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Preparing an Itemized Statement of Lien to Avoid Litigating its Sufficiency.

Once a Mechanic’s Lien has been filed, the Lienor may receive a demand for an itemized statement pursuant to Lien Law § 38.  Essentially, this statute obligates you to submit a verified itemization of the amount of your lien with sufficient detail to allow a contractor or owner to verify your claim for labor performed and materials and equipment furnished for a project.  There are a few components to the Itemized Statement:

1. The amount of your contract balance (presumably, this amount includes approved change orders);  
2. The amount claimed for extra work which has not been approved as a change order;   
3. For the extra work that is included in the lien amount which has not been approved as a change order, you will need to provide specific information including:  
a. The items of labor (i.e. a description of labor, hours, rates, and dates);  
b. The items of material (i.e. a description of materials furnished, costs of the materials, and dates); and  
c. Any other charges that make up the value of the lien for extra work (i.e. rental charges).  
4. A verification from a corporate representative as to the accuracy of the Itemized Statement; and  
5. A copy of the contract including approved change orders.  If you choose, you can also provide copies of invoices and other supporting documentation.

 
Your attorneys can assist you in compiling the Itemized Statement if you provide them with the underlying information (i.e., as a starting point, a copy of the contract, change orders, extra work invoices and requisitions for payment).  Additional information may be required as you itemize the details of the extra work that has not been approved as change orders.

 
You must furnish the Itemized Statement within five (5) days after you receive the demand for it or within an extended period of time if the requesting party allows you additional time to respond.  If you do not provide the Itemized Statement, or if the Itemized Statement that you provide is insufficient, the requesting party may start a court proceeding to compel you to comply with the lien law to serve an Itemized Statement.      
Once a Court proceeding is commenced, a judge will review the application and issue an order that requires you to comply with the lien law or, if your Itemized Statement is deemed sufficient, the judge will deny the petitioner’s application.  If the judge orders you to comply with the lien law, the judge will set a new time frame for you to do so.  Thereafter, the other party can make an application to cancel your lien if you do not comply with the Order at all or if it appears that your further Itemized Statement is still insufficient.  To protect your lien rights and avoid litigating the sufficiency of your Itemized Statement, you should provide a detailed Itemized Statement. 

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP. 


This alert provides general information only.  It is not intended to provide legal advice.  We encourage you to contact an attorney should you desire to discuss specific situations for which you may need legal advice.   

Court Allows Claim For Personal Liability Against Corporate Owner

Real estate developers form corporate entities to conduct business to primarily protect them from personal liability on high-risk ventures, such as the construction of a major real estate project. A corporate form of doing business normally insulates corporate shareholders from any debts or liabilities of the corporation.

But courts will not allow an individual owner to escape personal liability by hiding behind the corporate shield when he creates a corporate entity for the purpose of evading payments to contractors and subcontractors. This issue was addressed in the recent case of Puma Sidewalk Corp. v. GDY Properties, Inc.

Background 

Ron Herscho formed a number of corporate entities that were engaged in the business of developing and selling real estate. He is the principal shareholder and officer of each of the companies. GDY Properties, Inc. was one of the entities formed by Mr. Herscho. GDY Properties, Inc. contracted with Puma Sidewalk Corporation to supply labor and concrete for a project to be developed on property in which Mr. Herscho had an interest. The contractor supplied labor and concrete valued at $270,400, none of which was paid.

The concrete contractor sued GDY Properties, Inc., and other corporate entities formed by Mr. Herscho, and also sued Mr. Herscho personally for fraud. The basis of the contractor’s claims against Mr. Herscho was that he intentionally created more than thirty corporate entities that had no assets, other than the property to be developed, for the purpose of evading payment for services provided by contractors and subcontractors on properties in which he had an interest. GDY Properties counterclaimed against the concrete contractor for defective workmanship, claiming damages of $250,000.

Mr. Herscho made a motion for summary judgment, seeking to have the claims against him dismissed. According to Mr. Herscho, since he did not personally contract with Puma Sidewalk Corporation, he could not be held personally liable for the debts of GDY Properties.

Decision

The court denied Mr. Herscho’s motion for summary judgment. In so ruling, the court first noted that simple allegations that an individual dominates a corporation are inadequate to establish personal liability, since that could be said about virtually any single-person corporation. Rather, the court noted that the party seeking to “pierce the corporate veil” to establish personal liability must also establish that the owner, through his domination, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form. The factors to be considered in determining whether or not there has been such an abuse include whether there was a failure to adhere to corporate formalities, inadequate capitalization, commingling of assets, and the use of corporate funds for personal use.

In this case, the court noted that Mr. Herscho failed to produce any corporate records, failed to show in any meaningful way that the entities he formed were operated separate and apart from one another, and acknowledged that funds from multiple entities were intermingled without any distinction between or among corporate or limited liability companies. Whether or not this conduct was such as to constitute a conspiracy to defraud the contractor, or to warrant piercing the corporate veil was a factual question, which required a trial.

The court dismissed the counterclaim for defective workmanship since no evidence was produced to substantiate this claim.

Comment

The corporate form is a legitimate means of avoiding personal liability, and a corporation may be organized for the very purpose of avoiding personal liability. However, a court may pierce the corporate veil or disregard the corporate form where the corporate owner commits a fraud by means of a corporate vehicle. As this case demonstrates, if a corporation is formed as a “dummy” by the individual stockholders for the purpose of evading payment to contractors and subcontractors for services provided by them, the stockholders will be held personally liable for these corporate debts.

Contractor’s Conduct Shows Acceptance To Terms Of Oral Contract

Construction contracts are usually formed by signing contract documents. The signature is a manifestation of assent to be bound by the terms of the contract. Contracts can also be formed orally, and by conduct.

Although oral contracts are enforced by the courts, it is risky to rely on them because it may be difficult to prove mutual assent to the terms of an oral contract. A contractor’s course of conduct may signify an intent to be bound to the obligations of a contract.

In the recent case of Minelli Construction Co., Inc. v. Volmar Construction, Inc., an appellate court held that a contractor’s course of conduct constituted acceptance of a subcontractor’s offer to perform the work for a fixed price.

Background 

Volmar Construction, Inc. was the general contractor on a project to renovate a school for the New York City School Construction Authority. Minelli Construction Company, Inc. was a masonry subcontractor at the project. During construction, the need for additional masonry work became apparent and the subcontractor submitted a written offer to perform the work for $498,000. In response, the contractor issued a letter of intent to enter into a subcontract for the $498,000. The letter of intent was expressly contingent upon approval of the subcontractor’s proposal by the SCA.

Though the subcontractor’s price was comparable to the SCA’s own cost estimate for the work, the SCA tried to negotiate the price for the work. The subcontractor refused, stating in writing on several occasions that the $498,000 was non-negotiable and was the amount the subcontractor needed to perform the work. Discussions between the contractor and the SCA broke down, and, without the SCA having approved the subcontractor’s proposal, the contractor directed the subcontractor to perform the work.

The subcontractor performed the work. The contractor did not object the subcontractor’s first payment requisition, which stated a contract price of $498,000. The contractor also filed a notice of claim with the SCA to recover the sum of $498,000 for the subcontractor’s work, which amount the contractor described in a sworn affidavit as the “fair and reasonable value” of the work.

After the work was complete, the contractor refused to pay any portion of the $498,000 on the grounds that the letter of intent expressly conditioned payment on the SCA’s approval of the subcontract for $498,000. The subcontractor sued the general contractor and moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the subcontractor and the general contractor appealed.

Decision

The appellate court upheld the award of summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The court stated that, under these circumstances, the letter of intent did not constitute a binding contract, but was merely an unenforceable agreement to agree.

The court held, however, that the general contractor’s direction to the subcontractor to perform the work constituted an objective manifestation of assent to the subcontractor’s quoted price. The court also stated that the general contractor’s failure to object to the subcontractor’s first payment requisition, and the general contractor’s submission of a claim to the SCA for the $498,000, presented further evidence that the general contractor agreed to the price term.

Comment

Letters of intent are frequently issued by a contractor in an attempt to get a subcontractor working on a particular project, prior to the execution of a formal contract. The letter of intent usually attempts to condition any obligation of the general contractor upon the execution of a written contract. Here, the court refused to permit a contractor to, on the one hand, direct work, but on the other hand, rely on a provision in the letter of intent to avoid paying the subcontractor. Though the court ultimately sided with the subcontractor, the prudent contractor should make every effort to enter into a written agreement prior to performing work.

KUHN Construction, Inc. v. Diamond State Port Corp.

In March 2010, the Supreme Court of Delaware determined that a construction contract referee clause, similar to that found in Westinghouse and its progeny, did not clearly and unambiguously reflect the parties’ intention to arbitrate disputes arising out of the project. 

Defendant, Diamond State Port Corp.(“DSPC”) is an instrumentality and a corporate entity of the State of Dela- ware which owns and operates the Port of Wilmington.  DSPC solicited fixed price bids to reconstruct a wharf at the Port of Wilmington.  Plaintiff and responsible bidder, Kuhn  Construction, Inc. (“KUHN”) submitted the lowest, responsive bid and was awarded the contract.   

The referee clause in question stated: “The Director, or his designee, shall act as referee in all questions arising under the terms of the Contract between the parties hereto, and the Decision of the Director shall be final and binding.  On all questions concerning the interpretation of Plans and Specifications, the acceptability, quality and quantity of materials or machinery furnished and work performed, the classification of material, the execution of the work and the determination of payment due or to become due, a decision of the Director, or his designee, shall be final and binding.” 

The contract did not define “questions”, as used in the referee clause; but did define “claims”.  The contract con- tained a number of standardized forms one of which included a provision setting out the rights of parties in arbitration.  While DSPC included the form, it struck the arbitration provision along with any other substantive arbitration provisions. 

Disputes arose.  KUHN requested assistance from DSPC.  The disputes were not resolved and KUHN began to invoice DSPC, which rejected the invoices.  DSPC then attempted to initiate a multiparty hearing under the ref- eree clause.  KUHN objected claiming that DSPC did not have authority to arbitrate claims under the applicable statutes or under the referee clause which only governed day-to-day dispute resolution issues.  It was the position of KUHN that neither party intended the referee clause to act as an arbitration provision. 

Note the procedural development: DSPC then sent KUHN a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. KUHN filed a com- plaint for injunctive relief.  DSPC filed motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss the complaint.  After oral argument on the motions, DSPC agreed to withdraw the multiparty proceeding and to proceed with arbitration solely with KUHN.  The lower court granted the motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss. 

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware, the lower court is reversed.  The Supreme Court held that the policy of the State will allow the State’s agent to act as arbiter in connection with during the performance of the contract.  “This inherent conflict of interest creates the perception – if not the reality – of unfairness and injustice.”  However, the Court notes that: “[w]hen sophisticated parties enter into agreements, we grant them the power to bargain away their right to an impartial arbiter.  However, the contract must reflect that the parties clearly and intentionally bargained for whether and how to arbitrate.”

 The Court noted that it would not enforce a contract that unclearly or unambiguously reflected an intention to arbitrate.  The Court adheres to the “objective” theory of contracts; i.e., a contract’s construction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third-party. 
The Supreme Court found that the contract did not clearly and unambiguously reflect the parties’ intent to arbi- trate. 

If you would like more information regarding this topic, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100 ***** This Legal Alert is supplied for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice. You should consult competent legal counsel depending on the specific issues of your matter.

Contracting For Public Works Projects

Many facets of contracting for public works projects are controlled by statute. However, as in any area of the law, in order to determine how the satutes are applied and how much latitude a public entity has in bidding, awarding and administering the performance of public works contracts, it is important to refer to the decisions and opinions of our courts. The purpose of this article is to not only review some of the more important cases in this area, but to discuss the practical, philosophical and legal issues involved in public construction projects from bid phase to project close-out.

I. PUBLIC BIDDING

A. Project Specifications

Once the construction drawings and specifications are prepared, the project architect or engineer usually places an advertisement with the Dodge Reports or other publications to alert potential bidders so that they might pick up a copy of the plans and specifications and submit bids to perform the work. The project specifications contain an “invitation to bidders” which establishes the legal framework upon which the bidder submits its bid. The municipal owner, as financial security, will require the bidder to submit a bid bond. Should the low bidder refuse to accept the award of the contract, the surety on the bid bond is liable for the difference between the bidder’s bid and the next lowest bid up to the penal sum of the bond. The bidder remains responsible for any shortfall. In addition, after the bidder returns the executed contract, it will be required to submit a performance bond and labor and material payment bond to the municipality (State Finance Law ¬ß137). The performance bond acts as security for the public owner in the event the contractor fails to complete its work. In such an event, the surety has various options and may hire a contractor to complete the work left undone by the defaulting contractor. If the contractor is not sufficiently progressing its work, the owner may default the contractor. Determining whether or not to default a contractor is a very difficult decision for any municipal owner and should only be taken with the advice of counsel and careful consideration of the economic implications.

The labor and material payment bond acts as financial security for entities that furnish labor and material to the project. A public owner should be alert to payment bond claims being made as it may be a symptom that the contractor is not timely paying its subcontractors and suppliers. Payment bond claims also may work to reduce the protection the owner is afforded by the performance bond as most labor and material payment bonds and performance bonds have a joint penal sum so that if the surety pays a payment bond claimant the penal sum of the performance bond is reduced so that less protection is available for the owner to secure the completion of the project should the contractor default.

B. Competitive Bidding Statutes

Municipal owners, with certain exceptions, must award contracts to the lowest responsible bidder. Public bidding in New York is governed, by and large, by General Municipal Law ¬ß103. The General Municipal Law requires that the public owner award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder. In order to be the lowest responsible bidder, however, the bidder’s bid must be responsive. In other words, the bid must provide a price quote for every item for which the owner solicited a bid. If a bidder fails to submit a bid for a particular item of work, the bidder’s bid should be deemed “non-responsive” by the municipality. As a non-responsive bidder, the bidder should not be awarded the contract. A contract that is awarded in non-compliance with General Municipal Law √Ǭß103 is void so that the contractor would be performing its work at the risk of not having an enforceable legal right to be paid; the municipality would have the risk of the next lowest responsible bidder seeking court intervention to review the conduct of the municipality in awarding the contract. The next lowest bidder would, no doubt, ask the court to issue a temporary restraining order preventing the work from proceeding until meaningful court review could occur.

A municipality may set forth in its request for bids, certain minimum experience requirements for bidders on public contracts. For example, for a roofing project, the municipality may require bidders to demonstrate that they have “in the last five (5) consecutive years prior to the bid opening, successfully completed in a timely fashion at least two (2) roofing projects similar in type and scope to the work required under the contract bid upon, which projects must be completed and be in service for a minimum of two (2) full years prior to the bid opening. See, P&C Giampilis Construction Corp. v. William J. Diamond, et al., 619 N.Y.S.2d 271 (A.D., 1st Dept., 1994). In Giampilis, the Court held that the City of New York was not only entitled to reject the low bid since the low bidder failed to meet the experience requirements, it further determined that the municipality had a rational basis for rejecting the low bid, even though the principals of the corporate low bidder could demonstrate the requisite experience (i.e., the bid documents required the corporate bidder to have the requisite experience). The courts of this state have repeatedly upheld the rejection by municipal agencies of competitive bids, without any further investigation other than a review of the bid documents, based on non-responsiveness, where the bids failed to “comply with the literal requirements of the bid specifications”. See LeCesse Bros. Contracting, Inc. v. The Town Board of the Town of Williamson, 62 A.D.2d 28, 31, 403 N.Y.S.2d , 950, Affirmed 46 N.Y. 960, 415 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1978); A.I. Smith of Long Island v. The City of Long Beach, 158 A.D.2d 454, 551 N.Y.S.2d 48 [wherein the court upheld the City’s rejection of a bid for failure to include a “detailed declaration of the bidders qualifications” including the firm’s experience.] See also In re: Kaelber, 281 A.D. 980, 120 N.Y.S.2nd 556 (A.D., 2 Dept., 1953) and W.J. Gaskell, Inc. v. William J. Maslanka, Mayor of the Village of Garden City, 33 Misc.2d 88 225 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Nassau Co., 1962).

However, a public agency can go too far. In the Matter of Construction Contractors Association of the Hudson Valley, Inc., et al. v. Board of Trustees, Orange County Community College, et al., 192 A.D.2d 265, 600 N.Y.S.2d 953 (2nd Dept., 1993), the Court held that a requirement in the bid specifications for restoration work on a historic building located at Orange County Community College violated public bidding statutes because it was too restrictive and unreasonably limited the potential pool of bidders. The requirement was that the contractor must have successfully completed two restoration projects on buildings listed on the National Register of Historic Places within the previous five years. While the Court held that the successful completion of similar projects is a reasonable requirement, there was no evidence before the Court that buildings registered on the National Register of Historic Places presented restoration problems unlike those of other historical buildings which are not so listed. Therefore, the Court concluded that such a flat requirement does not pass muster under General Municipal Law §103.

A “responsible” bidder is one that does not have a record that would bare on their honesty, trustworthiness or their ability to complete the project, including the requisite experience for the particular type of work involved. In determining whether or not a bidder is the lowest responsible bidder, the municipal entity is vested with a certain measure of discretion. Should the bidder not receive the award of a contract to which it felt itself entitled, the bidder would then have to bring a special court proceeding under Article 78 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, seeking judicial review pursuant to which the court would determine whether the public entity “abused its discretion” or acted in an “arbitrary” or “capricious” manner. The standard of review of an agency’s decision to award or deny a contract is whether there is a rational basis to support that determination, and the burden of proving that there is no rational basis for the decision is on the contractor. (See Matter of Schiavone Construction Co. v. LaRocca, 117 A.D.2d 440, 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 196, Lv. denied 68 N.Y.2d 610, 508 N.Y.S.2d 1026, (1986).

The courts have also recognized, however, that when a low bidder has its bid rejected with the inevitable implication of non-responsibility, its “commercial good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” is at stake. See LaCorte Electrical Construction and Maintenance, Inc. v. County of Rensselaer, 80 N.Y.2d 232, 590 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Court of Appeals of New York, 1992) citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S. Ct. 507. While safeguards of reasonable notice and timely opportunity to be heard become operative in such circumstances, the public fisc and process must also be weighed in light of the additional expense of a more costly contract flowing from the rejection of the lowest bid. In considering the required and appropriate remedies for failure to afford necessary protections, courts are not blind to the need that governmental agencies be able to conduct business in an efficient and effective manner and to the potentially crippling effect that might result from the imposition of stringent due process requirements with respect to all government actions adverse to unsuccessful bidders on Government contracts. See, LaCorte Electrical Construction and Maintenance, Inc. v. County of Rensselaer, supra. While a low bidder does not acquire a property right in a contract, it has been held that a low bidder does have a “liberty” interest which includes the right to contract. See LaCorte Electrical Construction and Maintenance, Inc. v. County of Rensselaer, supra. As a result, there are certain minimal due process requirements which the municipality must meet when making a determination that a contractor is not a “responsible bidder”. Giving the bidder notice of a municipality’s concern over its responsibility and the reasons for that concern, and affording the bidder the opportunity to rebut the charges both in writing and at informal hearings have been determined to meet the minimal due process requirements, especially in light of the availability of court review pursuant to CPLR Article 78. See Matter of Schiavone Construction Co. v. LaRocca., supra. It is important to note that in reaching a determination of non-responsibility, it is not necessary for the municipality or agency to have an evidentiary hearing, as long as there is an opportunity for the low bidder to be heard whether at a meeting or in the form of written submissions. See Tully Construction Co., Inc. v. Hevesi, 214 A.D.2d 465, 625 N.Y.S.2d 531 (A.D., 1st Dept., 1995).

The owner, in determining which bidder is the lowest responsible bidder, should check the bidders references to make sure that the bidder is “responsible”. The owner should also review the bid with the bidder to make sure that the bidder has a complete understanding of the scope of work to be performed.

Municipal owners should also be wary of prime contractors acting as brokers and not actually performing any work activities themselves. In order to guard against this risk, the contract should have a limitation on the dollar value that can be subcontracted. Certain public entities also establish Minority and Women owned Business Enterprise (“MBE” and “WBE”) goals that are typically met by subcontracting certain aspects of work.

Upon determination of the apparent lowest responsive and responsible bidder and prior to award, the municipality or agency may elect to open negotiations with the selected bidder in an effort to improve the bid to the municipality or agency with respect to the price only. In Matter of Fischbach & Moore v. New York City Trataros. Auth., 79 A.D.2d 14, 435 N.Y.S.2d 984,(2nd Dept., 1981) lv. denied 53 N.Y.2d 604, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (N.Y., 1981), the court held that once the bidding process fairly produces a lowest responsible bidder, there is no supervening interest or policy consideration which precludes a municipality or agency from negotiating and obtaining a post bid, pre-award price concession from that very same bidder. However, the court cautioned that a municipality may not “engage in post-bid negotiations through which a contractor other than the low bidder may become the low bidder, or coerce a low bidder to making unfair and unwarranted concessions through the threat of rejecting all bids. In the event the apparent lowest responsive and responsible bidder declines to negotiate, the municipality may elect to either award the contract to the apparent lowest responsive and responsible bidder or may, upon reasonable grounds, reject all bids in accordance with General Municipal Law √Ǭß103. See also, Acme Bus Corp. v. Board of Education of the Roosevelt Union Free School District, 91 N.Y.2d 51, 666 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1997).

It is important to recognize that the laws requiring competitive bidding were designed to benefit tax payers rather than corporate bidders, and, thus should be “construed and administered with sole reference to the public interest”. See, Acme Bus Corp. v. Board of Education of Roosevelt Union Free School District, supra. In Matter of New York State Ch., Inc., Associated Gen. Contrs. V. New York State Thruway Auth., 88 N.Y.2d 56, 643 N.Y.S.2d 480, 666 N.E.2d 185, the New York Court of Appeals declared that there are:

“two central purposes of New York’s competitive bidding statutes, both falling under the rubric of promoting the public interest: (1) protection of the public fisc by obtaining the best work at the lowest possible price; and (2) prevention of favoritism, improvidence, fraud and corruption in the awarding of public contracts.”

In Acme Bus Corp. v. Board of Education of Roosevelt Union Free School District, supra, the court stated that these separate goals are not incompatible. Favoritism or irregularity in the bidding process may ostensibly produce monetary savings, but the use of such means to meet that singular end is still unsustainable because the complete public interest is ultimately promoted by fostering honest competition. The spectral appearance, however, of impropriety is insufficient proof to disturb a board’s determination under the competitive bidding statutes. An unsuccessful bidder has the burden to demonstrate “actual” impropriety, unfair dealing or some other violation of statutory requirements when challenging an award of a public contract. See Matter of Conduit & Found. Corp. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 66 N.Y.2d 144, 495 N.Y.S.2d 340 (N.Y.,1985).

A public owner issues an award of contract to the bidder it deems to be the lowest responsible bidder and then issues a “Notice of Award” and ultimately a “Notice to Proceed” when the work is ready to commence. Upon the bidder’s receipt of the Notice of Award, the bidder will be required to return the executed contract and forward the appropriate bonds and insurance certificates. After the owner receives and reviews the executed contract and makes sure that the necessary bonds and insurances have been provided, the owner will then issue a Notice to Proceed directing the bidder, now contractor, to start work.

C. Bid Mistakes

On occasion, a bidder may submit a bid that is disproportionately low when compared with with the owner’s estimate of the costs, or the bids submitted by other bidders. In such a case, the owner may be on notice that the bidder made a mistake. The bidder may also realize that it made a mistake and seek to withdraw its bid. The owner when faced with deciding whether or not to permit a bidder to withdraw its bid, must act with a high degree of caution as the municipality, bidder and its surety as well as the next lowest bidder all have a financial stake in the decision. In order for a municipal owner to legally accept the withdrawal of a bid based on a mistake, it must first receive a notice from the bidder within three days of the bid opening requesting the withdrawal of its bid. General Municipal Law √Ǭß103 (11)(a), states as follows:

11. Bid mistakes; public projects. (a) In all contracts governed by this section, where a unilateral error or mistake is discovered in a bid, such bid may be withdrawn after a showing of the following: (1) the mistake is known or made known to the awarding officer, board or agency prior to the awarding of the contract or within three days after the opening of the bid, whichever period is shorter; and (2) the price bid was based on an error of such magnitude that enforcement would be unconscionable; and (3) the bid was submitted in good faith and the bidder submits credible evidence that the mistake was a clerical error as opposed to a judgment error; and (4) the error in the bid is actually due to an unintentional and substantial arithmetic error or an unintentional omission of a substantial quantity of work, labor, material, goods or services made directly in the compilation of the bid, which unintentional arithmetic error or unintentional omission can be clearly shown by objective evidence drawn from inspection of the original work paper, documents, or materials used in the preparation of the bid sought to be withdrawn; and (5) it is possible to place the public agency, board, officer, or subdivision in status quo ante.

Upon the owner’s receipt of such a letter from a bidder, the owner should carefully review the supporting documentation to make sure that the error was a clerical error and not an error in judgment. An error in judgment is not a sufficient basis for accepting the withdrawal of a bid.

For example, an agency’s refusal to permit a contractor to withdraw its bid was found not to be arbitrary or capricious where shortly after the bid was accepted, the contractor notified the agency that it had made an error, but delayed three months before requesting to be released from its bid. Gilston Elec. Contracting Corp. v. Popolizio 169 A.D.2d 583, 564 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1st Dept., 1991). In Balaban-Gordon Co. v. Brighton Sewer Dist. No. 2, 67 Misc.2d 76, 323 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct., 1971), the court held that where a contractor prepared a bid for general construction for a sewage treatment plant, and also a bid for the plumbing and equipment for such plants, and in doing so, misinterpreted the specifications and erroneously omitted certain items that had to be furnished under the general construction contract computations it made in preparing its bid for such contract and instead included these items in computations it made in preparing its bid for the plumbing contract, and contractor gave sewer district notice of mistake the day after bids were opened, the district could not properly retain advantage of the contractor’s mistake, and fair dealing required that contractor be relieved of its bid.

II CONTRACT PERFORMANCE AND CLAIMS

A. Role of Project Architect as Owner’s Representative

After the award of the contract and Notice to Proceed is issued, the architect or consulting engineer will typically act as the owner’s representative during the course of construction. The owner’s representative will coordinate the kick-off meeting and schedule weekly progress meetings or such other meetings as are necessary to monitor the work performed by the contractors. The owner’s representative does not insure the quality of the work, but instead acts as the owner’s eyes and ears to make sure that the work is being performed in accordance with the contract specifications.

The main role served by the owner’s representative is to certify what payments are properly due and owing the contractors. Contractors typically submit requisitions for payment on a monthly basis whereupon the owner’s representative reviews the requisition with the contractor at the project site to determine what percentage of completion was achieved by the contractor. The contract is typically divided into items of work so that the contractor submits a “schedule of values” for each item of work. After the owner issues a Notice of Award, the owner’s representative and the bidder will agree upon what values should be attributed to each item of work and a schedule of values is prepared.

Some contracts are awarded on a lump sum basis while others are on a unit price basis depending on the nature of the work involved. Regardless of the manner in which the contractor is to be compensated, the owner’s representative will monitor the level of completion and certify what payments are due.

B. Interpretation of Contract

The owner’s representative, during construction, typically acts as the first interpreter of contractual disputes so that if a contractor submits a request for a change order seeking additional money for certain work, the owner’s representative will review the plans and specifications and make a recommendation to the owner as to whether or not a change order should be issued. Owners should be careful to document any disagreements it may have with its architect concerning whether or not any item of given work is additional work, because the contractor could, in a subsequent lawsuit, claim that the architect was not exhibiting independent professional judgment or that the owner and the architect conspired to deprive the contractor of its working capital.

C. Presentation of Claims

The owner’s representative, in addition to making various determinations as to whether or not a contractor is entitled to be issued a change order for additional work, must also determine whether a contractor should be granted an extension of time to perform any additional work or in order to compensate the contractor for unanticipated delays it encountered in performing its work. The owner should be careful in this area and should seek legal counsel as disclaimers may or may not protect the owner depending on the circumstances. Early resolution of a contractor’s claim will, in the long run, limit the owner’s costs.

Certain disclaimers and other legal clauses can protect a municipality from liability depending on the circumstances. For example, to avoid responsibility for incorrect or incomplete information, bid documents often include disclaimer clauses, which generally require the contractor to investigate the project site and determine the risks associated with building the project. The owner also typically disclaims responsibility for the information it provides and states that such information is provided for estimating purposes only. An effective disclaimer prevents the contractor from claiming that it reasonably relied on the accuracy of certain bid information and requires the contractor to make its own investigations.

Disclaimer clauses, however, are strictly construed against owners. Changed conditions clauses are also often used in municipal contracts. Such a clause provides for procedures for identifying changed conditions and modifying the contract if additional work is necessary due to unanticipated conditions. An example of such a clause follows:

Viewing of Site and Consideration of Other Sources of Information (b) Changed Conditions – Should the contractor encounter during the progress of the work, subsurface conditions at the site materially deferring from any shown on the Contract Drawings or indicated in the specifications or such subsurface conditions as could not reasonably have been anticipated by the contractor and were not anticipated by the City, which conditions will materially effect the cost of the work to be done on the contract, the attention of the Commissioner must be called immediately to such conditions before they are disturbed. The Commissioner shall thereupon promptly investigate the conditions. If he finds [a changed condition]. . . the contract may be modified . . .(Andrew Catapano Co. v. City of New York, 116 Misc.2d 163, 455 N.Y.S.2d 144 (S. Ct., 1980).

A common exculpatory clause found in municipal contracts is what is known as the “No Damage for Delay” clause. Such a clause attempts to excuse an owner from contractual liability for monetary damages due to delays caused by itself, its architect and/or engineer and other entities under its employ. While “no damage for delay” clauses are generally valid and enforceable in New York, the courts have carved out certain exceptions. See Corinno Civetta Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 297, 502 N.Y.S.2d 681 (NY Ct. of Appeals, 1986). Generally, even with such a clause, the contractor may recover damages for: (1) delays caused by the contractee’s bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct; (2) uncontemplated delays; (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract by the contractee; and (4) delays resulting from the contractee’s breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract. See Corinno Civetta Construction Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

In a recent case, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department, held that a contractor on a school renovation project was entitled to recover delay damages against the school district even though the public contract contained a “no damage for delay” clause. See, Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v. City School District of Albany, 2000 N.Y. Slip Op. 10376, 2000 WL 1742731. The Court found that: (i) the evidence was sufficient to support a determination that the delays were uncontemplated; and (ii) the school district was responsible for the breach of fundamental contractual obligations, permitting the contractor to recover its delay damages despite the contract’s exculpatory clause.

Contract clauses conta

Court Rules Bidder is Not Responsible

Public construction contracts are subject to New York’s competitive bidding statutes. They provide that the contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and responsive bidder.

A “responsible” bidder is a contractor who has the skill, integrity, experience, financial and technical resources to complete the work in a satisfactory manner. A “responsive” bidder is a contractor who has complied with the exact requirements of the bid invitation. In the recent case of Matter of E&A Restoration, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, the court determined whether there was a rational basis for the Town’s rejection of a bidder as non-responsible. 

Background 

In May 2010 the Town of North Hempstead solicited bids for the construction of the North Hempstead Community Center. The Town’s bid documents advised prospective bidders that the community center was to be a 60,000 square foot building, certified as platinum under the United States Green Building Council’s (USGBC) Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design (LEED) rating system. The bid documents further advised prospective bidders that the Town would not accept bids from, nor award a contract to, anyone who could not prove to the satisfaction of the Town Board that they had sufficient experience and financial stability to complete the project as designed on time and on budget.

The technical requirements outlined in the project bid documents required the responsive contractors to demonstrate the completion of five similar projects, experience and expertise with the LEED rating system, and that a LEED accredited professional would be engaged to coordinate the LEED requirements of the project. The bid documents also noted that substantial Federal, State and local government grant money was contingent upon the project obtaining LEED platinum certification. 

A number of bids were received in response to the Town’s solicitation, including bids from E&A Restoration, Inc., the second lowest bidder, and Racanelli Construction Co., Inc., the fifth lowest bidder. In reviewing the bids, the Town determined that the first four lowest bidders either had no, or very little, of the required experience. Accordingly, the Town awarded the contract to Racanelli. In response, E&A Restoration sued, looking to have the contract award annulled. 

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the Town. In upholding the contract award, the court relied upon well-established case law, noting that the requirement of awarding public work to the lowest responsible bidder involves considerations of skill, judgment and integrity. The court noted that a municipality may investigate the experience and background of the bidder, and where good reason exists, the low bid may be disapproved or, indeed, all the bids rejected. The court also noted that where a municipality exercises its discretion to reject one or more bids, that decision ought not to be disturbed by the courts unless it is irrational, dishonest or otherwise unlawful.

After E&A Restoration submitted its bid, its staff members were enrolled in a LEED certification class, but were not yet LEED accredited professionals. In addition, E&A had not yet completed a project of similar nature, scope, cost or complexity.

In contrast, Racanelli demonstrated that it had completed five similar projects, including serving as the single-prime general contractor on a $100 million three campus project. The company also employed LEED accredited professionals and worked on LEED certified projects. Since the court determined that the Town’s decision to award the contract to Racanelli, as the experienced contractor, was rational, and there was no evidence to suggest that the award was dishonest, the court denied and dismissed E&A Restoration’s lawsuit. 

Comment 

This case confirms the importance of contractors remaining familiar with industry trends so as to remain commercially competitive. Here, a number of bidders encountered difficulty demonstrating experience and familiarity with the LEED rating system, which has dramatically grown in popularity among owners in recent years. The Town’s bid documents made clear that it was seeking bids from contractors who were not only experienced with projects of this size, but also the LEED rating system. Since experience is a prime consideration when determining whether a bidder is responsible, the Town was entitled to award the contract to the lowest responsible contractor experienced with the type of project involved.

Subcontractor Allowed Recovery For Work Performed

Disputes between contractors and subcontractors may ultimately require recourse to the courts.  A trial judge will allow both sides to present witnesses and produce documents as to the issues in dispute.  The judge will then make credibility determinations, resolve factual disputes and grant judgment upon application of the appropriate legal standard.

At times, however, a judge may grant summary judgment without a trial where the affidavits and supporting documents demonstrate the absence of factual disputes.  In the recent case of Durao Concrete, Inc. v. RJD Construction, Inc., a subcontractor was able to convince the court that it should enter summary judgment in its favor.

Background 

RJD Construction, Inc. was hired as a general contractor in connection with a construction project located in Yaphank, New York.  Under its agreement with the owner, RJD was to be paid $591,375.  RJD subcontracted the installation of a concrete foundation, footings, walls and slabs to Durao Concrete, Inc. for the agreed price of $40,000.  The subcontractor completed its work in August 2007 and submitted invoices to the general contractor totaling $41,800.  The additional $1,800 was for the use of a pump truck to pump the cement to the job.  After the general contractor failed to pay the subcontractor’s invoices, the subcontractor filed a mechanic’s lien, sued the general contractor, and moved for summary judgment.

In opposition to the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment, the general contractor argued that the subcontractor’s work was not properly performed, which led to cracks in the concrete.  The contractor also argued that since the parties’ agreement was for $40,000 it was not required to pay the subcontractor the $41,800 billed for the completed work. The contractor also claimed that the debt due to the subcontractor had been consolidated with monies due on other projects, which were settled and paid.  However, the contractor did not indicate the amount of the settlement, or how or when it was paid.  According to the general contractor, proof of the settlement and payment had been lost in a flood.

In response, the subcontractor submitted evidence that the owner had paid the general contractor in full for the subcontractor’s work, that the general contractor never complained of the quality of the subcontractor’s work until after the lawsuit was commenced, that only $40,000 was being claimed as due in the lawsuit, that no such settlement or payment ever occurred, and that the subcontractor was entitled to be paid as agreed for the work performed and completed.

Decision

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor as to liability and directed a trial as to the amount of money actually due to the subcontractor.  According to the court, the subcontractor established that the general contractor agreed to pay the subcontractor $40,000 for its work at the project; the subcontractor performed its work at the project in accordance with its initial proposal and estimate; the general contractor received payment in full from the owner; and the general contractor failed to pay the subcontractor any monies with respect to the work performed.

As to the general contractor’s claim that the parties had agreed to settle the debt due to the subcontractor together with the debt owed on other jobs, the court noted that the alleged settlement payment was by check, and notwithstanding the alleged flood, the general contractor could have obtained duplicate records from its banking institution, which the general contractor failed to do.  Under these circumstances, the court determined that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor was appropriate.

Comment 

It is difficult to persuade a court to grant summary judgment without a trial because in most cases credibility questions require a trial.  Here, however, the general contractor failed to produce any documents to justify his refusal to make payment to the subcontractor.  If there is no material factual dispute to decide, why have a trial?  It was therefore appropriate for the court to grant summary judgment to the subcontractor.


Defending Against An OSHA Citation: A General Contractor’s Perspective

General Contractors have a dual concern when it comes to protecting their companies from OSHA citations: they must not only be on guard against OSHA violations committed by their own employees, but a prudent General Contractor should also be vigilant with respect to a subcontractor’s employees whose violative acts will often be imputed by OSHA to the General Contractor because of the General Contractor’s control over a site. It is particularly difficult for a general contractor to protect itself against violations caused by independent acts and omissions of employees and subcontractors of which the General Contractor has no knowledge. For these reasons, there are a series of steps which every General Contractor should consider taking in order to protect their companies from OSHA citations in such instances.

In general, applicable OSHA case law has held that an employer cannot be held responsible for the violation of an OSHA standard resulting from an act by an employee (and by analogy, a subcontractor), for which the employer ( or General Contractor) has no knowledge and which was contrary to the employer’s instructions. In order to establish this defense, known as “unpreventable employee misconduct,” the employer must demonstrate the following:

(1) the violation must have been caused by or resulted from exclusively employee action; (2) it must have been an isolated and unanticipated instance; (3) it must have been of short duration; (4) it must not have been participated in, observed by, or performed with the knowledge of supervisory personnel and must not have been foreseen by the employer in the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (5) the employee’s action was in contravention of well established policy, program or rule which was used to instruct employees in safe work practices and which was enforced by disciplinary action when necessary.

Therefore, with respect to employees, a General Contractor should have in place a well established written company-wide safety plan covering all aspects of the contractor’s operations, including both management and employees. Having the safety plan reviewed by an independent consultant, and then implementing any suggestions made by that consultant further strengthens the safety plan.

Next, elements of the company-wide safety plan need to be communicated to the employees by whatever means possible, including at “tool box meetings”. For example, a General Contractor should consider covering a different topic of workplace safety each week at “tool box meetings”, and at those meetings, handing out pamphlets and literature to the employees regarding various topical OSHA rules. Employee attendance at those meetings should be documented.

Finally, the safety plan needs to be actively enforced by the General Contractor, including reprimanding and dismissing employees that disregard explicit safety rules. Enforcement should similarly be documented with memos, letters and other employment records.

With respect to subcontractors, by analogy, the Contractor should have a written company-wide safety plan describing how the General Contractor communicates and enforces safety issues with subcontractors, including the use of comprehensive contract clauses concerning workplace safety. It should be made clear that a breach of OSHA rules is a breach of the subcontract and the failure to cure could, as with any material breach, be grounds for termination.

During the course of the project, those safety issues need to be effectively communicated to the subcontractors at project meetings and later confirmed in meeting minutes. Correspondence and field memos should also memorialize the communication of safety concerns. For example, the site superintendent should immediately notify a subcontractor in writing when he or she witnesses an unsafe situation and the superintendent should then follow-up on those notifications.

Finally, safety issues should be actively enforced with the subcontractors through various contractual mechanisms, including withholding funds, threatening termination, and even terminating recalcitrant subcontractors when the circumstances warrant it.

In the event a General Contractor is issued a citation by OSHA resulting from the independent act of an employee or a subcontractor, documentation of the aforementioned steps could prove in valuable in defending against the citation at an informal conference or a full hearing.

Court Allows Change Order And Extra Work Claims But Rejects Delay Claim

There are few projects completed with no changes or additions to the original contract.  Problems arise when the contractor fails to comply with the standard contract requirement for changes and extras to be in writing.

Equally problematic for contractors is the common contract clause providing for “no damage-for-delay”, which precludes delay claims by contractor.

In the recent case of ADC Contracting & Construction, Inc. v. Town of Southampton, the court ruled on the enforceability of contract provisions requiring written approval for change orders and extra work and the “no-damage-for-delay” clause.

Background 

ADC Contracting & Construction, Inc. contracted with the Town of Southampton, New York to construct an animal shelter.  According to the contractor, the Town directed, and the contractor performed, extra work for which a written change order was never issued. 

The contractor also claimed that the Town delayed the project by poor planning and scheduling.  The Town acted as its own general contractor and entered into separate contracts with ADC, as the construction contractor, a plumbing contractor and an electric contractor.  The contractor argued that the Town’s inexperienced representatives failed to supervise and coordinate the various trades, which resulted in interference and hindrance in the contractor’s ability to orderly and efficiently perform under the contract.  The lack of supervision and coordination resulted in delays, as well as additional work, which increased the cost of the contract.

When the Town refused to pay for the extra work and the contractor’s delay claim, the contractor sued.  The Town moved for summary judgment, arguing that the parties’ contract required all change orders and extras to be in writing, and that the contract barred the contractor’s recovery of any delay damages.

Decision

The court dismissed the contractor’s delay claims, but permitted the contractor’s extra work claims to proceed to trial.  In making its decision, the court relied on the express terms of the parties’ agreement and the controlling case law.  With regard to the contractor’s delay claim, the court noted that the contract stated: “Where Contractor is prevented from completing work due to a delay beyond his control, an extension of the time to complete the specific task shall be Contractor’s sole and exclusive remedy for such a delay.”  The court went on to state that notwithstanding the owner’s poor planning and scheduling, inept administration of the project was within the scope of the no-damages-for-delay clause.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the contractor’s delay claims, ruling that an extension of time to complete the work was the contractor’s only remedy for project delays caused by the owner.

As for the contractor’s extra work claim, the court referred to contract provisions requiring all changes to be first approved in writing.  However, the court also pointed to case law which prohibited an owner from relying on such a provision to avoid payment if the absence of a written approval was caused by the owner. 

The contractor submitted written correspondence with the owner and testimony from the Town’s representatives at their examinations before trial to raise factual questions as to whether the Town had actual knowledge of the contractor’s additional work claims and whether the Town, through the conduct of its agents, waived its right to insist upon strict compliance with the requirement of written authorization.  Since the court was uncertain as to whether the absence of a written extra was caused by the owner, the court permitted the contractor’s extra work claims to remain.

Comment 

Though there are limited exceptions, no-damages-for-delay contract clauses are frequently upheld and enforced by New York courts.  Contract clauses that require extra work to be performed pursuant to a written change order prior to triggering an owner’s payment obligations produce differing results from the courts.  On one hand, courts are sometimes hesitant to deny a contractor compensation for work verbally directed by the owner.  On the other hand, courts may strictly enforce the requirement of a written authorization.  The particular facts of a case will determine whether a court will allow a waiver of the written change order requirement.  A prudent contractor should insist upon written approval before performing changes or extras, rather than risk a court’s enforcement of a contract requirement of a written authorization.

Court Rejects Extra Work Claims

Claims by contractors for extra work continue to be a major source of construction litigation.  There are few projects completed with no additions or changes to the original contract.  Most contracts have a standard provision requiring that orders for extra work be in writing.  Problems arise when the contractor does not obtain the approval for the extra work but proceeds to perform the additional work anyway.

In the recent case of Tadco Construction Corp. v. Dormitory Authority of the State of New York, the court ruled on the contractor’s extra work claims.

Background 

TADCO Construction Corp. entered into a written contract with the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York to perform certain work related to the marina rehabilitation project located at Kingsborough Community College. Under the parties’ agreement, the contractor agreed to perform all work and furnish all supplies and materials for the price of $1,436,642, subject to adjustments for extra work or alterations to or deductions from the work. 

Before construction started, the contractor determined that fixing the floating dock system would only extend the life of the dock by a few years, and that replacing the dock, although more expensive, would give the dock a significantly longer lifespan.  The contractor presented this information to DASNY, who responded that it would not entertain an increase in costs for the repair of the dock, and that it would only approve replacement of the dock if it did not increase the contract price.  The contractor responded by telling DASNY that it intended to proceed with its plan to replace the dock “under protest” and that it would seek compensation for the increased costs of this plan later, by submitting a change order request.

When the contractor submitted the change order request for the cost of the replacement dock in the amount of $155,040, DASNY refused to pay it, arguing that the contractor had chosen to replace the dock system on its own initiative and that DASNY had repeatedly told the contractor that it would not approve a change in contract price if the contractor chose to proceed with the installation of the new dock system.  Based on DASNY’s denial of the change order request, the contractor filed suit, seeking to recover the extra costs related to the replacement dock.  DASNY responded with a motion for summary judgment, seeking to have the contractor’s extra work claims dismissed.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of DASNY, denying the contractor’s extra work claims.  According to the court, recovery cannot be had for “extra” work which actually falls within the contract or the plans and specifications, but recovery may be had for work outside the contract where the contractor was in fact specifically ordered to do work that was not within the scope of that called for by the contract. 

Here, the court ruled that the contractor chose to proceed with the dock replacement plan after being told by DASNY that it would not agree to any changes in the original contract plan that would result in increased costs.  Because the work was not ordered by DASNY, the court determined that the contractor voluntarily substituted materials in the project at its own discretion, and the costs of that choice are not recoverable.  Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of DASNY.

Comment 

A contractor who wishes to be assured that he will be paid for extra work should follow the contractual requirements and obtain proper written authorization to do the additional work either from the owner or his duly authorized representative prior to performing the extra work.  As this case demonstrates, a contractor should not ignore contract provisions relating to extra work in the hope that a court may make an exception to the contract and find a waiver under particular facts and circumstances.