went into effect in July of 2008, which was the second day of the project. This new schedule superseded the schedule set forth in the project specifications.

In March of 2010, a local labor union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, claiming that Central City failed to pay prevailing wages. Following an investigation and a hearing, a Hearing Officer issued a report recommending, among other things, that Central City’s use of the expired wage rate schedule constituted a willful failure to pay prevailing wages and supplements in violation of the Labor Law.  The Department of Labor adopted the Hearing Officer's findings and recommendations, which included an assessment of a civil penalty at the maximum rate allowed by statute, which was 25% of the total underpayment and interest.  

Decision

The appellate court found that notwithstanding Central City’s declaration that it had no intention of underpaying its workers, the Department of Labor’s determination that Central City willfully failed to pay prevailing wages was supported by substantial evidence. After noting that the Department of Labor had to show that Central City’s failure to pay prevailing wages was more than purely accidental, it relied upon well settled case law that it is not necessary to prove an intent to defraud.  All that is required is proof that the employer knew or should have known that it was violating the prevailing wage laws. The court found that Central City’s willfulness could be inferred based upon the explicit notices regarding the timing of wage rate changes that appear in the expired schedule upon which Central City relied. The schedule plainly states that it is “effective from July 2007 through June 2008,” and that “future copies of the annual determination are available on the Department of Labor’s website.” The schedule further stated that “[t]he rate listed is valid until the next effective rate change or until the new annual determination which takes effect on July 1 of each year. All contractors . . . are required to pay the current prevailing rates of wages and supplements.”

The court further held that this language provided substantial support for the Department of Labor’s conclusion that Central City — a contracting company with over three decades of experience performing public work projects — should have known that the rate schedule had changed and, by not adjusting its payroll accordingly, it willfully failed to pay prevailing wages to its workers.

The court, however, disagreed with the Department of Labor’s imposition of an additional 25% civil penalty for willfully violating the Labor Law.  According to the court, the representatives of Central City had no actual knowledge of the violations and that Central City’s actions were not motivated by bad faith.  Equally significant, the court pointed out that Central City “had no history of willful failure to pay prevailing wages, despite performing public works projects since 1979”.  

The court concluded that the “imposition of the maximum penalty allowed by law must be annulled as it is so disproportionate to the underlying offenses that it shocks one’s sense of fairness.”  The appellate court sent the matter back to the Department of Labor for reconsideration of the civil penalty consistent with the court’s decision.

Comment

New York has taken aggressive action towards contractors who have committed prevailing wage law violations.  A contractor is well-advised to update and strictly adhere to the wage schedules for the duration of a public works project or risk severe penalties for non-compliance.     

Public Owner Held Not Responsible for Contractor’s Escalation Costs

In Laws Construction Corp. v. Town of Patterson (135 AD3d 830, 2d Dept. 2016), plaintiff submitted a bid to perform work on a New York construction project and was deemed the lowest bidder. Thereafter, construction was delayed and plaintiff was given the option to withdraw its bid. However, plaintiff elected to not withdraw its bid after defendant’s Town Supervisor advised (in writing) that “there appears to be no prohibition regarding (the) application of contingency monies built into contracts toward potential increases in costs of material and labor due to the extended time factor.”

Plaintiff submitted fourteen applications for payment to defendant, none of which included escalation costs, and all of which were paid. Plaintiff’s fifteenth application for payment, however, sought reimbursement for increased labor and material costs caused by delay in construction, totaling $121,119.93, which defendant refused to pay. Plaintiff then commenced suit against defendant to recover the escalation costs.

In response to plaintiff’s suit, defendant argued that plaintiff was attempting to improperly modify a competitive bid after the fact. In response, plaintiff sought to impose the legal doctrine of promissory estoppel, which stands for the principle that a promise is enforceable by law when the promisor (i.e. defendant) makes a promise to the promisee (i.e. plaintiff), who relies on it to their detriment.

In affirming summary judgment for defendant, the Appellate Division held that barring “exceptional circumstances” involving wrongful or negligent conduct of a governmental subdivision, estoppel is generally not available against a municipal defendant with regard to the exercise of its governmental functions. The Appellate Division further held that the Town Supervisor’s written statement did not establish an agreement by defendant to pay for plaintiff’s increased costs. The Appellate Division also rejected plaintiff’s argument that an oral representation (made during construction) by an agent of defendant was sufficient to grant it rights by estoppel. Such an oral representation would be contrary to the terms of the relevant contract, which required changes in the contract sum and time to be effectuated via written change order.

The holding in Laws Construction Corp. v. Town of Patterson demonstrates the importance of complying with agreed-upon contractual mechanisms for adjusting contract sums and performance schedules. If and to the extent you are seeking an extension of time or additional compensation, whether by way of escalation or otherwise, such extensions or additions should be accomplished through valid written change orders, or, if possible, through fully executed amendments to the relevant agreements. As Laws Construction Corp. v. Town of Patterson illustrates, a vague written promise will not hold weight against a municipal owner.

Subcontractor Recovers Lost Profits for Wrongful Termination

Lost profits as a measure of damages may be recovered in a breach of contract action where they were foreseeable and can be established with reasonable certainty.

In the recent case of Inspectronic Corporation v. Gottlieb Skanska, Inc., an appellate court explained the criteria for lost profits as damages for the wrongful termination of a subcontractor.

Background

In 2003, Gottlieb Skanska entered into a contract with the New York City Department of Environmental Protection to perform repairs and renovations on the reservoir system providing water to the City. Skanska entered into a lump-sum subcontract with Inspectronic to perform all diving and underwater operations at the project consisting of seven “scope of the work” items. The contract contemplated change orders that would be billed on a time and materials basis.

Inspectronic completed three of the seven work items and some change order work when Skanska terminated the subcontract and replaced Inspectronic with another company who completed the remaining four work items and the change order work. Inspectronic thereafter sued Skanska for wrongful termination and sought to recover its lost profits in connection with the termination.

Decision

At trial, the court found that Skanska wrongfully terminated Inspectronic and determined that Inspectronic was entitled to its lost profits in the amount of $304,852. On appeal, Skanska challenged the trial court’s calculation of lost profit damages. The appellate court affirmed the award of lost profits relating to change order work that would have been performed by Inspectronic. The court relied upon well-established case law, which provides that if the damages were in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract then they are properly recoverable. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s finding that at the time the subcontract was entered, the parties fully anticipated that there would be change order work relating to the diving and underwater operations, and that such change order work would be performed by Inspectronic. The measure of lost profit damages awarded to Inspectronic for the contemplated change order work were the actual amount paid to the replacement subcontractor who completed the change order work.

As for the lost profit damages for the four remaining base contract work items, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s calculation of lost profit damages for the unfinished contract work items, which were the lump sum contract price, less payments already made and less the cost to complete the contract work.

Comment

As this case demonstrates, a party may recover lost profits provided they were foreseeable by the parties at the time the contract was entered into and are capable of calculation with reasonable certainty. The law does not require absolute certainty. Damages from the loss of future profits are after often an approximation. Here, the measures of lost profit damages for the unfinished contract work was the fixed contract price minus the amount it would have cost the contractor to complete. With regard to change order work, lost profit damages were easy for the court to establish with measurable certainty because the actual amount paid to the subcontractor who replaced Inspectronic provided an exact number for the loss of profits, without the need for any speculation.

Failure to Serve Proper Verified Statement of Trust Results in Contractor being Held Liable for Trust Fund Diversion

Article 3-A of New York’s Lien Law contains some of the most perilous legal requirements a construction contractor will face. Section 13 of the Lien Law makes it clear that the funds received on a construction project are trust funds for the benefit of contractors, subcontractors, laborers and suppliers. If those funds are not used exclusively to satisfy claims of contractors and suppliers for work performed on the project (“Trust Purposes”), contractors may be liable for trust fund diversion. Contractors have often heard of their obligations under Article 3-A, but usually lack a sufficient understanding of how to avoid the serious penalties that can arise from diverting trust funds (even inadvertently). New York’s construction trust fund statute is primarily intended to ensure that a contractor, subcontractor, supplier or worker (“Trust Beneficiaries”) involved in the improvement of real property, or of a public works project will be properly compensated for its services.

One overlooked tool in the arsenal of such beneficiaries to ensure payment is a Demand for a Verified Statement of Trust pursuant to Section 76 of the Lien Law. Under this section of the Lien Law, a beneficiary of lien trust funds on a construction project has the right to demand that the trustee provide a verified statement, in writing and under oath, setting forth the items contained in the books and records of the trust. A contractor has the statutory right to obtain a sworn statement from a trustee of the funds setting forth certain information including the dates and amounts of funds received and disbursed on the project, as well as the total amount of the funds still held. Moreover, a failure to serve a Verified Statement has been found by New York courts to be presumptive evidence that trust fund diversion occurred. A recent case shows the seriousness of the repercussions for failure to serve a proper Verified Statement.

In Anthony DeMarco & Sons Nursery, LLC v. Maxim Construction Service Corporation, et al., 130 A.D.3d 1409, (3d Dept 2015), the Appellate Division, Third Department, had an opportunity to examine the technical requirements of the Demand for a Verified Statement of Trust under Section 76 of the Lien Law. The underlying action involved a construction project at SUNY – Binghamton and a property owned by the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York. LeChase Construction Services, LLC (“LeChase”) was hired by the Owner as the general contractor. LeChase, in turn, hired Maxim Construction Service Corporation (“Maxim”) as the site contractor. Plaintiff subcontracted with Maxim to provide certain landscaping services for the project.

A payment dispute arose and Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit. Thereafter, Plaintiff served a Demand for a Verified Statement of Trust upon Maxim. Maxim failed to respond and Plaintiff filed a motion to compel a response, which was granted by the court. Maxim finally did serve a Verified Statement, but it was deficient. Plaintiff again moved to compel a response from Maxim. On that motion, the court found that Maxim’s response failed to comply with the requirements of Section 76 and, surprisingly, on its own motion awarded Plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of liability.  On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, agreed with the lower court and noted that Maxim’s Verified Statement failed to set forth “the dates and amounts of the trust assets receivable, trust accounts payable or trust funds received”, failed “to provide a sufficiently detailed breakdown of the total amount of payments made with trust funds” and failed to “provide a complete accounting of its trust assets receivable”. Interestingly, the Appellate Division also noted that while Maxim did provide a dollar figure for open change orders submitted to LeChase, the response lacked the requisite level of specificity.           

A beneficiary that successfully establishes a trust fund diversion is entitled to recover the diverted trust funds and receive damages for breach of the trust including interest, costs and attorneys’ fees expended in asserting a claim. In some instances a trustee may even be required to pay punitive damages. It is also important to note that corporate officers of a trustee may be personally liable for diverting trust funds. Further, such liability is not dischargeable in bankruptcy and, in extreme cases, can result in criminal prosecution that can include fines and even imprisonment for grand larceny. Contractors can safeguard against accusations of trust fund diversion by keeping accurate books and project records for every project. Clearly, given the perils of an improper response, it is advisable to contact a construction attorney to assist with the preparation of a Verified Statement.

Court Rejects Subcontractor’s Unjust Enrichment Claim Against Owner

When a subcontractor is unable to collect money owing from a contractor because of the contractor’s insolvency, or some other reason, the subcontractor sometimes looks to the owner of the project for recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment. A claimant seeking relief under unjust enrichment must demonstrate that the owner has agreed to pay for the subcontractor’s work or that the owner acted in such a way that gave rise to an obligation to pay the subcontractor.

The court addressed what must be shown to support an unjust enrichment claim in MCM Prods. USA Inc. v Aliusta Design. The case determined whether subcontractors can make a valid unjust enrichment claim against a leased owner of property where the contract is between the subcontractors and the general contractor.

Background

MCM, a seller of luggage and accessories, leased a space in Manhattan for a store. In June of 2014, MCM entered into a $1.4 million contract with a general contractor to renovate the leased property. The general contractor, in turn, retained various subcontractors to carry out the construction. There was no contractual relationship between MCM and any of the subcontractors.

In March of 2015, the general contractor filed a mechanic’s lien against the property, and several subcontractors followed suit. MCM’s lease with its landlord required that MCM promptly discharge any mechanic’s liens filed against the property. In May of 2015, MCM filed a lawsuit seeking a judgment declaring that it did not owe any money to any of the subcontractors. Several of the subcontractors filed counterclaims against MCM for unjust enrichment, claiming that MCM’s leased property was unjustly benefitted by their work for which no payment has been made to the subcontractors and, therefore, MCM should be responsible for payment. MCM moved to dismiss the counterclaims, arguing that the subcontractors could not recover without a contract with the owner.

Decision

The court dismissed the subcontractors’ unjust enrichment counterclaims. In doing so, the court followed well settled case law to hold that an unjust enrichment claim cannot be supported merely because MCM received a benefit from the subcontractor’s work. Where there is an express contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor, the law is clear that the owner may not be held liable unless the owner has assented to a payment obligation to the subcontractor. The owner’s consent to allow the improvements for which it received a benefit to be made is not enough. The owner has to undertake actions which would give clear indication that it assumed the obligation to pay the subcontractor. In this decision, the court did not address the validity of the subcontractors’ mechanic’s liens.

Comment

Here, the MCM court applied New York law to bar the application of the unjust enrichment doctrine where there is no evidence that the owner assumed any independent obligation to pay the subcontractors. However, a subcontractor may have a valid unjust enrichment claim against an owner if it can show direct dealings between the owner and the subcontractor to justify imposing an obligation the owner, despite the absence of a contractual relationship. This includes situations where the owner paid the subcontractor directly or expressed a willingness to pay the subcontractor. Therefore, an owner may be liable to the subcontractor where communications between the parties show that the owner assured direct payment to the subcontractor.  

Court Rejects Pay-When-Paid and Lien Waiver Contract Provisions

Subcontracts often contain a “pay-when-paid” provision whereby payment of the monthly requisitions or final payment for work performed will be made only after payment has been received by the general contractor from the owner. New York courts, however, interpret this contingent payment clause to mean that it only fixes a reasonable time within which the subcontractor may be expected to wait for payment from the general contractor, rather than making payment by the owner to the general contractor a condition of payment to the subcontractor.

Some subcontracts also provide that a subcontractor waives its right to file a mechanic’s lien against the project or against the property being improved. New York law, however, has declared that such a waiver of lien protection is contrary to public policy and, thus, void.

In the recent case of Conviron Controlled Environments, Inc. v Arch Insurance Company, the court addressed the validity of both contract provisions.

Background

In December of 2010, the State University Construction Fund entered into a contract with Framan Mechanical, Inc. for a mechanical systems upgrade project at SUNY Stony Brook. Arch Insurance Company issued a labor and material payment bond to Framan for the project.

The following month, Framan entered into a subcontract with Conviron Controlled Environments, Inc. for the installation of 10 plant growth rooms and associated climate controls. The subcontract contained a provision providing that final payment would be made to the subcontractor either after Framan received a waiver of all claims relating to the subcontractor’s work or after Framan had received final payment from the owner for the subcontractor’s work. The contract also provided that, “to the fullest extent permitted by law”, Conviron waived its right to file a mechanic’s lien against the project or the improved property.

While Conviron attempted to show completion of its scope of work as early as February of 2013, it was undisputed that its scope of work was complete no later than September 24, 2013, when Framan acknowledged completion in a letter to the owner titled “Completion of Project—Entire Project”, in which Framan stated that “the captioned project phase has been completed in accordance with the Contract Documents and is ready for acceptance and occupancy”. Conviron also filed a mechanic’s lien against the project in the amount of $179,689.87. Because this balance still remained outstanding in March of 2014, Conviron sued Arch, Framan’s payment bond surety.

After discovery, Conviron moved for summary judgment, arguing that as its work has been accepted by Framan it was entitled to payment. In opposition, Arch argued that payment was not due under the terms of the subcontract because: 1) the owner had not given written notice of acceptance of Conviron’s scope of work; 2) the owner had not waived all of its claims relating to Conviron’s scope of work; and 3) Framan had not received final payment from the owner on account of Conviron’s scope of work. Arch also relied on the waiver of lien clause in the subcontract to argue that Conviron breached the subcontract by filing a mechanic’s lien.

Decision

The court rule in favor of Conviron, holding that the three conditions to payment cited by Arch are not true conditions precedent to payment. The court cited well settled New York law that such contingent payment provisions allow the general contractor to postpone payment only for a reasonable period of time after completion of the work. In light of Framan’s September 24, 2013 acknowledgement of the completion of Conviron’s work, the court held that its two year delay in issuing payment to Conviron was unreasonable.

Finally, as to Arch’s argument that Conviron breached the subcontract by filing a mechanic’s lien where such lien right was waived, the court noted the equally well established New York law that such provisions are void as against public policy and unenforceable.

Comment

The Conviron court applied well recognized case law to hold that the pay-when-paid provision of a subcontract cannot be used to construe a condition of payment to the subcontractor. The provision allows payment to a subcontractor to be delayed only for a reasonable time after the completion of the subcontractor’s work. While what constitutes a reasonable time is subject to court interpretation, the two years that Framan withheld payment from Conviron was clearly not reasonable. The court pointed out that if the pay-when-paid provision was literally interpreted, it “would allow the owner to delay its own performance indefinitely, to the substantial detriment of subcontractors, like Conviron, whose work the parties largely agree is complete”