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New EPA Rule Will Affect Owners and Contractors Performing Renovation, Repair or Painting Work.

Alert: 

The EPA has issued a new rule which will affect owners and contractors performing renovation, repair, or painting work on housing, schools, or child- occupied facilities constructed prior to 1978.  Under the rule, which is aimed at minimizing lead exposure, certification must be obtained from the EPA prior to starting the work.  Certification involves an application process and requires a demonstrated understanding of lead-safe work practices.  Violators of the rule are subject to civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day and criminal sanctions of up to a year in prison. 

Summary: 

The EPA has issued a new rule, 40 C.F.R. §745.80 et. seq., effective April 2010, which will affect owners and contractors performing renovation, repair or painting work on housing, schools, or child-occupied facilities constructed prior to 1978.  Under the rule, which is aimed at minimizing lead exposure, certification must be obtained from the EPA prior to starting the work.  Certification involves an application process and requires a demonstrated understanding of lead-safe work practices.  Upon receipt of the certification application, the EPA has ninety (90) days within which to approve or reject the application. 

The applicability of the rule is presumed for each targeted project (i.e. the renovation, repair or painting of housing, schools, or child-occupied facilities constructed prior to 1978).  Accordingly, the need for certification is presumed for each targeted project.  However, the presumption can be rebutted by an inspector’s written determination stating that the components affected by the renovation are free of paint or other surface coatings containing lead.  The rule will also not apply to “minor maintenance or repairs,” which are defined as projects where less than six square feet of lead-based paint is disturbed per room on the interior of the building, or where less than 20 square feet of lead-based paint is disturbed on the exterior.  Notably, under the rule’s express terms, window replacement is not a “minor maintenance or repair.” 

The consequences of non-compliance can be severe.  Under the rule, the EPA Administrator is authorized to impose civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day and criminal sanctions of up to one year in prison for violations of the rule.  Contractors and owners engaged in renovating, repairing, or painting any of the targeted projects should take steps now to ensure compliance with the new rule prior to April of 2010. 

 

About Welby, Brady & Greenblatt LLP Welby, Brady & Greenbla tt LLP represents a wide range of ent ities wit hin the construction and real estate industries includin g general contractors , subcontractors, sureties , d evelopers , owner s, s uppliers, engineers , and home owners with core competencies , su ch as constr uction law and li tigation, real estate development, labor law, OSHA complianc e an d mediation and arbitration . The firm is headquartered in W hite Plai ns, New Yo rk with offic es i n Cranfo rd, New Jersey and Stamford , Co nnecticut . The firm’s website can be fo und at www. wbgllp .com .  

Employment of Alien Workers – Update

We previously reported on the employment of alien workers in two Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP Legal Alerts.  

The first report1 discussed the New York Court of Appeals ruling in the Balbulena Case 2, where the court ruled that an injured undocumented alien worker, who did not tender false work identification documents to obtain employment, could sue for lost wages under the state Labor Law.  The employer in that case failed to verify whether the worker had any work authorization documentation. We posed the question to our readers whether they knew if their general liability insurance policies would cover them in an injured undocumented alien worker situation.  

The second report3 discussed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”).  The IRCA prohibits employers from knowingly hiring non-citizens who are not authorized to be in the U.S.  Employers are required to verify the identity and work eligibility of all employees, including U.S. citizens, by completing Department of Homeland Security Form I-9.  Workers who fail to comply with the instructions on Form I-9 cannot be hired.  Employers who do not comply with IRCA are subject to administrative fines and criminal prosecution.  I-9 forms are available on the internet.  Once completed, I-9 forms are kept by the employer and must be made available for inspection by authorized government officials from the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Labor, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices. Employers may but are not required to photocopy the identification document(s) presented by the worker when the I-9 form is completed.  If photocopies are made they must be kept by the employer with the I-9 form.

More recently the courts have considered what happens when an employer hires an alien worker who submits false identification and work eligibility documents and is injured while working.  

In New York, a worker’s submission of false documentation is sufficient to shield the employer from the injured workers claim for lost wages provided the employer was induced by the false documentation to hire that worker.  

In the Coque Case4, the injured worker submitted a false social security card to the employer, who accepted the document and hired the worker.  The employer, however, did not follow the instructions accompanying the I-9 form.  Where a social security card is offered by a worker, the  I-9 form instructions require a second valid form of identification.  Because the employer failed to ask for the second form of identification, the Court ruled that the employer had not fulfilled its duty to verify the employee’s documentation and therefore the employer was not falsely induced to employ the worker despite the submission of false documentation.  Thus, the illegal alien worker could recover damages for lost wages resulting from the workplace injury. 

In the Macedo Case5 a worker presented the employer with a driver’s license, a union card, a tax ID card and what turned out to be a false social security card.  Months after the worker was injured while working, the employer completed the I-9 form.  Because of the employer’s tardiness in completing the I-9 form, the Court ruled that the employer was not induced to hire the worker by his presentation of a false social security card and the injured worker could recover damages for lost wages.

These court decisions send a clear message to employers. For an employer to avoid liability for lost wages sought by an injured illegal alien worker, the employer must show that it was induced to hire that worker based upon his or her presentation of false identification and work eligibility documents.  To do that the employer must establish that when it hired the worker it promptly completed the I-9 form and that it followed all of the instructions describing the type of documentation that must be presented.  The employer should also consider keeping a copy of the document(s) presented when the I-9 form is completed.  

Further, as demonstrated by the Macedo Case where the worker presented a union card, just because you may run a union shop, don’t think you are immune from verifying the worker’s eligibility for employment.  Check your Collective Bargaining Agreement.  Does the union verify the work eligibility of the workers it sends to your projects?   

So what should you consider doing to protect your business?

First, develop an employee identification and work verification program and include it as part of your overall employment manual – and follow it.  Your attorney can help you put together an employment manual if you do not already have one or need to update it.  Also, promptly verify the eligibility of all your employees by completing an I-9 form for each and be sure to follow the instructions specifying the identification documents your workers are required to present to establish identity and employment authorization.  Maintain the I-9 form and copy of the identification documents in your file for that employee.  

Second, speak with your insurance agent about your general liability insurance policy.  Find out whether it covers you against alien workers lost wages claims.  Find out whether your general liability policy has requirement(s) for completing I-9 forms for your workers and fulfill the requirements of your policy.

This alert provides general information only.  It is not intended to provide legal advice.  We encourage you to contact an attorney should you desire to discuss specific situations for which you may need legal advice. 

1 Legal Alert ” Volume 1, #4 (Found at Welby Brady & Greenblatt, LLP’s website, www.wbgllp.com)
2 Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d 338, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2006)
3 WBG Legal Alert – Volume 1, #8 (Found at Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP’s website, www.wbgllp.com)
4 Coque v. Wildflower Estates Developers Inc., 58 A.D.3d 44, 867 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2nd Dept. 2008)
5 Macedo v. J.D. Posillico Inc., 68 A.D.3d 508, 891 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1st Dept. 2009)

Greener, Greater Buildings Plan: Benchmarking, Lighting Upgrades, and Sub-Metering Requirements

As part of the “Greener, Greater Buildings Plan” legislation, the New York City Council adopted two new laws aimed at reducing the energy used in buildings.  The Council found that non-residential lighting is responsible for about one fifth of the energy used in New York City’s buildings and of the carbon emissions from buildings.  In light of recent improvements in technology, the Council found that energy use can be reduced if data is made available to tenants for comparison and by requiring the installation of lighting upgrades.  The new laws require building performance benchmarking, lighting upgrades, and sub-metering as part of a comprehensive plan to reduce the consumption of energy.  

With some exceptions, these laws apply to “covered buildings” which are defined as: 

i. a building that exceeds 50,000 gross square feet (4645 m2),  

ii. two or more buildings on the same tax lot that together exceed 100,000 gross square feet, or  

iii. two or more buildings held in the condominium form of ownership that are governed by the same board of managers and that together exceed 100,000 gross square feet. 

Generally, the laws do not apply to one, two, and three family residential properties.1   

Benchmarking Energy and Water Use (Administrative Code of the City of New York § 28-309.1 
e t a l . )  

This law became effective immediately and requires benchmarking of energy2and water use in city buildings3 and “covered buildings.”  Benchmarking is accomplished by inputting and submitting into an internet-based database system the total use of energy and water for a building for the previous calendar year and other descriptive information for the building4 Owners of “covered buildings” who must request energy use information from tenants of separately-metered, non- dwelling units. Starting with the second calendar year of benchmarking data, the Department of Finance must make the following information, generated by the benchmarking tool, available to the public on the internet: (i) the energy utilization index, (ii) the water use per gross square foot, (iii) where available, a rating that compares the energy and water use of the building to that of similar buildings, and (iv) a comparison of data across calendar years for any years such building was benchmarked. 5   

The benchmarking and disclosure requirements commence on the dates listed in the following table:   

Annual Benchmarking and Disclosure Requirements  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  City Building Covered Building
Benchmarking For Previous Calendar Yr. No later than May 1, 2010 and no later than May 1st thereafter No later than May 1, 2011 and no later than May 1st thereafter
Period to Request Information from Separately-Metered Tenant5    January 1, 2011 to January 31, 2011 and every January 1st to January 31st thereafter
Deadline for Tenant to Provide Information    February 15, 2011 and every February 15th thereafter
Disclosure by the Department of Finance of the Previous Calendar Year’s Benchmarking
No later than September 1, 2011
If Primary Use is not Residential: No later than
Data  and no later than every September 1st thereafter September 1, 2012  and no later than every September 1st thereafter If Primary Use is Residential: No later than September 1, 2013  and no later than every September 1st thereafter


Owners of “covered buildings” must maintain records including energy and water bills and reports or forms received from tenants for a period of three years.  The legislators envision that some or all of the reporting will eventually be uploaded directly by the utility companies or the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”).  An owner and/or tenant may not be required to request and report benchmarking information where information is uploaded directly to the benchmarking tool by a utility company or other authorized source.  The DEP must upload directly to the benchmarking tool information on water use at all buildings that are equipped with automatic meter reading equipment by the DEP.    
Lighting Upgrades and Sub-Metering  (Administrative Code of the City of New York §§ 28-310.1 et al. and 28-311.1 e t a l .)   
This law requires that lighting systems of “covered buildings” be upgraded to comply with the standards for new systems set forth in § 805 of the New York City Energy Conservation Code on or prior to January 1, 2025.  The necessary upgrade includes the following elements:  lighting controls (interior lighting control, light reduction controls and automatic lighting shutoff), tandem wiring, exit signs, interior lighting power requirements and exterior lighting.  No upgrade is required for certain lighting systems including, among others, systems within certain dwelling units or common spaces of certain dwelling units (i.e. hallways, 
laundry rooms, or boiler rooms).   
The law also requires that electrical consumption of each covered tenant space must be measured by one or more sub-meters on or prior to January 1, 2025.  No sub-meters are required for certain buildings including, among others, dwelling units classified in occupancy groups R-2 and R-3.  
An owner or lessor must install these sub-meters on or prior to January 1, 2025 and thereafter as new tenant spaces are created within the building.  
Covered tenant spaces include: 
i. A tenant space larger than 10,000 gross square feet (929 m2) on one or more floors of a covered building let or sublet to the same person, or  
ii. a floor of a covered building larger than 10,000 gross square feet (929 m2) consisting of tenant spaces let or sublet to two or more different persons. 
If the covered tenant space is a floor with multiple tenancies, each tenancy that is 10,000 gross square feet (929 m2) or less shall  
i. have a separate sub-meter,  
ii. share a sub-meter with other tenant spaces on the floor, or  
iii. share a sub-meter covering the entire floor. 
Each tenant or subtenant within a covered tenant space that has a sub-meter or sub-meters to measure electrical consumption must be provided with a monthly statement showing the amount of electricity measured by the sub-meter.    
The owner of the building is required to file a report prepared by a registered design professional or a licensed master or special electrician certifying that the electrical upgrade and sub-metering has been completed and complies with § 805.   
The “Greener, Greater Buildings Plan” aims at reducing the consumption of energy by taking advantage of rapid improvements in lighting technology and providing data on electrical energy use to tenants.  Giving building owners almost 
fifteen years to upgrade lighting systems and electrical metering seems reasonable and should avoid any hardship on owners who are required to install the new systems.   
This Legal Alert is supplied for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice. You should consult competent legal counsel depending on the specific issues of your matter.  
1Consult Real Property Tax Law § 1802(1) (Class One) for a full definition of exempt property.  
2 “Energy” is defined as electricity, natural gas, fuel oil, and steam. 
3 With some exceptions, a “city building” is a building that is more than 10,000 square feet that is owned by the city or for which the city regularly pays all or part of the annual energy bills.   
4 The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s Benchmarking Tool is described at http://www.epa.gov/eeBuildings/benchmarking/detail/index.html#tool (last viewed March 26, 2010) and available at https://www.energystar.gov/istar/pmpam/ (last viewed March 26, 2010). 
5 Ratings generated by the benchmarking tool for a covered building that contains a data center, television studio, and/or trading floor that together exceed ten percent of the gross square footage of any such building shall not be disclosed until the office of long-term planning and sustainability determines that the benchmarking tool can make adequate adjustments for such facilities. 
6 Not applicable to separately-metered dwelling units.  

False Vendex Statements Doom Contractor’s Delay Claim


Municipalities are required by statute to award contracts to the “lowest responsible bidder.” In making its lowest responsible bidder determination, city agencies are directed to use information supplied by prospective contractors including VENDEX (acronym for Vendor Information Exchange) and prequalification questionnaire replies. VENDEX forms are completed by a contractor as part of the bid process, which a city relies on in evaluating the lowest responsible bidder designation.

A responsible contractor determination is normally made prior to the award of the contract to the contractor. But what if a city discovers that the contractor made false statements or withheld information on its VENDEX form after the contractor was paid for substantial completion of the work and the contractor sues the city to recover delay damages? Can the city disregard the contract and avoid payment based on the contractor’s false VENDEX statements? This question was addressed in the recent case of Omni Contracting Company, Inc. v. The City of New York. 

Background 

In June 2005 Omni Contracting Company, Inc. submitted a bid to contract for a public improvement project known as “Reconstruction of Thompson Street (Vesuvio) Playground.” The contract was awarded to Omni. In March 2006 the contractor entered into an agreement with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation to construct the project. The contract price was $2,127,000. The contractor was originally required to complete work within 270 consecutive calendar days. During construction the contractor requested, and the City approved, six time extensions, extending the project’s completion date by nearly seven months. The City paid the contractor $2,143,866 for its work under the contract. Thereafter, the contractor sued the City, alleging that it had fully performed the contract, but that its performance was delayed by the acts of the City, and those delays caused the contractor to incur $319,386 in additional costs.

In defense to the contractor’s lawsuit, the City argued that it was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract. According to the City, the contractor made false statements and withheld information on its VENDEX form originally filed with the City in April 2004, and reaffirmed those same false statements in July 2004, February 2005, and April 2005, in the contractor’s sworn “no change” certifications. Accordingly, it was the City’s argument that when the contractor submitted its bid for the playground project in June 2005, the contractor failed to make a required disclosure regarding its failure to pay employees a prevailing wage on several of the contractor’s other projects with the City. Based on the failed disclosure, the City argued that in was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract. The City moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the contractor’s claims.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the City. The court first noted the requirement that public projects be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. It went on to note that under the New York City Procurement Policy Board Rules, the “failure of a firm to provide relevant information specifically requested by the Contracting Officer may be grounds for a determination of non-responsibility.” Since the contractor failed to provide requested information relating to its past prevailing wage investigations and violations, which occurred in 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006, the court held that the contractor was not a “responsible” contractor. 

The court went on to state that contracts procured through fraudulent bidding are void as against public policy. Where work is done pursuant to such an illegal contract, the court held that the contractor is not entitled to recover on its claims. Additionally, the court pointed out that the municipality can recover from the contractor all amounts paid under the illegal contract.

The court accordingly dismissed the contractor’s delay claim for the $319,386. Given that the City was not seeking to recover the entire amount paid to the contractor, the contractor was permitted to retain the monies previously paid to it by the City.

Comment 

This case emphasizes the importance of accurately completing and updating VENDEX and prequalification questionnaire replies. The failure to do so may not only support a non-responsible determination, but, as shown, it may also be grounds for non-payment for work performed and the recovery of payments already made for work performed. 

Court Allows Contractor’s Work Claim Against Architect

An architect acts as the owner’s agent in some situations. The general conditions of a construction contract will determine in what areas the owner has designated the architect as his representative. In areas of shop drawings approval, construction schedules, material samples, and the like, an architect is typically considered the agent for the owner. 

But can a contractor make a valid extra work claim directly against an architect for nonpayment? This issue was raised in the recent case of Pulver Roofing Company, Inc. v. SBLM Architect’s P.C. 

Background 

Pulver Roofing Company, Inc. entered into a contract with the Rome City School District to install a roof on a school. The roof was to be installed in accordance with plans provided by SBLM Architects, P.C. According to the contractor, the architect requested that the contractor perform extra work, which was outside the scope of work originally agreed to. The contractor also claimed that the architect promised the contractor that it would be paid for the extra work. When the architect refused to pay the contractor for the extra work performed, the contractor sued the architect for the reasonable value of the extra work. 

The architect defended on the grounds that that the contractor’s agreement was with the School District, that the extra work was performed for the benefit of the School District, that the architect was simply acting as an agent for the School District, and that the architect was not responsible for ensuring that the contractor was paid. 

The architect moved to dismiss the claim by the contractor. The trial court ruled in favor of the architect, holding that the work was in fact rendered for the benefit of the School District rather than the architect. The contractor appealed. 

Decision

The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In so doing, the appellate court relied upon the elements necessary to state a claim for recovery in quantum meruit.

The legal theory of “quantum meruit” is available where there is no express contract, but rather a legal obligation is imposed in order to prevent a party’s unjust enrichment. The elements of a quantum meruit claim are: (1) the performance of services in good faith; (2) the acceptance of the services by the party for whom they were rendered; (3) the expectation of compensation for those services; and (4) a statement of the reasonable value of the services. While the appellate court agreed that the work was in fact rendered for the benefit of the School District, the court pointed out that the contractor is not required to establish that the architect received a benefit in order to recover in quantum meruit. 

According to the appellate court, the contractor performed the work at the architect’s request, pursuant to an express promise that it would be paid, and the contractor was accordingly entitled to recover the reasonable value of its work, regardless of whether or not the architect in any economic sense benefitted from the work. 

Where a contract covering a specified subject matter exists, recovery in quantum meruit is not permitted. Here however, because the work was extra work, beyond the scope of the contractor’s agreement with the School District, the appellate court permitted the quantum meruit claim. The case proceeded to trial because there is a dispute whether the additional work was outside the scope of the work originally agreed to.

Comment 

This case is unique in that a contractor traditionally has not been permitted to maintain a direct claim for nonpayment against an architect. The prudent contractor will require extra work approvals to be in writing before the work begins to help ensure that it will be paid for that work. 

Court Rules on Personal Liability Against Corporate Owner

A corporation has an existence separate and distinct from that of its individual officers, directors and stockholders. The general rule is that individual owners of a corporation are insulated from personal liability for corporate debts, and that individuals may incorporate for the purpose of limiting their liability. 

In certain circumstances however, owners may be liable for some underlying corporate obligations. In an appropriate case, a court will disregard the corporate entity or “pierce the veil” of the corporate entity and hold a corporate officer or shareholder personally liable for corporate debt. In the recent case of East Hampton Union Free School District v. Sandpebble Builders, Inc., the court addressed the issue of piercing the corporate veil and imposing personal liability against the corporation’s president and principal owner. 

Background 

In June 2006 the East Hampton Union Free School District negotiated a construction management agreement with Sandpebble Builders, Inc. The agreement was negotiated in principle and was subject to signature by the construction manager’s owner and president, Victor Canseco. Although Mr. Canseco indicated that he would sign the contract, he later refused and additional negotiations were held, but again, Mr. Canseco refused to sign the agreement. This sequence of re-negotiation, agreement in principle, and refusal to execute was repeated twice more until, by letter dated September 15, 2006, the construction manager terminated negotiations, and stated that it was “ready, willing and able to perform”, but only under the terms of an abandoned 2002 agreement between the school district and the construction manager, which contained more favorable terms. The school district contracted with a different construction manager and sued Sandpebble Builders, Inc. and Victor Canseco, personally for breach of contract. 

In support of the school district’s direct claim against Mr. Canseco, the district argued that Mr. Canseco was the president and owner of Sandpebble, that he exercised “complete dominion and control” over Sandpebble, and that Mr. Canseco used such power to commit a wrong against the school district. According to the school district, Mr. Canseco never intended to perform the work as negotiated under the contracts. Rather, Mr. Canseco engaged in bad faith and unfair negotiating tactics by repeated demands for new terms, after having reached an agreement in principle, which were designed to delay progress of the project in order to pressure the district to offer more favorable terms. 

Mr. Canseco moved to dismiss the claims against him personally on the ground that in his dealings with the district he acted solely in his capacity as president and principal owner of Sandpebble. Additionally, Mr. Canseco argued that the allegations contained in the complaint were insufficient to maintain an action against him personally. The trial court denied Mr. Canseco’s motion to dismiss and he appealed. 

Decision

The appellate court reversed the trial court, and dismissed the school district’s direct claims against Mr. Canseco. In so doing, the appellate court relied heavily on prior case law, which states, “The general rule, of course, is that a corporation exists independently of its owners, who are not personally liable for its obligations, and that individuals may incorporate for the express purpose of limiting their liability. The concept of piercing the corporate veil is an exception to this general rule, permitting, in certain circumstances, the imposition of personal liability on owners for the obligations of their corporation. A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court in equity should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over it in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the plaintiff.” 

According to the court, the factors to be considered in determining whether the owner has “abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form” include whether there was a failure to adhere to corporate formalities, inadequate capitalization of the corporation, personal and corporate commingling of accounts, and use of corporate funds for personal use. Although the school district alleged in its complaint that Mr. Canseco exercised “domination and control” over the corporation, it did not allege the factors necessary to find that Mr. Canseco “abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form.” Accordingly, the appellate court granted Mr. Canseco’s motion to dismiss the claims against him personally. 

Comment 

The analysis of whether a corporate principal can be held personally liable requires a detailed review of the relevant facts and the allegations contained in the complaint. However, even after a thorough review of the facts and allegations, judges and juries can still arrive at different conclusions. In this case, three of the five appellate judges agreed that the claims against Mr. Canseco should be dismissed, while two appellate judges would have let the claims remain. 

The majority of the judges held that an allegation in the complaint of “domination and control” is not standing alone, sufficient to state a cause of action for personal liability against the corporate owner. The two dissenting judges, however, held that the complaint states a cause of action against Mr. Canseco under the “piercing the corporate veil” theory because the complaint alleges Mr. Canseco’s bad faith conduct, consisting of his “repeated negotiations of contract terms with the school district, to which he would orally agree on multiple occasions while never intending to execute written contract documents, all in a deliberate effort to delay the construction project as a means of leveraging a greater percentage of completion from the school district.” 

An appeal of this decision to New York’s highest court remains possible, and would finally determine whether Mr. Canseco can be sued personally for corporate debt under the “piercing the corporate veil” theory.

Subcontractor Allowed Recovery for Value of Work Performed

Where a contractor has not been paid he can sue for a breach of contract, for which he can recover the amount due on the contract. If there is no contract in existence between the parties, the contractor can sue for the reasonable value of the work he had performed. This legal theory is called quantum meruit. To determine the amount the contractor should be awarded in quantum meruit, the court will focus on the fair and reasonable value of the work provided by the contractor. 

It is important that the contractor understand the distinction between the two remedies because the contractor’s amount of recovery may vary significantly depending on whether he is allowed to sue for breach of contract or recover on quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the work he has performed.

In the recent case of ADCO Electrical Corporation v. HRH Construction, LLC, the subcontractor elected to sue to recover damages in quantum meruit rather than for breach for contract.

Background 

HRH Construction, LLC, as construction manager, sent a notice of intent to ADCO Electrical Corporation, an electrical subcontractor, in connection with the construction of the Performing Arts Center in White Plains, New York. The notice of intent stated in part: “This will constitute a notice of our intent to award you a contract for the Electrical Work at the [Performing Arts Center] for the total sum of ‚Ķ$685,000. This agreement is in accordance with drawings‚Ķ dated 6/10/03 as prepared by Enviro Design, Inc.” The notice of intent also clearly stated that it was “subject to the execution of a formal contract by [general contractor], to follow”. Though the construction manager sent the subcontractor a $685,000 fixed-price subcontract, it was never signed by the general contractor, the construction manager or the subcontractor. 

The subcontractor supplied labor, materials and equipment to the project, for which it claimed a portion was unpaid. According to the subcontractor, the actual fair value of the labor, materials and equipment it supplied was $1,267,675. Since the subcontractor was of the belief that the actual fair value of the labor, materials and equipment supplied by it to the project was greater than the $685,000 stated in the letter of intent, it chose to sue based on quantum meruit. 

The general contractor and construction manager argued that a binding obligation arose under the subcontract by virtue of the fact that the parties agreed to all of the subcontract’s terms and simply failed to sign the document. Alternatively, they argued that the letter of intent created a contract and established an agreed fixed price which was binding on the subcontractor. 

A trial was held and the jury awarded an additional $393,469.75 to the subcontractor in quantum meruit. The general contractor and construction manager appealed.

Decision

The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the subcontractor. Relying on established case law, the court stated, “(i)f the parties to an agreement do not intend it to be binding upon them until it is reduced to writing and signed by both of them, they are not bound and may not be held liable until it has been written out and signed.” The court then looked to the plain language of the notice of intent, which contemplated a future written agreement that was never entered into. Since the written agreement was never entered into, the court held that both it and the letter of intent were not binding on the subcontractor. 

The court also found no merit to the argument that the parties had actually agreed to the subcontract’s terms, but simply failed to sign it. The court noted that rather than sign the subcontract, the subcontractor proposed several material modifications, which constituted its rejection of the proposed contract and a counteroffer that was never accepted by the general contractor or the construction manager. 

Since no binding contract governed the contractor’s work at the project, the appellate court agreed that the award for the fair and reasonable value of the work performed in quantum meruit was appropriate. 

Comment 

Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine which seeks to make a contractor “whole” by compensating him for the fair and reasonable value of his work. Quantum meruit is not available where a valid and enforceable agreement exists. Though the damages recoverable in quantum meruit may often approximate the damages recoverable for breach of contract, the prudent contractor should be familiar with the principles of quantum meruit. The distinction between the two legal remedies is readily apparent in this case where the fair and reasonable value of the work performed far exceeded the contemplated price of the work. 

Union Challenges Prevailing Wage Rate Determination

New York Labor Law Section 220 requires contractors to pay its workers the appropriate prevailing wages and benefits on public works projects. Collective bargaining agreements are used as a means of determining the prevailing wage rate, provided such agreements cover at least thirty percent of the workers in a particular trade. 

How is the prevailing rate determined where there are two unions covering the same work in a given locality? This question was answered in the recent case of Matter of International Union of Elevator Constructors Local No. 1 AFL-CIO v. Thompson, where the trade workers were represented by two unions, each of which had collective bargaining agreements containing different wage rates and benefits. 

Background 

In New York City, Local 1 and Local 3 are two main labor unions that represent elevator repair and maintenance workers. Local 1’s collective bargaining agreement provides for a higher rate of pay than that of Local 3. The Comptroller of the City of New York is responsible for establishing prevailing wage rates which must be paid to workers on public projects in New York City. This differs from projects outside of New York City, where it is the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor who is responsible for establishing prevailing wage rates. 

The City Comptroller used the rates set forth in Local 3’s collective bargaining agreement, rather than the higher rates set forth in Local 1’s collective bargaining agreement, in determining the prevailing wage rates for New York City elevator repair and maintenance workers for the period of July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009.

The City Comptroller conducted a survey to determine which union had the most members. Mailings were sent to 78 contractors previously identified as employing Local 1 members and 27 contractors previously identified as employing Local 3 members. Only 12 of the Local 1 contractors responded, indicating 130 members performed elevator work. Of the 27 Local 3 contractors, 20 contractors responded, indicating 1,331 members performed elevator work. The City Comptroller concluded that Local 3 had more members and therefore its rates were the “prevailing” wage rates among elevator repair and maintenance workers.

Local 1 learned of the Comptroller’s determination and sued to annul the determination. According to Local 1, the Comptroller’s survey method and determination were arbitrary, capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. Local 1 argued that it actually had 1,608 members to Local 3’s 1,331 members. It was Local 1’s position that when more than one union represented a particular type of worker, it was the historical practice for the Comptroller to use the rates set forth in the collective bargaining agreement for the predominant union for the trade, with the predominant union to be measured by the number of each union’s members. Since Local 1 claimed to have more members performing elevator work than Local 3, Local 1 argued that its rates should apply and the Comptroller’s determination should be annulled. 

Decision

The court agreed with Local 1’s argument that the Comptroller’s reliance upon the survey data was based on flawed data since so few Local 1 contractors responded. The court held that the use of a survey with such a poor response from contractors identified by Local 1 resulted in a determination that “is without foundation in fact.” In evaluating the meaning of the term “prevailing”, the court relied on past judicial decisions interpreting the word to mean “commonly accepted or predominant” and “most frequent.” Based on its analysis of the term “prevailing”, the court held that the larger union’s collective bargaining agreement should establish the prevailing wage rate. However, the court stopped short of annulling the determination of the City Comptroller to use Local 3’s rates. With the limited evidence presented, it could not be sure of which union truly had the greater number of members. The court ordered that a hearing take place with the taking of testimony and submission of evidence to determine which union had more members performing elevator work. The predominant union’s collective bargaining agreement would establish the prevailing wage rate. 

Comment 

The prevailing wage statute does not set forth how the “prevailing rate” is to be determined where there is more than one union representing a particular type of work. This case shines a light on how the prevailing wage rate should be determined in such a case. 

Court Rejects Bid for Unresponsiveness

Public construction contracts in New York are subject to the statutory competitive bidding requirements. They provide that the contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and responsive bidder. A “responsible” bidder is a contractor who has the skill, integrity, experience, financial and technical resources to complete the work in a satisfactory manner. A “responsive” bidder is a contractor who has complied with the exact requirements of the bid invitation. 

Bid protests frequently arise when the contractor’s bid is rejected because it was found to be “non-responsive”, as shown in the recent case of E.W. Tompkins Company, Inc. v. State University of New York. 

Background 

In January 2008, the State University of New York advertised for bids on a project involving the upgrade of a heating and cooling plant at its Albany campus. The work included asbestos abatement, demolition of parts of the existing system, installation of new equipment, new piping and extensive electrical work. The bid specifications required the successful contractor to have “completed at least three similar projects within the immediate past five years involving centrifugal chillers, boiler house controls, HTW generator burner replacement with controls, and replacement of large diameter piping over significant distances.” The specifications further stated that “references must be submitted with the bid, documenting the scope of work completed, the contract value, the time frame it was completed under, and the name of the client.” 

E.W. Tompkins Company, Inc. submitted its bid for the project on February 2008. After reviewing the bid, SUNY’s Associate Director of Architecture, Engineering & Construction sent a letter to the contractor requesting additional information with respect to the three projects that the contractor listed in its bid as evidence that it had the requisite prior work experience. After supplying its response to SUNY’s request, the contractor was notified that although it was the lowest bidder, its bid had been deemed “non-responsive” and the contract would be awarded to a competitor. 

SUNY based its non-responsive determination on the contractor’s failure to provide the requested information and SUNY’s inability to verify that the contractor’s prior work experience met the requirements of the specifications. Additionally, SUNY noted that the three projects listed by the contractor in its bid as evidence of this prior work experience had, in fact, been performed by another firm, Albany Specialties, Inc. 

Upon receipt of the non-responsive determination, the contractor had its attorney send a letter to the SUNY representative that, for the first time, advised that the contractor had merged with Albany Specialties, Inc. in 2005, which had the requisite experience. Based on the supplemental information, the contractor asked that its bid be reconsidered. SUNY denied the request to reconsider, awarded the contract to the second bidder and the contractor sued SUNY. 

The trial court held that SUNY had a reasonable basis to conclude that the contractor’s bid was non-responsive and dismissed the case. The contractor appealed. 

Decision
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s holding. In so doing, the court relied on well established case law stating, “judicial review of an agency’s decision denying or awarding the contract is limited to ascertaining whether there is a rational basis to support the agency’s determination.” In addition, the court stated that “an agency, when composing bid specifications, may establish requirements – as long as they are rationally based – that set forth criteria for experience and qualifications that must be met for an entity to be an eligible bidder and, it may disqualify a bidder for failure to comply with these requirements.”

In applying the law to the facts, the court simply recounted the contractor’s original failure to provide any description of the scope for work completed for each project it identified as relevant, the contractor’s insufficient clarification, the performance of the relied upon work by a separate entity, and the contractor’s failure to indicate in any of its bid documents that it had merged with the company who did perform the work. Based on these facts, the appellate court found SUNY’s decision of “non-responsiveness” to have a rational basis. 

Comment 

Courts give broad discretion to public entities when reviewing a responsiveness determination. Where the agency’s insistence upon strict compliance with the bid specifications has a rational basis, the courts will uphold the determination of non-responsiveness. 

Court Addresses Liability of Successor Company

Under what circumstances can a successor company be liable for the debts of a predecessor company? A company does not become a successor company responsible for the debts of the so-called predecessor company merely by purchasing the earlier company’s assets. In the recent case of Crown Painting & Decorating, Inc. v. VBH Luxury, Inc., a subcontractor sought to recover monies due for work performed against a general contractor on the basis that it is a successor company to the previous contractor for which the work was performed. 

Background 

Crown Painting & Decorating, Inc. subcontracted with Maxcon General Contracting Corp. to perform work at a building owned by VBH Luxury, Inc. The subcontractor’s work was completed in August 2002. In January 2003 the president of the general contractor, Maxcon, formed another corporation, Omnicon Interiors, Inc., of which he was also president. Maxcon did not pay the subcontractor as agreed and the subcontractor sued Maxcon for breach of contract. The subcontractor also sued Omnicon, claiming that as a successor company, it was liable for the debts of Maxcon. 

According to the subcontractor, Omnicon not only had the same president as Maxcon, but performed the same work, had the same clients, the same secretary, the same telephone number and was “right around the corner” from Maxcon’s old place of business. Additionally, in March of 2004, in response to the subcontractor’s payment demands, the subcontractor was invited to go to Omnicon’s office and receive partial payments in the amounts of $1,500 and $750, with both checks paid from Onmicon’s bank account. Omnicon also acknowledged that Maxcon was “no longer doing business.” 

Omnicon argued that it was formed after the subcontractor’s work was completed, that it had no involvement in the subcontractor’s work, that it never entered into any contracts with the subcontractor, and that Omnicon’s place of business was different than Maxcon’s. Based on these argument’s Omnicon moved for summary judgment, seeking to have the subcontractor’s claims against it dismissed.

Decision

The court denied Omnicon’s motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the court first noted that a corporation does not become a successor corporation responsible for the obligations of the predecessor merely by acquiring the latter’s assets. However, the court also pointed out that there are four ways in which a corporation may become liable for a predecessor’s obligations. The four ways are: (1) where the corporation expressly or impliedly assumed the predecessor’s tort liability; (2) where there was a consolidation or merger of seller and purchaser; (3) where the purchasing corporation was a mere continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape obligations. The court determined methods three and four did not apply because Maxcon was never dissolved and the subcontractor never alleged fraud. 

However, as to methods one and two, the court determined that Omnicon was possibly liable to the subcontractor under a successor liability theory. In so holding, the court focused on the subcontractor’s argument that Omnicon assumed Maxcon’s debt to the subcontractor by promising to pay and then partially paying the subcontractor. The court also focused on the similarities in ownership and business operations of Macon and Omnicon. 

Since Omnicon was potentially liable under the successor liability theory, the court denied its motion for summary judgment. 

Comment 

Successor liability is often a bone of contention in the construction industry. Though courts are hesitant to extend liability to separate and distinct companies, this case illustrates that there are exceptions. The prudent contractor should be aware of these exceptions in conducting its business operations.