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Important Notice: New FinCEN Reporting Obligations Under the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA)

There are critical forthcoming changes related to the disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). These changes are in line with the requirements of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) and accompanying Treasury regulations. The introduction of this mandate marks a significant move in the fight against money laundering and the misuse of shell companies for illicit purposes.

  1. Reporting Entities: Entities such as corporations, LEGImlimited liability companies (LLCs), and similar organizations established through a Secretary of State or equivalent authority are required to report Beneficial Ownership information to FinCEN. It’s important to note that exemptions apply to large corporations meeting certain criteria, publicly traded companies, and tax-exempt organizations. Additionally, foreign entities active in the U.S. may be subject to these reporting requirements.
  2. Identifying a Beneficial Owner: A Beneficial Owner is defined as an individual who, either directly or indirectly, has control over an entity or holds a minimum of 25% equity interest in it. This encompasses senior executives and individuals who play a significant role in pivotal decisions.
  3. Disclosure Requirements: Entities must disclose essential details about the company and personal information of Beneficial Owners, including names, dates of birth, addresses, and identification documentation. This data will be maintained in a secure, non-public database, accessible only to specific government bodies.
  4. Compliance Timelines:
    • Entities established before January 1, 2024: Must report between January 1, 2024, and January 1, 2025
    • Entities established in 2024: Required to report within 90 days of their formation.
    • Entities established in 2025 or later: Obligated to report within 30 days of formation.
  5. Consequences of Non-Compliance: Non-compliance can lead to a daily civil penalty of $500, a criminal fine up to $10,000, and a potential imprisonment of up to two years.
  6. Continuous Reporting Responsibilities: Any modifications in Beneficial Ownership or company details post-initial report must be updated within 30 days. The same penalties are applicable for non-compliance or inaccurate reporting.

Immediate Steps: We strongly advise you to assess your company’s situation and prepare for adherence to these new reporting obligations. If your company was established before January 1, 2024, ensure readiness to file your initial report starting January 1, 2024.

Our Support: At Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, we are dedicated to guiding you through these regulatory changes. Our services include determining your business’s applicability to these requirements, identifying Beneficial Owners, and facilitating accurate and timely reporting. Should you need more information or assistance regarding these updates, please feel free to reach out to us.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at ttripodianos@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6440

Court Holds That “Adjoioning” Properties To Be Protected During Excavation Do Not Have To Be Abutting

It has long been the law that owners and contractors who perform construction activities on a property can be held liable for damages caused to neighboring properties as a result of construction. The initial theory was straightforward negligence, with the contractor being held directly responsible for any negligent activities that result in damage, and the owner held vicariously liable for its retained contractor’s acts. As structures and construction became more complex, not all damages remained apparent (or above ground). Neighbors were no longer as concerned about the tree that fell across the property line and onto their roof as they were about excavation that causes subsidence and damage to their foundation. In response, statutes were enacted that imposed absolute liability on those who excavate (initially deeper than 10 feet, and now regardless of depth) in the course of building. The latest version is Section 3309 of the New York City Building Code, which provides that “Adjoining public and private property, including persons thereon, shall be protected from damage and injury during construction or demolition work”, and that “the person who causes such [excavation] to be made shall, at all times during the course of such work and at his or her own expense, preserve and protect from damage any adjoining structures”.

In the recent case of 7-11 E. 13th Street Tenants Corp. v The New School, an appellate court clarified that the term “adjoining” does not require that the properties physically abut, or share any boundary, and that nearby structures were similarly protected.

Background

The New School is a college in New York City, and in 2009 it commenced to undertake the construction of a 16 story University Center to “provide[] a new focal point for our downtown New York City campus * * * [with] the forward-thinking design reflect[ing] The New School’s commitment to creativity, innovation, and social engagement”. The School retained engineers to design the project, including its support of excavation aspects, and construction ultimately commenced. In 2010, tenants of the plaintiff 7-11 East 13th Street Condominium began to complain of cracks in the walls and ceilings, and uneven and torqued doors throughout the building. Ultimately, it was determined that the west wall of the Condo had settled by approximately four inches. The Condo and its tenants ultimately commenced a lawsuit to recover the damages attributable to the excavation.

After lengthy discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the strict liability claim against them, arguing that as there was a property between the construction site and the Condo that the Condo was not an “adjoining property”, and its building was not an “adjoining structure”. In opposition, the Condo cited to case law interpreting prior versions of the strict liability statute in which courts found that the word “adjoining” does not require abutment, and that having a property “within a near enough proximity that the soil or foundation work poses an inherent risk of damage to the plaintiff’s structure” was sufficient.

Decision

The motion court denied the motion, citing to older—but still valid—case law interpreting predecessor versions of the statute and holding that the word “adjoining” in this context “contemplates nearness, but with intervening spaces, as between houses; and when we are contemplating a local city provision, designed to apply to city lots, with contiguous buildings, it seems entirely proper that we should hold that any wall is contiguous which is near enough to be disturbed by the excavation”. To hold otherwise, stated the motion court, would not serve the “statutory intent [] to shift the risk of injury from the landowner injured by the excavation to the party causing the excavation”. The appellate court affirmed, holding that “[a]s the legislative history of the relevant predecessor statutes makes clear, the intent was to protect both adjoining and nearby properties”, and that the defendants “fail[ed] to show that the changes in statutory language, before or in connection with the adoption of [the current version of the ordinance] in 2008, reflect an intent to narrow the statutory protection”.

Comment

While courts generally acknowledge that living in cities necessary involves some hustle-and-bustle, with New York’s highest court having long ago held that “[i]f one lives in the city he must expect to suffer the dirt, smoke, noisome odors, noise and confusion incident to city life”, such does not require that one accept physical damage because a nearby property owner wishes to excavate a deep foundation for a tall structure. For that circumstance, the city has enacted a scheme that provides generally for strict liability to those who excavate. However, there are conditions on such strict liability, such as the requirement that the neighbor permit a pre-excavation survey of conditions so that any pre-excavation damage can be documented (with further damage presumed to have resulted from the excavation). Because a failure to follow the prerequisites set forth in the building code can result in the loss of the full strict liability protection, owners and contractors seeking to undertake excavation (and neighbors of those seeking to excavate) would be well advised to consult with experienced construction counsel to see what everyone’s respective obligations are, and how to best prepare oneself for the excavation. In a like vein, consulting with a geotechnical engineer would also be wise.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Tree Trimming Operations Must be Performed with Feasible Safety Measures In Place

The recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. Asplundh Tree Expert, LLC discussed feasible and effective methods to reduce or eliminate harm to employees performing tree trimming operations. Of course, in this field, proper and well-documented training of employees is needed given the danger of falls and falling objects. The decision arose from an unfortunate November 2, 2020 incident where a worker for Asplundh Tree Expert, LLC (“Asplundh”) fell during a tree trimming operation in Colorado and suffered severe injuries.

Asplundh is a nationwide tree-trimming company with over 34,000 employees. It had contracted with an electric utility company to prune and manage vegetation affecting its power infrastructure including trimming and pruning several dead trees that were interfering with the utility’s powerlines. On the day of the incident, Asplundh sent its crew consisting of the crew foreman, James Haynes and two crewmen to remove the top portions of several large trees. Upon arrival at this site, the crew performed a Job Safety Briefing prior to commencing work, which included a description of the tasks performed, necessary tools, potential hazards including dead trees, and steps to ensure safety. The Job Safety Briefing was signed-off by each crew member.

Although Foreman Haynes had determined that they needed a bucket truck that could extend 60 to 70 feet carrying a tree trimmer (a “60/70 bucket truck”) another employee for Asplundh testified and confirmed that they did not have authority to use this type of truck on this site. As alternative, Asplundh provided a second crew with a smaller squirt boom that can lift the tree trimmer in the air up to a 42-foot working height. Prior to the second crew’s arrival, the crew member from the first crew who was an experienced climber (with 17 months of experience), and who was unaware of the second crew’s arrival, began to climb to dead tree and made it up to 35 feet, at which point he stopped being unable to climb further due to the tree’s structural weakness. The remaining 35 feet of the tree needed to be cut and prior to beginning his work, he tied into a fall protection system by securing his lanyard around the main stem of the tree while securing his climbing line around the branch he was standing on. The crewmember began to make his cuts which were unobserved by the crew on the ground who were working on the opposite side. It was determined post-incident that he performed this cut improperly by a mere few inches, which caused the top of the tree to fall in an unintended direction. The top portion of the tree (weighing about 875 lbs.) struck the branch on which he was standing, and which his tie-off was secured. The impact further led to the lanyard around the main stem to lift over the area, in which he was tied off, and therefore caused him to fall 35 feet to the ground sustaining various serious injuries.

Following the incident, OSHA investigated and issued a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause in alleging that Asplundh “did not provide safe means and methods to remove a dead cottonwood tree in cold weather” which exposed their employees to a struck-by and fall hazards while performing tree operations. The Citation further indicated the feasible and effective means existed to eliminate or reduce the hazards by among other methods “ensuring that all dead limbs are trimmed from a safe distance by using a bucket truck or similar equipment”.

The general duty clause requires employers to furnish their employees a “place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm…” To prove a violation of the general duty clause, the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) must prove a (1) a condition or activity in the workplace presented a hazard; (2) the employee or its industry standard recognized the hazard; (3) the hazard was likely to cause death or serious harm; and (4) that a feasible means existed to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard. The Secretary must also prove the employer knew or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of the hazardous condition.

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Secretary succeeded in showing the existence of some but not all of the above-mentioned elements. The conditions of falling trees pose hazards to Asplundh’s employees and the Secretary was able to show through their expert witness that trimming dead trees such as cottonwood could lead to falling and crushing employees given that the dead trees are suspect and often not structurally sound and unpredictable. Asplundh acknowledged as much from this its job briefings, Job Hazard Assessment and investigative reports and further acknowledged and recognized the hazard. Supervisory personnel also recognized the hazards and had signed the Job Safety Briefing. They provided written safety policies defining the hazards associated with dead trees and discussed it within their Line Clearance Qualification Standard Employer Training Manual, which specifically addressed the “felling path” of a tree, struck-by and falling hazards, and the danger zone around the tree to be felled. The manual further discussed the type of cuts to be used when trimming trees. The materials also referenced industry standards regarding safety tree trimming measures for which Asplundh’s employees were trained including fall protection systems and tie-in procedures. The existence of these standards established the industry’s recognition of the hazards. Furthermore, the actual incident itself demonstrated and proved that that the hazard was likely to cause severe injury and/or death.

However, the ALJ found that the proposed abatement in the Citation was not feasible. The industry standards did not require use of 60/70 bucket truck and there was nothing in this instance that required one. The Secretary’s own expert conceded that a qualified climber could perform the work with the equipment provided and the use of the bucket truck in this instance would also actually create an additional electrical hazard as the trees were in proximity to power lines. Asplundh provided training and associated materials that met or exceeded industry standards. Here, the ALJ found that the Secretary failed to present evidence that training enforcement or employee supervision would materially reduce the hazard. Furthermore, since the incident happened so quickly at the elevation, other employees would not be able to impact the direction of the falling portion of the tree or to correct the crewmember’s mistake of cutting too deeply into the trees by mere inches. In light of the above, the Citation was vacated.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Governor Hochul signs Bill aimed at Retainage provisions in Private Construction Projects.

New York State Senate Bill S3539, revised on May 25, 2023, and sponsored by Senator Breslin, addresses the issue of payment and retainage in construction contracts. The bill’s key provisions include:

  1. Amendment of Payment Terms: It amends section 756-a of the general business law to condition the release of retainage from the contractor upon achieving the “substantial completion” terms described in the contract.
  2. Retainage Limitations: It amends section 756-c to cap retainage at a maximum of 5% of the contract sum and establishes a maximum period of thirty days post-final approval for the release of retainage.
  3. Objective: The bill aims to reduce delays in the release of retainage on private construction jobs that meet “substantial completion” requirements, addressing long waiting times and disputes that often burden contractors and subcontractors, including Minority and Women Owned businesses.
  4. Implementation Details: The bill mandates the specification of substantial completion in private construction contracts and reforms the payment process of retainage to reduce disputes and delays between owners and contractors.
  5. Prior Legislative History and Fiscal Implications: The bill follows similar legislative efforts in previous years, with no fiscal implications for state and local governments.
  6. Effective Date: The act becomes effective immediately and applies to contracts entered into after its effective date

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at ttripodianos@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6440

Court Clarifies That Scaffold Law Claims Fail Where Worker Was “Sole Proximate Cause” Of Injuries

Last month, this column discussed how Sections 200, 240(1), and 241(6) of New York’s Labor Law, which are commonly referred to as New York’s “Scaffold Law”, apply only to workers, and not to third parties who may also be on the project site (such as a building inspector, in that case). While this holding can offer some relief to contractors and property owners, it is widely accepted that when the victim of the injury is, in fact, a worker, there is nothing much left to be done other than to pay the worker for the injuries suffered. In that regard, many contractors and owners believe that deploying safety measures above and beyond what are minimally required to satisfy regulatory requirements (or someone’s own moral compass) are futile. However, the logic behind the Scaffold Law is that the contractor and owner are responsible to deploy such safety measures “as to give proper protection to a person so employed”. Accordingly, the question remains as to whether contractors and owners are liable where they could have done nothing else to prevent the accident. A trial court, in Becker v Cornell University, answers that question by reminding us that where the worker is the sole proximate cause of the injuries, no recovery can be had.

Background

Lori Becker, a sheet metal worker since 2010, found herself installing architectural sheet metal on a roof dormer at Cornell University’s Sage Hall in December of 2019. While performing her work, her ladder, which she had set up, slipped and fell approximately six feet to a separate roof below, and then slid another 20 feet, taking Becker for a “sled ride”. Becker sustained multiple fractures of her right leg as a result of the fall.

Becker testified at her deposition that she had been trained on the proper use and securing of ladders, including OHSA-30 training. She also testified that she had used this same ladder each day while on this jobsite, but did not secure it on the day of her injury—although she had previously secured this ladder with a rope, screw and washer. Ropes, screws, and washers of the type she used to secure the ladder were readily available on the job site. She did not secure the ladder at the time of her injury because the roof was complete and she did not want to make a hole. However, she acknowledged that she could have patched any hole that she made to secure the ladder. This failure to secure the ladder violated her employer, Welliver McGuire’s, safety policy (which she acknowledges having received), which stated unequivocally “all ladders must be tied off at or near the top of the ladder to prevent slippage”.

The project superintendent confirmed that Welliver McGuire had a policy that required that ladders be secured, and that although he had seen Becker tie off the ladder on previous occasions, he had to instruct her to tie off the ladder before her accident (which she clearly did not do). As to Becker’s rationale for not tying off the ladder (making a hole in the roof), the superintendent testified that the area where she should have placed the screw was going to be patched anyway, so a screw hole would not have been an issue.

After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. On the one hand, Becker argued that as the ladder fell, she met her burden on the motion. Conversely, Cornell argued that Becker’s failure to tie off the ladder was the sole proximate cause of her accident.

Decision

The court denied Becker’s motion, and granted Cornell’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In doing so, the court acknowledged that generally a fall from a ladder, alone, is enough to establish a violation of the Scaffold Law. However, the court cited a previous Court of Appeals holding rejecting the proposition that “every ladder injury leads ineluctably to liability under [the Scaffold Law]”. After doing so, the court, citing well established case law holding that “[p]laintiff will be considered the sole proximate cause of her injuries, and there will be no liability under the Labor Law, where the evidence establishes that ‘plaintiff had adequate safety devices available; that [she] knew both that they were available and that [she] was expected to use them; that [she] chose for no good reason not to do so; and that had [she] not made that choice [she] would not have been injured’”, held that as the materials to tie off the ladder were readily available at the job site, and as Becker refused to use them although she had used them previously (which also served as an acknowledgement of the adequacy of these materials), she was the sole proximate cause of her injuries. As such, she could not recover under the Scaffold Law.

Comment

It is no exaggeration to state that the Scaffold Law is viewed as the bane of New York’s construction industry. Because of its absolute liability, the Scaffold Law does not permit the consideration of whether the plaintiff also had any comparative fault for his or her injuries, or how much effort the contractor put into safety, or otherwise preventing the accident in the first place. Rather, when arguing that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the case law makes it clear that “sole” proximate cause means sole—i.e., that there can be no other device, etc., that would have provided greater protection than that which was available. Likewise, there is a similar volume of case law holding that simply failing to follow general safety instructions is not sufficient, and that the worker must refuse to use that which she was directed to use (and was available). Stated differently, the contractor and owner not only cannot have had any contribution to the happening of the accident—the accident had to have happened in spite of the efforts of the owner and the contractor. Clearly, this is a hard burden to meet, which is why victories on sole proximate cause arguments are rare (but not impossible). For this reason, contractors must document their safety plans and procedures, and communicate them to employees and job site contractors—and do so on an ongoing basis.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Construction Companies Need to Maintain Robust Training and Safety Programs in the Use and Operation of Powered Industrial Vehicles

The recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. Americold Logistics, LLC reaffirms the need for construction companies to provide proper training and establish rules and regulations for their employees when using powered industrial vehicles (“PIVs”). Further, companies can better ensure employee safety by conducting routine, documented, monitoring of employee practices and performance, while also maintaining and enforcing their disciplinary programs.

This decision arose from a work-place incident where an employee was severely injured while working in a large cold food storage facility in Georgia. Americold Logistic, LLC (“Americold”) temporarily stores food products and performs various operations from its Savannah 2 facility. Each shift had four floor supervisors, and each supervisor was responsible for a team that consisted of PIV operators and laborers. Different types of PIVs were used at this facility including fork trucks that were used to load and unload product and move around the facility, and reach trucks that were used to stack and remove products from the racking systems. Tractor trailers containing the food products would be unloaded at the loading dock with the use of the fork trucks. A PIV operator would then move food products into the blast freezer where they would be flash frozen. Once the food products were frozen, laborers would restack the products on pallets and PIV operators would then use the reach trucks to move them into freezers.

On July 7, 2022, an Americold employee who was driving a fork truck and making a turn, stuck out his food and caught it between a bollard and the truck, injuring his ankle. OSHA was notified of the accident and an OSHA Compliance Safety and Health Officer (“CSHO”) appeared on-site and conducted an investigation. During her investigation, the CSHO noted that she even had to step-out of the way from a PIV during her walk of the premises with management. She appeared again in September 2022 and observed similar conditions as in her earlier visit. She also interviewed the injured employee. The CSHO subsequently issued safety citations including permitting an untrained person to operate a PIV. The applicable safety standard required an employer to “ensure that each operator has successfully completed the training required by this paragraph” prior to being allowed to operate the vehicle.

To prove a violation, the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) must show by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., that it was more likely than not) that (1) the cited standard applies, (2) there was failure to comply with the cite standard, (3) employees had access to the violative condition, and (4) the cited employer either knew or should have known of the condition with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Americold’s former floor supervisor, Lamar Church testified as to Americold’s training procedures for PIV operators and explained that their training consisted of three parts. New operators would first be shown a 30-minute video created by the PIV manufacturer that addressed different operating and safety topics. The employees would then attend a class held by a supervisor who presented a 76-slide PowerPoint presentation on the vehicles’ operations and safety. The employees would then complete their training by receiving hands-on training and proficiency testing. Operators would also receive annual refresher training and recertifications, every three years. However, if an operator was involved in an accident or was observed operating a PIV unsafely, they would be mandated to immediately take the refresher and recertification. Americold had procedures and rules in place for PIV use, which included instructing operators to slow down and sound their horn when approaching pedestrians (within the warehouse). An operator would also complete a vehicle inspection checklist before starting-up the vehicle, and if it failed the inspection, it would be taken out of service. The company also had installed software which required an employee to have an ID badge with the appropriate credentials, which they would have to swipe before starting the vehicle. The PIVs also had speed governors installed that limited the vehicle’s speed to five miles per hour.

Furthermore, floor supervisors were responsible for conducting three “behavior-based safety observations” per day which included observing an employee conducting their work for 30 minutes, after which the floor supervisor would coach the employees on what was observed. Floor supervisors also had to conduct “coaching method observations” twice a day involving observing an employee conducting certain job skills. Americold’s disciplinary program included termination for serious safety rule violations. If a supervisor observed such behavior, they could request an employee’s immediate termination and the request would then be reviewed by a safety panel which determined the final outcome for the employee.

Here, Americold’s records indicated that the injured employee had not completed their training program and Americold conceded that the employee was not authorized to operate the PIV. The employee was exposed to the hazards associated with untrained use of a PIV and was in fact severely injured. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Secretary had established the first three elements of the alleged violation. However, the record was unclear as to whether any supervisory employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the violation.

The injured employee did not testify at the hearing, and the Secretary only presented the CSHO’s account of her interview with the employee without documentation, in which she recalled that another PIV driver badged-through the PIV’s system permitting this employee to use it. She also was told that a supervisor overrode the system after this employee failed the safety questions. However, the record contained no evidence corroborating the injured employee’s statement as provided through the CSHO. Further, the ALJ found the CSHO’s account that unnamed employees informed her that supervisors had observed unauthorized employees using PIVs, as unpersuasive. Therefore, the Secretary failed to establish that Americold had actual knowledge of the violative condition.

The ALJ’s Decision then looked at whether Americold should have known or been aware of this violative condition. The evidence presented in fact showed that Americold had written rules prohibiting unauthorized use of PIVs which included training provided to all employees. They also had controls in place requiring ID badges showing training and certification to operate the machine and employees had to perform a safety inspection prior to even starting the PIV. Although Americold conceded that an authorized employee’s card could be used by an unauthorized employee, Americold was unaware of any similar instances and Secretary had not shown any evidence of this practice. Americold also had two forms of routine, documented, monitoring of employee safety and performance as well as a disciplinary program for which it established it had terminated three of its employees, months prior to the accident for PIV violations. Under these circumstances the Secretary failed to meet its burden and the Citation was vacated.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Construction Companies Engaging in Excavation Work Must Follow Safety Regulations to Avoid Cave-Ins and Trench Collapses

As is well documented and reported, a cave-in or trench collapse can lead to serious injuries and even death. The recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. Texas Underground Utilities, Inc. is instructive, and should again remind construction companies engaged in excavation of the necessary steps they must take to properly protect their workers during trenching activities, even if no one was injured in the underlying matter.   

On October 6, 2020, OSHA Safety Officer Keith Thomkins (alternatively referred to as “CSHO”) was driving past a construction site in Houston, Texas, and observed two workers inside a trench.  He pulled over, presented his credentials and then proceeded to have an opening conference with Juan Diaz, Texas Underground Utilities Inc.’s (“TUU”) Foreman at the site. The CSHO took measurements and photographs and conducted employee interviews.  It appears that work had started at the site less than an hour before his arrival, and was still in progress.  Mr. Diaz advised the CSHO that the workers had been in the trench for 5 to 10 minutes before the officer had arrived, although the officer believed they might have been there longer based on his observations of tools and activities. The length of the trench was 25 feet, and the width of the trench floor was 3 feet, while the width of the trench opening was 10 feet, 3 inches.  A ladder rested along the trench wall on the west end at an angle of about 75 degrees.  The wall on the western end of the trench measured 7 feet deep, while other sections of the trench measured 4 ½ to 5 feet in depth. The excavation at issue dug into a Type B soil (as per OSHA’s soil type classification) and TUU was utilizing a bench cut into the trench walls (which allows for sloping of the trench walls to avoid collapsing soil).  Pursuant to the OSHA’s standards, Type B soil should be benched or sloped to 45 degrees.  Here, Officer Thompkins measured the first wall of the bench (floor to shelf) at 4 ½ feet to 5 feet high, depending on where the measurements was taken along the trench.  The top of the first wall of the bench, was a shelf that measured 2 feet wide.  The second wall of the wall of the bench (from shelf to the surface) measured 2 feet high.  Officer Tompkins based some measurements on representations made by Foreman Diaz because he could not safely access the trench floor, as well as approximations since the trench walls and soil conditions varied.  Following the measurements, Officer Thomkins interviewed Foreman Diaz without an interpreter, and compiled information in a form, which Mr. Diaz signed.  Specifically, Mr. Diaz, had trenching and excavation training (but not with TUU in his 40 years in the industry).  He did not know whether other employees had received training.  A bench system was being used because the trench was not deep enough for a trench box.   Two individuals were working in the trench for about 10 minutes before the CSHO arrived.   During the trial, Mr. Diaz confirmed these statements and further indicated that he was charged with ensuring worker safety.  On the following day, Officer Thomkins requested all training documentation and certifications, but TUU never responded.  During Officer Thomkins’ investigation he also found that TUU had been previously cited by OSHA for failure to provide adequate protection from cave-ins during excavation from a 2017 incident where a trench that was slightly over 9 feet deep with previously disturbed Class B soil and one of the walls was improperly benched and the slope on both walls were steeper than the requisite 45 degrees exposing workers to a “crushed-by hazard”).  Following his investigation, the CSHO issued various citations to TUU included failing to protect employees working in a trench from cave-ins, in violation of OSHA regulations and classified this citation as a repeat offense since the 2017 incident had also involved an improperly sloped trench. 

TUU took issue with the applicable standard based on the CSHO’s measurements.  The cited regulation sets forth that each employee in an excavation be protected from cave-ins unless the excavation is made entirely of stable rock, or the excavation is less than 5 feet in depth and examination of the ground by a competent person provides no indication of a potential cave-in.  Both parties agreed that the soil type was Type B, but disagreed as to whether the trench was 5 feet deep.  The deepest part of the trench measured 7 feet and the CSHO took photographs of his measuring tool showing that depth.  TUU explained that this was an impossibility and the measuring device fell into a depression on the trench floor.   However, TUU presented no evidence disputing the height measurement, and when TUU’s owner, Julio Lugo, went to the site on the following day, it had already been backfilled and no other TUU employees had taken measurements.  Furthermore, Foreman Diaz had not objected to the CSHO’s measurements as they were being taken.  Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that this OSHA standard applied, and they accepted Officer Thomkins’ photographs and measurements as credible as per his testimony on the methodology, and, especially since TUU could not offer any evidence that called these measurements into question with their own independent measurements or dimensions.  Under either a multiple bench system or single bench system, the first bench wall could not be more than 4 feet in height.  In a single bench system, the first shelf must be equal the height of the bench for a 1:1 ratio.  In a multiple bench system, the first shelf wall must double the height of the bench and every other shelf would have a height and width equal to the first shelf wall to create a 1:1 ratio.  All sides of a trench have to be properly sloped or benched 1:1 or 45 degrees.  Here, the height of the first bench wall was between 4 ½ and 5 feet while the standard requires the first bench wall to be no more than 4 feet.  The standard also required the bench shelf to be 4 feet in width (for a single bench) or 8 feet (for multiple benches), while, here, the bench shelf measured between 2 and 3 feet.  Under either single or multiple bench systems, TUU was not in compliance as the trench was improperly sloped.   Therefore, TUU was found to have violated the standard.   

Even if workers were not injured, they were exposed to the hazards based on the evidence of the ladder and tools near the 7-foot wall, which could have exposed them to the cave-in hazard when entering/existing the trench even during that brief 5-to-10-minute period that Foreman Diaz admitted they were present.  Foreman Diaz was aware that the trench was dug into Type B soil, and he could have known with reasonable diligence that portions of the trench exceeded 5 feet in depth, and the benching system did not meet the standard’s requirements.  Given that the same standard had been previously violated in 2017, the ALJ found that this violation was a repeat offense and assessed a penalty of $20,781 for this repeat-serious citation. 

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Court Clarifies That Scaffold Law Only Applies To Workers

Sections 200, 240(1), and 241(6) of New York’s Labor Law are commonly referred to as New York’s “Scaffold Law”. The Scaffold Law was enacted back in 1885, long before the advent of the Worker’s Compensation statutes or regulatory schemes designed to enforce worker safety (such as OSHA and its state analogues). New York is the last state with such a law on its books, and it is widely credited with driving up construction and insurance costs. Further, in viewing the results of the repeal of Illinois’ Scaffold Law back in 1995, it is not universally accepted that the law actually achieves its stated goal of promoting worker safety. However, until it is modified to include a comparative negligence standard (that accounts for any failures of the worker to follow directions or otherwise work correctly), it is accepted that any time a worker falls from a height or is hurt as a result of a violation of the Industrial Code, the employer has no defense to the claim. Accordingly, high payouts by insurance companies (and high premiums for insurance policies) are a reluctantly accepted cost of engaging in construction in New York.

While workers are insulated from the consequences of their own negligence by virtue of the absolute liability imposed by the Labor Law, an appellate court, in Lauria v Lippolis Construction, Inc., reminds us that the benefits afforded by the Scaffold Law only apply to workers on the site, and not third parties.

Background

Prior to May of 2016, Lippolis Construction engaged to construct two homes on Avenue C in the Village of North Port Washington. In May of 2016, Lippolis excavated for the foundations of both homes, and on May 16, 2016, it was commencing to construct the forms for the footings. Before it poured concrete for the foundation, Lippolis requested that the Village inspect the excavation and forms for the footings to make sure that everything would comply with the local building code. The Village sent Building Inspector Fred Lauria to the site to perform the inspection. This was not Lauria’s first visit to the site. Unfortunately, during this particular visit, Lauria tripped and fell, suffering a torn ACL and other associated injuries. Accordingly, Lauria commenced a personal injury lawsuit against Lippolis, alleging that Lippolis was negligent and also violated the applicable provisions of the Scaffold Law.

After discovery, Lippolis moved for summary judgment dismissing the lawsuit. In support of the dismissal of the Labor Law claims, Lippolis noted that it was not disputed that he was only an employee of the Village, and was not an employee of Lippolis or any other contractor on the site. As to the negligence claim, Lippolis argued that the excavation was open and obvious, and was not inherently dangerous; accordingly, Lippolis was not negligent in maintaining the site as it did. In opposition, Lauria claimed that as an “inspector”, he is entitled to recovery under the Labor Law. Lauria also argued that there were questions as to whether the excavation constituted a hazard which needed to be resolved at trial.

Decision

The motion court granted Lippolis’ motion to the extent that it dismissed the Labor Law claims. In doing so, the court found that as Lauria was not an employee, he was not entitled to the protections set forth in the Labor Law. However, as to the negligence claim, the court found that there was an issue of fact which precluded summary judgment. Lauria appealed, seeking to revive the Labor Law claims (with their strict liability standard). However, the appellate court affirmed, citing well settled case law that “the plaintiff was not within the class of persons subject to the protections of the Labor Law”.

Comment

At first blush, one would believe that the plaintiff would have been relieved that he was able to stave off summary judgment dismissing his negligence claim and, therefore, have his proverbial day in court. However, the Scaffold Law is particularly onerous because of its imposition of absolute liability—which does not permit the consideration of whether the plaintiff also had any fault for his injuries, or how much effort the contractor put into safety, or otherwise preventing the accident in the first place. Where strict liability is imposed, it is not a question of whether the plaintiff will get paid, only how much. Accordingly, one can understand why the fight over this standard is fought so vigorously. In the meantime, this decision reminds contractors that while common law negligence provides an incentive to provide for the safety of all of those on the worksite, the most onerous requirements are reserved for the protection of workers.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Court Reminds Us That Parties Are Generally Free To Shorten The Period Within Which To Start A Lawsuit

Construction contracts, like other contracts, are meant to define the relationship between the parties. In that regard, the parties are generally free to negotiate the terms of that contract. It is only where the contractual language at issue is contrary to statute, against public policy, or is unreasonable, will a court decline to enforce the contract as negotiated between the parties.

While parties are generally free to negotiate to shorten (but not lengthen) the period within which to start a lawsuit (the contractual statute of limitations) from the otherwise applicable six years, where the contract’s shortened limitations period effectively nullifies the claim before it arises it will be found to be unreasonable. However, this is a very fact intensive determination, and the same shortened period may be upheld in one instance, while in the next instance the exact same time period may be deemed unreasonable by a different judge. In the recent case of Cashman Dredging and Marine Contracting Co., LLC v City of New York, a court upheld a period as short as six months.

Background

In May of 2016, Cashman Dredging and Marine Contracting Co. entered into a contract with the City of New York for the dredging of portions of Flushing Bay in Queens. The contract contained a provision that any lawsuit relating to the project must be brought within six months of the date of substantial completion.

Once started, the project quickly encountered problems. These problems were determined to stem from the design’s failure to account for certain low tide conditions, which resulted in slope failures. While the City investigated the issue, all work was put on hold, and delays ensued. Work ultimately resumed and on October 22, 2020, the project was determined to be substantially complete.

As a result of the delays, Cashman asserted a delay claim seeking $808,013 in damages, which it set forth in its verified statement of damages on May 5, 2021. Although some negotiations were had on the delay claim, no formal determination was ever made, and no resolution was reached. In order to collect on this claim, on August 31, 2022, Cashman commenced its lawsuit. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was untimely as it had not been brought within the six month contractual limitations period. Cashman opposed, arguing that its delay claim had not accrued because no determination had been made (which it argued was, itself, a breach of the contract), and therefore its claim was timely. Cashman also cross-moved to assert a claim to compel the City to make a formal determination on its delay claim.

Decision

The motion court granted the City’s motion and dismissed Cashman’s claims (and denied its cross motion relating to a formal determination on the delay claim). In doing so, the court cited the six-month limitations period under the contract and found that the lawsuit, commenced nearly two years after substantial completion, was well outside of that limitations period. As to the argument that the claim had not yet accrued, the court noted that the delay claim, itself, was not articulated until after the six-month limitations period had expired. However, even following that logic to its conclusion, the court noted that the contract provided that City had only 60 days after the submission of the final statement of damages to act on the claim, so the proposed claim to compel any determination would, itself, have been time barred under that applicable statute of limitations.

Comment

This column often notes that the construction contract is the single most important document defining the relationship between the parties in our industry. Here, the court reminds us that parties are free to agree to shorten the time within which to start a lawsuit arising out of the contract. (Sometimes a party may do this unwittingly.) There is an exception to this freedom that the limitations period cannot be so short that it runs before the claim actually accrues. However, absent such circumstances, parties would be advised that where they have agreed to a shortened limitations period, they must exercise extra diligence to do everything they need to do to preserve and prosecute their claims within that shortened period. Consulting with construction counsel in drafting and reviewing contracts so that you can be sure that any shortened limitations period passes the reasonableness test (and does not run before the claim accrues), and how to best timely assert any claims within that shortened period, could be very helpful. Please also study your contract at the beginning of the job—not at the end.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Construction Companies Cannot Simply Delegate the Duty of Safety to Its Employees

Power saws, shears, presses and other machines typically used in construction require one or more methods of machine guarding to protect operators from the hazards created by using these machines, and companies cannot merely delegate such duty to its own employees. The recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. Good Food Concepts, LLC d/b/a Ranch Food Directs is instructive as to the need for machine guarding. Although this matter arose from an unfortunate accident involving use of a meat grinder leading to the amputation of the worker’s fingers, the use of equipment with similar hazards are common in the construction industry and even if a company has stringent work rules in place they do not act as a substitute for guarding when an employee is in the zone of danger.

Ranch Foods is a meat processing business which also operates a retail store in Colorado that had approximately 15 employees in 2021. The owner of Ranch Foods, Mr. Michael Callicrate, visited the store twice a day, four to five times a week. Although he oversaw store operations, he delegated management and supervision to the store’s general manager, Mr. John Morrill and the head of the meat department, Mr. John Wichman. Mr. Morrill had held his position for 3 ½ years and typically he would visit the store every day to pick up receipts from the prior night and discuss any issues/needs with the employees during these visits. He was charged with safety compliance and discipline at the store and could remove employees for safety violations although he had never conducted any internal safety audits nor examined any of the equipment. If equipment was not operating properly, he expected his employees to report these problems and stop using that machine. They relied on “observation by managers and other employees” to ensure a safe work environment but safety violations were not documented, unless disciplinary action was required. They also posed a Code of Safe Practices in the common area, along with other labor law materials and schedules. Ranch Foods did not have a formal safety and health training plan and employees were given a handbook that contained the company’s disciplinary policy. Specific safety and equipment training was expected to be conducted by an employee’s immediate supervisor. Mr. Wichman, who held over 50 years of experience in the meat industry, trained new meat-cutters regarding the operation of meat cutting tools and machinery and was responsible for ensuring the employees operated the machinery safely. The employee involved in this underlying accident (hereinafter “Ms. Doe”) had been trained by Mr. Wichman, including the use of the meat grinder and the use of a stomper, an 18-inch cylindrical tool used to push meat down the throat of the grinder as well as cleaning and disassembling the grinder’s components which generally consisted of a hopper, a throat, an auger and rotating blade. The operator would place meat in the hopper and push down the throat of the grinder towards auger and blades that ground the meat. The stomper could also be used to push the meat down the grinder throat but sometimes the stomper was ineffective, and operators would use their fingers to dislodge meat from the walls of the throat. The grinder jammed frequently, and Mr. Wichman had trained this employee how to clear the jam by reversing it and then re-running it. If the jam did not clear, the operator was expected to disassemble and clean the machine. Mr. Wichman did not utilize any training materials nor videos, nor had he reviewed the grinder’s manual or OSHA publications pertaining to the safe use of meat grinders. Mr. Wichman trained this worker to avoid using her fingers to push the meat down the throat of the grinder but even though he knew it was dangerous, Mr. Wichman used his own fingers to push meat down the throat to about 2 inches (of the total 4 ¾ inches in length) since he was comfortable with this practice given his experience but advised employees not to do so because it was unsafe. No written rule existed prohibiting this practice and he had never formally reprimanded any employee for doing so.

On June 11, 2021, Ms. Doe was operating the meat grinder when it jammed. She reversed the machine but was unsuccessful. She then observed that extra meat was on the side of the throat, so she reached into the throat to push it towards the auger. At that point her right hand was caught and pulled into the grinder. Mr. Wichman unplugged grinder and an ambulance. The EMS personnel, after deliberation transported Ms. Doe with the grinder to the hospital. After emergency surgery which reversed the grinder’s motor, free the hand and amputated four fingers.

OSHA received notice that a worker had lost four fingers in a meat grinder and on June 15, 2021, a Safety Officer investigated the store, interviewed employees and took photographs. Following the investigation, Ranch Food was issued multiple citations. The relevant citation for our discussion pertained to violation of the safety standard which requires, one or more methods of machine guarding to protect the operator and other employees in the machine area from hazards such as those created by point of operation, ingoing nip points, rotating parts, flying chips and sparks, by methods such as barrier guards, two-hand tripping devices, electronic safety devices, etc. The citation set forth that Ranch Foods failed to ensure that the grinder was guarded effectively or that tools other than hands were used for pushing small amounts of meat through the grinder when the stomper was ineffective.

The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) found that the cited standard applied in this instance. The meat grinder presented a point of operation, ingoing nip point, and rotating parts with the potential for serious injury, which was being used during its “normal production operations” and did not a maintenance activity, which would have involved a different safety standard (lockout/tagout standard which places a larger onus on the equipment operator). The purpose of this safety standard is to not make it primarily dependent on human behavior but rather to provide a safe environment “regardless of the employee’s intelligence, skills and tendency to neglect a specified course of conduct”. Ranch Foods argued that the grinder’s own design prevented employee’s exposure as adult hand could not enter the zone of danger and further that the stomper, alleviated the need for use of an operator’s fingers to push meat into the throat of the grinder and further that operators were warned against this use. However, the safety standard prohibits tools to be used in lieu of a guard and therefore the stomper was inadequate. Moreover, the safety standard does not permit guarding by work rules but rather requires a physical guard so as not to depend upon correct employee behavior. The practice of inserting their fingers in the meat grinder to dislodge meat within 2 to 4 inches from the rotating auger, as confirmed by Mr. Wichman and other employee testimony, established that this was a common practice for which it was foreseeable that an operator would put their hands within the zone of danger. The inadequacies of Ranch Food’s safety training and precautions established that supervisor, Mr. Wichman, own violation of safety rules was foreseeable to impute knowledge of these violative conditions on the Ranch Foods of this practice. Furthermore, an employer could not merely delegate the duty of safety to its employees, and the general manager, Mr. Morrill’s reliance on employees to act safely and report any safety issues and his own failure to discipline any unsafe actions or examine equipment for safe operation did not allow Ranch Foods to escape responsibility. Consequently, the Citation was affirmed.

Ranch Foods was also cited for failing to timely notify OSHA of this accident, which was also affirmed by the ALJ. Pursuant to the applicable rules, all employers are required to notify OSHA when an employee is killed on the job or suffers a work-related hospitalization, amputation, or loss of an eye. A fatality must be reported within 8 hours, while an in-patient hospitalization, amputation, or eye loss must be reported within 24 hours.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445