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Court Reminds Us That Claims Generally Must Be Asserted Against Those With Whom You Have A Contract

Anyone who has undertaken a construction project knows that there are many activities to be coordinated, with many different people performing these activities. It is also accepted that different trades generally have no duty (or right) to direct the work of other trades, and that ultimately all direction comes from the general contractor or construction manager. In a like vein, claims by and against trade contractors must flow in the same direction—up or down, to or from the GC/CM. In the recent case of Greg Beeche, Logistics, Inc. v Cross Country Construction, Inc., successfully argued by my co-author, Mr. Spaun, an appellate court reminds us that absent exceptional circumstances, differing trade contractors cannot assert claims directly against each other, and that all claims must be asserted by or through the GC/CM.

Background

In June of 2014, Cross Country Construction entered into a subcontract with Lendlease, as agent for an owner/developer, VNO 225 West 58th Street, LLC, to perform the concrete and superstructure work for the construction of a 69 story condominium in Manhattan. In conjunction with the preparation for that work, Cross Country was obligated to provide a schedule of its own activities to be incorporated into Lendlease’s master schedule. Cross Country provided such information, and Lendlease ultimately created a master schedule.

Around the same time, Lendlease entered into a similar subcontract with Enclos for it to furnish and install the curtain wall. Enclos, in turn, entered into a fixed term lease with Greg Beeche, Logistics, for Beeche to furnish the scaffolding that would permit Enclos to perform its work. In determining the length of the lease, Beeche referred to Lendlease’s master schedule, and built in a small cushion.

Like many projects, this one was beset with various delays. These delays required that Beeche’s equipment remain on site for 20 months longer than the extended lease term. Ultimately, the project was completed and Beeche’s equipment was removed. In order to obtain its final payment, Beeche executed standard releases and waivers of lien releasing the owner, Lendlease, and Enclos—the very parties against which Beeche may have had a delay claim (and two of which could have backcharged Cross Country, if such were justified).

With the proper targets of its claims released, Beeche commenced suit against Cross Country to recover for the extra time, alleging that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of Cross Country’s contract (which Beeche claimed was breached by Cross Country), and that Cross Country’s misrepresentations (its contribution to the master schedule) were negligent. Cross Country moved to dismiss, arguing that the beneficiaries to the contract were limited to the owner and the construction manager, and that there was no relationship between these two separately retained subcontractors that approached privity sufficient that Beeche was justified on relying on Cross Country’s contribution to Lendlease’s schedule (and assuming that a prediction of future scheduling was actually a statement of fact that could be relied upon at all). Beeche opposed, contending that without language limiting the beneficiaries to those contracting parties, it could also be construed as a beneficiary of the contract. As to the negligent misrepresentation claim, Beeche argued that as the superstructure contractor, Cross Country was the “premier subcontractor” and, thus, all other schedules were built from Cross Country’s and, as such, other subcontractors not in privity with Cross Country could nonetheless maintain claims against it.

The motion court granted the motion to dismiss, first noting that Beeche had released its claims against the parties with which it was in privity, and then finding that the language of the contract specifically precluded third party beneficiaries. As to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court found that Cross Country had no greater or lesser relationship with Beeche than that of other subcontractors also not in privity of contract with Cross Country, and therefore Beeche could not recover from Cross Country because, to do otherwise, “would subject Cross Country to limitless liability for any project delays”.

Beeche appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. Citing well settled case law, the appellate court held that regardless of any prohibitory language in Cross Country’s contract, Beeche had not carried its burden to establish that Cross Country and the owner intended that Beeche be benefitted by the contract, or that Beeche had the right to enforce the terms of that contract. As to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the appellate court held that Beeche was not a known party to Cross Country. As a result, Cross Country had no duty to speak with care to Beech on the subject of scheduling (or any other subject). Importantly, similar to the motion court, the appellate court also noted that to permit a claim like this to proceed “would be to sanction limitless liability against contractors such as (Cross Country) for delays ubiquitous in construction”. Beeche moved before New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, for a further appeal; that motion was denied, leaving the appellate court’s dismissal of Beeche’s claims in place.

Comment

This case reinforces that courts frown on claims asserted outside of a contractor’s own chain of contractual privity, such as those between distinct trade contractors. As the appellate court noted, while all contractors are generally performing for the benefit of the project as a whole, to permit these type of inter-trade claims would be to subject contractors to potentially limitless liability for the type of problems that are pervasive on a construction project. However, contractors are not without recourse and can assert such claims against the GC/CM and/or the owner (who can pass any claim on in the form of a backcharge)—provided that they do not blindly sign a release and waiver of lien for the sake of obtaining a quick payment. While many owners and general contractors will not release payment in the absence of a signed release and waiver of lien, there may still be ways to preserve your right to preserve your right to later pursue such claims. Consulting with experienced construction counsel can help you determine what your exact rights are under your contract, and how to best preserve such claims while still being paid your undisputed contract balance and retainage.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Adequate Lock-Out/Tag-Out Systems Must Be In Place to Prevent Employee Injuries When Using Energized Equipment

The decision in Secretary of Labor v. Ward Vessel & Exchange Corporation reminds us that construction companies must have adequate lock-out/tag-out systems in place to prevent injuries to their employees including during the servicing of such equipment. The decision arose from a January 23, 2021 incident in which Ward Vessel & Exchanger Corporation (“Ward”)’s employee had the tips of his fingers pinched in a plate rolling machine as his supervisor who was troubleshooting a power problem, activated the equipment.

Following the reporting of the accident, OSHA’s Compliance Safety and Health Officer Javier Fernandez (“CSHO Fernandez”) appeared, and conducted an investigation, inspected the equipment, a Roundo plate rolling machine (the “Roundo”), and conducted interviews of Ward’s employees. Following its investigation, OSHA issued multiple citations against Ward. OSHA alleged that Ward failed to implement adequate lock-out/tag-out (“LOTO”) procedures. Ward replied that the LOTO safety standard for which they were cited did not apply in this instance and furthermore that the LOTO requirements did not apply to troubleshooting because the work process either required an energization of the Roundo or that the proper implementation of the work processes removed the subject hazard.

The Roundo consists of a series of rollers that turn large metal plates into cylinders. The equipment is powered by a hydraulic motor which is energized by a one cord and plug. The cord is then plugged into a 480-volt breaker on the adjacent wall. Ward’s Vice President of Production, Bob Besh (“Besh”) testified at trial that the roller is a single-plug, single energy source machine, which can be de-energized by simply unplugging it. Ward’s employees can either lock-out the breaker on the wall or place the plug in a lockable container. The latter method was preferred since one could run an extension cord to plug the machine into a different outlet. The roller was energized in the same manner as about 30 to 40 other welding machines at their work-shop which all used a single 480-volt break and single cord and plug. Ward used the same general procedure for LOTO on all 480-volt, cord and plug machines.

During his inspection and investigation, CSHO Fernandez learned that the Roundo had hydraulics in addition to the electric power and deemed that the single, general procedure for LOTO was insufficient. However, CSHO Fernandez during his testimony was unable to describe how the hydraulics worked nor how the hydraulic energy should be controlled to prevent unexpected energization. Besh, though testified that the hydraulics were used to raise the bottom rolls to impact the metal but that there was no stored potential energy to create a pinch point when the equipment was not in use because there was no pressure on the hydraulics.

Ward’s night supervisor, Frank Hernandez further testified as to the process for making steel cylinders and using the Roundo, which requires a two-person team process to clean and prepare the equipment. The process involves creating space between the three rollers to wipe down and clean the rollers and then wrap each one in plastic. Ward does not require its employees to de-energize the Roundo when preparing it for stainless steel applications but rather requires a series of steps to remove any pinch-point hazards or the release of hazardous energy. On the night of the incident, Hernandez directed two employees to prepare the Roundo for stainless steel cylinders but when they tried to lower the bottom rollers to begin the cleaning process the rollers failed to move. Hernandez was called over and two of them began to troubleshoot while Hernandez directed the third employee (the injured employee referred to as “IE”) to gather additional cleaning solution. Hernandez discovered that a superfluous extension cord had been connected from the Roundo to the breaker. In light of the voltage at issue, the employee turned off the breaker, removed the extension cord, reconnected the Roundo’s cord and then re-energized the breaker. At that point, Hernandez activated the rollers when he heard the IE begin to scream. Apparently, and unbeknownst to either Hernandez or the other troubleshooting employee, the IE had not only collected the cleaning solution, but he had begun wiping down the rollers so that once the Roundo was activated, the IE’s fingers were briefly pinched between two rollers before he pulled them out. He was taken to the hospital and received treatment.

Following the accident, Ward conducted its own internal investigation and determined that the injured employee had violated the company rules by attempting to clean before all necessary steps had been taken. Specifically, the two employees knew that they were not supposed to proceed with cleaning when the rollers had not been lowered and they had in fact contacted their supervisor Hernandez regarding the problem. As the rollers were in the “up” position IE attempted to clean, which constituted a violation of company policy. More importantly, Ward determined that Hernandez failed to ensure the area surrounding the Roundo was clear prior to troubleshooting the machine and he was subsequently disciplined.

The LOTO standard covers the servicing and maintenance of machines in which the “unexpected energization or start up… or release of stored energy could cause injuries to employees.” Ward claimed two exceptions to the standard (1) the exception for cord-and-plug machines and (2) the exception from the machine-specific procedure requirements and the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) agreed. The ALJ found that the “hazards of the unexpected energization… is controlled by the unplugging of the equipment from the energy source and by the plug being under the exclusive control of the employee performing the servicing…” Here, disconnecting the Roundo from its power source removed the hazard of stored energy potential energy as there was no stored pressure in the hydraulics. The lock-out condition was accomplished by placing the plug of the machine in a lockable container. Hernandez had been performing energized troubleshooting at the time of the incident which was governed by a different safety standard and was accounted for in Ward’s LOTO policy. Employees would have to adjust the roller heights to eliminate the pinch points as well as speed down the velocity of the rollers to a “snail’s pace” to wrap them in plastic. Ward’s policy requiring Hernandez to clear the surrounding area from the equipment while troubleshooting was compliant with the LOTO standard, which required it as a condition of performing “operational testing”. Basically, Ward is permitted to conduct energized operational testing of equipment as long as it takes proper precautions to avoid injury. Here, Hernandez violated Ward’s policy which caused this accident and the ALJ agreed. Given that Ward had been cited under certain LOTO standards for which it was determined it was exempt the Citations items were vacated. The Secretary had the burden to match the safety standard with the condition allegedly violated and here it had failed to meet its burden.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Important Notice: New FinCEN Reporting Obligations Under the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA)

There are critical forthcoming changes related to the disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). These changes are in line with the requirements of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) and accompanying Treasury regulations. The introduction of this mandate marks a significant move in the fight against money laundering and the misuse of shell companies for illicit purposes.

  1. Reporting Entities: Entities such as corporations, LEGImlimited liability companies (LLCs), and similar organizations established through a Secretary of State or equivalent authority are required to report Beneficial Ownership information to FinCEN. It’s important to note that exemptions apply to large corporations meeting certain criteria, publicly traded companies, and tax-exempt organizations. Additionally, foreign entities active in the U.S. may be subject to these reporting requirements.
  2. Identifying a Beneficial Owner: A Beneficial Owner is defined as an individual who, either directly or indirectly, has control over an entity or holds a minimum of 25% equity interest in it. This encompasses senior executives and individuals who play a significant role in pivotal decisions.
  3. Disclosure Requirements: Entities must disclose essential details about the company and personal information of Beneficial Owners, including names, dates of birth, addresses, and identification documentation. This data will be maintained in a secure, non-public database, accessible only to specific government bodies.
  4. Compliance Timelines:
    • Entities established before January 1, 2024: Must report between January 1, 2024, and January 1, 2025
    • Entities established in 2024: Required to report within 90 days of their formation.
    • Entities established in 2025 or later: Obligated to report within 30 days of formation.
  5. Consequences of Non-Compliance: Non-compliance can lead to a daily civil penalty of $500, a criminal fine up to $10,000, and a potential imprisonment of up to two years.
  6. Continuous Reporting Responsibilities: Any modifications in Beneficial Ownership or company details post-initial report must be updated within 30 days. The same penalties are applicable for non-compliance or inaccurate reporting.

Immediate Steps: We strongly advise you to assess your company’s situation and prepare for adherence to these new reporting obligations. If your company was established before January 1, 2024, ensure readiness to file your initial report starting January 1, 2024.

Our Support: At Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, we are dedicated to guiding you through these regulatory changes. Our services include determining your business’s applicability to these requirements, identifying Beneficial Owners, and facilitating accurate and timely reporting. Should you need more information or assistance regarding these updates, please feel free to reach out to us.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at ttripodianos@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6440

Court Holds That “Adjoioning” Properties To Be Protected During Excavation Do Not Have To Be Abutting

It has long been the law that owners and contractors who perform construction activities on a property can be held liable for damages caused to neighboring properties as a result of construction. The initial theory was straightforward negligence, with the contractor being held directly responsible for any negligent activities that result in damage, and the owner held vicariously liable for its retained contractor’s acts. As structures and construction became more complex, not all damages remained apparent (or above ground). Neighbors were no longer as concerned about the tree that fell across the property line and onto their roof as they were about excavation that causes subsidence and damage to their foundation. In response, statutes were enacted that imposed absolute liability on those who excavate (initially deeper than 10 feet, and now regardless of depth) in the course of building. The latest version is Section 3309 of the New York City Building Code, which provides that “Adjoining public and private property, including persons thereon, shall be protected from damage and injury during construction or demolition work”, and that “the person who causes such [excavation] to be made shall, at all times during the course of such work and at his or her own expense, preserve and protect from damage any adjoining structures”.

In the recent case of 7-11 E. 13th Street Tenants Corp. v The New School, an appellate court clarified that the term “adjoining” does not require that the properties physically abut, or share any boundary, and that nearby structures were similarly protected.

Background

The New School is a college in New York City, and in 2009 it commenced to undertake the construction of a 16 story University Center to “provide[] a new focal point for our downtown New York City campus * * * [with] the forward-thinking design reflect[ing] The New School’s commitment to creativity, innovation, and social engagement”. The School retained engineers to design the project, including its support of excavation aspects, and construction ultimately commenced. In 2010, tenants of the plaintiff 7-11 East 13th Street Condominium began to complain of cracks in the walls and ceilings, and uneven and torqued doors throughout the building. Ultimately, it was determined that the west wall of the Condo had settled by approximately four inches. The Condo and its tenants ultimately commenced a lawsuit to recover the damages attributable to the excavation.

After lengthy discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the strict liability claim against them, arguing that as there was a property between the construction site and the Condo that the Condo was not an “adjoining property”, and its building was not an “adjoining structure”. In opposition, the Condo cited to case law interpreting prior versions of the strict liability statute in which courts found that the word “adjoining” does not require abutment, and that having a property “within a near enough proximity that the soil or foundation work poses an inherent risk of damage to the plaintiff’s structure” was sufficient.

Decision

The motion court denied the motion, citing to older—but still valid—case law interpreting predecessor versions of the statute and holding that the word “adjoining” in this context “contemplates nearness, but with intervening spaces, as between houses; and when we are contemplating a local city provision, designed to apply to city lots, with contiguous buildings, it seems entirely proper that we should hold that any wall is contiguous which is near enough to be disturbed by the excavation”. To hold otherwise, stated the motion court, would not serve the “statutory intent [] to shift the risk of injury from the landowner injured by the excavation to the party causing the excavation”. The appellate court affirmed, holding that “[a]s the legislative history of the relevant predecessor statutes makes clear, the intent was to protect both adjoining and nearby properties”, and that the defendants “fail[ed] to show that the changes in statutory language, before or in connection with the adoption of [the current version of the ordinance] in 2008, reflect an intent to narrow the statutory protection”.

Comment

While courts generally acknowledge that living in cities necessary involves some hustle-and-bustle, with New York’s highest court having long ago held that “[i]f one lives in the city he must expect to suffer the dirt, smoke, noisome odors, noise and confusion incident to city life”, such does not require that one accept physical damage because a nearby property owner wishes to excavate a deep foundation for a tall structure. For that circumstance, the city has enacted a scheme that provides generally for strict liability to those who excavate. However, there are conditions on such strict liability, such as the requirement that the neighbor permit a pre-excavation survey of conditions so that any pre-excavation damage can be documented (with further damage presumed to have resulted from the excavation). Because a failure to follow the prerequisites set forth in the building code can result in the loss of the full strict liability protection, owners and contractors seeking to undertake excavation (and neighbors of those seeking to excavate) would be well advised to consult with experienced construction counsel to see what everyone’s respective obligations are, and how to best prepare oneself for the excavation. In a like vein, consulting with a geotechnical engineer would also be wise.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Tree Trimming Operations Must be Performed with Feasible Safety Measures In Place

The recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. Asplundh Tree Expert, LLC discussed feasible and effective methods to reduce or eliminate harm to employees performing tree trimming operations. Of course, in this field, proper and well-documented training of employees is needed given the danger of falls and falling objects. The decision arose from an unfortunate November 2, 2020 incident where a worker for Asplundh Tree Expert, LLC (“Asplundh”) fell during a tree trimming operation in Colorado and suffered severe injuries.

Asplundh is a nationwide tree-trimming company with over 34,000 employees. It had contracted with an electric utility company to prune and manage vegetation affecting its power infrastructure including trimming and pruning several dead trees that were interfering with the utility’s powerlines. On the day of the incident, Asplundh sent its crew consisting of the crew foreman, James Haynes and two crewmen to remove the top portions of several large trees. Upon arrival at this site, the crew performed a Job Safety Briefing prior to commencing work, which included a description of the tasks performed, necessary tools, potential hazards including dead trees, and steps to ensure safety. The Job Safety Briefing was signed-off by each crew member.

Although Foreman Haynes had determined that they needed a bucket truck that could extend 60 to 70 feet carrying a tree trimmer (a “60/70 bucket truck”) another employee for Asplundh testified and confirmed that they did not have authority to use this type of truck on this site. As alternative, Asplundh provided a second crew with a smaller squirt boom that can lift the tree trimmer in the air up to a 42-foot working height. Prior to the second crew’s arrival, the crew member from the first crew who was an experienced climber (with 17 months of experience), and who was unaware of the second crew’s arrival, began to climb to dead tree and made it up to 35 feet, at which point he stopped being unable to climb further due to the tree’s structural weakness. The remaining 35 feet of the tree needed to be cut and prior to beginning his work, he tied into a fall protection system by securing his lanyard around the main stem of the tree while securing his climbing line around the branch he was standing on. The crewmember began to make his cuts which were unobserved by the crew on the ground who were working on the opposite side. It was determined post-incident that he performed this cut improperly by a mere few inches, which caused the top of the tree to fall in an unintended direction. The top portion of the tree (weighing about 875 lbs.) struck the branch on which he was standing, and which his tie-off was secured. The impact further led to the lanyard around the main stem to lift over the area, in which he was tied off, and therefore caused him to fall 35 feet to the ground sustaining various serious injuries.

Following the incident, OSHA investigated and issued a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause in alleging that Asplundh “did not provide safe means and methods to remove a dead cottonwood tree in cold weather” which exposed their employees to a struck-by and fall hazards while performing tree operations. The Citation further indicated the feasible and effective means existed to eliminate or reduce the hazards by among other methods “ensuring that all dead limbs are trimmed from a safe distance by using a bucket truck or similar equipment”.

The general duty clause requires employers to furnish their employees a “place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm…” To prove a violation of the general duty clause, the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) must prove a (1) a condition or activity in the workplace presented a hazard; (2) the employee or its industry standard recognized the hazard; (3) the hazard was likely to cause death or serious harm; and (4) that a feasible means existed to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard. The Secretary must also prove the employer knew or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of the hazardous condition.

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Secretary succeeded in showing the existence of some but not all of the above-mentioned elements. The conditions of falling trees pose hazards to Asplundh’s employees and the Secretary was able to show through their expert witness that trimming dead trees such as cottonwood could lead to falling and crushing employees given that the dead trees are suspect and often not structurally sound and unpredictable. Asplundh acknowledged as much from this its job briefings, Job Hazard Assessment and investigative reports and further acknowledged and recognized the hazard. Supervisory personnel also recognized the hazards and had signed the Job Safety Briefing. They provided written safety policies defining the hazards associated with dead trees and discussed it within their Line Clearance Qualification Standard Employer Training Manual, which specifically addressed the “felling path” of a tree, struck-by and falling hazards, and the danger zone around the tree to be felled. The manual further discussed the type of cuts to be used when trimming trees. The materials also referenced industry standards regarding safety tree trimming measures for which Asplundh’s employees were trained including fall protection systems and tie-in procedures. The existence of these standards established the industry’s recognition of the hazards. Furthermore, the actual incident itself demonstrated and proved that that the hazard was likely to cause severe injury and/or death.

However, the ALJ found that the proposed abatement in the Citation was not feasible. The industry standards did not require use of 60/70 bucket truck and there was nothing in this instance that required one. The Secretary’s own expert conceded that a qualified climber could perform the work with the equipment provided and the use of the bucket truck in this instance would also actually create an additional electrical hazard as the trees were in proximity to power lines. Asplundh provided training and associated materials that met or exceeded industry standards. Here, the ALJ found that the Secretary failed to present evidence that training enforcement or employee supervision would materially reduce the hazard. Furthermore, since the incident happened so quickly at the elevation, other employees would not be able to impact the direction of the falling portion of the tree or to correct the crewmember’s mistake of cutting too deeply into the trees by mere inches. In light of the above, the Citation was vacated.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Governor Hochul signs Bill aimed at Retainage provisions in Private Construction Projects.

New York State Senate Bill S3539, revised on May 25, 2023, and sponsored by Senator Breslin, addresses the issue of payment and retainage in construction contracts. The bill’s key provisions include:

  1. Amendment of Payment Terms: It amends section 756-a of the general business law to condition the release of retainage from the contractor upon achieving the “substantial completion” terms described in the contract.
  2. Retainage Limitations: It amends section 756-c to cap retainage at a maximum of 5% of the contract sum and establishes a maximum period of thirty days post-final approval for the release of retainage.
  3. Objective: The bill aims to reduce delays in the release of retainage on private construction jobs that meet “substantial completion” requirements, addressing long waiting times and disputes that often burden contractors and subcontractors, including Minority and Women Owned businesses.
  4. Implementation Details: The bill mandates the specification of substantial completion in private construction contracts and reforms the payment process of retainage to reduce disputes and delays between owners and contractors.
  5. Prior Legislative History and Fiscal Implications: The bill follows similar legislative efforts in previous years, with no fiscal implications for state and local governments.
  6. Effective Date: The act becomes effective immediately and applies to contracts entered into after its effective date

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at ttripodianos@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6440

Court Clarifies That Scaffold Law Claims Fail Where Worker Was “Sole Proximate Cause” Of Injuries

Last month, this column discussed how Sections 200, 240(1), and 241(6) of New York’s Labor Law, which are commonly referred to as New York’s “Scaffold Law”, apply only to workers, and not to third parties who may also be on the project site (such as a building inspector, in that case). While this holding can offer some relief to contractors and property owners, it is widely accepted that when the victim of the injury is, in fact, a worker, there is nothing much left to be done other than to pay the worker for the injuries suffered. In that regard, many contractors and owners believe that deploying safety measures above and beyond what are minimally required to satisfy regulatory requirements (or someone’s own moral compass) are futile. However, the logic behind the Scaffold Law is that the contractor and owner are responsible to deploy such safety measures “as to give proper protection to a person so employed”. Accordingly, the question remains as to whether contractors and owners are liable where they could have done nothing else to prevent the accident. A trial court, in Becker v Cornell University, answers that question by reminding us that where the worker is the sole proximate cause of the injuries, no recovery can be had.

Background

Lori Becker, a sheet metal worker since 2010, found herself installing architectural sheet metal on a roof dormer at Cornell University’s Sage Hall in December of 2019. While performing her work, her ladder, which she had set up, slipped and fell approximately six feet to a separate roof below, and then slid another 20 feet, taking Becker for a “sled ride”. Becker sustained multiple fractures of her right leg as a result of the fall.

Becker testified at her deposition that she had been trained on the proper use and securing of ladders, including OHSA-30 training. She also testified that she had used this same ladder each day while on this jobsite, but did not secure it on the day of her injury—although she had previously secured this ladder with a rope, screw and washer. Ropes, screws, and washers of the type she used to secure the ladder were readily available on the job site. She did not secure the ladder at the time of her injury because the roof was complete and she did not want to make a hole. However, she acknowledged that she could have patched any hole that she made to secure the ladder. This failure to secure the ladder violated her employer, Welliver McGuire’s, safety policy (which she acknowledges having received), which stated unequivocally “all ladders must be tied off at or near the top of the ladder to prevent slippage”.

The project superintendent confirmed that Welliver McGuire had a policy that required that ladders be secured, and that although he had seen Becker tie off the ladder on previous occasions, he had to instruct her to tie off the ladder before her accident (which she clearly did not do). As to Becker’s rationale for not tying off the ladder (making a hole in the roof), the superintendent testified that the area where she should have placed the screw was going to be patched anyway, so a screw hole would not have been an issue.

After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. On the one hand, Becker argued that as the ladder fell, she met her burden on the motion. Conversely, Cornell argued that Becker’s failure to tie off the ladder was the sole proximate cause of her accident.

Decision

The court denied Becker’s motion, and granted Cornell’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In doing so, the court acknowledged that generally a fall from a ladder, alone, is enough to establish a violation of the Scaffold Law. However, the court cited a previous Court of Appeals holding rejecting the proposition that “every ladder injury leads ineluctably to liability under [the Scaffold Law]”. After doing so, the court, citing well established case law holding that “[p]laintiff will be considered the sole proximate cause of her injuries, and there will be no liability under the Labor Law, where the evidence establishes that ‘plaintiff had adequate safety devices available; that [she] knew both that they were available and that [she] was expected to use them; that [she] chose for no good reason not to do so; and that had [she] not made that choice [she] would not have been injured’”, held that as the materials to tie off the ladder were readily available at the job site, and as Becker refused to use them although she had used them previously (which also served as an acknowledgement of the adequacy of these materials), she was the sole proximate cause of her injuries. As such, she could not recover under the Scaffold Law.

Comment

It is no exaggeration to state that the Scaffold Law is viewed as the bane of New York’s construction industry. Because of its absolute liability, the Scaffold Law does not permit the consideration of whether the plaintiff also had any comparative fault for his or her injuries, or how much effort the contractor put into safety, or otherwise preventing the accident in the first place. Rather, when arguing that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the case law makes it clear that “sole” proximate cause means sole—i.e., that there can be no other device, etc., that would have provided greater protection than that which was available. Likewise, there is a similar volume of case law holding that simply failing to follow general safety instructions is not sufficient, and that the worker must refuse to use that which she was directed to use (and was available). Stated differently, the contractor and owner not only cannot have had any contribution to the happening of the accident—the accident had to have happened in spite of the efforts of the owner and the contractor. Clearly, this is a hard burden to meet, which is why victories on sole proximate cause arguments are rare (but not impossible). For this reason, contractors must document their safety plans and procedures, and communicate them to employees and job site contractors—and do so on an ongoing basis.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Construction Companies Need to Maintain Robust Training and Safety Programs in the Use and Operation of Powered Industrial Vehicles

The recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. Americold Logistics, LLC reaffirms the need for construction companies to provide proper training and establish rules and regulations for their employees when using powered industrial vehicles (“PIVs”). Further, companies can better ensure employee safety by conducting routine, documented, monitoring of employee practices and performance, while also maintaining and enforcing their disciplinary programs.

This decision arose from a work-place incident where an employee was severely injured while working in a large cold food storage facility in Georgia. Americold Logistic, LLC (“Americold”) temporarily stores food products and performs various operations from its Savannah 2 facility. Each shift had four floor supervisors, and each supervisor was responsible for a team that consisted of PIV operators and laborers. Different types of PIVs were used at this facility including fork trucks that were used to load and unload product and move around the facility, and reach trucks that were used to stack and remove products from the racking systems. Tractor trailers containing the food products would be unloaded at the loading dock with the use of the fork trucks. A PIV operator would then move food products into the blast freezer where they would be flash frozen. Once the food products were frozen, laborers would restack the products on pallets and PIV operators would then use the reach trucks to move them into freezers.

On July 7, 2022, an Americold employee who was driving a fork truck and making a turn, stuck out his food and caught it between a bollard and the truck, injuring his ankle. OSHA was notified of the accident and an OSHA Compliance Safety and Health Officer (“CSHO”) appeared on-site and conducted an investigation. During her investigation, the CSHO noted that she even had to step-out of the way from a PIV during her walk of the premises with management. She appeared again in September 2022 and observed similar conditions as in her earlier visit. She also interviewed the injured employee. The CSHO subsequently issued safety citations including permitting an untrained person to operate a PIV. The applicable safety standard required an employer to “ensure that each operator has successfully completed the training required by this paragraph” prior to being allowed to operate the vehicle.

To prove a violation, the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) must show by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., that it was more likely than not) that (1) the cited standard applies, (2) there was failure to comply with the cite standard, (3) employees had access to the violative condition, and (4) the cited employer either knew or should have known of the condition with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Americold’s former floor supervisor, Lamar Church testified as to Americold’s training procedures for PIV operators and explained that their training consisted of three parts. New operators would first be shown a 30-minute video created by the PIV manufacturer that addressed different operating and safety topics. The employees would then attend a class held by a supervisor who presented a 76-slide PowerPoint presentation on the vehicles’ operations and safety. The employees would then complete their training by receiving hands-on training and proficiency testing. Operators would also receive annual refresher training and recertifications, every three years. However, if an operator was involved in an accident or was observed operating a PIV unsafely, they would be mandated to immediately take the refresher and recertification. Americold had procedures and rules in place for PIV use, which included instructing operators to slow down and sound their horn when approaching pedestrians (within the warehouse). An operator would also complete a vehicle inspection checklist before starting-up the vehicle, and if it failed the inspection, it would be taken out of service. The company also had installed software which required an employee to have an ID badge with the appropriate credentials, which they would have to swipe before starting the vehicle. The PIVs also had speed governors installed that limited the vehicle’s speed to five miles per hour.

Furthermore, floor supervisors were responsible for conducting three “behavior-based safety observations” per day which included observing an employee conducting their work for 30 minutes, after which the floor supervisor would coach the employees on what was observed. Floor supervisors also had to conduct “coaching method observations” twice a day involving observing an employee conducting certain job skills. Americold’s disciplinary program included termination for serious safety rule violations. If a supervisor observed such behavior, they could request an employee’s immediate termination and the request would then be reviewed by a safety panel which determined the final outcome for the employee.

Here, Americold’s records indicated that the injured employee had not completed their training program and Americold conceded that the employee was not authorized to operate the PIV. The employee was exposed to the hazards associated with untrained use of a PIV and was in fact severely injured. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Secretary had established the first three elements of the alleged violation. However, the record was unclear as to whether any supervisory employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the violation.

The injured employee did not testify at the hearing, and the Secretary only presented the CSHO’s account of her interview with the employee without documentation, in which she recalled that another PIV driver badged-through the PIV’s system permitting this employee to use it. She also was told that a supervisor overrode the system after this employee failed the safety questions. However, the record contained no evidence corroborating the injured employee’s statement as provided through the CSHO. Further, the ALJ found the CSHO’s account that unnamed employees informed her that supervisors had observed unauthorized employees using PIVs, as unpersuasive. Therefore, the Secretary failed to establish that Americold had actual knowledge of the violative condition.

The ALJ’s Decision then looked at whether Americold should have known or been aware of this violative condition. The evidence presented in fact showed that Americold had written rules prohibiting unauthorized use of PIVs which included training provided to all employees. They also had controls in place requiring ID badges showing training and certification to operate the machine and employees had to perform a safety inspection prior to even starting the PIV. Although Americold conceded that an authorized employee’s card could be used by an unauthorized employee, Americold was unaware of any similar instances and Secretary had not shown any evidence of this practice. Americold also had two forms of routine, documented, monitoring of employee safety and performance as well as a disciplinary program for which it established it had terminated three of its employees, months prior to the accident for PIV violations. Under these circumstances the Secretary failed to meet its burden and the Citation was vacated.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Construction Companies Engaging in Excavation Work Must Follow Safety Regulations to Avoid Cave-Ins and Trench Collapses

As is well documented and reported, a cave-in or trench collapse can lead to serious injuries and even death. The recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. Texas Underground Utilities, Inc. is instructive, and should again remind construction companies engaged in excavation of the necessary steps they must take to properly protect their workers during trenching activities, even if no one was injured in the underlying matter.   

On October 6, 2020, OSHA Safety Officer Keith Thomkins (alternatively referred to as “CSHO”) was driving past a construction site in Houston, Texas, and observed two workers inside a trench.  He pulled over, presented his credentials and then proceeded to have an opening conference with Juan Diaz, Texas Underground Utilities Inc.’s (“TUU”) Foreman at the site. The CSHO took measurements and photographs and conducted employee interviews.  It appears that work had started at the site less than an hour before his arrival, and was still in progress.  Mr. Diaz advised the CSHO that the workers had been in the trench for 5 to 10 minutes before the officer had arrived, although the officer believed they might have been there longer based on his observations of tools and activities. The length of the trench was 25 feet, and the width of the trench floor was 3 feet, while the width of the trench opening was 10 feet, 3 inches.  A ladder rested along the trench wall on the west end at an angle of about 75 degrees.  The wall on the western end of the trench measured 7 feet deep, while other sections of the trench measured 4 ½ to 5 feet in depth. The excavation at issue dug into a Type B soil (as per OSHA’s soil type classification) and TUU was utilizing a bench cut into the trench walls (which allows for sloping of the trench walls to avoid collapsing soil).  Pursuant to the OSHA’s standards, Type B soil should be benched or sloped to 45 degrees.  Here, Officer Thompkins measured the first wall of the bench (floor to shelf) at 4 ½ feet to 5 feet high, depending on where the measurements was taken along the trench.  The top of the first wall of the bench, was a shelf that measured 2 feet wide.  The second wall of the wall of the bench (from shelf to the surface) measured 2 feet high.  Officer Tompkins based some measurements on representations made by Foreman Diaz because he could not safely access the trench floor, as well as approximations since the trench walls and soil conditions varied.  Following the measurements, Officer Thomkins interviewed Foreman Diaz without an interpreter, and compiled information in a form, which Mr. Diaz signed.  Specifically, Mr. Diaz, had trenching and excavation training (but not with TUU in his 40 years in the industry).  He did not know whether other employees had received training.  A bench system was being used because the trench was not deep enough for a trench box.   Two individuals were working in the trench for about 10 minutes before the CSHO arrived.   During the trial, Mr. Diaz confirmed these statements and further indicated that he was charged with ensuring worker safety.  On the following day, Officer Thomkins requested all training documentation and certifications, but TUU never responded.  During Officer Thomkins’ investigation he also found that TUU had been previously cited by OSHA for failure to provide adequate protection from cave-ins during excavation from a 2017 incident where a trench that was slightly over 9 feet deep with previously disturbed Class B soil and one of the walls was improperly benched and the slope on both walls were steeper than the requisite 45 degrees exposing workers to a “crushed-by hazard”).  Following his investigation, the CSHO issued various citations to TUU included failing to protect employees working in a trench from cave-ins, in violation of OSHA regulations and classified this citation as a repeat offense since the 2017 incident had also involved an improperly sloped trench. 

TUU took issue with the applicable standard based on the CSHO’s measurements.  The cited regulation sets forth that each employee in an excavation be protected from cave-ins unless the excavation is made entirely of stable rock, or the excavation is less than 5 feet in depth and examination of the ground by a competent person provides no indication of a potential cave-in.  Both parties agreed that the soil type was Type B, but disagreed as to whether the trench was 5 feet deep.  The deepest part of the trench measured 7 feet and the CSHO took photographs of his measuring tool showing that depth.  TUU explained that this was an impossibility and the measuring device fell into a depression on the trench floor.   However, TUU presented no evidence disputing the height measurement, and when TUU’s owner, Julio Lugo, went to the site on the following day, it had already been backfilled and no other TUU employees had taken measurements.  Furthermore, Foreman Diaz had not objected to the CSHO’s measurements as they were being taken.  Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that this OSHA standard applied, and they accepted Officer Thomkins’ photographs and measurements as credible as per his testimony on the methodology, and, especially since TUU could not offer any evidence that called these measurements into question with their own independent measurements or dimensions.  Under either a multiple bench system or single bench system, the first bench wall could not be more than 4 feet in height.  In a single bench system, the first shelf must be equal the height of the bench for a 1:1 ratio.  In a multiple bench system, the first shelf wall must double the height of the bench and every other shelf would have a height and width equal to the first shelf wall to create a 1:1 ratio.  All sides of a trench have to be properly sloped or benched 1:1 or 45 degrees.  Here, the height of the first bench wall was between 4 ½ and 5 feet while the standard requires the first bench wall to be no more than 4 feet.  The standard also required the bench shelf to be 4 feet in width (for a single bench) or 8 feet (for multiple benches), while, here, the bench shelf measured between 2 and 3 feet.  Under either single or multiple bench systems, TUU was not in compliance as the trench was improperly sloped.   Therefore, TUU was found to have violated the standard.   

Even if workers were not injured, they were exposed to the hazards based on the evidence of the ladder and tools near the 7-foot wall, which could have exposed them to the cave-in hazard when entering/existing the trench even during that brief 5-to-10-minute period that Foreman Diaz admitted they were present.  Foreman Diaz was aware that the trench was dug into Type B soil, and he could have known with reasonable diligence that portions of the trench exceeded 5 feet in depth, and the benching system did not meet the standard’s requirements.  Given that the same standard had been previously violated in 2017, the ALJ found that this violation was a repeat offense and assessed a penalty of $20,781 for this repeat-serious citation. 

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Court Clarifies That Scaffold Law Only Applies To Workers

Sections 200, 240(1), and 241(6) of New York’s Labor Law are commonly referred to as New York’s “Scaffold Law”. The Scaffold Law was enacted back in 1885, long before the advent of the Worker’s Compensation statutes or regulatory schemes designed to enforce worker safety (such as OSHA and its state analogues). New York is the last state with such a law on its books, and it is widely credited with driving up construction and insurance costs. Further, in viewing the results of the repeal of Illinois’ Scaffold Law back in 1995, it is not universally accepted that the law actually achieves its stated goal of promoting worker safety. However, until it is modified to include a comparative negligence standard (that accounts for any failures of the worker to follow directions or otherwise work correctly), it is accepted that any time a worker falls from a height or is hurt as a result of a violation of the Industrial Code, the employer has no defense to the claim. Accordingly, high payouts by insurance companies (and high premiums for insurance policies) are a reluctantly accepted cost of engaging in construction in New York.

While workers are insulated from the consequences of their own negligence by virtue of the absolute liability imposed by the Labor Law, an appellate court, in Lauria v Lippolis Construction, Inc., reminds us that the benefits afforded by the Scaffold Law only apply to workers on the site, and not third parties.

Background

Prior to May of 2016, Lippolis Construction engaged to construct two homes on Avenue C in the Village of North Port Washington. In May of 2016, Lippolis excavated for the foundations of both homes, and on May 16, 2016, it was commencing to construct the forms for the footings. Before it poured concrete for the foundation, Lippolis requested that the Village inspect the excavation and forms for the footings to make sure that everything would comply with the local building code. The Village sent Building Inspector Fred Lauria to the site to perform the inspection. This was not Lauria’s first visit to the site. Unfortunately, during this particular visit, Lauria tripped and fell, suffering a torn ACL and other associated injuries. Accordingly, Lauria commenced a personal injury lawsuit against Lippolis, alleging that Lippolis was negligent and also violated the applicable provisions of the Scaffold Law.

After discovery, Lippolis moved for summary judgment dismissing the lawsuit. In support of the dismissal of the Labor Law claims, Lippolis noted that it was not disputed that he was only an employee of the Village, and was not an employee of Lippolis or any other contractor on the site. As to the negligence claim, Lippolis argued that the excavation was open and obvious, and was not inherently dangerous; accordingly, Lippolis was not negligent in maintaining the site as it did. In opposition, Lauria claimed that as an “inspector”, he is entitled to recovery under the Labor Law. Lauria also argued that there were questions as to whether the excavation constituted a hazard which needed to be resolved at trial.

Decision

The motion court granted Lippolis’ motion to the extent that it dismissed the Labor Law claims. In doing so, the court found that as Lauria was not an employee, he was not entitled to the protections set forth in the Labor Law. However, as to the negligence claim, the court found that there was an issue of fact which precluded summary judgment. Lauria appealed, seeking to revive the Labor Law claims (with their strict liability standard). However, the appellate court affirmed, citing well settled case law that “the plaintiff was not within the class of persons subject to the protections of the Labor Law”.

Comment

At first blush, one would believe that the plaintiff would have been relieved that he was able to stave off summary judgment dismissing his negligence claim and, therefore, have his proverbial day in court. However, the Scaffold Law is particularly onerous because of its imposition of absolute liability—which does not permit the consideration of whether the plaintiff also had any fault for his injuries, or how much effort the contractor put into safety, or otherwise preventing the accident in the first place. Where strict liability is imposed, it is not a question of whether the plaintiff will get paid, only how much. Accordingly, one can understand why the fight over this standard is fought so vigorously. In the meantime, this decision reminds contractors that while common law negligence provides an incentive to provide for the safety of all of those on the worksite, the most onerous requirements are reserved for the protection of workers.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100