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Mechanic’s Liens – Lot Retitling & Subdivision

In a recent New York construction law case an issue arose when a Mechanic’s Liens was placed on retitled/subdivided lot. New York State Lien law Lien Law ¬ß 9 requires “that the notice of lien shall state…the property subject to the lien, with a description thereof sufficient for identification; and if in a city,…, its location by street and number, if known.” This case highlights the need for an experienced attorney to draft Notice of Mechanic’s Liens to avoid the potential that the lien be discharged, and further to avoid costly litigation over potentially defective liens.

HAI MING CONSTRUCTION CORP., Plaintiff, v. 258 DEVOE LLC, Defendant
2011 WL 5041802 (N.Y.Sup.)
October 19, 2011

The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the motion by a general contractor seeking discharge of record of Notice of Mechanic’s Lien, dismissal of lien foreclosure action, cancelation of the Amended Notice of Pendency, and request for costs and expenses for the action.

In HAI MING CONSTRUCTION CORP., v. 258 DEVOE LLC, defendant, 258 Devoe LLC was assigned rights under a general contractor agreement with plaintiff, Hai Ming Construction Corp. Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff demolished and constructed three new buildings on Lot 9 (Block 2920) located at 258 Devoe Street.

On March 15, 2007, defendant requested that Lot 9 be subdivided into Lots 15 – 18 with new addresses of 260, 264, and 268 Devoe Street. On October 24, 2007, plaintiff filed a Mechanic’s Lien for alleged non-payment under the general contractor agreement for the claimed amount of $386,614.48. The lien was subsequently renewed on October 17, 2008, and further extended by Notice of Pendency filed on September 29, 2009.

Defendant contended that plaintiff’s lien was invalid, it toto, because it did not comply with the provisions of Lien Law ¬ß 9 since it failed to adequately describe the property. Defendant contended the lots subdivision existed as on March 15, 2007. In support, defendant referred to the New York City Department of Finance “alteration book,” which reflected the subdivision into separate lots beforeplaintiff filed the lien on October 24, 2007. Plaintiff countered that the subdivision was not effective until December 5, 2008 supported by a certified copy of the Digital Tax Map which indicated the effective date was December 5, 2008.

The sole issue for the Court was whether the inclusion of the superseded Lot 9, and the omission of the new Lots 16-18 and the new street addresses of 260, 264, and 268. The Court found adequate precedent to determine that if a description that identifies the property is “in substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute sufficient to provide jurisdiction to the courts to enforce it.” The Court referenced SGS Assoc., LLC v. R.A. German Constr. Corp. (15 Misc.3d 1135) where an architect and a contractor were allowed to amend their Notices of Lien when property owner filed a declaration of condominium and subdivided three lots into nine new tax lots prior to the filing of a Notice of Lien.

The Court was unconvinced by defendant’s reasoning noting that while a search of the New York City Department of Finance Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) would have shown, under a single Lot 9, a April 20, 2007, mortgage against 258, 260, 264, and 268 Devoe Street the search provided insufficient notice as to the existence of a subdivision. The Court ultimately determined that the superseded lot numbers were nevertheless sufficient to identify the property and was not fatal to the validity of the liens. A fair and liberal reading of the lien law required the finding that the description of the property was in substantial compliance with Lien Law ¬ß 9.

While the plaintiff was granted leave to amend its lien, nunc pro tunc, it is important to remember to take the time to verify information in a Notice of Mechanic’s Lien, and search all available databases. Title work is easily performed by a competent lien company or attorney, and is well worth the money. As the Court pointed out a search of the proper database would have provided forewarning of the mortgage and pending address change so plaintiff could add specific language to account for these changes. This would have precluded that defendant from bringing the proceeding in the first place. Further, it is important to remember that the stakes are high because an incorrect address in your lien is usually a fatal defect that will result in the discharge of the lien.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Court Rejects Claim for Loss of Profitability

In a recent New York Court of Claims case, Liddell v. The State of New York, a contractor made a novel claim for breach of contract. The contractor sought compensation based on the unanticipated increase in the cost of materials. Notably, the claim to recover the increase in the cost of materials was not caused by any delay by the State in the completion of the project.

Background 

Liddell Brothers, Inc. contracted with the State of New York to upgrade the Intelligent Transportation System on the Northern State Parkway in Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Part of the contractor’s work included the installation of copper cable. Between the contract signing and the contractor’s purchase of the copper cable, the cost of copper materials increased. The contractor claimed that the price increase was unanticipated and requested additional compensation from the State. The State denied the request on the grounds that it was not contractually or statutorily required to pay the contractor for the increased cost of the copper cable. The State’s representatives also noted that under the contract, the contractor was entitled to purchase and stockpile the copper cable once the contract was signed, and invoice the State for the materials purchased, which the contractor did not do.

After the contractor’s request for additional compensation was denied, the contractor sued the State. The State moved for summary judgment, dismissing the contractor’s claims.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the State, granting summary judgment and dismissing the contractor’s claims. The Court based its decision on the plain terms of the parties’ contract. Although the parties’ contract included provisions for an increase in the cost of steel, iron, asphalt and fuel, it did not include any provision for increases in the cost of copper. Additionally, the court noted that the contract provision addressing unanticipated price increases related to delays caused by the State. This was not a delay claim. Here, the contractor acknowledged that there were no delays caused by the State, so the contract provision that the contractor was attempting to rely upon was inapplicable.

According to the court, “the mere fact that a contract becomes economically unprofitable is insufficient reason to relieve a contracting party from its contractual obligations.” Further, the court stated “there is no moral obligation to give public money to disappointed contractors.” Based on the plain terms of the parties’ contract, the court dismissed the contractor’s claims.

Comment

With limited exceptions, courts will enforce contract terms that are clear and unambiguous. Here, there was simply no contractual basis for the State to provide the contractor additional compensation for the increased cost of copper cable. Nor would the contractor have been required to provide the State a refund if the cost of copper had gone down. The court system does not exist to rewrite the terms of the parties’ contract. Courts will not substitute for an agreement reached by two parties the court’s view of what the agreement should have been. The court’s role is to interpret and enforce the agreed-upon terms. Contractors should keep this in mind when negotiating a contract and performing their work.

Showing of Actual Supervision Required Before a General Contractor must Indemnify an Owner for Damages Paid to an Injured Person

Construction site accidents and related injuries are a constant concern to contractors and owners, as are the lawsuits that may follow. A general contractor's agreement with a property owner may provide that the general contractor supervise and direct work. But what happens when the owner seeks to be indemnified by the general contractor for injuries a worker sustained at the site? Must the general contractor indemnify the owner where they have contractual authority to supervise and control work? Does the answer change if the general contractor has contracted the work out to someone else and didn't actively supervise and/or direct the work?

The New York Court of Appeals has provided an answer in McCarthy v. Turner Const., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 369,953 N.E.2d 794 (2011).

Boston Properties and Times Square Tower Associates, LLC (the "Owners") own retail space at7 Times Square. Ann Taylor, a non party to this action, leases space from the Owners for its clothing store. In December of 2004, Ann Taylor contracted with John Gallin & Son, Inc. ("Gallin") to expand its retail space. The contract with Gallin required that Gallin "supervise and direct the [w]ork, using [its] best skill and attention[, and] be solely responsible for and have control over construction means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures for coordinating all portions of the [w]ork." Id. at 372, 796. Furthermore, Gallin was required to take "reasonable safety precautions to protect the workers from injury." Id.

Gallin then engaged Linear Technologies, Inc. ("Linear") to install phone and data cables, via a purchase order. Linear subsequently subcontracted its work out to Samuels Datacom, LLC ("Samuels") to perform all of the installation. The plaintiff, while performing electrical work for Samuels, failed to defy Newton's law and fell from a ladder, sustaining injuries. Id. at 372, 796-797.

The plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the Owners and Gallin, asserting common law negligence and violations of Labor Law § 200, 240(1) and 240(6). Id. at 372, 797. The Owners cross-claimed against Gallin for, in relevant part, common law indemnification. Gallin then implead Linear, who implead Samuels. Id.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the Owner's cross-moved, seeking contractual indemnification against Gallin. The Supreme Court refused to require Gallin to indemnify the owners, finding that Gallin did not have supervisory authority over Samuel's work and did not provide any tools or ladders to the subcontractors, nor would Gallin have directed Samuel on how to perform its work. Id. The Owners and Gallin then settled with the plaintiff for $1.6 million, contributing $800,000 each.

The Owners then moved for summary judgment on common law indemnification against Gallin, which was likewise denied due to their failure to establish Gallin's direct control over the work. This denial was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department. Id.

The case reached the Court of Appeals, who likewise affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Owners argued that Gallin did not need to directly supervise and control plaintiff's work, because Gallin's contract with Ann Taylor assumed sole responsibility and control, and likewise provided Gallin with the authority to exercise same. Id. at 374, 798.

The Court of Appeals refused to require that every general contractor owe a common law duty to indemnify the owner, where they aren't actively at fault. Id. New York case law does impose such a duty on ''parties who actually supervised and controlled the injury-producing work." Id. at 376, 799. However, the Court held that a contractual responsibility to supervise, ''where another party, with authority engaged in actual supervision of the injury-producing work", is insufficient to create such a duty. Id. at 377,800.

Therefore, "if a party with contractual authority to direct and supervise the work at a job site never exercises that authority because it subcontracted its contractual duties to an entity that actually directed and supervised the work, a common law indemnification claim will not lie against that party on the basis of its contractual authority alone." Id. at 378, 801. In conclusion, Gallin did not have to cover the Owners' $800,000 share of the settlement.

The take away lesson here is that if you are going to subcontract your authority to supervise, control and direct work at a site, do so completely. Do not subsequently engage in such supervision and direction if you want to avoid common law indemnification for sustained injuries, which in this case, is a savings of $800,000. Of course, the wording of your subcontract will control.

 

Court Enforces Waiver of Lien Against Unpaid Contractor

One of the most effective ways to protect an owner from liens is to require as a precondition to payment that the contractor execute an affidavit and waiver of lien which states that it has been paid to date for work performed at the project. But what if the contractor has not received all the money it is due through the date on the lien affidavit and waiver? Is the lien affidavit and waiver a complete bar to the contractor’s right to file a mechanic’s lien and sue the owner for monies owed for work performed through the date on the lien affidavit and waiver?

The court addressed the enforceability of the lien affidavit and waiver in the recent case of Atlantic Line Construction LLC v. Marsten Development Corp., et al.

Background 

Argyle Development LLC, as owner, hired Marstan Development Corp., as general contractor, in connection with a construction project located at 753 St. Nicholas Avenue in Manhattan. The general contractor subcontracted the project’s carpentry work to Atlantic Line Construction LLC.

On June 9, 2009 the general contractor provided the owner with an “Affidavit & Waiver of Lien”, in which the general contractor acknowledged receipt of all sums due from the owner for all work performed and materials furnished through May 29, 2009. On June 11, 2009, the subcontractor filed a mechanic’s lien against the project, alleging that $82,300 was past due to it for labor and materials supplied to the project. The subcontractor thereafter attempted to enforce the mechanic’s lien by commencing a foreclosure action. The owner moved to dismiss the lien claim, arguing that it had paid the general contractor in full and that the general contractor’s own statement contained within the lien affidavit and waiver confirmed full payment. The owner also presented cancelled checks and wire transfers to show that all monies were paid to the general contractor. In opposition, the general contractor argued that, notwithstanding the terms of the lien affidavit and waiver, money remained due from the owner, and that the lien affidavit and waiver had been obtained through fraud.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the owner, dismissing the mechanic’s lien foreclosure action. The court noted that mechanic’s lien rights are derivative. As stated by the court, “The principle is well settled that the rights of a subcontractor are derivative of the rights of the general contractor and a subcontractor’s lien must be satisfied out of funds due and owing from the owner to the general contractor at the time the lien is filed.” Since the general contractor provided the owner with a lien affidavit and waiver stating that it had been paid in full, the court ruled that no monies were due from the owner to the general contractor. Accordingly, there was no lien fund from which the subcontractor could recover.

The court further ruled that no evidence was presented to find that the lien affidavit and waiver was procured through fraud.

Comment 

This case follows the general principle that courts will enforce an affidavit and waiver of lien provided by a general contractor to the effect that the contractor has no existing claims and has paid all of its subcontractors and suppliers on the project. These affidavits and lien waivers may be problematic for contractors where the owner relies on them to reject a contractor’s legitimate claims, such as extra work claims, arising before the affidavit and lien waiver was signed. As this case demonstrates, the owner is entitled to rely on the clear and express terms of the affidavit and lien waiver to reject such claims.

Contractor May Be Personally Liable for Diversion of Trust Funds

The trust fund provisions of New York’s Lien Law provide that monies received by an owner, such as a building loan, and monies received by a contractor or subcontractor are trust funds to be held by them as trustees for payment to those performing work and supplying materials on their behalf for the project. The statute is intended to prevent owners, contractors and subcontractors from diverting trust monies from a project to pay creditors on other projects or keeping the monies for themselves.

Where there has been an improper diversion of trust monies, a corporation’s officers may be personally liable for the unpaid project debts of the corporation, even though the officer was acting for the corporation. In the recent case of Ippolito v. TJC Development, LLC, the appellate court ruled on whether a corporate officer could be personally liable for diversion of trust funds.

Background 

TJC Development, LLC contracted to substantially renovate a residence located in Babylon, New York. A dispute arose between the contractor and the homeowners, and the homeowners ultimately terminated the contractor. In addition to claims against the contractor for defective work and performance, the homeowners also sued the contractor and the contractor’s principals for trust fund diversion under the Lien Law. According to the homeowners, the contractor received payments from the homeowners for work performed, but the contractor failed and refused to pay the project’s subcontractors and suppliers. Since the contractor’s principals directed the distribution of funds received from the homeowners, the homeowners argued that the principals were personally liable for trust fund diversion.

The contractor argued that the homeowners’ trust fund claims were improper and should be dismissed. According to the contractor, its principals were not personally liable since the homeowners contracted with a company and made payments to that company, and therefore only the company was a trustee of funds received by the homeowners. In addition, the contractor argued that the homeowners did not have any right to claim against the contractor for trust fund diversion. Rather, according to the contractor, such a claim would only belong to the contractor’s subcontractors and suppliers, not the homeowners.

The contractor made a motion for summary judgment, requesting that the trust fund diversion claims against it and its principals be dismissed. The trial court ruled in favor of the contractor and its principals. The homeowners appealed.

Decision

The appellate court reversed, ruling in favor of the homeowners. In its decision, the court stated that Article 3-A of the Lien Law creates trust funds out of certain construction payments or funds to assure payment to subcontractors, suppliers, architects, engineers and laborers. The purpose of Article 3-A is to ensure that those who actually perform the work and furnish materials are paid. The court noted that upon receipt of payments from the owner, the contractor is required to pay its subcontractors and suppliers for work performed. According to the court, the funds remain the property of the owners until the proper distribution of the trust funds by the contractor. Accordingly, the court held that the homeowners had the right to maintain trust fund diversion claims against a contractor who diverted funds.

In addition, the court noted that officers and directors of a company are guilty of the crime of larceny if they divert trust funds. Since a company’s officers and directors can be charged criminally, the court reasoned that they may also be held personally liable for the money damages caused by their diversion of trust funds. Accordingly, the court held that the homeowners could claim against the contractor and its principals, personally, for misappropriation of the trust funds.

Comment 

The construction trust fund statute is a valuable tool for collecting money for labor performed or materials supplied. This may be the only source of recovery where mechanic’s lien rights have expired, the claimant is not protected under a labor and material payment bond or where the project debtor is bankrupt. Personal liability of corporate officers for diversion of trust funds is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. It is only fair that project claimants, who have provided the wherewithal that made possible the construction of the project, should be allowed to sue corporate officers for personal liability where they direct trust funds for purposes other than paying the claims of unpaid material suppliers or subcontractors on that project.

Power NY Act of 2011

On June 22, 2011, the New York State legislature passed the Power NY Act of 2011 (“Act”) and it was signed by Governor Cuomo on August 4, 2011. This Act is meant to further the Green Jobs, Green New York Act that was passed in 2009. The Act amends the Public Service Law, the Public Authorities Law, the Real Property Law, the State Finance Law, and the Environmental Conservation Law to (1) establish a procedure for administering the existing revolving loan fund, (2) create an on-bill recovery program, (3) enact a simplified procedure for the siting of new major electric generating facilities and for increasing the capacity of existing electric generating facilities, and (4) mandate a study with respect to increasing energy generation from photovoltaic devices (i.e. solar energy generation).

The Green Jobs, Green New York revolving loan fund provides loans to finance the cost of approved qualified energy efficiency services for residential structures, multi-family structures, and non-residential structures. With a few exceptions, the loans are capped at $13,000 per applicant for residential structures and $26,000.00 per applicant for non-residential structures.

The on-bill recovery program is a billing and collection service that will be operated by large electric and gas companies as a way to recover the re-payment of its customers’ revolving loans. Under this program, a charge will be collected on the customer’s monthly utility bill. The electric corporation will collect such charges unless the qualified energy efficiency services at that customer’s premises result in more projected energy savings on the customer’s gas bill than the electric bill. In that case, the charge will be collected by the gas company. The program is set up such that the monthly bill payments will be less than the energy cost savings associated with the efficiency upgrades.

With on-bill recovery, the charge stays with the meter upon transfers of the property so that the efficiency measures are paid over the useful life of the equipment and customers can pay for the cost of the loan through reductions in energy bills. Prior to accepting a purchase offer, a seller of real property that is subject to an on-bill recovery charge has to provide the prospective buyer with a notice stating (1) that the property is subject to an on-bill recovery charge, (2) the total amount of the original charge, (3) the payment schedule, (4) the approximate remaining balance, (5) a description of the energy efficiency services performed, including improvements to the property, and (6) an explanation of the benefit of the qualified energy efficiency services.

The law also enacts a simplified procedure for the siting of new, major electric generating facilities and for increasing the capacity of existing electric generating facilities pursuant to the new certification process outlined in the new article 10 of the Public Service Law. Lastly, the Act calls for a study with respect to increasing energy generation from photovoltaic devices (i.e. solar energy generation) including an analysis of the net economic and job creation benefits of achieving increased development and usage of photovoltaic devices.

These changes are expected to develop the state’s clean energy economic sector including the creation of jobs for construction professionals in the energy retrofit industry business and new high technology jobs related to increasing energy from photovoltaic devices. The Act is also expected to spur the construction of new electric generation including commercial wind facilities.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100. 

Second Circuit clarifies the standard for reversal of an arbitral award in connection with an arbitrator’s alleged manifest disregard of the law:

STMICROELECTRONICS, N.V.,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES
(USA) LLC, Respondent-Appellant.

In June 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified the standard for reversal of an arbitral award in connection with an arbitrator’s alleged manifest disregard of the law.

STMicroelectronics, N.V. (“ST”) manufactures semiconductors. Due to be cyclical nature of its business the company is required to have large amounts of cash or cash equivalents on hand to meet its needs. In April 2006, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“Credit Suisse”) approached ST offering a type of investment called auction rate securities which are debt instruments whose interest rates are reset by auctions at periodic intervals. Credit Suisse explicitly proposed, and ST explicitly accepted investing only in auction rate securities backed by federally guaranteed student loans.

Credit Suisse adhered to this plan for only a few days. Almost immediately Credit Suisse began buying other securities which carried a higher yield and a higher average commission for Credit Suisse. Those other securities had no government guarantee. By November 2006, the account contained no government-backed securities. After January 2007, none of Credit Suisse’s purchases for ST involved student loans at all. Instead, Credit Suisse bought securities backed up by a wide variety of the assets, some of which turned out to be risky. Credit Suisse brokers responsible for the account sent false email confirmations in which they replaced the names of securities with neutral terms like “funding”.

In July 2007, an ST employee noticed that Credit Suisse had purchased securities that deviate from ST’s instructions and asked Credit Suisse to “stick to the mandate to buy only at Student Loan” securities. In August 2007, the auction rate securities market began to fall apart. By September 2007, all of the securities in ST’s portfolio – worth over $400 million – had failed at auction.

In February 2008, ST filed an arbitration claim against Credit Suisse. In February 2009, after four days of pre-hearing conferences, fifteen days of hearings, and voluminous briefing, the arbitration panel ruled unanimously in favor of ST. The arbitrators’ award undid the trades: ST would return the failed securities (with a par value of $414,975,000) to Credit Suisse upon the payment by Credit Suisse of $400 million in compensatory damages, plus $1.5 million for financing fees, $3 million to cover ST’s attorneys and expert witnesses, and interest. These figures, though substantial, were all lower than the amounts ST had requested in each category.

Naturally, ST quickly petitioned to confirm the award in the Southern District of New York. Credit Suisse opposed ST’s petition and sought to vacate the award in connection with the arbitrators’ alleged “manifest disregard of the law.”

The basic purpose of arbitration is to dispose of disputes quickly and avoid the expense and delay of extended court proceedings. A searching review by the Court would make an arbitration award the commencement, not the end, of litigation. A Court will not vacate an award because of “a simple error in law or a failure by the arbitrators to understand or apply it” but only when a party clearly demonstrates “that the panel intentionally defied the law.” Consequently, where the arbitrators do not explain the reason for their decision, the Court will uphold it if it can discern any valid ground.

In prior decisions the Supreme Court of the United States had basically dismembered the concept of “manifest disregard of the law” in connection with arbitration awards. This decision puts the final nail in the coffin, at least in connection with arbitration awards in New York.

Credit Suisse made a tactical error in attacking only the fraud-based claims of ST, while ignoring the other claims which ST raised, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and failure to supervise. The Second Circuit has stated that, “where an arbitral award contains more than one plausible reading, manifest disregard cannot be found if at least one of the readings yields a legally correct justification for the outcome.” Because ST’s award does not specify claim or claims upon which it rests, Credit Suisse must show manifest disregard of the law for all the claims.

To demonstrate manifest disregard, Credit Suisse must first point to law that is “well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable” to the case. While Credit Suisse pointed to two different lines of precedent it claims were disregarded, those precedents are inherently fact bound. While broader principles may be extrapolated from similar cases, it does not follow that all cases dealing with similar issues must reach the same result. In reviewing an arbitration award, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals does not require that a distinction be correct, only that it be at least “barely colorable”.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals easily concluded that the arbitrators did not manifestly disregarded the law.

THE BASIS OF THE DECISION:

WHERE AN AWARD CONTAINS MORE THAN ONE PLAUSIBLE READING, MANIFEST DISREGARD WILL NOT BE FOUND AS LONG AS ONE READING YIELDS A LEGALLY CORRECT JUSTIFICATION FOR THE OUTCOME.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100. 

The Pitfalls Of Stopping The Work For Nonpayment

The majority of cases regarding abandonment of work occur after a dispute over payment. A contractor or subcontractor is justified in stopping the work for nonpayment if there is a substantial delay in making a substantial progress payment. In such instance, the nonpayment constitutes a material breach of contract. But contractors should proceed with caution prior to taking drastic action such as stopping the work.

Contractors who consider abandoning a job should make sure that they follow the requisite provisions of the contract prior to stopping work.

In the recent case of Zip Sys., Inc. v. Lettire Constr. Corp., the court ruled that a subcontractor wrongfully abandoned the work for nonpayment because he failed to comply with the notice of termination provisions of the subcontract.

Background 

Zip Systems, Inc., as subcontractor, entered into a contract with Lettire Construction Corp. to install elevators at the “Honeywell II” project, located in the Bronx. The subcontract called for periodic payment requisitions as the work progressed. The first payment application was timely paid. The second payment application, made on February 5, 2008, was not paid until June 24, 2008. The third payment application was made in September 2008 for $193,500, was partially paid on October 31, 2008 in the amount of $85,000, and was never paid in full. The subcontractor stopped work on December 1, 2008 and sent a letter on the same day stating that it would not return until it received payment. The subcontractor then sued the general contractor for the balance due, and moved for summary judgment.

In opposition, the general contractor argued that the subcontractor breached the contract by failing to follow the contractual procedure for stopping work. Under the contract, the subcontractor was required to send a written notice not earlier than seven days after payment became due, advising that if payment was not received within seven days of the written notice, the subcontractor would stop work. Alternatively, the contract permitted the subcontractor to stop work sixty days after nonpayment. Under either provision, the contractor argued that the subcontractor improperly abandoned the work since the proper notice was not sent and payment was not sixty days past due.

In addition to opposing the subcontractor’s summary judgment motion, the general contractor made its own motion for summary judgment, arguing that it incurred $31,000 in extra costs to complete the subcontractor’s work.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the general contractor. The court focused on the language of the parties’ contract, which set forth the terms under which the subcontractor was permitted to stop its work. The court ruled that the subcontractor wrongfully abandoned the project and breached the subcontract because it failed to comply with the contract terms prior to stopping the work for nonpayment. Since the subcontractor breached the agreement, the general contractor was entitled to the fair market value of the excess costs incurred in completing the subcontractor’s work.

Comment 

There are a number of factors that a contractor should weigh in deciding whether to stop its work. How much work is left? How much is owed? How long past due is the debt? What are the contract provisions for stopping the work? In this case, an otherwise valid debt due was waived on account of the subcontractor’s failure to comply with the work stoppage provisions of its contract. To make matters worse for the subcontractor, rather than recovering monies due to him, the subcontractor was held responsible for the general contractor’s excess completion costs.

The decision whether to “walk off the job” should never be taken lightly. Although it rarely occurs, there are times when abandonment is the best alternative despite the inherent risks. The decision, however, should only be made after consultation with legal counsel.

Court Rejects Concrete Supplier’s Claim Against Contractor

There are circumstances when a party may unintentionally repudiate a contract. In legal terms, the repudiation constitutes an anticipatory breach of contract. Whether a repudiation has occurred is determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the particular statements made or demonstrated by the conduct of the party.

In the recent case of Joseph P. Carrara & Sons, Inc. v. A.R. Mack Construction Company, Inc., an appellate court ruled on whether a concrete supplier’s breach of contract claim should be denied because he repudiated the contract.

Background

In May 2008 Joseph P. Carrara & Sons, Inc., a concrete supplier, entered into a purchase order agreement with A.R. Mack Construction Company, Inc., a general contractor, to supply the concrete needed for the construction of a project in Ticonderoga, New York. The agreement did not specify delivery dates, but indicated that deliveries would be as scheduled by the parties. The subcontractor made deliveries from August through November 2008, at which point all that remained to be delivered was the concrete for the interior floor slab. Due to colder weather, the supplier informed the contractor that it could not deliver on the five-day pour schedule that contractor sought. After discussions among the parties, the supplier sent a December 2, 2008 letter proposing a six-day pour schedule, and outlining the weather conditions that would be required in order to meet that schedule. The concluding paragraph of the letter required written acceptance of the terms by 3:00 P.M. that day or the supplier would “begin immediately shutting our New York operation down for the winter.” The contractor did not reply to the letter, but instead obtained the concrete from another concrete supplier.

The supplier then sued the contractor, arguing that it was contractually entitled to supply concrete to the project, and that it was entitled to its lost profits. The contractor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the supplier’s December 2, 2008 letter was an anticipatory repudiation of the parties’ agreement, which excused the contractor from any further obligations under the agreement, and permitted the contractor to obtain concrete from another supplier. The court ruled in favor of the contractor, granting summary judgment and dismissing the supplier’s claims. The supplier appealed.

Decision

The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision. According to the court, the supplier’s December 2, 2008 correspondence was a clear refusal to deliver the concrete unless the supplier’s delivery terms were accepted by the contractor within a matter of hours. The supplier’s delivery terms were not part of the parties’ purchase order agreement. The court noted that the supplier’s New York operation was critical to its performance under the contract and that the supplier’s stated closure of its New York operation confirmed an intention not to perform unless its demanded terms were immediately agreed to. Under these circumstances, the court agreed that the supplier’s letter amounted to a repudiation of the contract, which permitted the contractor to obtain concrete from another supplier.

Comment

The repudiation or renunciation of a contract must be an unqualified or clear refusal to perform with respect to the entire contract. An intent to repudiate may be expressed by words or acts communicated to the other party. Here, the supplier stated that unless its delivery terms were immediately agreed to, it would close its plant operations, thereby making it impossible for the supplier to deliver the concrete. Since the court determined that this was a repudiation by the supplier of the parties’ agreement, the contractor was excused from the parties’ agreement, and was free to obtain concrete from any supplier.