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Author: WB&G

What Constitutes an “Undertaking” Under Lien Law Section 5

A recent decision surrounding the highly publicized and litigated project known as B2, a 34-story modular building containing 350 residential units, provides an opportunity to interpret the language of Lien Law § 5, which states that a private developer on public land must post a bond or other undertaking guaranteeing prompt payment to a contractor.

In furtherance of the project, Skanska USA Bldg. Inc. (“Skanska”) and Atlantic Yards B2 Owner, LLC (“B2 Owner”) entered into a “Construction Management and Fabrication Services Agreement” (the “CM Agreement”). After terminating the CM Agreement via a 146-page letter, Skanska commenced suit against, among others, B2 Owner and its parent company, Forest City Ratner Companies, LLC (“Forest City”). In relevant part, Skanska alleges that B2 Owner and/or Forest City (the private developer) breached the CM Agreement by failing to post a bond (pursuant to Lien Law § 5) to guarantee B2 Owner’s performance under the CM Agreement. In response, B2 Owner and Forest City moved to dismiss.

The lower court granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the ruling. In affirming, the Appellate Division undertook an analysis of the guarantee provided by a Forest City affiliate, and the following language contained in Lien Law § 5:

Where no public fund has been established for the financing of a public improvement with estimated cost in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars, the chief financial officer of the public owner shall require the private entity for whom the public improvement is being made to post, or cause to be posted, a bond or other form of undertaking guaranteeing prompt payment of moneys due to the contractor, his or her subcontractors and to all persons furnishing labor or materials to the contractor or his or her subcontractors in the prosecution of the work on the public improvement.

The Appellate Division rejected Skanska’s argument that the guarantee provided by an affiliate of Forest City did not comply with the law because it is not equivalent to a bond “or other form of undertaking”. The guarantee stated that B2 Owner would “cause Substantial Completion of the Improvements and perform the Development Work,” including “to fully and punctually pay and discharge any and all costs, expenses and liabilities incurred for or in connection with the Guaranteed Work, including, but not limited to, the costs of construction, equipping and furnishing the Guaranteed Work”.

The Appellate Division stated that the guarantee provided follows the letter of the statute in that it guarantees prompt payment to contractors. The fact that alternative or seemingly better “undertakings” may have been available, such as a letter of credit (as the dissent notes), is irrelevant. The public owner, Empire State Development Corporation, was satisfied with the guarantee, as was the Appellate Division. It should be noted that the Appellate Division did not address Skanska’s ability to enforce the guarantee as a third-party beneficiary, thereby leaving open the question of proper pursuit of the undertaking. 

 

While this case provides an interesting analysis and decision with regard to compliance with Lien Law § 5, the waters remain murky as to what type of “undertaking” will actually satisfy the statute. Given that two of the Appellate Division Judges provided a dissenting opinion, Skanska has the right to appeal to the highest court in the State, the New York Court of Appeals. Thus, please stay tuned for further developments with regard to the interpretation of Lien Law § 5.

Failure to Give Timely Notice Dooms Subcontractor’s Claim

Notice of claim provisions in public works contracts are strictly enforced. The failure of a contractor to give timely written notice required by the contract or statute generally results in the forfeiture of its claim. In the recent case of USA v AIM Steel International, Inc. et. al., a second-tier subcontractor’s claim was dismissed because of the failure of that sub-subcontractor to give timely notice of its claim to the prime contractor.

Background

In March of 2013, the prime contractor Macknak-Korte contracted with the U.S. government for the construction of an addition to the Army Reserve Center at Fort Wadsworth in Staten Island. Because of the size of the project, and because mechanic’s liens are not available on federal public construction projects, the Miller Act requires that prime contractors obtain payment bonds to provide an alternate security for the benefit of subcontractors and material suppliers. Further, because the Miller Act is designed to protect the claims of lower-tier subcontractors who may not even be known to the prime contractor, it requires that any subcontractor who doesn’t have a direct relationship with the prime contractor must first give the prime contractor notice of its claim with substantial accuracy, which notice must be given within 90 days of the lower-tier subcontractor’s last day of work on the project.

Here, Macknak obtained the required payment bond and subcontracted with AIM Steel International for steel supply and erection services. AIM, in turn, subcontracted out a portion of its scope of the work to Midtown Contracting. Pursuant to its sub-subcontract with AIM, Midtown performed work for the project up through August 20, 2014. Separately, in September of 2014, Macknak purchased materials directly from Midtown, for which it was paid in full.

In February of 2015, Midtown sued Macknak’s payment bond surety for the amounts owed by AIM to Midtown. The surety moved for summary judgment dismissing Midtown’s claims, arguing that the prerequisite notice of these claims was untimely. In opposition to the motion, Midtown claimed that it provided written notice to Midtown on three separate occasions in October and December of 2014 and, therefore, it satisfied the notice requirements of the statute.

Decision

The court dismissed Midtown’s claims against the bond surety, finding that it failed to give adequate notice prior to November 18, 2014, within 90 days of Midtown’s last day of work on the project. This notice is required under the Miller Act so that the prime contractor can “understand the total scope of its obligations” and be alerted to protect itself by withholding sufficient sums from its payments to AIM, the first-tier subcontractor.

As to the three specific notices that Midtown claimed were provided to Macknak, the October 2014 communication was simply an email in which Macknak stated that it was aware that Midtown was owed money. However, Midtown did not notify Macknak that Midtown was making any claim against it or its payment bond, and Midtown failed to set forth how much was owed. Accordingly, the Court held that this notice, although within the proper 90 day time frame, was not sufficiently detailed to provide the required notice.

As to the two December 2014 communications, the Court held that they were untimely because they were sent outside of the 90 day window. In doing so, the Court rejected Midtown’s argument that the separate Macknak contract with Midtown tolled commencement of the 90 day period until Midtown delivered its last material under that September 2014 agreement. The Court noted, however, that Midtown’s work was not performed under an “over-all contract” but, rather, two separate contracts; the one subcontract between Macknak and AIM, and the other direct contract between Macknak and Midtown, for which Midtown was paid in full.

Comment

Here, the Midtown court followed long-standing case law which enforce the notice requirements of the Miller Act against lower-tier subcontractors, such as Midtown. Contractors would be well advised to comply with these statutory notice deadlines, as courts will not hesitate to strictly enforce them, even if it means that a contractor may end up forfeiting any recovery on an otherwise valid claim

Subcontractor Allowed to Maintain Fraud Claim against Sub-Sub for Unpaid Union Fringe Benefits

Contractual provisions sometimes provide that a general contractor is entitled to withhold payments otherwise due to its subcontractor for the subcontractor’s failure to pay fringe benefit payments for work performed on a project. This withholding insures that there is sufficient money outstanding to fund the payment of unpaid fringe benefits. Where the subcontractor enters into an agreement with a sub-subcontractor, the contract may require, as a condition of receiving progress payments, that the sub-subcontractor submit certified weekly payroll reports indicating that the workers had been paid correct prevailing wage and fringe benefits.

In the recent case of Summit Development Corp. v Interstate Masonry Corp., the general contractor withheld a payment otherwise due to a subcontractor when the union notified the general contractor of a sub-subcontractor’s failure to pay fringe benefits in excess of $300,000.00. The subcontractor thereafter brought an action against the sub-subcontractor for fraud, claiming that it falsified certified payroll reports.

Background

Summit, as subcontractor, and Interstate, as sub-subcontractor, entered into a subcontract whereby Interstate agreed to perform masonry work for a project in Manhattan. As a condition for receiving progress payments, Interstate was required to submit certified weekly payroll reports showing payment of both prevailing wages and union fringe benefits on behalf of the workers.

Eighteen months into the project, the general contractor received a letter from Bricklayers Local No. 1 and its fringe benefit funds claiming that Interstate owed the fringe benefit funds $341,000 for unpaid benefits payments. The general contractor withheld that sum from monies owed to Summit, as it was entitled to do under its subcontract.

Summit sued Interstate for the $341,000 it had previously paid to Interstate in reliance on the certified payroll documents. Summit then moved for summary judgment on its fraud claim, arguing that it would not have made progress payments to Interstate if Summit had known that Interstate’s representations and certified payroll reports were false and that benefits payments that Interstate claimed were made were, in fact, unpaid.

Decision

The trial court granted Summit summary judgment on its fraud claim, finding that there was no credible dispute that the representations made in the certified payroll documents were false. The appellate court reversed, finding that the pre-printed representation on the certified payroll document that the payments “have been or will be made” could not, on the face of the document, be determined to be false at the time it was signed. Similarly, it was not determinable from the face of the document whether the handwritten language on the payroll reports to the effect that the payments had been made “was present or whether at the time the forms were signed the handwritten language was added to the forms at a later time.” Accordingly, the appellate court held that these factual issues had to be presented at a trial for a jury to determine.

Comment

A question that often arises in the circumstance of subcontracting on a prevailing wage or a union labor project is what credence can be placed on the certified payroll documents. While certified payroll reports are made under oath and specifically represent that prevailing and/or union wages and fringe benefits have been paid, they are not evidence that such payments were actually made. Ideally, the issue of delinquent payments should be promptly brought to the general contractor’s attention after the delinquency is known by the union. Typically, a contractor does not have the wherewithal to monitor the actual payroll checks and wage statements of its subcontractors to determine whether such payments were made. Here, the Summit court reminds us of an additional remedy, that the submission of falsified certified payroll documents constitutes a fraud, and money damages may be awarded against the guilty subcontractor. 

Think Your Additional Insureds have Coverage? Better Check the Insurance Policy

While it can be a headache, Commercial General Liability Insurance (“CGL”) is a necessity in construction. Generally, every party involved in a construction project is required to obtain insurance not just for themselves, but also for many other entities involved in the project. Most contractors and owners are diligent in procuring the additional insurance coverage required under their contracts. But inevitably, when a claim is made during or after the project and the insurance companies get involved, contractors, subcontractors and owners often find themselves with limitations and restrictions on the coverage they thought they had.

Take, for instance, the recent decision of New York’s Appellate Division, First Department, in the case of Gilbane Bldg. Co./TDX Const. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.1 Gilbane/TDX was a joint venture that contracted with the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York (“DASNY”) to be the construction manager on a New York City public project for construction of a DNA lab at the Bellevue Hospital Campus in Manhattan (the “Project”). Under the Construction Management Agreement between Gilbane/TDX and DASNY, any prime contractor, whether retained by DASNY or otherwise, was required to name Gilbane/TDX as an Additional Insured under its CGL policies. DASNY contracted directly with a prime contractor, Samson, for excavation and foundation work on the Project. Pursuant to its contract with DASNY, Samson was to procure CGL insurance specifically naming, among others, Gilbane/TDX as an Additional Insured. Samson obtained a policy from Liberty Insurance Underwriters (“Liberty”) with the following Additional Insured endorsement:

WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured any person or organization with whom you have agreed to add as an additional insured by written contract but only with respect to liability arising out of your operations or premises owned by or rented to you.”

During the Project, Samson’s work allegedly caused adjacent buildings to sink, resulting in significant structural damage to those buildings. DASNY commenced a lawsuit against Samson and the Project architect, which, in turn, led to a third-party action being filed against Gilbane/TDX. Gilbane/TDX thereafter provided notice to Liberty and sought defense and indemnification as an Additional Insured under Samson’s policy. Liberty denied coverage to Gilbane/TDX, and Gilbane/TDX commenced a declaratory judgment action to force Liberty to provide Gilbane/TDX with coverage as an Additional Insured under Samson’s policy. The motion court held that Samson had a written contract with DASNY to provide Additional Insured coverage to Gilbane/TDX and, thus, held that Gilbane/TDX was an Additional Insured under the language of Samson’s policy with Liberty. Liberty appealed.
    
The appellate court reversed the motion court’s decision, focusing on the specific language of the Additional Insured endorsement contained within the policy of insurance issued by Liberty. The appellate court held that the endorsement required that the party seeking Additional Insured coverage (Gilbane/TDX) must have a written contract with the Insured (Samson) under whose policy it was seeking coverage as an Additional Insured. The Court focused on two words in the Additional Insured endorsement, “with whom”, and determined that those words required a contract between the Insured (Samson) and the entity seeking Additional Insured coverage (Gilbane/TDX) to trigger such coverage. The appellate court held that since Samson, the insured, only had a contract with DASNY and not Gilbane/TDX, no Additional Insured coverage existed for Gilbane/TDX under the policy procured by Samson from Liberty.
    
As an aside, the appellate court noted that Gilbane/TDX could possibly recover from Samson on a breach of contract theory based on Samson’s failure to obtain the insurance required in its contract with DASNY. However, no such claim was made in this action. Accordingly, the end result was that Gilbane/TDX was left without any coverage.

TAKEWAY: Every insurance policy contains different language which could lead to differing levels of coverage. Unfortunately, the contractor procuring the insurance may not realize the effect of the language used in the policy until it’s too late. Courts uniformly hold that the language of the insurance policy, and not that of a contract or an insurance certificate, governs the insurance coverage provided by an insurance carrier.  This may lead to situations in which contractors, subcontractors and owners may be exposed to liability, such as: (1)  if you were supposed to have the benefit of the additional insurance, you do not have the coverage you bargained for—and thought you had—in your contract(s) due to the actual language used in the insurance policy (thus exposing yo to direct claims); and (2) if you were supposed to have provided the additional insurance, you have breached your contract because you have not provided the correct coverage required.  In order to best avoid these situations, contractors, subcontractors and owners should have their insurance policies reviewed by their attorneys and insurance brokers (and their contracts reviewed by their attorneys) to ensure that proper coverage is provided.


1 2016 NY Slip. Op. 06052; 2016 WL 4837454 (1st Dept Sept. 15, 2016)

Court Rules Contractor Entered Into an Enforceable Contract

The general rule in New York is that a construction contract is enforceable if it contains the necessary essential terms and conditions. Parties may enter into a valid contract without ever signing a final document. For example, by their course of conduct, they may have objectively demonstrated their intention to enter into a binding contractual obligation. In the case of J.S. McHugh, Inc. v WEB Construction, the court addressed the issue of whether the parties had an enforceable contract.

Background

In early 2013, WEB engaged in negotiations with McHugh for McHugh to provide cabinetry at a project WEB was performing for the Long Beach Public Schools. The project was to have been performed over the summer of that year and be completed in time for the new school year.

The parties’ negotiations were comprised of a quote from McHugh to WEB to provide the cabinetry, followed by a revised quote. The revised quote provided for a furnished and installed price of $490,000, and it was signed by WEB. In comprising its quote, McHugh had priced out a cost to manufacture the cabinets of $275,475 and a cost to install of $80,000, leaving $152,575 for its profit. This quote, however, did not contain terms for the payment of the $490,000 and, in fact, stated that such terms were “to be discussed upon contract”. The emails which accompanied the quote stated that McHugh could “start shop drawings and submit . . . insurance”.

Believing that it had a binding agreement with WEB, McHugh entered into contracts with the cabinet manufacturer and installer. However, McHugh’s project manager (who was apparently leaving the company) advised WEB that the manufacturer would not supply McHugh with the cabinets due to payment issues it was having with McHugh. Upon hearing this, WEB informed McHugh that WEB would not be using its services, and it directly retained McHugh’s proposed manufacturer and installer to complete the work.

McHugh sued WEB for breach of contract, claiming $152,575 in lost profits. At trial, WEB presented evidence that although the price had been set, there had been no terms negotiated for the payment of the contract price. WEB further argued that the language “to be discussed on contract” indicated that there was no contract. McHugh, on the other hand, argued that the evidence showed that the parties had a meeting of the minds, the major terms had been agreed to, and the missing payment terms were relatively minor and could be filled in based on either what is customary in the industry or the prior course of dealing between these parties on other projects.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of McHugh, holding that there was, in fact, a binding contract between the parties. After first noting that “virtually every agreement can be said to have a degree of indefiniteness”, the court held that all that was necessary to establish a binding contract was evidence that the parties assented as to the essential terms. As to the missing specifics of the payment terms, the court found that there were certain customs and practices in the construction industry that could have filled in the missing terms, or that a form AIA contract that is typical in the industry could have done the same. Accordingly, the court held that the few missing terms in this contract could not defeat the fact that there had been a sufficient meeting of the minds on the essential terms to establish an enforceable agreement.

Comment

While it is true that an agreement does not have to be in writing to be enforceable, this case shows that where there is no writing there can easily be disputes as to what terms were included in the contract, particularly here, where there was uncertainty as to the method or terms of payment. The best practice, of course, is to have a written agreement where the essential terms are clearly set forth so that there can be no dispute as to whether a contract was formed.

Subcontractor’s Unjust Enrichment Claim Against Project Owner Held Invalid

In MCM Products USA, Inc. v. Aliusta Design, et al., the Plaintiff/owner of the relevant property engaged a general contractor (the “GC”) in connection with a construction project located in New York City (the “Project”). Thereafter, the GC engaged numerous subcontractors (the “Subcontractors”) to carry out portions of the work. Importantly, the Subcontractors were directly engaged by the GC, and had no contractual relationship with Plaintiff/owner.

As payment disputes arose on the Project, mainly due to the GC’s failure to pay certain Subcontractors, mechanic’s liens were filed against the property. Thereafter, Plaintiff/owner commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it is not liable to the Subcontractors for any money due and owing from the GC. In response to Plaintiff/owner’s complaint, one of the Subcontractors asserted a counterclaim for unjust enrichment1. Plaintiff/owner subsequently moved to dismiss the counterclaim.

In granting Plaintiff/owner’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim for unjust enrichment (which rests on a theory of quasi-contract), the Court noted that, generally, the existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi-contract for events arising out of the same subject matter. The general rule further precludes a quasi-contractual claim against a third-party non-signatory to a contract that covers the subject matter of the claim (i.e. Plaintiff/owner).

Given that the unjust enrichment counterclaim does not assert any allegations linking Plaintiff/owner to the services allegedly performed, and that the counterclaiming Subcontractor admitted it was engaged directly by the GC, Plaintiff/owner may not be held liable to the counterclaiming Subcontractor.

The holding in MCM Products USA, Inc. demonstrates the importance of knowing from whom a subcontractor can recover monies owed. Where there is an express contract between a general contractor and subcontractor, the owner of the subject project may not be held directly liable to the subcontractor on a theory of implied or quasi-contract, unless the owner has expressly assented to such an obligation. The mere fact that an owner consented to the improvements being provided by a subcontractor (and accepted the benefit of such improvements), however, does not render it liable to a subcontractor. Rather, the subcontractor’s sole remedy lies against the general contractor with whom it contracted.


1A claim for unjust enrichment is based on the theory of quasi-contract. Such theory seeks to create an implied contract when a written agreement doesn’t actually exist. The theory is based in equity and is designed to avoid an individual or entity being unjustly enriched at the expense of another.

 

Court Refuses to Vacate Arbitration Award in Favor of Contractor

Arbitration awards can be challenged in court, but overturning an award is rare because judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited. The theory being that having agreed to arbitration, the parties should be held to the result, even if the arbitrator misunderstood or misapplied the law. Courts will vacate or refuse to confirm an award, however, if there is actual evidence of serious misconduct, corruption or fraud by the arbitrator.

In the recent case of Structure Tek Construction, Inc. v Waterville Holdings, LLC, the appellate court addressed the standards of review for vacating an arbitrator’s award.

Background

In June of 2012, Structure Tek, a contractor, commenced a lawsuit against Waterville seeking to foreclose an $89,000 mechanic’s lien, and seeking contract and delay damages. Because the parties had agreed to arbitration in their construction contract, the lawsuit was stayed to allow the arbitration to proceed. The parties agreed that the arbitrator should be a construction lawyer. The arbitrator at issue was the first choice of Waterville and the third choice of Structure Tek. On the assurance of Waterville’s counsel that this arbitrator “has practical architecture background and I think he is a good choice”, Structure Tek’s counsel agreed to utilize the arbitrators and the parties proceeded to a five day arbitration, after which the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the contractor in the total amount of $254,735.29, which included $95,970.10 in contract balance, and additional sums for delay damages.

After the issuance of the award, Waterville’s counsel learned that the arbitrator was personally in default of his own home mortgage and was a defendant in a current mortgage foreclosure action. When Structure Tek returned to court and petitioned to confirm the award as a judgment, Waterville opposed, arguing that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose his personal default of his own real estate mortgage and his status as a mortgage foreclosure defendant tainted the award. Waterville added that threats and intimidating behavior made by an agent of Structure Tek before and during the arbitration—which included threats to contact the Liquor Authority and Internal Revenue Service, false accusations that Waterville solicited organized crime to intimidate Structure Tek, and false accusations that Waterville representatives had threatened him and Structure Tek’s attorney with physical harm—provided further grounds for overturning the award. Finally, Waterville argued that the award was irrational, in part because the arbitrator awarded in excess of $95,000 on the claim when the contractor’s own mechanic’s lien was only in the sum of $89,000.

Decision

The trial court confirmed the arbitrator’s award, finding that Waterville failed to establish that the arbitrator’s financial difficulties affected his impartiality. The court also found that the amount of the award was not totally irrational, and that Waterville failed to establish any other basis to overturn the award.

The appellate court affirmed. In doing so, the appellate court acknowledged that judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is extremely limited. It relied upon well settled case law that such award should not be disturbed unless there is clear and convincing evidence that vacatur is appropriate. The court held that there were no grounds to overturn the award. As to the irrationality standard, the appellate court pointed out that mere mistakes of law or fact were insufficient because the arbitrator “may do justice as he [or she] sees it, applying his [or her] own sense of law and equity to the facts as he [or she] finds them to be and making an award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the agreement”.

Comment

Courts favor arbitration because it expedites claims and reduces litigation in an overburdened court system. Because of the limited right of appeal, the arbitration award is final and binding, even if the arbitrator makes a mistake of fact or law, or the award is contrary to the weight of the evidence presented at the hearing. Although it has been said that arbitration is an effective way to resolve disputes privately, promptly and economically, the arbitrating parties should be aware that they are giving up the important safeguard of full appellate review of the arbitration award.

A Lesson that Contractors should thoroughly Document Approval of any Owner Directed Design Changes

Ordinarily, an owner and design professional are liable for defects and omissions in the plans and specifications for a project. Generally speaking, the owner and design professional impliedly warrant that project plans and specifications are accurate, without defects and suitable for the purpose intended. That is not to say contractors should let their guard down as an owner may attempt to shift the risk of design errors to a contractor through language in the contract. The following case shows the fruits of proper contract language and documentation.

In Maines Paper & Food Service, Inc. v. Pike Co., Inc., 137 AD3D 1366 (3d Dept 2016), the Appellate Division, Third Department, had an opportunity to examine liability for a design change approved and directed by the owner and architect that ultimately resulted in costly damages to a project. The dispute arose out of a 2009 contract between the owner and contractor, Pike Co. Inc. (“Pike”), for the construction of a supermarket. After completion, there was “considerable settling of the [supermarket’s] floor”, which the owner alleged was directly attributable to Pike’s failure to construct the foundation in accordance with the contract documents, including the plans and geotechnical engineering report. It was noted that the initial plan did not call for Pike to attach the slab to the pile caps. However,  after the project had commenced, Pike submitted a request for clarification (“RFC”) to the architect. In response to the RFC, the architect indicated that rebar reinforcement should be added to “tie-in the pile-cap, slab and column to each other”, and he provided a drawing for clarification. Thereafter, a change order was approved and issued by the owner and architect referencing the RFC and directing Pike to undertake work in accordance with the architect’s clarification and drawing. Interestingly, the geotechnical engineering report contained in the project manual indicated that a slab-on-grade concrete foundation could be used and specifically warned that the slab should not be connected to the pile caps to limit the risk of potential settlement.

The owner filed a lawsuit alleging breach of contract for Pike’s failure to follow the project plans and design specifications. After answering the lawsuit, Pike promptly moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, noting that Pike did not breach the terms of the contract because the changes to the design of the foundation were approved by the architect and owner. The Appellate Division upheld the lower court’s decision dismissing the complaint against Pike. In so doing, the appellate court noted that Pike’s submission of the RFC and owner directed change order was sufficient to insulate Pike from liability—even though the original plans and geotechnical engineering report in the project manual specified the floor slab not be connected to the pile caps. The court was unpersuaded by the owner’s claims that Pike breached its contractual duty to “carefully study and compare the various Contract Documents” and its obligation to report any “errors, inconsistencies or omissions” in the plans, noting that pursuant to the language of the contract Pike was not a design professional, was directed to follow the design change, and was not “responsible for the adequacy of the performance and design criteria specified in the Contract Documents”.

It is easy to envision a very different outcome had Pike failed to thoroughly document the change to the project plans or, worse yet, simply relied upon an oral directive of the architect or owner. In that case, Pike would have been stuck conducting time consuming and costly discovery to try and prove that the owner and architect approved and directed the design change. Instead, all Pike needed was the contract, RFC and change order to obtain summary judgment dismissing the complaint shortly after the lawsuit was commenced.

Court Rejects Owner’s Claim of Willful Exaggeration of Lien

The consequences of filing a willfully exaggerated mechanic’s lien are severe. Section 39-a of the New York Lien Law provides that such a lien is declared void and the owner or contractor can recover the difference between the amount of the exaggerated lien and the actual amount due, costs of a bond to discharge the lien, and attorney’s fees.

New York courts, however, are reluctant to find that a lien has been willfully exaggerated unless it can be proved that the lienor intentionally and deliberately exaggerated the lien. The recent case of S. DiGiacomo & Son, Inc. v. Robinson Callen demonstrates the heavy burden of establishing a willfully exaggerated lien.

Background

In January of 2014, DiGiacomo entered into a contract with Reinstein Ross LLC, a tenant of a retail space in Manhattan, to perform the interior build-out of Reinstein’s store. DiGiacomo’s scope of work included certain specified HVAC work, including the installation of heat pumps and runtal wall radiators. Work continued for approximately 6 months, at which time communications between DiGiacomo and Reinstein broke down and work stopped. Ultimately, Reinstein terminated DiGiacomo’s contract, claiming that DiGiacomo was over 110 days behind schedule in completing the contract work.

In March of 2015, DiGiacomo filed a mechanic’s lien against the property for $100,621.76 and, shortly thereafter, commenced a lawsuit to foreclose that mechanic’s lien. The amount of DiGiacomo’s lien was based on its final payment application, which certified that its work was 100% complete, and which includes 28 separate items of work and 19 change orders. Reinstein moved to dismiss the lawsuit, disputing that the work reflected in the payment application was complete (or, with regard to several items, performed at all), and disputing the validity of these claimed change orders, arguing that they were unsigned, unilateral, and not a part of the parties’ contract. In support of its motion, Reinstein submitted the affidavit of its project architect, who stated: he never saw or approved the payment application, as required by the contract; he never approved the change orders referenced in the payment application; he specifically rejected several of the change orders, including two as being duplicative; and little of what was billed was actually performed and, accordingly, he would have rejected the work as not completed. Based on this affidavit, Reinstein contended that DiGiacomo’s lien was willfully exaggerated.

In opposition to the motion, DiGiacomo disputed the architect’s account and argued that the issue of willful exaggeration of a mechanic’s lien could not be determined on affidavits alone. DiGiacomo also responded to each of the architect’s specific claims, which indicated that $8,000 of the liened cost of the HVAC system was exaggerated, $3,750 was billed for hardware that was never installed, and $550 was billed for a microwave that was never provided.

Decision

The court denied Reinstein’s motion, holding that an inaccuracy in the amount of the lien, if no exaggeration is intended, cannot serve to void the lien. As to Reinstein’s disavowal of the change orders, the court followed well settled law that a mechanic’s lien may include amounts due for change orders and extras, including amounts based on unsigned change orders—even where the contract requires any changes to be in writing. Further, in addressing the question of exaggeration, the court declined to find at the initial stage of the litigation that the mechanic’s lien was exaggerated, holding that “while [DiGiacomo] may have inserted in the lien improper charges and double-billed certain items, Reinstein offers no evidence that [DiGiacomo] willfully and intentionally exaggerated the lien”.

Comment

Although the owner failed to meet its burden of establishing that DiGiacomo willfully and intentionally exaggerated the lien, it is worth noting that the court rejected the owner’s claim of willful exaggeration of the lien before Reinstein filed its answer to DiGiacomo’s complaint to foreclose its mechanic’s lien.  The issue of willful exaggeration necessarily involves proof as to the creditability of the lienor and is ordinarily determined at the trial of the foreclosure action.  Accordingly, Reinstein will have another opportunity to show DiGiacomo intentionally exaggerated the lien rather than acting in a good faith belief, although mistaken, that the lien claim was legitimate.

The Critical Need for Record Keeping on Oral Agreements

Contractors, subcontractors and owners involved in residential or small scale construction projects often find themselves contracting through short-form, non-comprehensive written contracts or, sometimes, bare oral agreements. This is also common where extra work not contemplated in the original agreements becomes necessary. While contracting in definitive terms is generally the best plan, oral contracts have remained a part of the construction industry because some projects may seem to lend themselves to a simpler contract or an oral agreement. Counterintuitively, contracting on less-than-complete and/or oral terms often makes detailed record keeping even more critical for both owners and contractors. Such is particularly the case  when construction does not go as planned and the scope of work must be changed, or a contractor must be terminated.

The New York Appellate Division, Second Department, recently released a decision in the case of DiSario v. Rynston1 reminding of the critical importance of record-keeping on construction projects, especially those based on oral contracts. Rynston, a Suffolk County homeowner, sought to remodel his home and hired DiSario to perform the work, which included enlargement of the kitchen, remodeling of the master bath and painting of the master bedroom. The parties entered into an oral2 agreement that DiSario would perform all of the work for $48,000. While DiSario was performing the work, he discovered that there were various unforeseen extra work items that needed to be performed. Chief among these items was additional kitchen work attributable to the existence of a structural post not previously known, as well as an infestation of carpenter ants in the kitchen ceiling. Although none of these additional items were subject to the original agreed contract sum of $48,000, DiSario, with the homeowner’s consent, undertook to perform these extra tasks throughout the project. Eventually, the homeowner became dissatisfied with DiSario’s work and terminated him after paying only $15,000 of the agreed $48,000 contract price. Thereafter, DiSario demanded payment of the unpaid balance of  $27,000, which included allegedly unpaid contract work and agreed upon extras. The homeowner refused to pay any additional sum to DiSario, and DiSario filed a mechanic’s lien for $27,000. The Homeowner proceeded to complete DiSario’s scope of work with completion contractors.

DiSario brought an action to enforce the $27,000 lien, but was only awarded $7,000 of his claim. The lower court found that although DiSario could not sufficiently prove he performed $27,000 worth of work, he was able to prove that he performed $7,000 worth of work for which he was not paid. DiSario appealed the award seeking a greater payment and the homeowner cross-appealed, arguing that DiSario was not entitled to any award at all, and that he was entitled to compensation for its cost to complete DiSario’s work.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the court below and found in favor of the homeowner, holding that DiSario would not receive any payment for contract or extra work performed. The court pointed out that while DiSario was able to establish the existence of both the oral contract and the homeowner’s consent to the extra work, DiSario failed to produce the accompanying bills, invoices, receipts, timesheets, checks or other documentary evidence that supported that he performed any such work. DiSario apparently offered some oral testimony regarding the description and value of the work, but the court did not find it persuasive.

Interestingly, the homeowner’s counterclaim against DiSario for the increased cost to complete DiSario’s original scope was dismissed for similar reasons. The court found that the homeowner failed to provide documentary evidence of the description and value of alleged completion work, and found oral testimony on that point inadequate.

TAKEWAY: Owners and contractors alike need to engage in detailed record keeping, no matter the size of the construction project. Sometimes record keeping is required specifically in the contract documents, but that is not always the case and is even less common in smaller residential construction. Still, in the event something goes wrong on a  construction project of any size, witness testimony alone will often not be enough to convince a judge or jury that you are entitled to any payment. Use of simple agreements, especially oral contracts, should not be an excuse to relax record-keeping. Quite the contrary, such should instead warn of the necessity to keep especially detailed records of all contract and extra work. In the end, the party that keeps detailed records of work, including important information regarding the work such as dates, values of labor/materials and detailed descriptions, will likely have a much easier (not to mention less expensive) time winning its case. Contractor and owners undertaking a construction project would be well served to consult their construction attorney to ensure they employ adequate record keeping procedures in the event that litigation becomes necessary.


1 DiSario v. Rynston No. 2014-04072, 2016 WL 1355814, at (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 6, 2016)

2 In some counties and in New York City, an oral agreement for home improvement contracting services is unenforceable by the contractor.