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Court Rules on Method for Calculating Damages

What is the proper method for calculating the value of work performed and lost profit damages where a contractor is wrongfully terminated? What is the measure of damages to the owner of a project where the contractor willfully and intentionally exaggerates its mechanic’s lien? Both questions were recently addressed by an appellate court in Abra Construction Corp. v. 112 Duane Associates, LLC. 

Background 

Abra Construction Corp., a contractor, entered into a construction agreement with 112 Duane Associates, LLC, an owner. After working on the job for approximately two months, the owner terminated the contractor. Disputes arose over the propriety of termination and the amount due to the contractor. Since the parties were unable to resolve their disputes, the contractor filed a mechanic’s lien against the project and commenced a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action. 

The owner defended the foreclosure action on the grounds that termination was proper, and, the owner argued that even if the termination was improper, the amount of the contractor’s mechanic’s lien was willfully exaggerated. The contractor argued that termination was improper, that it was entitled to its lost profit because of the wrongful termination, and that the mechanic’s lien was not willfully exaggerated since, according to the contractor, it was entitled to file a lien for the percentage of its contract based on overall project completion. In other words, the contractor argued that if the project was 50% complete, it could file a lien for 50% of its contract value, regardless of the extent of the work actually performed by the contractor. The percentage of completion method used by the contractor for calculating the value of its work was inaccurate because the contractor failed to establish substantial completion of the contract as a whole. In addition, according to the court, the completion-percentage method was rejected because the contractor sought to obtain the benefit of the percentage of completion of work performed by other subcontractors, for which the contractor did not pay them. 

The trial court properly calculated the value of the work performed by using the contractor’s payroll records, adding reasonable percentages for the cost of labor, overhead and profit, and adding to that figure the amount of proven cost of the contractor’s materials. 

Decision

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. In so doing, the court first noted that under the mechanic’s lien law a contractor is only entitled to file a lien for the value of labor and materials it provided to the project. The court held that the evidence amply supported the trial court’s finding that the contractor had willfully and intentionally exaggerated its mechanic’s lien since the contractor knew that the amount of its mechanic’s lien was unrelated to the value of labor and materials it actually furnished to the project. The court pointed out that the amount of the lien was almost seven times the amount due and owing to the contractor. 

The court noted that the penalty for filing a willfully exaggerated lien is the difference between the lien as filed and the amount due to the contractor. Based on the court’s findings, the contractor’s lost contract profit of $294,808.20, which was awarded to the contractor because it was wrongfully terminated, was reduced by $243,808.20, which was the amount by which the court determined the contractor’s lien had been willfully exaggerated. According to the court, rather than receiving its lost profits of $294,519.05, the contractor was only entitled to recover $50,710.85 because it filed a willfully exaggerated lien. 

Comment 

As illustrated in this case, the value of work performed and lost profit are properly awarded when a contractor is wrongfully terminated. As further demonstrated, however, mechanic’s liens are intended to secure the value of labor and materials actually furnished to a project. The filing of a willfully exaggerated mechanic’s lien subjects a contractor to harsh penalties, which includes liability to the owner for the amount of the exaggeration, the amount of the owner’s attorneys’ fees, and the costs of discharging the lien by a discharge bond or otherwise. Contractors should be careful to ensure that the amount of their lien is limited to the value of labor and materials actually furnished to the project. 

Contractual Time Limitation Bars Sub’s Claim

Contractors and subcontractors should be aware of contractual and statutory time limitations by which a claimant must commence an action for breach of contract. If the lawsuit is not started within the contractual or statutory time period, the suit will be dismissed as time-barred. 

Under New York’s statute of limitations, a breach of contract claim must be brought within six years from the date upon which the cause of action accrued. Claimants should be mindful, however, that the parties’ agreement may reduce the statutory six year time period to a substantially shorter time period. 

In addition, problems may arise as to when the cause of action accrues to commence the limitation period. In the recent case of Vardo Construction Corp. v. Spectrum Contracting Group, Inc., the court applied the short four-month contractual period to bar the subcontractor’s claim for breach of contract. 

Background 

Spectrum Contracting Group, Inc., as general contractor, entered into an agreement with the New York City Housing Authority to provide labor and materials for a project known as the Polo Grounds Towers Community Center. By written agreement, Spectrum subcontracted a portion of the work to Vardo Construction Corp. The subcontract established a four-month time limitation on claims by the subcontractor against the general contractor. The four-month time limitation ran from the date of the breach of the subcontract. A dispute arose over payment and completion of the work, and on September 23, 2005, the general contractor sent a letter advising the subcontractor that the general contractor would be completing the subcontractor’s work and backcharging the subcontractor for the costs to do so. 

The subcontractor sued the general contractor for breach of contract on December 22, 2006, seeking to recover its subcontract balance. The general contractor moved for summary judgment based on of the subcontract’s four-month limitation period. 

Decision

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the general contractor. In so doing, the court relied on the general contractor’s September 23, 2005 letter to the subcontractor. The court noted that the correspondence clearly advised the subcontractor that the general contractor was going to complete the subcontractor’s work, and would backcharge the subcontractor for the costs incurred in so doing. According to the court, this was when the subcontractor knew that it was not going to be allowed to complete the project, would not be paid until completion of the project by another party, and indeed might not be paid at all. The court held that it was at this time that the subcontractor had a claim against the general contractor for breach of contract. Consequently, the four-month contractual limitations period ran from September 23, 2005 to January 23, 2006. Since the four-month limitations period expired on January 23, 2006, and the subcontractor’s action was not commenced until December 22, 2006, the action was dismissed as time-barred by the court. 

Comment 

Courts will strictly construe time limitations periods that are voluntarily negotiated by the parties. This means that before even considering the merits of a claim, courts will make certain that there has been strict compliance with the parties’ agreed-upon time limitation periods. Courts will not rewrite or change the terms of an agreement that was freely negotiated between the parties. The unpaid claimant, or potential claimant, should make every effort to become thoroughly familiar with their contractual limitation periods. If the terms of the limitations period are not complied with, the claim will often be lost. 

Subcontractor Not Entitled to Delay Damages

The “no-damage-for-delay” clause by which a party denies liability when it is responsible for delays has been the subject of much litigation. The clause is found in both private construction contracts and public works contracts and is generally upheld as valid by the courts. There are exceptions, however, to the enforceability of this clause. 

In the recent case of Premier-New York Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp., a court ruled on the enforceability of a no-damage-for-delay provision contained in a subcontract.

Background 

Trataros Construction, Inc., a prime contractor, subcontracted with Premier-New York, Inc. to perform the roofing work at Baruch College located in Manhattan. The project was significantly delayed and the subcontractor sued the prime contractor for its delay damages. 

The subcontractor argued that as a result of changes to the project schedule and re-sequencing of the work, it was entitled to reimbursement for its additional costs since it was forced to: a) work in winter conditions; b) perform additional and extra work as a result of the installation of the curtain wall prior to the start of roofing work; c) stop and start work as other trades had material stored on the roof or were working in areas needed for the sucontractor’s work; d) move materials by elevator rather than by the hoist; e) have inadequate storage area for its materials; f) work in an inefficient and disrupted fashion; and g.) work for a prolonged period of time during which time there were prevailing wage increases mandated for its workforce. 

The prime contractor moved to dismiss the claims for delay damages. The prime contractor did not dispute that the subcontractor incurred extra costs as a result of project delays. Rather, the prime contractor argued that the subcontract’s no-damage-for-delay clause barred the delay damage claims against the prime contractor. The provision stated, “should the Subcontractor’s performance of this Subcontract be delayed‚Ķthe Subcontractor‚Ķshall not be entitled to any increase in the Subcontract Price or to damages or additional compensation‚Ķ” 

The subcontract further required the subcontractor to waive any claim for additional compensation arising from any of the following site conditions: (1) the work was hindered by delays or accelerations of the project schedule; (2) the work was rescheduled; (3) the work was re-sequenced; and (4) the work was interrupted and re-started. 

The subcontractor argued that the no-damage-for-delay provision was not enforceable because it fell within the four recognized exceptions to a no-damage-for delay clause. These exceptions are: (1) delays caused by the prime contractor’s bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct; (2) uncontemplated delays; (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract by the prime contractor; and (4) delays resulting from the prime contractor’s breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract. 

Decision

The trial court dismissed the delay claims against the prime contractor. The court held that all damages claimed by the subcontractor were a result of project delays, which were expressly waived under the plain language of the subcontract’s no-damage-for-delay clause. 

The court relied heavily on established case law upholding the validity of no-damage-for-delay clauses. The court addressed the four exceptions to the enforceability of a no-damage-for delay clause, and held that none of them applied in this case. 

With respect to the subcontractor’s claim that the delays were caused by the prime contractor’s bad faith, willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, the court found no evidence to suggest that the prime contractor made intentional misleading representations or withheld material information from the subcontractor before submitting its bid. The court further relied on the subcontract provisions which obligated the bidder to inspect site conditions and investigate the requirements of its work.

In rejecting the subcontractor’s further argument that the delays were uncontemplated, the court noted that “the uncontemplated delay exception only applies if the claimant can demonstrate that the delays were wholly unanticipated.” The court stated that “if the alleged delays were foreseeable under a project’s particular circumstances, or were discussed in the contract, damages arising from those delays are barred.” In relying upon prior case law, the court held that slow or poor performance by other project subcontractors is foreseeable, and that the general contractor’s inept administration of its contract is also foreseeable. According to the court, the subcontractor’s allegations fell within these categories, and therefore the delays were foreseeable risks of construction. Since the delays were anticipated at the time the subcontract was signed, the court ruled that they did not fall within the “uncontemplated delay” exception to the no-damage-for-delay clause. 

The court also found no evidence regarding the subcontractor’s claim that the delays were so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract. 

Finally, the court rejected the subcontractor’s argument that the prime contractor’s conduct constituted a fundamental breach of the contract that would render the no-damage-for-delay clause unenforceable. In support of this argument, the subcontractor claimed that the “sample CPM schedule” provided by the prime contractor with the bid package had been changed and the work was re-sequenced without notice to the subcontractor, forcing the subcontractor to incur additional costs. The court held that the subcontractor’s reliance on the sample CPM schedule was unreasonable, pointing out that the subcontract clearly identified the document as being only a “sample” schedule.

Comment 

In New York, the no-damage-for-delay clause is generally enforceable, unless it falls within the four recognized exceptions to its enforcement. The courts are not permitted to rewrite the contract; they will ordinarily enforce the plain language of the no-damage-for-delay clause as written. Contractors and subcontractors should be wary of this clause when negotiating contract terms and conditions. 

Amendments to The New York City School Construction Authority Act Allow Subcontractors to Elect a Remedy for Nonpayment

I. Background  

Section 101 of the General Municipal Law, also known as the Wicks Law, sets forth requirements for public construction contracts.  The Wicks Law requires public works owners to prepare separate specifications and award separate contracts for general construction, plumbing, HVAC, and electrical work when the total value of the contract exceeds three million dollars for public construction within New York City.  

The Wicks Law provision was preempted by Section 1735 of the New York City School Construction Authority Act (“Act”) for contracts awarded by the New York City School Construction Authority (“Authority”) between July 1, 1989 and June 13, 2014.  Unlike Wicks Law contracts, the Authority can award one contract.  Contractors submitting bids with the Authority during this time period must identify the names of the subcontractors they intend to use for the performance of the plumbing, HVAC, and electrical work.    

Contracts that come within the Act are also subject to its payment protection clause.  Under Subsection Six of the Act, contractors are required to pay subcontractors within seven (7) days of receiving payment from the Authority.  The contractors must pay their subcontractors the portion of the proceeds of the payment they receive representing the value of the work performed by their subcontractors which has been approved and paid for by the Authority.  Contractors may hold back an amount necessary to satisfy any claims, liens or judgments against the subcontractor which have not been suitably discharged and they may hold retainage.  Retainage is set at either five or ten percent depending on whether the subcontractor has posted a performance and/or a labor and material payment bond.   

If a subcontractor notifies the contractor and the Authority that the contractor failed to make a required payment, the contractor must provide the Authority with either proof of the payment to the subcontractor or a notice that the amount claimed by the subcontractor is in dispute.  The contractor must do so within five (5) calendar days of receiving the notice of nonpayment from the subcontractor.  If the contractor fails to respond to the subcontractor’s notice or notifies the Authority that the payment to the subcontractor is in dispute, the Authority withholds money from the contractor’s payment.  If the contractor disputes the payment owed to the subcontractor, the Authority deposits the amount withheld into an interest bearing account.  Any amounts owed together with interest will be paid to the party ultimately determined to be entitled to payment.  The Act also contains provisions for determining priority and distribution of amounts withheld in the event of multiple withholdings.  

Amendments to the Act became effective on September 17, 2010 (“Amendments”).  The purpose of the Amendments the Amendments will significantly impact the amounts withheld from contractors by the Authority, contractors’ ability to bond the payment amounts disputed by subcontractors, and subcontractors’ remedies for payment protection.   

Pursuant to the Amendments, the Authority will now withhold one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the portion of the Authority’s prior payment to the contractor which the subcontractor claims to be due from the contractor.  Notably, the amendment does not alter that portion of the statute that provides that if the contractor fails to dispute the withholding the Authority will remit the amount withheld (i.e. the 150%) to the subcontractor and deduct such payment from the amounts then otherwise due and payable to the contractor.  Such payments by the Authority are deemed a payment by the Authority to the contractor. Prior to the Amendments, the Authority held an amount equal to the prior payment to the contractor which the subcontractor claimed to be due from the contractor.  

To avoid the Authority’s one hundred fifty percent (150%) withholding, the contractor can file a bond or undertaking in the amount(s) withheld by the Authority.  This remedy was added by the Amendments and is new to the Act.  

The Act was also modified so that subcontractors must now choose between filing a lien or seeking payment protection from the Authority under the one hundred fifty percent withholding clause of Section 1735.  Going forward, a subcontractor can file a lien for the amount disputed in the event the Authority does not withhold the required amounts within sixty (60) days after the Authority’s receipt of written notification from the subcontractor of the contrator’s failure to make a payment.  Significantly, such a lien will be the subcontractor’s sole remedy in lieu of the remedies provided by the Act.  This election of remedies clause was added to avoid the financial burden placed on a contractor when the Authority withheld a percentage of the amounts owed to a subcontractor in addition to one hundred fifty percent of its lien amount.  The Authority will stop this double withholding by limiting the amounts withheld to either one hundred fifty percent of a subcontractor’s lien or one hundred fifty percent of a subcontractor’s claim under the special payment protections of section 1735.  

These provisions do not apply to subcontractors acting as primes (i.e. subcontractors whose contract is limited to the performance of a single scope of the plumbing, electrical or mechanical work for the project). These Amendments are already effective and certain contractors and subcontractors currently performing work for the Authority are already subject to these provisions if their contracts come within the Act rather than the Wicks Law. 

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP. 

This Legal Alert is supplied for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice. You should consult competent legal counsel depending on the specific issues of your matter. 

Court Rules Owner Waived Contract Requirement for Written Extra Work

When the contract documents require changes and extras to be in writing, courts generally hold that a contractor who fails to obtain a written change order or extra prior to performing the change or extra will not be paid for that work. In some instances however, courts have allowed a contractor to recover, regardless of the existence of a provision in the contract documents requiring changes and extras to be in writing. 

In the case of B. Reitman Blacktop, Inc. v. Missirlian, a court allowed the contractor to recover for extra work despite a standard contract provision requiring modifications to the contract to be made in writing.

Background 

A paving contractor entered into a written agreement with a homeowner to install a driveway. The agreement stated that the contract price was to be determined by the final square footage of the installed driveway. The agreement also contained a provision requiring that modifications to the agreement must be in writing to be enforceable. During the course of construction, the homeowner requested the installation of Belgium blocks on part of the driveway. The written agreement did not address the installation of Belgium blocks. When the contractor sought to recover additional moneys from the homeowner on account of the increased costs associated with the Belgium block, the homeowner refused, and the contractor sued. 

According to the homeowner, it only had to pay for the end square footage of the driveway, in accordance with the pricing set forth in the parties’ written agreement. The contractor, however, argued that the homeowner verbally requested the Belgium block upgrade and was responsible for paying for the added costs associated with the installation. The trial court ruled in favor of the contractor and the homeowner appealed. 

Decision

Decision The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision. In so doing, the court stated that normally the law bars oral modifications to a contract which expressly provides that modifications must be in writing. However, the court also noted that an exception applies when there is part performance by the party disputing the existence of the subsequent agreement. In this case, the homeowner was willing to include the square footage of the Belgium block in the final square footage calculation of the driveway. In the court’s eyes, this provided clear evidence that a later agreement for the use of Belgium block was entered into between the parties. Since there was clear evidence that the homeowner requested a Belgium block upgrade, and the contractor supplied the Belgium block in response to the request, the court awarded the contractor its increased costs associated with the installation. 

Comment 

Where an owner consents to upgrades and modifications without written authorization, the consent may constitute a waiver of the written authorization requirement. The holding in this case, however, is an exception to the rule of law that a contract clause requiring written authorization for changes and extras is valid and enforceable. There is much more judicial support for the general rule that a contractor who fails to obtain the required written authorization for changes or extras will not be paid for that work. The prudent contractor should refuse to perform any changes or extra work until it receives a written order in the form specified by the construction documents. 

Contract Awarded to Second Low Bidder Upheld

A recent case out of the Appellate Division, Second Department is instructive to 
public works contract bidders, who believe that the low bidder gets the contract. The 
case is In the Matter of AAA Carting and Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Southeast.1
In this case the Town awarded a contract for rubbish removal to the second low bidder 
(Suburban Carting). and the low bidder (AAA Carting) sought court review of the 
Town’s decision by bringing an Article 78 proceeding. The Town favored the second 
low bidder on the basis that it could offer superior service as compared to the low bidder. 
To the Town, the second low bidder was the lowest responsible bidder even though the 
cost would be higher. 
 
The Supreme Court, Putnam County, granted the low bidder’s Article 78 petition, thereby 
overturning the Town’s decision to award the contract to the second low bidder. The 
second low bidder (not the Town) appealed to the Appellate Division, Second 
Department. The appellate court reversed the lower court and dismissed the low bidder’s 
Article 78 petition, leaving intact the contract between the Town and the second low 
bidder. 
 
In reversing the lower court, the appellate court summarized several principals of law that 
potential bid challengers should be aware of: 
 
a. A court reviewing an Article 78 bid challenge may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the public body unless the decision is arbitrary and capricious or the 
public body’s exercise of discretion lacks a rational basis. 
 
b. It is not the reviewing court’s role to weigh the desirability of any action 
or to choose among alternatives. 
 
c. General Municipal Law §103(1) requires any public works contract for 
more than $10,000 to be awarded to “the lowest responsible bidder”. This is an elastic 
concept that includes “consideration of skill, judgment and integrity”. 
 
d. Public bodies may investigate the experience and background of the 
bidder. 
 
e. Public bodies need not give “slavish attention to financial considerations 
alone.” 
 
f. Where good reason exists, the low bid may be disapproved or all the bids 
rejected. 
 
g. Where a public body exercises its discretion and rejects one or more bids, 
its decision “ought not to be disturbed by the courts unless it is irrational, dishonest or 
otherwise unlawful.” 
 
Successful bid challenges are difficult to achieve. Now you know why. 

 
 
 \
This alert provides general information only. It is not intended to provide legal advice. 
We encourage you to contact an attorney should you desire to discuss specific situations 
for which you may need legal advice. 

 

 1 74 AD3d 959 (2nd Dept. 2010)  

Owners and Contractors

New York’s Labor Law 240(1) covers Employees, not Volunteers. New York’s employee protection scaffold law, Labor Law §240(1), makes all contractors and owners and their agents (except for owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work) responsible for work-site safety practices. However, in a recent case decided by the New York Court of Appeals, light has now been shed on who is and is not a protected employee.

Attempted Bribery of City Employees

Contractor Forfeits $260,000 Balance owed on Contract. The Appellate Division, First Department, has ruled that a Contractor must forfeit more than $260,000 owed to it by the City under a contract to renovate the Brooklyn Borough Hall, because its president attempted to bribe two City workers who were reviewing a $101,000 change order request submitted by the contractor. The Contractor’s president had left envelopes containing $3,000 and a Christmas card on the employees’ desks. One envelope also contained the pending change order request. After being alerted by its employees, the City’s Department of Investigation obtained the Contractor’s president’s admission that he had left the envelopes. The City cancelled the almost fully-completed contract and told the Contractor that no further payment would be made.

Allowance Change Orders Will Be Issued By The NYC School Construction Authority.

Contractors who perform (or intend to perform) public contracting work for the NYC School Construction Authority, may have reason to rejoice (a little). As of March 19, 2008, a new provision has been added to the SCA’s Construction General Conditions. New Section 7.04, “Allowance Change Orders” should alleviate some of the economic pressure faced by Contractors and Subcontractors when they are directed to perform changed work, but are unable to agree with the SCA as to the value and credits for that work.