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Author: WB&G

Contractor Allowed To Correct Mistake After Bid Opening

Failure of a contractor to carefully comply with all the requirements of the bid specifications for public works may result in the bid being rejected on the grounds of “non-responsiveness”.  A bidder may be allowed to correct his mistake after the bid opening, however, if the variance from bid specifications is not material.  For example, clerical errors or mere irregularities may be waived by the awarding authority.

The contracting agency, however, should not allow a bidder to correct its bid after the bid opening in a way that would give the bidder a substantial advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other bidders.  When essential information is missing from a bid, it may not be supplied later by a private understanding between the bidder and the awarding authority.

In the recent case of Metra Industries Corp. v. Rockland County Sewer District No. 1, the court ruled on whether the County’s decision to allow a bidder to correct its mistake after the bid opening gave the bidder an advantage over the other bidders, thereby undermining the open competitive bidding process.

Background 

In June of 2010 Rockland County invited bids for a project to extend and replace the North Pascack Sewer Interceptor.  Among the bid specifications was a requirement that the total value for Mobilization/Demobilization could not exceed five percent of the total contract award.  All bids were submitted by the July 8, 2010 deadline.  Montana Construction Corp., Inc. had the lowest bid, which was $2,712,319.  Metra Industries Corporation submitted the second lowest bid, which was $2,903,214.  Montana’s low bid contained a Mobilization/Demobilization price of $250,000, which exceeded the five percent limit set forth in the bid specifications.  Unknown to Metra, after the County advised Montana of the defect in its bid, Montana lowered its Mobilization/Demobilization cost from $250,000 to $129,000, reducing their total initial bid by $121,000.  Once the bid was reduced, Montana’s bid totaled $2,591,320, approximately $311,894 less than Metra’s bid.  According to Montana, the initial figure of $250,000 was essentially a clerical error caused by the inadvertent combination of a separate cost item with the Mobilization/Demobilization price. 

On July 9, 2010 Metra sent a letter to the County complaining that Montana’s bid was defective since Montana’s Mobilization/Demobilization cost of $250,000 exceeded the five percent limitation in the bid specifications.  On July 16th, the County sent a letter in reply, acknowledging the bid defect, but went on to state that Montana’s bid had been adjusted to comply with the specifications, and that the County would approve Montana’s bid.  Metra sued to stop the County from awarding the job to Montana, arguing that allowing Montana to correct its mistake after the bid opening placed Montana at a competitive advantage over the other bidders.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the County.  According to the court, immaterial bid errors in a bid can be waived by a municipality, so long as the municipality has a rational basis for its determination.  In determining whether a bid error is or is not material, the court looked to the effect of the waiver and whether other bidders will be placed at a competitive disadvantage.  According to the court, if the waiver of the error by the municipality promotes completion of the work as specified without placing other bidders at a competitive disadvantage, the error may be deemed immaterial and can be waived.

Here, the court noted that the effect of the waiver, and Montana’s subsequent lowering of its bid, ensured that the contract would be entered into, and the same work performed, at a lower price than initially bid.  Since it was in the County’s best interest to waive the bid defect and permit correction, the court held that a rational basis existed for the County’s determination.  Also, the court pointed out that the County’s waiver of the defect did not place Montana at a competitive advantage since Montana was the lowest bidder with or without the error.  Accordingly, the court permitted the County to move forward with awarding the contract to Montana.

Comment 

There is no conclusive formula for determining on a case-by-case basis what constitutes a substantial bid defect as opposed to a minor defect.  The courts give broad discretion to public authorities in determining whether a bid is responsive and will uphold the agency’s determination if supported by a rational basis.


Court Rejects Variance From Bid Requirements

A disappointed bidder on a public project can go to court and challenge an award to the lowest bidder if he believes that the successful bidder failed to comply with the bid documents.  Although minor defects or irregularities in a bid may be waived by the contracting authority, a failure to conform to a material or substantial bid requirement cannot be waived or corrected after the bid opening.

In the recent case of Gemstar Constr. Corp. v. County of Nassau, the issue before the court was whether a low bidder’s variance from the bid specifications gave him an unfair advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other bidders.

Background 

In July 2009 the Nassau County Department of Public works invited bid proposals for two public improvement contracts relating to the removal and replacement of underground storage tanks at the Rockville Centre and Garden City MTA Long Island Bus maintenance depots.  The instructions to bidders required that the bids include a verification that the bidder had an approved State of New York registered Apprenticeship Training Program.  TCM Services, Inc. and Environmental Closures, Inc. were the lowest bidders for the two projects.  However, only the next lowest bidder for each job, Gemstar Construction Corp., had an approved registered New York State apprenticeship program when the bids were opened.  The low bidder, TMC, produced a verification of a New York State apprenticeship program twenty-four days after the bid opening.  The other low bidder, Environmental Closures, submitted its verification of a New York State apprenticeship program fifty-one days after the bid opening. 

Gemstar protested the awarding of the bids to TCM and Environmental Closures on the grounds that they failed to timely comply with the bid specifications.  The County denied Gemstar’s protest and Gemstar petitioned the court to reverse and annul the County’s determination.

Decision

The court reversed and annulled the County’s award and directed that the bidding be reopened.  The court stated that a governmental agency has the right to determine whether a variance from bid specifications is substantial or whether to waive it as a mere irregularity, and that determination must be upheld by the courts if supported by any rational basis.  However, the court also noted that a contracting agency may not allow a bidder to correct its bid after the bid opening in a way that would result in an unfair competitive advantage over the other bidders.  According to the court, TMC and Environmental Closures did not provide verification of the apprentice program mandated by the bid requirements until long after the bid opening and, as a result, “gained a competitive advantage” over Gemstar. 

The responsiveness of a bid must be assessed on the face of the bid at the time the bids are opened.  TMC and Environmental Closures should not have been allowed to submit their apprenticeship information long after the opening of bids.  This material defect in the bid may not be waived and the County must reject the bid so that all bidders may be treated alike and so that the possibility of fraud, corruption or favoritism is avoided.

Comment 

It is rare for courts to overturn governmental agency determinations of responsive bids.  A contracting agency has the right to determine whether a variance from bid specifications is substantial or whether to waive it as a mere irregularity or minor defect.  However, if it can be shown that the successful low bidder’s variance from the bid requirements gave him an unfair advantage over other bidders, courts will reject the lowest bid. 

Alter-Egos And Personal Liability Of Corporate Owners Are Triable Issues

Courts impose liability on related companies under the “alter ego” theory where two apparently separate companies are considered to be one, in spite the maintenance of two or more distinct operations.  In other words, the two separate companies are treated as an alter ego of each other for liability purposes.
Under certain circumstances, courts apply the concept of “piercing the corporate veil” to hold corporate owners personally liable for corporate debts.

In the recent case of Matter of B.R.M. Concrete, Inc. v. Portland Transit-Mix, Inc., the court addressed issues of alter ego and the personal liability of a corporate president and sole shareholder.

Background 

B.R.M. Concrete Inc. supplied concrete valued at $193,928 to Portland Transit-Mix, Inc.  When Portland refused to pay for the concrete, B.R.M. sued Portland, its corporate principals, and Bedrock Concrete Inc., which was another company owned by the same principals.

According to B.R.M., Portland and Bedrock failed to follow corporate formalities such that they were mere alter egos of the corporate principals.  Specifically, B.R.M. pointed to the follow factors: (a) there was an overlap in the corporate officers and shareholders; (b) the corporations had the same address; (c) the corporations banked at the same location; (d) the companies held no meetings; (e) the companies had no by-laws; (f) the companies had no records of meetings or documents regarding shareholders; and (g) the companies had no records of business transactions or other financial records.  In addition, Bedrock admitted that it paid for at least a portion of the concrete that was delivered to Portland.  Given defendants’ failure to follow corporate formalities, B.R.M. argued that the corporate and individual defendants were liable for the $193,928 owed.

Defendants argued that only Portland was liable for the debt, which it did not have sufficient assets to pay.  According to defendants, Portland and Bedrock were separate corporations which conducted separate businesses and maintained separate bank accounts.  Defendants also argued that the individual defendants only conducted business on behalf of the corporate defendants.  The defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking to have the claims against the corporate principals and Bedrock dismissed.

Decision

The trial court denied the defendants motion to dismiss B.R.M.’s claims.  According to the court, piercing the corporate veil requires a showing that the individual defendants (1) exercised complete dominion and control over the corporation, and (2) used such dominion and control to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in injury.  The mere claim that the corporations were completely dominated by the individual defendants, or conclusory assertions that the corporations acted as their alter ego, without more, will not suffice to support the equitable relief of piercing the corporate veil.  Since the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil, or treat two companies as alter egos in a given circumstance depends on the particular facts and circumstances, the court held that triable issues of fact existed as to whether the corporate principals and Bedrock could be found liable.

Comment 

The analysis of whether corporate principals or corporate entities can be held liable for the debts of another corporate entity under the theories of alter ego or “piercing the corporate veil” requires a fact intensive review.  Here, the court believed that a trial was necessary to determine whether all defendants should be held liable for the debt due.  The prudent contractor should take care to follow corporate formalities so as to minimize the risk of alter ego liability or personal liability resulting from corporate dealings.


False Vendex Satements Doom Contractor’s Delay Claim.

Municipalities are required by statute to award contracts to the “lowest responsible bidder.”  In making its lowest responsible bidder determination, city agencies are directed to use information supplied by prospective contractors including VENDEX (acronym for Vendor Information Exchange) and prequalification questionnaire replies.  VENDEX forms are completed by a contractor as part of the bid process, which a city relies on in evaluating the lowest responsible bidder designation.    

A responsible contractor determination is normally made prior to the award of the contract to the contractor.  But what if a city discovers that the contractor made false statements or withheld information on its VENDEX form after the contractor was paid for substantial completion of the work and the contractor sues the city to recover delay damages?  Can the city disregard the contract and avoid payment based on the contractor’s false VENDEX statements?  This question was addressed in the recent case of Omni Contracting Company, Inc. v. The City of New York.  

Background  

In June 2005 Omni Contracting Company, Inc. submitted a bid to contract for a public improvement project known as “Reconstruction of Thompson Street (Vesuvio) Playground.”  The contract was awarded to Omni.  In March 2006 the contractor entered into an agreement with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation to construct the project.  The contract price was $2,127,000.  The contractor was originally required to complete work within 270 consecutive calendar days.  During construction the contractor requested, and the City approved, six time extensions, extending the project’s completion date by nearly seven months.  The City paid the contractor $2,143,866 for its work under the contract.  Thereafter, the contractor sued the City, alleging that it had fully performed the contract, but that its performance was delayed by the acts of the City, and those delays caused the contractor to incur $319,386 in additional costs.   

 In defense to the contractor’s lawsuit, the City argued that it was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract.  According to the City, the contractor made false statements and withheld information on its VENDEX form originally filed with the City in April 2004, and reaffirmed those same false statements in July 2004, February 2005, and April 2005, in the contractor’s sworn “no change” certifications.

 Accordingly, it was the City’s argument that when the contractor submitted its bid for the playground project in June 2005, the contractor failed to make a required disclosure regarding its failure to pay employees a prevailing wage on several of the contractor’s other projects with the City.  Based on the failed disclosure, the City argued that in was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract.  The City moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the contractor’s claims.  

Decision  

 

The court ruled in favor of the City.  The court first noted the requirement that public projects be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.  It went on to note that under the New York City Procurement Policy Board Rules, the “failure of a firm to provide relevant information specifically requested by the Contracting Officer may be grounds for a determination of non-responsibility.”  Since the contractor failed to provide requested information relating to its past prevailing wage investigations and violations, which occurred in 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006, the court held that the contractor was not a “responsible” contractor.    

The court went on to state that contracts procured through fraudulent bidding are void as against public policy.  Where work is done pursuant to such an illegal contract, the court held that the contractor is not entitled to recover on its claims.  Additionally, the court pointed out that the municipality can recover from the contractor all amounts paid under the illegal contract.      

The court accordingly dismissed the contractor’s delay claim for the $319,386. Given that the City was not seeking to recover the entire amount paid to the contractor, the contractor was permitted to retain the monies previously paid to it by the City.  

Comment  

 

This case emphasizes the importance of accurately completing and updating VENDEX and prequalification questionnaire replies.  The failure to do so may not only support a non-responsible determination, but, as shown, it may also be grounds for non-payment for work performed and the recovery of payments already made for work performed.    

About the author:  Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc. 

Mutual Misunderstanding Nullifies Contract

Courts will not enforce a contract where there is no “meeting of the minds” between the parties on a material term of the agreement.  There is no contract where one party reasonably understands a contract term to mean one thing and the other party reasonably understands it differently.

In Gessin Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. 95 Wall Associates, LLC, the contractor and the owner had a different understanding of the material terms of their agreement.

Background 

Gessin Electrical Contractors, Inc., a subcontractor, brought a claim for approximately $1.7 million in change orders against the project owner, 95 Wall Associates, LLC.  The parties agreed to resolve the dispute by having the owner pay the subcontractor $500,000.  A settlement agreement was drafted and signed by both the owner and subcontractor. 

At the time that the settlement agreement was entered into, the owner did not realize that approximately $1.1 million of the subcontractor’s claim had already been satisfied by payments from the general contractor to the subcontractor.  Therefore, while the owner thought it was settling the full $1.7 million claim for $500,000, the contractor thought it was settling a $580,000 balance for $500,000.  The parties were not represented by counsel at the settlement meeting.

Only after the owner had paid the first $450,000 required under the settlement agreement did the owner realize that about $1.09 million of the subcontractor’s claim had already been satisfied by payments from the general contractor.  The owner then refused to make any further payments under the settlement agreement and made an overpayment claim against the subcontractor.  The subcontractor sued to enforce the settlement agreement and the owner counterclaimed on account of the overpayment.  Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The motion court found that there was no “meeting of the minds” between the parties, and declared the settlement agreement null and void.  The subcontractor appealed.

Decision

The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision.  According to the court, the ultimate aim in interpreting an agreement is to realize the parties’ reasonable expectations through a practical interpretation of the contract language.  Even if parties intend to be bound by a contract, it is unenforceable if there is no meeting of the minds, i.e., if the parties understand the contract’s material terms differently.  Additionally, the court noted that a contract can be rescinded if the failure to do so would unjustly enrich one party at the other’s expense, and the parties can be returned to the status quo ante without prejudice. 

Since the court found that the parties did not have a meeting of the minds with respect to the payment terms of the agreement, and the enforcement of the agreement would have unjustly enriched the subcontractor, the appellate court held that the settlement agreement should be rescinded, restoring the parties to the status quo ante.

Comment 

A “meeting of the minds” is essential to the enforcement of a contract.  As shown in this case, even if parties intend to be bound by a contract, it may still be unenforceable if there is a mutual misunderstanding about a material term.  Here, the parties’ agreement did not reflect either party’s understanding.  The contract will be held unenforceable only if there is a reasonable basis for the parties’ difference of opinion as to what the contract included or did not include.  A party, however, may not create ambiguity in otherwise clear language simply by urging a different interpretation or understanding of the contract wording.  The prudent contractor should make every effort to ensure that clear and unequivocal wording exists in its written agreements.


Green Building Requirements

Environmental concerns have significantly impacted the face of today’s construction industry. As recently as thirty years ago such concerns may have invoked little more than thoughts of rain at the jobsite. Today however, such concerns are truly business concerns, of which a prudent contractor, supplier, owner, and their attorney, must be aware. From land use restrictions and disposal mandates, to tax credits and insurance coverage, the environmentally-related considerations affecting today’s business environment are numerous and continuously evolving.

This article addresses the recently evolving impact of environmental concerns on building requirements. Specifically, this article addresses so-called “green building” requirements.

Though passing familiarity with the term “green building” is presumed, an exact definition for the term is not. Accordingly, for the purposes of this article, green building is the claimed practice of: 1. increasing the efficiency with which buildings and their sites use and obtain energy, water, and materials; and, 2. reducing building impacts on human health and the environment, through better siting, design, construction, operation, maintenance, and removal.

Proponents argue that the practice of green building leads to such benefits as reduced operating costs (by using less energy and water), improved public and occupant health (due to improved indoor air quality), and reduced environmental impacts (by utilizing less natural resources, lessening storm water runoff and lessening the “heat-islands” associated with urban environments).

Surely, few readers of this article will disagree that the above human and environmental byproducts of green building, if realized, are indeed benefits to the community. Equally as sure however, is that the actions necessary to realize the claimed benefits will not be collectively taken unless: 1. mandatory or, 2. such actions improve a business’ profitability.

First addressing profitability, while implementation of certain green building designs or materials may increase total project cost by one to seven percent (1-7%), the technological advances incorporated by way of green building have proven to strengthen a business’ bottom line. In fact, a recent study conducted for the State of California concluded that, on average, green buildings deliver a return on investment ten times the additional costs associated with green building. Accordingly, from advances in energy efficiency to cost reductions associated with recycling, it is inevitable that the implementation of certain green building techniques will benefit contractors, suppliers and owners. Increasingly however, regardless of profitability, the implementation of green building techniques by a contractor, supplier and even owner, will not be voluntary, but rather mandatory.

An example of the shift toward mandatory green building is Local Law of the City of New York for the Year 2005 No. 86, also known as the “LEED Law” or “Local Law 86”, which takes effect on January 1, 2007. Under Local Law 86, New York City’s capital projects, as well as private capital projects receiving city funding, must meet certain green building standards contained in the United States Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) standards.

Local Law 86 will apply to those capital improvement projects which involve the construction and/or rehabilitation of a building where the total anticipated costs of the improvement exceed $2 million; installation or replacement of a boiler or HVAC system projects which exceed $2 million; installation or replacement of lighting systems projects which exceed $1 million; and, installation or replacement of plumbing systems projects which exceed $500,000.00.

With regard to private sector projects, Local Law 86 will apply where the project receives a minimum of $10 million or fifty percent (50%) of the estimated project cost from the City treasury.

Considering the anticipated $12 billion effect on construction of Local Law 86 over the City’s ten-year capital plan, it is clear that the Local Law 86 will have a major impact in promoting green design and building techniques throughout New York’s construction industry. Moreover, it is equally clear that Local Law 86 will competitively favor those contractors, suppliers and owners familiar with the LEED standards.

Accordingly, for those attorneys with clients who are contractors, suppliers and/or owners, familiarity with the LEED standards is necessary. Under the standards, four levels of certification exist, described as either “Certified”, “Silver”, “Gold” or “Platinum.” The rating level is determined by the number of points the project receives under a checklist developed by the U.S. Green Building Counsel. In order to achieve a “Certified” rating, a project must score between 26-32 points; for Silver, between 33-38 points; for Gold, 39-51 points; and for Platinum, between 52-69 points.

The points are linked to such categories as “Sustainability”, “Water Efficiency”, “Energy and Atmosphere”, “Materials and Resources”, “Indoor Environmental Quality” and “Innovation and Design Process.” While the ultimate receipt of certification is the responsibility of the project architect, engineer or other LEED specialist assigned to the project, clearly, the contractor or supplier who can provide a “greener” service and/or product is in the best position to outperform the competition.

Those contractors, suppliers and owners outside of New York City believing that the LEED standards will not affect them should reconsider. Numerous municipalities have either already enacted green building requirements, or are in the process of enacting such requirements. Examples of municipalities that have adopted LEED, or have otherwise required that city-owned buildings be built according to green building criteria, include Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Boulder, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Portland (Oregon), San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, and Seattle. Clearly, a trend has been established.

Accordingly, green buildings, and the related LEED standards developed by the United States Green Building Council, are topics which all contractors, suppliers, owners and their attorneys should be aware if they wish to remain commercially competitive.i Office of the Federal Environmental Executive, The Federal Commitment to Green Building: Experiences and Expectations, §V Defining Green Building (2006).

ii Greg Kats, The Costs and Financial Benefits of Green Buildings – A Report to California’s Sustainable Building Task Force, viii (2003); United Stated Green Building Counsel, Building Momentum – National Trends and Prospectus for High-Performance Green Buildings, 1 (November, 2002).

iii Greg Kats, The Costs and Financial Benefits of Green Buildings – A Report to California’s Sustainable Building Task Force, ix (2003); Local Laws of the City of New York No. 86, ¬ß1 (2005).

iv A copy of Local Law 86 can be found athttp://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf

v Local Laws of the City of New York No. 86, §1 (2005).

vi See “Rating Systems” at www.usgbc.org

Court Rejects “Flow-Down” Provision in Subcontract


Flow-down clauses are common in construction contracts. It is often used in subcontracts. A flow-down clause incorporates by reference the terms of the prime contract into the subcontract. It binds a subcontractor to the terms of the prime contract between the owner and the general or prime contractor. 

Courts, however, are reluctant to enforce flow-down provisions against subcontractors because they are at times overly broad or are inconsistent with the terms of the subcontract.

In the recent case of In re Wonder Works Construction Corp. v. R. C. Dolner, Inc., the appellate court ruled on the enforceability of a flow-down arbitration provision against a subcontractor. 

Background 

217 Mulberry Street Company, LLC, as project owner, sought to arbitrate a claim against the general contractor, R.C. Dolner, Inc., for damages resulting from deficiencies in the construction performed pursuant to the prime contract. The prime contract contained an arbitration agreement. The general contractor in turn demanded that the subcontractor who performed the disputed work, Wonder Works Construction Corp., join in the arbitration.

The subcontract stated that with respect to the work, the subcontractor agreed to be bound by every term and provision of the contract documents. The contract documents were defined to include the prime contract between the general contractor and owner. The subcontract also required the subcontractor to assume toward the general contractor all of the duties that the general contractor had assumed towards the owner with respect to the subcontractor’s work. 

Based on the “flow-down” language of the subcontract, the general contractor named the subcontractor as a party to the arbitration. The subcontractor argued that it never agreed to arbitrate its disputes with the general contractor. When the general contractor would not voluntarily discontinue the arbitration, the subcontractor went to court, seeking a ruling that it was not obligated to participate in the arbitration between the owner and the general contractor. 

The trial court ruled in favor of the general contractor, directing the subcontractor and general contractor to proceed to arbitration. The subcontractor appealed. 

Decision

The appellate court reversed and held that the subcontractor was not required to be joined in the arbitration between the owner and the general contactor. According to the appellate court, an alternative dispute resolution agreement, like an arbitration agreement, must be clear, explicit and unequivocal and must not depend upon implication or subtlety. Under New York law, incorporation by reference clauses in a construction subcontract bind a subcontractor only as to prime contract provisions relating to the scope, quality, character and manner of the work to be performed by the subcontractor. 

Since the subcontract lacked an express and specific agreement to arbitrate, the appellate court held that the subcontractor did not waive its right to ordinary judicial process, which includes the use of the court system to resolve disputes.

Comment 

“Ordinary judicial process”, or the use of the courts, is considered a “right” that is not readily waived. As shown in this case, flow-down clauses will bind a subcontractor to prime contract provisions relating to the scope, quality, character and manner of the work to be performed by the subcontractor. However, flow-down provisions will not necessarily bind a subcontractor to other terms agreed to between the owner and general contractor, such as an agreement to arbitrate. The prudent contractor should be aware of this distinction when negotiating flow-down provisions. 

Court Dismisses Lien Claim Against Owner

Contractors, subcontractors and material suppliers are granted by New York statute the right to file a mechanic’s lien against the realty being improved to the extent of the work and labor performed and materials furnished. A mechanic’s lien operates much like attachment and garnishment, to make sure that a subcontractor, for example, who supplies labor or materials for a construction project and does not have a contractual relationship with the owner of the property will receive the amount due to himself or herself. The mechanic’s lien secures the amount due to the subcontractor by a lien on the real property improved. 

However, the rights of a subcontractor are derivative of the rights of the general contractor, and a subcontractor’s lien must be satisfied out of any monies due and owing from the owner to the general contractor at the time the lien is filed. The subcontractor cannot enforce his lien if full payment has been made by the owner to the general contractor. 

In the recent case of Trofien Steel & Construction Inc. vs. Sergey Rybak, et al., the court addressed the question of monies due to the general contractor when the lien was filed

Background 

Trofien Steel & Construction, Inc., as subcontractor, entered into an agreement with Rybak Development and Construction Corp., as general contractor, to supply and install the structural steel required for a project located at 26 Highlawn Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. After the structural steel work was completed, a $135,619 balance remained due on the subcontract. In an attempt to recover the unpaid balance, the subcontractor filed a mechanic’s lien and commenced a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action against the project owner. 

In defense, the owner argued that it had not contracted with the subcontractor and that if any money was due to the subcontractor, it was due from the general contractor to the subcontractor, not from the owner. The owner also argued that at the time of the subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien filing, no monies were due and owing to the general contractor. As proof, the owner submitted an affidavit from the general contractor stating that at the time the subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien filing, no money was due to the general contractor. Based on these defenses, the owner made a motion to dismiss the subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim. 

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the owner, dismissing the subcontractor’s lien foreclosure claim. The court first noted that an owner is not liable to a subcontractor unless the owner has agreed to pay the subcontractor. According to the court, the mere fact that an owner consents to the improvements provided by the subcontractor does not render him liable to the subcontractor, whose sole remedy lies against the general contractor. 

The court went on to note that a mechanic’s lien will only attach to amounts due and owing from the owner to the general contractor at the time of the lien filing. Since the owner submitted an affidavit from the general contractor stating that no monies were due and owing to it at the time of the subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien filing, and no evidence was presented to the contrary, the court accepted the affidavit as proof that all monies properly due and owing to the general contractor had been paid at the time of the mechanic’s lien filing. Since no money was due from the owner to the general contractor at the time of the subcontractor’s lien filing, the court dismissed the subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien foreclosure claim.

Comment 

Where an owner pays the general contractor in full, an owner is generally not liable to a subcontractor unless the owner otherwise agrees to pay the subcontractor. The theory is that the services performed by the subcontractor are for the benefit of the general contractor who is responsible for the completion of the improvement, not for the benefit of the owner. A mechanic’s lien filed without delay increases the likelihood that the lien will attach to monies due and owing from the owner to the general contractor. Accordingly, the prudent subcontractor or material supplier should promptly file a mechanic’s lien once it becomes clear that there is a problem with payment on the project.

Court Allows Recovery for Verbal Extra Work Claim

Most construction contracts have a standard provision requiring changes in the work or directions to perform extra work to be made in writing. Courts generally hold that a contractor who fails to obtain the required written authorization will not be paid for such work.

However, a contractor or subcontractor who performs extra work will not automatically lose his extra work claim just because he failed to follow the contract provision requiring written authorization. Courts are hesitant to deny a just claim for extra work and have found that contractual requirements for written orders can be waived under certain circumstances.

In the recent case of Penava Mechanical Corp. v. Afgo Mechanical Services, Inc., an appellate court ruled on whether recovery may be had for orally directed extra work despite the contract provision that an extra work claim must be supported by written authorization. 

Background 

Absolute Electrical Contractors, Inc. entered into a subcontract with general contractor Richter & Ratner Contracting Corp. The parties’ subcontract contained a so-called “no-oral modification clause.” Pursuant to the clause, all changes in the work or directions to perform extra work were to be made in writing or were otherwise not compensable. 

During the course of construction, representatives of the general contractor verbally directed the subcontractor to work overtime. The representatives also orally agreed to pay for this premium time over and above the contract price, as they had previously paid for other overtime work throughout the project. The promised overtime payment was in lieu of an extension of time to finish the work. In addition, the general contractor’s project manager testified that he instructed the subcontractor not to bother with the “tickets” that were usually prepared by the subcontractor for such extra work and formed the basis for change orders issued, but rather directed the subcontractor to “just get the work done.” The subcontractor sued when the general contractor refused to make payment for the subcontractor’s overtime. 

In defense, the general contractor argued that the subcontract’s no-oral modification clause barred any claim by the subcontractor, since the direction to perform overtime work and promise to pay at a premium rate were made orally, and were not in writing. In addition, the general contractor argued that the subcontractor had waived any claims to the overtime pay pursuant to the express language of the lien waivers signed by the subcontractor. 

The general contractor moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The subcontractor appealed. 

Decision

The appellate court reversed the trial court, denying the general contractor’s motion for summary judgment and directing a trial on whether the subcontractor had been paid in full for the overtime work performed. 

According to the appellate court, under New York law, oral directions to perform extra work, or the general course of conduct between the parties, may modify or eliminate contract provisions requiring written authorizations or notice of claims. The appellate court relied heavily on the verbal directions by the general contractor to the subcontractor to perform the overtime work and verbal promises to pay the subcontractor. The court also relied on the general contractor’s verbal direction that the subcontractor not bother with the work tickets that would form a written basis for a formal change order. Under these circumstances, the court held that the general contractor cannot argue that it did not have to pay for the overtime. 

As to the general contractor’s argument that the claims had been released, the appellate court held that since the subcontractor was required to sign these waivers whenever it received partial payment, and since payments were made after waivers were given, the parties treated the waivers as mere receipts of the amounts stated in the waivers, not as complete waivers of all claims to that point. 

Comment 

While courts routinely seek to enforce the express terms of an agreement that was freely negotiated, courts also seek to prohibit bad-faith dealings. Here, where the general contractor verbally promised payment, and verbally stated that written work tickets were not necessary to protect the subcontractor’s right to payment, the court would not allow the general contractor to rely on the subcontract’s provisions to the contrary.

A prudent contractor or subcontractor, however, should not ignore the contractual requirement for written extra work orders in the hope that a court may make an exception and find a waiver of the contract provisions under particular circumstances. He should insist on a written order in the form specified by the contract provisions before he performs any extra work. A written extra work order will ensure his right to be paid for performing such work. 

Short Contractual Time Period Dooms Sub’s Claim

Under New York’s Statute of Limitations, an action for breach of contract must be commenced within six years after the claim has accrued. No claim can be asserted beyond that six year period, but parties, by agreement, may provide for a much shorter period within which to start suit for breach of contract. An agreement to shorten the limitations period will be enforced provided the shortened period is reasonable. For example, a time period of 14 days has been held unreasonably short and therefore unenforceable. 

In Mulvihill Electrical Contracting Corp. v. NAB Construction Corporation, the contractor argued that the subcontractor’s breach of contract claim was time barred because it was not brought within the six month contractual limitations period within which an action must be commenced. 

Background 

NAB Construction Corporation entered into an agreement with Metro North Commuter Railroad for the rehabilitation of the Park Avenue Viaduct. In January 1994, NAB entered into a subcontract with Mulvihill Electrical Contracting Corp. to perform electrical work at the project. A dispute over payment arose, with the subcontractor claiming that $722,135 remained due to it. On July 12, 2004 Mulvihill sued the contractor, seeking to recover the unpaid balance. 

The subcontract stated that no action or proceeding may be commenced by the subcontractor for breach of contract or any other claim arising out of the contract, unless such action or proceeding is commenced within six months of the earlier of the contractor’s or the owner’s acceptance of the subcontractor’s work as complete or the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. 

Based on this provision, NAB moved to dismiss Mulvihill’s claim. According to NAB, the owner accepted Mulvihill’s work as complete on September 28, 2001, the acceptance triggered the provisions of the subcontract regarding the six month period to commence an action, and the limitation period expired on March 28, 2002. Accordingly, the contractor argued that the subcontractor’s lawsuit, commenced on July 12, 2004, was untimely and must be dismissed.

The subcontractor argued that the contractor was never paid in full for the subcontractor’s work, thereby showing that the work was never accepted as complete by the owner. Mulvihill also noted that no certificate of occupancy was ever issued. Since NAB could not show that the owner accepted Mulvihill’s work as complete, or that a certificate of occupancy was issued, the subcontractor argued that NAB’s motion to dismiss should be denied. 

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the contractor, dismissing the subcontractor’s claim. The court acknowledged that NAB did not show that it received full payment from the owner. However, the court relied heavily on a memorandum prepared by the owner’s construction manager. The memorandum stated, “as of September 28, 2001, NAB Construction Corporation satisfactorily completed all outstanding items on the punch list, and submitted all deliverables to the Railroad.” The court also relied on the owner’s construction manager’s deposition testimony, which noted that no certificate of occupancy had been issued because certificates of occupancy are not issued in connection with a project of this type. Consequently, the court found that the owner accepted NAB’s work as having been completed as of September 28, 2001. Since six months from the date of acceptance was March 28, 2002, and the action was not commenced until July 12, 2004, the court held that the subcontractor’s action was time barred under the six month contractual limitations period. Accordingly, the court ruled that the subcontractor’s lawsuit was untimely and granted NAB’s motion to dismiss Mulvihill’s claim. 

Comment 

Courts will strictly construe time limitations periods that are voluntarily agreed to by the parties. This means that before even considering the merits of a claim, courts will dismiss a breach of contract claim if the claimant failed to comply with a shortened contractual limitations period. Courts will not rewrite or change the terms of an agreement that was freely entered into between the parties. The unpaid claimant, or potential claimant, should make every effort to become thoroughly familiar with their contractual limitation period. A claim will be lost if a shortened limitations period is not complied with.