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Court Limits Owner’s Right To Itemized Statement Of Lien As Contract Was Fully Performed

As this column has often noted, a mechanic’s lien is a powerful tool to help a contractor to get paid. Because of the power of this tool—and the ability of a stranger to the property, and perhaps even a stranger to the contract with the owner, to affect title to the property—there are certain protections built into the Lien Law to provide balance. One of these balancing tools is the ability of an owner to demand a verified itemized statement of the lien, pursuant to Section 38 of the Lien Law. This statement is designed to provide the owner or upstream contractor with a line-by-line breakdown of what comprises the mechanic’s lien (which court holdings over time have demonstrated that, as a practical matter, should resemble a time and materials billing statement). The statement may also help identify whether the lien is exaggerated. The penalty for failing to provide the required verified itemized statement is the cancellation and discharge of the lien. Courts have also held that defenses to the requirement to provide such a statement are very limited. Accordingly, some who are the subject of a mechanic’s lien will use the demand for a verified itemized statement as a weapon to attempt to discharge the lien through the attrition of litigating the sufficiency of the response, as opposed to forcefully litigating the substance of the lien in a foreclosure action. For that reason, in the recent case of York Restoration Corp. v Pedrol Contracting Inc., a court reaffirmed that where a stipulated sum contract is substantially complete, a statement of the terms of that contract, together with a statement of the amounts owing, will be sufficient to apprise the owner of the basis for the lien.

Background

In August of 2018, York Restoration and Pedrol Contracting entered into a purchase order contract whereby Pedrol would rent certain scaffolding equipment to York for use on a construction project in Manhattan. The contract required Pedrol to provide 5 two-point scaffold, including 10 motors and accessories, as well as a “rigging license”. Each scaffold cost $1,200 per month, and the license cost $400 per month; the total cost for all equipment was agreed to be $6,400 per month. The rental ran through February of 2021, during which time York accrued $128,000 in arrears.

To secure its right to collect, Pedrol filed a mechanic’s lien on July 25, 2021 with the New York County Clerk. On August 26, 2021, York served a demand for an itemized statement, pursuant to Section 38 of the Lien Law, which required Pedrol to set forth the items of labor and material, and the value of same, together with the terms of the contract under which such were furnished, in a written and verified statement, within 5 days of the demand. Because Pedrol failed to comply with the demand, on September 16, 2021, York brought a special proceeding to compel Pedrol to comply. Alternatively, if Pedrol did not comply with the court order compelling production, York sought a further order cancelling the lien.

In opposition, Pedrol provided a copy of the contract setting forth the terms of the rental, together with the statements previously sent to York setting forth the computation of the amounts owed. As these documents set forth the accounting by which Pedrol arrived at the amount of its lien, it argued that such were sufficient to meet Pedrol’s burden under Section 38 of the Lien Law.

Decision

The court denied York’s motion and dismissed its petition. In doing so, the court focused on the language in Section 38 that an itemized statement “may” be required of a lienor, following well settled law that such language establishes that there is no absolute right to an itemized statement where it would not serve the purpose of apprising the property owner of the details of the leinor’s claim. Here, the court found that as the contract had been substantially completed, and as the information as to what comprised the lien was easily ascertainable by multiplying the fixed price per month times the number of months of the rental—neither of which York disputed—there was no need for anything further to satisfy Pedrol’s obligations under Section 38. The court went on to note that while a more detailed statement may be required in certain complex contractual disputes, such was not required here because the owner was sufficiently apprised of the basis of the lien.

Comment

The demand for an itemized statement of lien, like its cousin the demand for a verified statement of trust, is a useful tool to ascertain certain information in an expeditious fashion without having to await a lawsuit and its often arduous discovery process. However, like the discovery process in a lawsuit, these tools can be abused—particularly where, as here, a failure to comply with the demand can lead to a discharge of the lien (or, in the case of the demand for a verified statement of trust, a presumptive finding that trust funds were diverted). Accordingly, in order to prevent an overly litigious party from abusing the process in order to short circuit the lien—particularly with regard to a substantially complete project at a fixed price, where the computation of the amount owed is a matter of simple mathematics—the court will look to see whether the purpose of the statute (apprising the owner of the basis for the lien) has been met. Where it has, then any further litigation will be reserved for the foreclosure action.

While the court here held that the appraisal requirement was met because the contract was complete and the computation of damages was relatively simple (fixed sum times number of months), the court did leave open that a more thorough statement may be required where the computation is more complicated, or where the work is disputed. Accordingly, because the sanction for failing to adequately comply with these statutory requirements is cancellation of the lien, lienors would be well advised to consult with experienced construction counsel to determine what kind of a response is necessary under your particular set of circumstances.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Construction Companies Have an Up-Hill Battle in Proving Employee Misconduct Defense with OSHA Violations

OSHA violations are issued from the observation of unsafe practices at jobsites regardless of whether an accident has occurred. Typically, these violations arise from employee(s) not following a company’s own safety rules. However, the burden to prove the employee misconduct so as to dismiss an OSHA violation is generally high and the recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. Elmer W. Davis, Inc. is informative as to the extensive policies and procedures a construction company has to have in place to successfully argue it.

Elmer W. Davis, Inc. (“EWD”) is a commercial roofing contractor based in Rochester, New York and employes approximately 150 to 300 persons, varying with seasonal needs. On April 30, 2021, EWD assigned two employees, Ory Leach and Cody Pritt, to repair seams on a low-slope roof of a one-story commercial building in Rochester, New York. The roof to be repaired was rectangular and not more than 50 feet wide, and its slope was less than 4 in 12 (vertical to horizontal); the roof’s edge was unprotected and three of its four sides were about 15 feet above ground level. Upon arrival the employees decided that the roof’s configuration permitted them to solely use a safety monitoring system and did not require implementation of further fall protection based on EWD’s work rules. Leach was the designated foreman of the two-person crew based on seniority, and as crew foreman Leach decided he would act as the safety monitor for Pritt while Pritt performed the repair. EWD’s work rules for safety monitoring prohibited Leach from engaging in any roofing work while he was acting as safety monitor for Pritt, and Leach was aware of this rule. While Pritt did the roofing work, Leach held a hand trowel Pritt had been using and he began to do some roofing work himself thus performing work while simultaneously acting as safety monitor for Pritt. Leach’s action of simply holding the trowel violated EWD’s own work rule that safety monitors engage in no activity other than monitoring.

As Leach and Pritt were on the roof, an OSHA Compliance Officer (“CO”) that was driving by noticed them working near the roof’s unprotected edge without using any fall protection and began taking multiple photographs showing Leach standing near the unprotected edge with his back to the edge facing away from Pritt, and the hood of Leach’s sweatshirt pulled fully over his head, limiting his peripheral vision. After observing and photographing the employees for approximately 10 minutes, the CO identified himself to them and asked them to come down from the roof. CO briefly interviewed the employees. EWD’s safety director, Tim Crumb, had also been called by Leach and arrived at the site. After discussion with the CO, Crumb summoned the employees over in which it was established that the employees partook in safety training on fall protection that Tuesday, and EWD established that employees must always have a monitor. The next day, on May 1, 2021, Crumb sent the CO an email stating that “no doubt that a violation occurred” that “this is a case of misconduct”. On May 3, 2021, EWD formally disciplined both Leach and Pritt for their conduct on the roof, the disciplinary notices of each employee imposed a one-week suspension in accordance with EWD’s progressive discipline policy.

Subsequently, OSHA issued a Citation that alleged one serious violation asserting a violation of the standard which prescribes permissible fall protection systems and practices for “roofing work on low-slope roofs” with the alleged violation description providing that “On or about 4/30/2021,… the employer did not enforce the use of fall protection for employees engaged in roof work …Employees were exposed to falling 15 feet to lower levels while working near the roof edge with no fall protection.”

Following the hearings, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the Secretary (of Labor) had proven by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., that it was more likely than not) the employee’s conduct was in violation of the applicable standards, which provides that employees working on low-slope roofs with unprotected sides and edges 6 feet or more above lower level shall be protected by implementing a guardrail system, safety net system, personal fall arrest system, warning line system and safety monitoring system. As set forth in the standard, a compliant safety-monitoring system shall conform to criteria that a safety monitor shall be on same walking/working surface and within visual sighting distance of employee being monitored, be able to communicate orally with the employee and that the safety monitor shall not have other responsibilities which would take the monitor’s attention from the monitoring function. The acting foreman violated these rules when he began to do some roofing work which would have reasonably taken his attention away from his monitoring function.

However, EWD was successfully able to prove the affirmative defense of unforeseeable employee misconduct and overcome the “substantial evidentiary hurdle”. To establish this affirmative defense an employer must prove the following evidence by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) it established work rules to prevent the violation; 2) these rules were adequately communicated to the employees; 3) it took steps to discover the violation; and, 4) it effectively enforced the rules when infractions were discovered. Under the first element it was found that EWD’s work rule prohibited safety monitors from engaging in any activity other than monitoring employees and if Leach had complied with this company’s rule his conduct would have conformed to the mandate that a safety monitor have no “other responsibilities which would take the monitor’s attention from the monitoring function.” EWD’s work rule was adequate because it is both “effectively implemented the requirements of the standard” and was “designed to prevent the cited violation.” Under the second element, adequate communication of a work rule may be accomplished through training and here EWD adequately communicated its work rule. EWD’s written “Corporate Safety Program” addresses the role of a safety monitor in fall protection and is covered during orientation of new employees, in addition to annual training on fall protection training for its employees, and alongside regular participation by its field employees in toolbox talks and on-the-job training. Additionally, Leach and Pritt’s attended refresher training on the use of a safety monitoring system three days before the violation occurred. Under the third element of effective implementation, a safety program requires diligent effort to discover and discourage violation of safety rules by employees, and one of the factors used to determine whether employer effectively enforced its safety rules are the efforts it takes to monitor adherence to those safety rules. EWD established this element by showing it had a designated foreman who is responsible for worksite safety; a separate safety director who devotes much of their time visiting jobsites monitoring compliance with work rules, alongside another member of EWD’s safety department who also conducts worksite inspections. Furthermore, EWD also hires outside safety consultants to conduct unannounced inspections and requests that its insurance carriers conduct their own unannounced inspections. As to the last element it must be shown that an employer effectively disciplines employee misconduct. Pre-inspection and post-inspection disciplinary measures may be considered in determining whether an employee has effectively enforced its work rules. EWD’s progressive discipline policy prescribes an oral warning, as the sanction for first-time rule violations, but an employee’s first-time failure to use required fall protection is an exception, warranting the more severe sanction of a one-week suspension, or at the option of the sanctioned employee, in lieu of suspension, completing an OSHA-authorized training course on their own time. Since 2013, EWD had formally disciplined employees on 83 occasions including for violations of fall protection violations. The two employees here were similarly disciplined with one-week suspensions. Therefore, this affirmative defense was established, and the Citation was vacated.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Construction Companies Must Take Proper Precautions to Protect Workers from Heat Hazards

With summer approaching and temperatures beginning to rise, construction companies must take every reasonable precaution to protect their workers from potential hazards, including heat-related illnesses. The Occupation Safety and Health Review Commission’s recent decisions in Secretary of Labor v. United States Postal Service, show the importance of providing adequate heat safety training to employees.

In the summer of 2016 two letter carriers in Des Moines, Iowa were hospitalized due to “excessive heat” hazard. The first incident occurred on June 9, 2016, in which the first carrier began texting her supervisor on how she was not feeling well and she was trying to finish her run. The supervisor encouraged her to do as best as she could and offered to provide ice but was unable because she became preoccupied with work, as well. The temperature surpassed 90 degrees Fahrenheit during this period. As the letter carrier felt too ill to continue working, she began to drive back to the station when she vomited out the window of her vehicle. Upon the carrier’s arrival to the station three other letter carriers described her appearance as “extremely red”, “dazed”, and “shaking”. The supervisor acknowledged that the carrier looked “flushed” and noted her collar was wet with sweat and instructed her to sit down and proceeded to call the station manager. The station manager instructed the carrier to finish her route. The letter carrier refused and proceeded to “storm out” and talk to her union representative, and then proceeded to visit an urgent care facility.

The second incident occurred on July 21, 2016, as the second letter carrier, classified as a City Carrier Assistant (a “CCA”), a non-career employee, was delivering mail on-foot, she began to experience a headache, nausea, and memory loss. A supervisor came to the carrier’s truck and the carrier informed the supervisor of her symptoms. The supervisor provided the carrier with three water bottles and left, but as the carrier continued her route, her symptoms began to worsen. Eventually the carrier called her son who called 911 and the carrier was subsequently transported to the hospital.

As a result of these incidents and other related incidents, OSHA issued a Citation alleging repeat violations of the general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in which the Postal Service exposed its employees “to recognized hazards related to working outside during periods of high heat levels while delivering the … mail.”

The supervisor from the first incident testified that she had never been trained by the Postal Service on heat-related illnesses prior to this incident, apart from sometimes receiving emails with heat safety information and seeing a poster on heat safety in the breakroom. On the second incident, although, The Postal Service completed an accident report claiming that this carrier had failed to “comply with the rules”, the second letter carrier, a non-career employee, testified that no one at the Postal Service told her what rules she had failed to comply with and during the course of OSHA proceeding her testimony was deemed more credible than that of her supervisor’s.

The Commission found that this evidence had shown the training was deficient and that adequately training supervisors on heat safety would have materially reduced the risks posed by excessive heat. Moreover, safety talks were held when employees such as CCAs were not present. Adequate training requires attendance of all supervisors of safety talks, including ones addressing heat stress safety when all supervisors and employees, including CCAs, are present. Safety talks should not be conducted before certain employees are required to report to work.

The dangers of heat illness had been further discussed in the ALJ’s decision in this matter. The most serious illness caused by heat stress is heatstroke, which causes a dysfunction of the brain. Symptoms include slurred speech, disorientation, confusion, unconsciousness, or coma, and death. Symptoms of heat exhaustion include headaches, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and profuse sweating but does not result in an elevated body temperature or brain dysfunction. It is important that employers and employees recognize these symptoms to prevent “excessive” heat hazards. Moreover, it is vital to implement a heat acclimatation program for employees who are returning to work due to personal or health reasons. In A.H. Sturgill Roofing Inc., the Commission vacated citations that had been issued following an incident where employee who collapsed at a worksite and subsequently died from complications of heat stroke after working on a roofing project. The deceased employee had various pre-existing medical conditions. The employee’s assignment was to stand near the edge of the roof where other employees brought him a cart full of cut-up pieces of roofing. The assignment was intentionally made by the foreman because it was the employee’s first day on the project. All employees were encouraged to utilize the immediate access to ice, water, rest, and shade, without fear of reprisal.

Construction companies should have in place a proper heat illness prevention program that is communicated with all their employees, permanent and temporary, and that ensures adequate safeguards such proper supervision, acclimatizing workers, providing water, and managing work and rest cycles.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Court Rules Improperly Terminated Contractor Without Recourse In Light Of Converter Clause

As this column has noted on many occasions, the contract between the parties is the ultimate definition of their relationship. While that document should provide guidance in the “good times”, it will certainly be relied on when a party is looking to terminate the contract. However, in the absence of something in the contract justifying termination, a party may attempt to manufacture the circumstances it ultimately uses to do so. While such a termination would be improper, an appellate court, in the recent case of Tycoon Construction Corp. v New York City Housing Authority, reminds us that where the contract contains a “converter clause” converting an improper termination for cause into one for convenience, the contractor will have no recourse for the improper termination—no matter how ugly the circumstances of the termination were.

Background

In October of 2014, Tycoon Construction Corp. was awarded a contract by the New York City Housing Authority to perform certain “building entrance improvements”, which primarily focused on the installation of alarmed, ballistic security doors. The contract contained a “converter clause” which provided that “[i]f, after termination of the Contractor’s right to proceed, it is determined that the Contractor was not in default, or that the delay was excusable, the rights and obligations of the parties will be the same as if the termination had been for the convenience of [NYCHA]”. The contract also required that Tycoon provide NYCHA with notice of any claims within 20 days of their accrual.

In order to perform its work under the contract (specifically, the access control system), Tycoon needed for NYCHA to coordinate with Verizon to provide working telephone jacks and lines. For whatever reason, NYCHA could not provide the required working telephone service, thus precluding Tycoon from having the entrances tested and signed off. At around the same time (in October of 2016), NYCHA undertook to change the design of the entryways, and directed Tycoon to perform the extra work required to undertake the new design (which involved ripping out some of its newly installed entrances to install the ones with the updated design). On December 27, 2016, Tycoon submitted a change order of nearly $3 million to NYCHA for this work, and on January 11, 2017, it submitted a formal Notice of Claim under the contract.

Within a few weeks of this change order, NYCHA ordered Tycoon’s workers off of the site, and on March 27, 2017, it declared Tycoon in default (and placed a claim under Tycoon’s performance bond). None of the reasons cited in the March 27th letter were enumerated in the contract as bases to default the contractor. Because NYCHA is a public entity, Tycoon commenced an administrative review proceeding under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to annul the decision to terminate the contract, arguing that it was unsupported by the terms of the contract and, therefore, was arbitrary and capricious. Based on the language of the contract the court agreed, and the default was annulled (which annulment was subsequently affirmed on appeal).

Subsequently, Tycoon commenced a lawsuit against NYCHA to recover for the improper termination and unpaid extra work. NYCHA moved to dismiss, arguing that the converter clause insulated it from the effects of its judicially determined improper termination, and that the late Notice of Claim precluded Tycoon from recovering its extra costs pursuant to the change order. Tycoon opposed, offering a novel argument conceding that while the contract contained a converter clause giving NYCHA the right to terminate for any reason, such did not insulate it from having to pay financial damages resulting from such an improper termination. As to the late Notice of Claim, Tycoon argued that its damages were only ascertainable upon the issuance of the change order on December 27, 2016, and that its Notice of Claim, filed 15 days later, was timely.

Decision

The court granted NYCHA’s motion, finding that as NYCHA had the unilateral right to terminate the contract, it could not be made to pay costs related to an improper termination. As to the extra work claim, the court found that Tycoon’s claims accrued upon the change of the design in October of 2016—and not the issuance of the change order in December—and, therefore, the Notice of Claim filed in January of 2017 was untimely. The appellate court affirmed, citing well settled case law on both propositions, holding that where there is an unqualified right to terminate the contractor (here, by the converter clause deeming an improper termination as one for convenience), NYCHA had the right to do so “without court inquiry as to whether the termination was driven by an ulterior motive”. Similarly, as the service of a timely Notice of Claim was a condition precedent to the recovery on the extra work claim, the failure to do so amounted to a complete waiver of the claim.

Comment

On a construction project, the contract is the document by which claims live or die. A converter clause is a dangerous one for a contractor (or for a subcontractor) because it insulates the upstream party from the consequences of taking improper actions (which, here, were judicially determined to be improper, and included the making of an improper demand upon Tycoon’s performance bond). Similarly, a short Notice of Claim provision can serve to insulate an owner or an upstream contractor from having to pay for services rendered in good faith.

Holdings such as the one here serve as warnings to contractors to be familiar with all of the terms of their contract, and to be diligent about sending out correspondence, such as a Notice of Claim, so as to preserve their right to collect later on. Likewise, familiarity with all of the terms of the contract could have enlightened the decision as to whether to pursue a separate special proceeding to determine whether the termination was improper. Given the converter clause, that determination served only as a pyrrhic victory.

While a contract on a publicly bid job cannot be negotiated, contractors would nevertheless be well advised to have experienced construction counsel review the contract pre-bid and advise of both its “highlights” and “lowlights” so as to enlighten the contractor’s decision as to whether to bid or not. (To borrow a late-July baseball analogy, sometimes the best trade you make is the trade you don’t make.) Post-bid, the contractor should have counsel prepare “claim books”, which set forth the rights that the contractor has (and does not have) under the contract. These claim books also tailor notice and other documents to the terms of that contract, and include specific timelines clearly setting forth what notices have to be given, and when, so as to best preserve the contractor’s right to payment.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Woes in Different Area Codes – Enforceability of Pay-If-Paid Provisions

Welby, Brady & Greenblatt LLP represents contractors working throughout the Northeast United States; from the New York, New Jersey and Connecticut tristate area, to Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and beyond. Nonetheless, our clients’ “bread and butter” expectedly revolves around projects in the states of New York and New Jersey. If you were to create a composite WBG client, they would likely be a successful contractor with multiple projects in both states, operating as either General Contractor or Subcontractor depending on the size of the project.

In light of the prevalence of our clients’ involvement in New York/New Jersey, we keep a close eye on any legal developments that affect the construction industry in one or both states. A recent decision by New Jersey’s Appellate Division concerning a subcontractor’s right to payment has created a chasm in how contracts will be enforced in New Jersey when juxtaposed to statutory and caselaw authority in New York, and dual-state contractors must beware when signing on to New Jersey Projects.

On a daily basis, our firm drafts and/or negotiates contracts on behalf of prospective subcontractors. Quite often, the upstream general contractor attempts to include a “Pay-if-Paid” provision in the subcontract, which essentially transfers the risk of a project owner’s non-payment from the general contractor to the subcontractor by making the owner’s payment a condition precedent to the subcontractor’s entitlement to compensation for services rendered. This is quite easy to deal with when negotiating a subcontract in New York; under New York’s General Obligation Law §5-322.1, Pay-if-Paid provisions are unenforceable as contrary to public policy due to their infringement on lien rights, even if agreed to by both parties. As such, in New York these contract clauses revert to simple timing mechanisms for payment as opposed to their intended purpose of restricting the general contractor’s ultimate obligation to pay the subcontractor.

In contrast, the New Jersey courts are taking a diametrically different approach to Pay-if-Paid contract clauses. In JPC Merger Sub, LLC v. Tricon Enterprises (286 A.3d 1186 [2022]), the Appellate Division held that a Pay-if-Paid provision is fully enforceable so long as the parties’ contract specified a clear and unambiguous intent and agreement by the parties to shift the risk of non-payment by the project owner.

Tricon Enterprises (“Tricon”) was hired by the County of Union (“Owner”) to serve as general contractor on a large public improvement project. Tricon then hired JPC Merger Sub, LLC (“JPC”) as a subcontractor/vendor for the furnishing of materials on the project. The JPC-Tricon subcontract (the “Subcontract”) included an ironclad Pay-if-Paid provision:

“Vendor understands and agrees that Tricon’s obligation to make any payment to Vendor is subject to, and shall not exist unless and until, Tricon’s receipt of payment on account of Vendor’s work from the Owner…, the occurrence and satisfaction of which shall be a condition precedent to Tricon’s duty to remit payment.”

During the course of the project, JPC furnished structural steel beams for installation on the project, which were subsequently not accepted by Owner and never installed on the project. Due to the non-use of the materials, Owner did not pay Tricon for the beams, and Tricon in turn refused to pay JPC pursuant to the Subcontract’s Pay-if-Paid clause.

In its decision, New Jersey’s Appellate Division specifically referenced the fact that – unlike New York – the State does not have a statute or published caselaw governing the enforceability of such contract provisions. Moreover, the Court’s decision specifically stated that the prohibition against the use of Pay-if-Paid provisions as conditions precedent in construction contracts should come from the legislature rather than the courts, and that absent statutory authority such provisions are “neither unfair, unconscionable, nor against public policy” so long as the contract on its face contains clear and unequivocal language that unambiguously sets forth the parties intentions when the contract was executed.

The New Jersey decision is clearly problematic for subcontractors. In fact, the decision wholly changes how we approach contract negotiations for New Jersey projects. Rather than advise the clients of the provision’s true impacts and recommend its removal due to potential delays in payment (which is the approach in New York contracts), we now tell clients that the Pay-if-Paid clause in a New Jersey contract must be removed unless the client desperately wants to work on a specific project and is willing to eat the risk of non-payment. And make no mistake, the risk is substantial; if the receivable is large enough and the subcontractor is left holding the bag, their profit margin may be erased in the best case, and company-crippling losses may be sustained in the worst case.

This cautionary tale neatly illustrates the importance of retaining counsel before negotiating and executing a contract for a New Jersey project, and allowing your legal team to fight against a general contractor’s inclusion of a Pay-if-Paid provision before non-payment issues ever have a chance to arise. As discussed above, a subcontractor can do everything right on a given project and still have no legal recourse when making a justified claim for payment. As is always the case, a contractor’s best litigation defense remains “pre-litigation”; if you have any questions regarding what you are ultimately agreeing to, it is always wise to have skilled construction counsel review your contract before signing.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Andreas M. Koudellou at akoudellou@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6487

Limiting Language Can Make Unenforceable Indemnification Agreements Partially Enforceable

Background

New York G.O.L. § 5-322.1 was intended to mitigate the widespread construction industry practice in which subcontractors assume the liability of upstream contractors and owners by promising to pay for an upstream contractor’s or owner’s losses for their own negligence. Promises by one party to pay for another party’s losses – often referred to as “indemnification agreements” – are typically included in contracts drafted by owners and general contractors, as well as subcontractors soliciting bids from sub-subcontractors. Section 5-322.1 voids indemnification agreements between two construction contractors where Contractor A promises to pay for Contractor B’s losses resulting from Contractor B’s own negligence.

In practice, section 5-322.1 voids an indemnification agreement between a general contractor and a subcontractor when the general contractor is found partially negligent in an action brought by the subcontractor’s employee and the agreement provides for full, rather than partial, indemnification to the general contractor. That is, section 5-322.1 bars the enforcement of an agreement providing that the subcontractor promises to compensate the general contractor for the general contractor’s own negligence.

Situations where § 5-322.1 applies and does not apply

  • Applies: Negligence actions involving contracts for the “construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, appurtenances and appliances…”
  • Does not apply: Contractual provisions providing that a subcontractor will indemnify a general contractor for the subcontractor’s own negligence.
  • Does not apply: Contractual provisions requiring subcontractors to carry insurance coverage against personal injury.
  • Does not apply: Contracts for the sale of goods that are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).

Comment

Importantly, section 5-322.1 does not prohibit agreements in which a subcontractor agrees to indemnify an owner or general contractor for liability resulting from the subcontractor’s own negligence. Contractors can agree to pay for losses resulting from their own negligence but cannot assume liability for another contractor’s negligence. Consistent with this rule, New York courts have sometimes preserved that part of an indemnification agreement which is not prohibited by section 5-322.1. In cases where the indemnification agreement at issue was prefaced by language stating that the agreement is valid “to the extent permitted by law,” some courts have upheld the part of the agreement that was not invalidated by section 5-322.1. For example, if the subcontractor agrees to indemnify a general contractor for (1) the general contractor’s negligence, and (2) the subcontractor’s negligence – the part of the agreement providing that the subcontractor agrees to indemnify the general contractor for the subcontractor’s own negligence may be upheld with certain limiting language.

Ultimately, in certain circumstances, owners and contractors can partially save an otherwise unenforceable indemnification agreement by (1) limiting the agreement “to the extent that it is permitted by law” with express language, and (2) providing for partial, allocated indemnification in the agreement.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Gregory J. Spaun at gspaun@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6425

Liquidated Damages 101

Many construction contracts—and the parties that enter into those contracts—include specific contract provisions which seek to mitigate or shift risk. One such provision to a construction contract is the liquidated damages provisions, which may seem odious at first glance but may provide benefits to the parties who include them.

What are Liquidated Damages?

The first thing to understand about liquidated damages provisions is what exactly they are. Liquidated damages provisions are contract clauses that seek to avoid the difficult task of proving loss due to a failure by a contracting party to adhere to specific performance conditions. In the context of a construction contract, liquidated damages clauses typically specify a daily sum that a contractor will be charged for each day the project is delayed past the project completion date and any extension. In some—rare—cases, these provisions can be reciprocal. 1

New York Law on Liquidated Damages

There are some limitations on the use and validity of liquidated damages clauses, specifically, in New York, liquidated damages clauses are enforceable so long as they are not attempts to penalize a party. To ensure that the liquidated damages clause is enforceable, the liquidated damages amount must bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of damages that may be sustained. If there is no reasonable relationship between the actual damages sustained and the liquidated damages amount, the liquidated damage amount is considered a penalty and is unenforceable. Additionally, to ensure that a liquidated damage clause is sustainable, the actual damages must be difficult to determine, and the assessed liquidated damages amount must not be disproportionate to the possible loss.

How Can Liquidated Damages Hurt a Contractor?

From the simple definition above, liquidated damages provisions can be daunting, as most contractors are aware that delays are commonplace on most construction projects. In many cases, liquidated damages provisions can be harmful where a contractor faces significant delays. Typically, liquidated damages are assessed against the contractor where they are delayed from achieving substantial or final completion by a specified date. However, in many instances, delays suffered by a contractor on a project can be the result of delays that may be outside of a contractor’s control, such as delays faced by downstream material suppliers. Even if that is the case, a contractor may still be required to pay liquidated damages to the upstream owner.

How Can Liquidated Damages Help a Contractor?

Based on the above, liquidated damages seem detrimental to the parties that include them as provisions in their contract. This may be true on the surface but, liquidated damages clauses can provide significant benefits to contractors.

Aside from the obvious—but rare—examples where liquidated damages clauses are reciprocal, there is another latent benefit of liquidated damages clauses that benefit contractors. Namely, liquidated damages clauses will not be enforced where its enforcement would be unjust or unconscionable. Normally, where the owner is responsible for a portion of the delay the proper remedy is an extension of the project completion time. These time extensions serve to delay the project completion deadline and stall the accrual of liquidated damages.

In addition, a liquidated damages clause provides an easily identifiable number for both parties to understand the risk of failing to complete the project within the required timeline. Viewed from another angle, a contractor who has an upstream liquidated damages clause can foresee the costs of project delays and can mitigate that risk throughout the course of the project. Additionally, the parties who include a liquidated damages provision in their contract can avoid the time and costs associated with calculating actual damages after the project is completed.

Conclusion

Liquidated damages clauses can be both a benefit and a detriment to contractors who have those provisions included in their contracts. Consult with a construction law attorney before taking action, which may be detrimental.

1 Where the contractor pays the owner liquidated damages for each day that a project is delayed and the owner pays
the contractor a bonus for each day that the project is completed prior to the specified completion date.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Giovanni Care at gcare@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6437

Subcontractors Must Ensure Compliance with Relevant OSHA Standards and Keep All Workers Safe at a Jobsite

The Occupation Safety and Health Review Commission’s recent decision in Secretary of Labor v. A Crane Rental LLC shows that subcontractors on a construction jobsite must ensure proper compliance with relevant safety standards especially the specific standards applicable to their work. Although a subcontractor might not control or supervise the employees of other contractors on a site, if they in any way violate applicable safety standards and create an unsafe situation, they can be held responsible.

A Crane Rental LLC (“ACrane”) provides cranes, lifting equipment and operators for general contractors. ACrane was among multiple companies working on a communication tower in Norcross, Georgia on March 21, 2019 when another company’s employee fell from ACrane’s personnel platform. ACrane had been contracted to provide a crane, an operator, a personnel basket, and a rigging system to lift to a subcontractor, Superior Broadband Towers’s (“Superior”) workers onto the communications tower. The personnel basket was rated to carry only up to two persons. Superior’s foreman at the site was the Lift Director responsible for determining what and who would be lifted. ACrane’s operator, an employee whose name had been redacted from the record indicated that his responsibilities included crane assembly, determining the location of the crane at the site, and rigging the personnel basket. He had no supervisory job functions but was rather supervised by ACrane’s operations manager, although she had not visited the site until the accident. On the first day, ACrane’s operator hoisted two of Superior’s employees on the personnel platform, while on the second day he hoisted he hoisted one or two Superior employees. However, on the third day, March 21, 2019, Superiors’ foreman, loaded the personnel platform with equipment and three Superior employees. ACrane’s operator testified that due to the platform’s location he could not see it until the personnel platform had been lifted about halfway up the communications tower, at which point he decided it was safer to take three workers to the top of the tower rather than lower them to ground. As one of Superior’s employees attempted to tie off to the tower, he tragically fell 105 feet and succumbed to his injuries.

During OSHA’s subsequent investigations, ACrane’s operator admitted questioning that he had determined the best location for the crane to be set-up and that he could see the personnel basket from the ground to the whole tower. However, based on the submitted evidence, it was shown that the operator was unable to see the personnel platform until it cleared the trees about halfway up the tower at the time of this accident.

ACrane’s written procedures for Crane Hoisted Personnel Platforms required that “workers to be hoisted” must attend a pre-lift meeting. On the day of the accident, Superior’s foreman, in his capacity as the lift director, held a lift meeting with ACrane’s operator. However, the operator did not know which Superior employees would be hoisted that day and he had no knowledge whether the foreman briefed the Superior employees to be hoisted separately, except for observing the foreman walked towards Superior’s crew after their meeting.

OSHA investigated the tragic accident and subsequently issued a two-item citation to ACrane alleging violations of OSHA’s Cranes and Derricks in Construction standard. Under the Item #1, OSHA alleged that when a “two person personnel basket was utilized by the crane operator to hoist the…crew consisting of three employees to heights above 90 feet from ground level… the maximum capacity of the personnel basket was exceeded exposing employees to fall and struck-by hazards” given that the cited OSHA standard mandates that the “number of employees occupying the personnel platform must not exceed the maximum number the platform was designed to hold or the number required to perform the work, whichever is less.” Under Item # 2, it was alleged that ACrane committed a serious violation of OSHA’s standard when it did not ensure that “employees hoisted in a personnel basket attend the pre-lift meeting with the crane operator and competent person responsible for the communication tower work” as the cited standard requires that the pre-lift meeting must be attended by “the equipment operator, signal person (if used), employees to be hoisted and the person responsible for the task to be performed.”

The Secretary established that cited standards applied to the cited conditions and that they were violated since A.Crane’s operator could not identify anyone else besides the foreman/lift director who had attended the pre-lift meeting and he did not know whether Lift Director had separately briefed the workers to be hoisted. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that ACrane did not have its own employees exposed to the violative conditions, and it was not a “controlling employer” under OSHA’s Multi-Employer Citation Policy (which provides that an “employer who… controls the cited hazard has a duty… to protect not only its own employees but those of other employers engaged in the common undertaking”) and therefore vacated the Citation.

The Occupation Safety and Health Review Commission disagreed and reversed the ALJ. The Commission found that although ACrane was not a “controlling employer” it rather was a “creating employer” (which as defined by relevant precedent provides that an “employer who creates a violative or hazardous condition is obligated to protect its own employees as well as employes of others who are exposed to the hazard.”) Therefore, the ALJ should reconsider their legal analysis accordingly, to determine ACrane’s noncompliance and knowledge elements with respect to the Citation.

Even if a subcontractor lacks authority to direct other contractors’ employees at a site, it must still take “effective steps” to keep all workers safe, and, especially from any dangers and hazards associated with its own work.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445

Court Reminds Us of Importance of Complying with Insurance Notice Provisions

A crucial part of any construction business is a solid insurance policy. In today’s highly litigious society, it’s not a matter of if, it’s just a matter of when an injured worker lawyers-up and starts a sequence of events that results in you becoming embroiled in a lawsuit. This fact is not limited to the personal injury context: where there is a claim of defective work and a suit against a general contractor, that GC typically sees to it that everyone who touched the building is also brought into court. While there are other situations, these are two of the more likely scenarios where you will have to reach out to your insurance carrier to assign counsel and ultimately handle the loss. However, a court, in President and Fellows of Harvard College v Zurich American Insurance Company, reminds us that by failing to comply with notice provisions of your policy, you can forfeit coverage that would have otherwise covered the loss—coverage that you paid for.

Background

Harvard University is the subject of a lawsuit brought by a group calling themselves Students for Fair Admissions, which seeks to challenge Harvard’s policy of affirmative action favoring minority candidates for admission (and, by seeking to litigate this through the US Supreme Court, other schools’ polices, as well). While that lawsuit raises issues of greater constitutional law not relevant to our discussion, as concerns us Harvard had the foresight to obtain policies of insurance which would cover its defense costs in the affirmative action litigation. However, these policies had requirements that required Harvard to notify the carrier as soon as it had knowledge of the lawsuit, but in no event later than 90 days after the end of the policy term. Harvard notified its primary carrier in accordance with these timetables, but neglected to notify its excess carrier, Zurich American Insurance Co., which ultimately disclaimed coverage on this basis.

Harvard sued Zurich for breaching the policy by disclaiming coverage, arguing that as Zurich had actual knowledge of this extremely high profile litigation (which was just argued to the US Supreme Court last October, and which will be decided this spring), the notice requirement was actually met. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Zurich argued that notwithstanding any actual notice of the lawsuit through the high profile media coverage, as the policy required specific notice, and as Harvard failed to provide that specific notice, it breached the policy itself, thus removing Zurich’s obligation to provide any coverage.

Decision

The court granted Zurich’s motion, crediting its argument that regardless of any fortuitous actual knowledge that it may have had as a result of the media coverage, as the policy required specific notice—which was undisputedly not provided—Zurich had no obligation to provide any coverage under the policy. The court went on to address several other arguments relating to the “claims made” nature of this particular policy, but returned to the subject of prejudice, holding that as the policy language regarding notice was clear, it did not have to show that it suffered prejudice as a result of the failure to give such notice. Accordingly, the court dismissed Harvard’s lawsuit, leaving it to pay the defense costs of the affirmative action lawsuit itself.

Comment

Harvard University is widely reputed to produce the best and brightest minds in our nation. However, even such minds can fail to appreciate the terms of a complicated insurance policy, and that courts will enforce those terms, as written. While there is somewhat of a reprieve in New York for personal injury actions, with the operative statute requiring a carrier who argues that it did not receive timely notice also show that it was actually prejudiced by the failure to notify, it does not take much to show such prejudice. Accordingly, contractors would be well advised to be smarter than those at Harvard and provide any insurance carriers—including those which you may not initially think may afford coverage, as contractors may have more than one type of policy—with timely notice of any claim (or potential claim) as soon as they learn about it. By giving such timely notice, not only are you complying with the policy, you are also removing any potential claim that the carrier was somehow prejudiced, and ensuring that you receive the coverage you paid for.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas H. Welby at twelby@wbgllp.com or call (914) 428-2100

Construction Companies Must Timely Comply with Deadlines to Challenge OSHA Violations

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision in Secretary of Labor v. Rene Silverio Gonzalez/RG Roofing shows the importance for a construction company not to neglect but rather timely respond to any OSHA citation(s) and file a written notice of contest within 15 working days of receipt of the citation to preserve its ability to defend and challenge its merits.

Upon receipt of a citation, a company can chose to engage in an informal settlement process, and the documentation included with the OSHA citation typically outlines those procedures. However, should the matter not be resolved, and if the company does not accept the citation (and its corresponding fine(s)), in order to ensure its rights to challenge, it must send a written Notice of Contest within 15 work-days of receipt of the citation, or else risk having the citation and any corresponding fine/penalty become final, and the last word.

In this underlying matter, following a November 12, 2020 OSHA inspection at a worksite in Hitchcock, Texas, the Secretary of Labor issued a Citation alleging three serious violations on safety standards in relation to the RG Roofing’s operations at the site and a proposed penalty of $8,097. The Citation was mailed on December 28, 2020. Upon receipt of the Citation, RG Roofing’s owner, Rene Silverio Gonzalez, attempted to contact the local OSHA office but he could not offer any details as to when or the exact number of times he called the office and he never left any voicemails. RG Roofing never filed a written notice of contest and the Citation became a final order on January 27, 2021. OSHA thereafter sent a payment demand letter to RG Roofing. As payment was not received, the matter was referred to the respective debt collection office in May 2021. The local OSHA office on July 9, 2021 received a voicemail in Spanish from Mr. Gonzalez and the call was returned on July 12, 2021, and which point it was explained to him that the matter had been referred to debt collection and their office could take no further action.

On January 19, 2022, OSHA conducted another inspection of RG Roofing’s worksite in Texas City, Texas and based on the inspection, issued a Citation, alleging repeat violations of the same regulations as those cited in the December 2020. RG Roofing filed a timely notice of contest for this latter Citation and thereafter its representative, made an application for RG Roofing to be relieved from the final judgment arising from the December 2020 Citation.

The ALJ denied the motion on both procedural and meritorious grounds. The motion was procedurally untimely (as it was late by two months) and RG Roofing had not demonstrated excusable neglect. The ALJ, citing to applicable case law, “takes account all relevant circumstances surrounding RG Roofing’s failure to file a timely notice of contest, including the danger of prejudice to the Secretary, the length of delay and its potential impact on the judicial proceedings, the reason for delay and whether RG Roofing acted in good faith.” Here, the record showed little evidence of how RG Roofing handled its mail. Mr. Gonzalez testified that he receives his business mail at his home, the Citation was properly addressed, and although he does not read or write English, he engages his son when receiving mail in English. No other evidence of its mail handling procedures were offered. Although, Mr. Gonzales testified that he had resolved prior OSHA citations by calling the area office, and he attempted the same process unsuccessfully here but since he could not offer any details as to these attempts, this was given little evidentiary value.

Moreover, the ALJ found that RG Roofing had not acted in good faith in that it only sought to contest the Citation only after it had received a subsequent citation and the negative consequences of failing to challenge the initial Citation became evident.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Costas Cyprus at ccyprus@wbgllp.com or call (914) 607-6445