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Contractor Allowed To Correct Mistake After Bid Opening

Failure of a contractor to carefully comply with all the requirements of the bid specifications for public works may result in the bid being rejected on the grounds of “non-responsiveness”.  A bidder may be allowed to correct his mistake after the bid opening, however, if the variance from bid specifications is not material.  For example, clerical errors or mere irregularities may be waived by the awarding authority.

The contracting agency, however, should not allow a bidder to correct its bid after the bid opening in a way that would give the bidder a substantial advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other bidders.  When essential information is missing from a bid, it may not be supplied later by a private understanding between the bidder and the awarding authority.

In the recent case of Metra Industries Corp. v. Rockland County Sewer District No. 1, the court ruled on whether the County’s decision to allow a bidder to correct its mistake after the bid opening gave the bidder an advantage over the other bidders, thereby undermining the open competitive bidding process.

Background 

In June of 2010 Rockland County invited bids for a project to extend and replace the North Pascack Sewer Interceptor.  Among the bid specifications was a requirement that the total value for Mobilization/Demobilization could not exceed five percent of the total contract award.  All bids were submitted by the July 8, 2010 deadline.  Montana Construction Corp., Inc. had the lowest bid, which was $2,712,319.  Metra Industries Corporation submitted the second lowest bid, which was $2,903,214.  Montana’s low bid contained a Mobilization/Demobilization price of $250,000, which exceeded the five percent limit set forth in the bid specifications.  Unknown to Metra, after the County advised Montana of the defect in its bid, Montana lowered its Mobilization/Demobilization cost from $250,000 to $129,000, reducing their total initial bid by $121,000.  Once the bid was reduced, Montana’s bid totaled $2,591,320, approximately $311,894 less than Metra’s bid.  According to Montana, the initial figure of $250,000 was essentially a clerical error caused by the inadvertent combination of a separate cost item with the Mobilization/Demobilization price. 

On July 9, 2010 Metra sent a letter to the County complaining that Montana’s bid was defective since Montana’s Mobilization/Demobilization cost of $250,000 exceeded the five percent limitation in the bid specifications.  On July 16th, the County sent a letter in reply, acknowledging the bid defect, but went on to state that Montana’s bid had been adjusted to comply with the specifications, and that the County would approve Montana’s bid.  Metra sued to stop the County from awarding the job to Montana, arguing that allowing Montana to correct its mistake after the bid opening placed Montana at a competitive advantage over the other bidders.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of the County.  According to the court, immaterial bid errors in a bid can be waived by a municipality, so long as the municipality has a rational basis for its determination.  In determining whether a bid error is or is not material, the court looked to the effect of the waiver and whether other bidders will be placed at a competitive disadvantage.  According to the court, if the waiver of the error by the municipality promotes completion of the work as specified without placing other bidders at a competitive disadvantage, the error may be deemed immaterial and can be waived.

Here, the court noted that the effect of the waiver, and Montana’s subsequent lowering of its bid, ensured that the contract would be entered into, and the same work performed, at a lower price than initially bid.  Since it was in the County’s best interest to waive the bid defect and permit correction, the court held that a rational basis existed for the County’s determination.  Also, the court pointed out that the County’s waiver of the defect did not place Montana at a competitive advantage since Montana was the lowest bidder with or without the error.  Accordingly, the court permitted the County to move forward with awarding the contract to Montana.

Comment 

There is no conclusive formula for determining on a case-by-case basis what constitutes a substantial bid defect as opposed to a minor defect.  The courts give broad discretion to public authorities in determining whether a bid is responsive and will uphold the agency’s determination if supported by a rational basis.


The Construction Contracts Act

The Construction Contracts Act (hereinafter the “Act”) went into effect on January 14, 2003. All private construction contracts entered into after January 13, 2003, whether oral or written, where the aggregate amount of the construction project is $250,000.00 or more will be subject to the Act. Public works projects and contracts for the performance of work on public works projects are exempt from the Act’s provisions. In addition, certain residential projects and projects arising out of the events of September 11, 2001 are exempt from the Act.

The intent of the legislature in passing the Act was to prevent unjust delays in payments to contractors and subcontractors, working on private construction projects. If payments are not timely made, the Act establishes remedies for the benefit of contractors and subcontractors. The bulk of the Act’s provisions are triggered only upon default and can be bypassed if the construction contract is carefully drafted. However, the right to interest payments, the right to suspend performance and the right to have New York Law cover the rights of the parties and designating New York as the forum for any and all disputes are requirements for all contracts subject to the Act. Contracts with material suppliers are excluded and may be made subject to the laws of another State or jurisdiction and/or designate another jurisdiction or State as the venue for any and all contract disputes.

In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Act authorizes contractors and subcontractors to invoice for interim payments on a monthly basis. The party being invoiced, whether it is the owner, contractor or subcontractor, is required to approve or disapprove the invoice within twelve (12) business days of receipt of the invoice and all contractually required documentation, including partial waivers of lien. If the owner, contractor or subcontractor disapprove of the invoice or any portion thereof, it must prepare a written statement outlining the item(s) which are not approved, the reasons why and the amount(s) being withheld. The Act recites a list of grounds a party may raise when disapproving an invoice or any portion thereof. The sum of the withholdings are limited to amounts sufficient to cure and/or correct the defects and capped by the line item amount in the schedule of values, if previously submitted. In essence, the withholdings must be reasonable and can be based on contract provisions such as the owner’s and/or contractor’s rights to liquidated damages if the contract is not performed on time. However, the Act also provides that delays by anyone other than the invoicing party and/or its subcontractors and material suppliers shall not be a basis for withholding approval and payment of an application for payment.

Unless otherwise agreed, payments are due no later than thirty (30) days from approval. In situations involving subcontractors, payment is due, from the party with which it subcontracts, within seven days of that party’s receipt of good funds. Although not discussed here, the reader is also alerted to the fact that the Act contains provisions for situations when a lender is involved in financing all or part of the contract.

A contractor or subcontractor must disclose to a subcontractor of any tier the dates when payment is expected or contractually mandated from the owner or contractor. If the contractor or subcontractor fails to furnish the required notice, then it will be concluded that the due dates or time periods adopted by the act were complied with and payment will have to be made according to these adopted dates or time periods. Additionally, upon a written request from the subcontractor and within five (5) days of the request, the owner must provide the subcontractor with written notice of making any payments to the contractor.

Notwithstanding any agreements to the contrary, if payments are made beyond the due date, the party who owes the monies must pay interest at the rate of one percent (1%) per month or at a higher rate, if previously negotiated by the parties. In addition, the contractor may suspend performance without being in breach of the contract, if a ten (10) day written notice is provided to the owner with an opportunity to cure, and the notice outlines the contractor’s intention to suspend performance because payments were not timely approved or made. The subcontractor has the same remedy available to it when approvals and payments are unreasonably withheld, however, it must provide the ten (10) day written notice with an opportunity to cure to both the owner and contractor. The subcontractor may also suspend performance if the owner forwards payment to the contractor but the contractor fails to remit the payment to the subcontractor for its approved work.

In the event contractor or subcontractor suspends performance, the time frames established for performance are extended for the length of the suspension. The costs incurred for re-mobilization, however, can only be collected if negotiated by the parties. The Act provides that the suspending party must be permitted a reasonable opportunity to remove its materials, equipment, tools and/or machinery from the job-site.

If the parties agree, the Act permits retainage to be withheld, however, the contractor cannot retain an amount which exceeds the retainage withheld by the owner. Retainage must be released within thirty (30) days final approval of the work or interest will begin to accrue from the date the retainage became due and owing. The contractor must release proportionate amounts of retainage to each subcontractor after receipt of retainage from owner.

The definitions enumerated in the Act are very far-reaching, including how the terms “Construction Contract”, “Contractor”, “Subcontractor” and “Owner” are defined. The definitions, subject to the exemptions mentioned above, were intended to encompass most, if not all, contracting entities working on private construction projects greater than or equal to $250,000.00. Nevertheless, a carefully drafted contract can circumvent a majority of the Act’s more onerous provisions. Hopefully, the legislative intent of protecting contractors and subcontractors from unscrupulous payment practices will prevail. If you would like more information on this or any other construction issue, please feel free to contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP.

This Article is supplied for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice. You should consult competent legal counsel depending on the specific issues of your matter.

Safety Policy: Case Under OSHA’s General Duty Clause Involving a Fatality During Pressurized Testing of PVC Pipe

A recent ALJ case, involving a multi-item citation, underscores some unusual, and some recurring, issues in OSHA compliance and procedure.

The case, Secretary v. ASM-Sanders, Inc., arose out of work being done by a mechanical and HVAC subcontractor at the Warner Robins Air Force Base in Georgia.

Part of ASM’s work involved installing pipe from the access highway to a chill water plant.  That pipe had to be installed at a downward angle, below existing utility lines.  ASM was using 6-inch PVC pipe, covered with 2 inches of insulation and 2 inches of hard casing.

Two ASM employees, Andre Maldonado and superintendent Greg Arra, were working together with employees of ASM’s sub, Dublin Mechanical ? its owner, Jacky Brown, and his helper, Adam Westberry.  ASM had discovered a leak in the recently-installed chill water line, and Arra, accompanied by Maldonado, Brown, and Westberry, was making repairs.  Arra used sandpaper to smooth the ends of the pipes to be joined, then treated the sections with solvent and cement.  The workers then slid the two sections of pipe together, and left together for lunch.

During their lunch break, Arra told the three other men that he did not want to test the repaired pipe until the following morning, to give the newly-joined section of transition pipe time to cure.
However, shortly after returning from lunch, Brown asked Westberry and Maldonado to help him test the pipe.  Brown asked Westberry to pressurize the line to 100 psi, and then got down into the trench to see if the repair had been effective.  Maldonado was working outside the trench, and above Brown.  Arra was working about 100 feet away, putting bedding into the trench, and was not aware that the line was being pressurized.

As pressure in the line reached about 70 psi, the pipe exploded, and a section of it struck Brown in the head.  The force of the explosion knocked Maldonado off his feet.  Maldonado called out to Arra, who told him to call 911.  The pipe then exploded in a second location, knocking Arra down, as he tried to come to Brown’s aid.  Emergency personnel arrived shortly, but Brown was pronounced dead at the scene.

OSHA compliance officer Caliestro Spencer arrived at the site at dusk, and returned the following morning to begin his investigation.  Carmine Squatriglia, the safety director for ASM’s parent company, arrived from out of town that same morning.  After a brief delay ? the Air Force had secured the accident site as a crime scene ? the site was released to OSHA.  Spencer conducted an opening conference in ASM’s trailer, and took witness statements from the workers and AFB personnel.  He also inspected, measured, and photographed the trench in which the men had been working.

Spencer charged ASM with three violations.  One was under OSHA’s General Duty Clause, ¬ß 5(a)(1), which mandates that employers furnish their employees with employment and a place of employment “free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm” to the employees.  This citation item was based on the use of compressed air to test the PVC pipe.
The two additional citation items were for having workers in an unshored trench more than 5 feet deep, and for failing to provide a stairway, ladder, ramp or other safe means of egress from an excavation more than 4 feet deep.

When the matter came on for trial before the ALJ, ASM made, and the judge rejected, a motion to dismiss, based upon the compliance officer’s refusal to permit ASM’s representatives to be present during his (1) interviews of Maldonado, Westberry and others; and (2) inspection of the accident scene.
OSHA’s procedures do not permit management to be present during employee interviews.   This is not entirely fair to employers (as hearsay evidence, attributed to unnamed employees, can be received in evidence at the trial, and may even constitute an “admission” by the employer).  Nevertheless, these procedures are deemed to be necessary, to protect employees from potential retaliation.  Accordingly, ASM’s motion to dismiss was squarely rejected as to that ground.

The other issue ? that ASM’s representatives were excluded from accompanying Spencer during his inspection ?was taken more seriously.  While the ALJ disapproved Spencer’s having denied Squatriglia the opportunity to accompany him (and did not credit Spencer’s claim that he had invited Arra to do so) he did not grant the motion to dismiss, because he determined that ASM had failed to show any prejudice flowing from such denial.

Turning to the merits, recall that OSHA’s “General Duty Clause” is violated when (1) a condition or activity presents a hazard; which hazard (2) is recognized by the employer, or by the industry generally, as such and (3) is likely to cause death or serious physical harm; and (4) a feasible and effective means exists to eliminate, or materially reduce, the hazard.

The Secretary contended (and the ALJ agreed) that the elements of a General Duty Clause violation were shown, as employees were exposed to a struck-by hazard when the 8″ insulated PVC pipe was filled with compressed air to test for leaks.  Ample proof that this posed a hazard of death or serious injury was found from the fact that the pipe exploded, and Brown was killed when struck in the head by a piece of the pipe being tested.  A ready means of abatement existed:  to use only shatter-resistant materials.
The General Duty Clause citation item was vacated, however, and no penalty assessed, because the ALJ found that ASM had not had actual or constructive notice that pneumatic testing was being conducted on the day in question.  Arra had plainly told his crew that he did not want to test the pipe until the following day, Brown (not an employee of ASM) had taken it upon himself to order the testing, and Maldonado had no supervisory authority.  It was not foreseeable, the ALJ found, that Brown would disregard Arra’s instructions.

However, the other two items were affirmed, and monetary penalties assessed (although the item as to the depth of the excavation was downgraded from a “Willful” violation to a “Serious” one).
The lessons from the ASM case are as follows.

  1.  Be aware that you are not entitled to be present during OSHA interviews of your employees.
  2. You can, however, and should have a representative accompany the OSHA compliance officer during his or her inspection.
  3. Know your materials.  PVC pipe, to use the example at hand, is not all the same.  Some types can be tested under pressure; others cannot.  It is important (especially when you are working in collaboration with other contractors) to have clear specifications and lines of authority regarding material purchases and testing procedures.
  4. There is little excuse for trenching violations.  These are a leading cause of injury and death.  After fall protection violations, these are the most frequently cited by OSHA at construction sites, and the rules are not particularly complicated.1   A trench deeper than 5 feet (unless in stable rock) must be sloped, shored, or otherwise protected against a cave-in.  Period.  There is really no excuse for not measuring the depth of the trench. If it’s even close to 5 feet, it’s better to have a written record made that it was measured, and better still to have photographs taken before any incident has occurred, or OSHA inspector has appeared.  Even if less than 5 feet deep, moreover, the trench should be inspected at least daily by a “competent person,” and written records of inspections should be maintained.
  5. If you put men down into trenches, provide them with ladders.  Clambering on pipes, cables, and duct banks is not a suitable means of egress.  A way out of the excavation should be readily accessible in case of an emergency.  Often (for example, where the trench is unusually deep, or there are obstructions on the bottom service of the trench) you will want to do better than the minimum under the standard, which requires a ladder or other means of egress within 25 lateral feet, where the excavation is 4 feet deep or deeper.
  6. Always keep the General Duty Clause in the back of your mind.  Not every hazard equals an OSHA violation, but a recognized hazard, posing a danger of death or serious injury, and for which means of abatement are available, may be.

1 See 29 C.F.R. ¬ß1926.652.

Court Rejects Variance From Bid Requirements

A disappointed bidder on a public project can go to court and challenge an award to the lowest bidder if he believes that the successful bidder failed to comply with the bid documents.  Although minor defects or irregularities in a bid may be waived by the contracting authority, a failure to conform to a material or substantial bid requirement cannot be waived or corrected after the bid opening.

In the recent case of Gemstar Constr. Corp. v. County of Nassau, the issue before the court was whether a low bidder’s variance from the bid specifications gave him an unfair advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other bidders.

Background 

In July 2009 the Nassau County Department of Public works invited bid proposals for two public improvement contracts relating to the removal and replacement of underground storage tanks at the Rockville Centre and Garden City MTA Long Island Bus maintenance depots.  The instructions to bidders required that the bids include a verification that the bidder had an approved State of New York registered Apprenticeship Training Program.  TCM Services, Inc. and Environmental Closures, Inc. were the lowest bidders for the two projects.  However, only the next lowest bidder for each job, Gemstar Construction Corp., had an approved registered New York State apprenticeship program when the bids were opened.  The low bidder, TMC, produced a verification of a New York State apprenticeship program twenty-four days after the bid opening.  The other low bidder, Environmental Closures, submitted its verification of a New York State apprenticeship program fifty-one days after the bid opening. 

Gemstar protested the awarding of the bids to TCM and Environmental Closures on the grounds that they failed to timely comply with the bid specifications.  The County denied Gemstar’s protest and Gemstar petitioned the court to reverse and annul the County’s determination.

Decision

The court reversed and annulled the County’s award and directed that the bidding be reopened.  The court stated that a governmental agency has the right to determine whether a variance from bid specifications is substantial or whether to waive it as a mere irregularity, and that determination must be upheld by the courts if supported by any rational basis.  However, the court also noted that a contracting agency may not allow a bidder to correct its bid after the bid opening in a way that would result in an unfair competitive advantage over the other bidders.  According to the court, TMC and Environmental Closures did not provide verification of the apprentice program mandated by the bid requirements until long after the bid opening and, as a result, “gained a competitive advantage” over Gemstar. 

The responsiveness of a bid must be assessed on the face of the bid at the time the bids are opened.  TMC and Environmental Closures should not have been allowed to submit their apprenticeship information long after the opening of bids.  This material defect in the bid may not be waived and the County must reject the bid so that all bidders may be treated alike and so that the possibility of fraud, corruption or favoritism is avoided.

Comment 

It is rare for courts to overturn governmental agency determinations of responsive bids.  A contracting agency has the right to determine whether a variance from bid specifications is substantial or whether to waive it as a mere irregularity or minor defect.  However, if it can be shown that the successful low bidder’s variance from the bid requirements gave him an unfair advantage over other bidders, courts will reject the lowest bid. 

High Court K.O.’S Pay-If-Paid Clause

On December 7, 1995, the New York Court of Appeals, the highest Court in this State, handed-down a decision which changes the body of construction law and impacts the process of subcontracting. All CIC members, whether they are general contractors, subcontractors or suppliers, will be affected by the Court’s ruling.

In this landmark case entitled West-Fair Electric and L.J. Coppola, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety and Gilbane Building Company, the High Court held that:

“… a pay-when-paid provision which forces the subcontractor to assume the risk that the owner will fail to pay the general contractor is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy set forth in the Lien Law Section 34. By contrast, a pay-when-paid provision which merely fixes a time for payment does not indefinitely suspend a subcontractor’s right to payment upon the failure of an owner to pay the general contractor and does not violate public policy as stated in the Lien Law.”

In essence, in the normal course of a construction project, slight delays in payment from an owner to a general contractor would permit a corresponding slight delay from the general contractor to the subcontractor or supplier, if the subcontract or purchase order contained a simple pay-when-paid clause. If, however, the subcontract or purchase order contained a clause stating that the general contractor’s obligation to pay the subcontractor was subject to the “condition precedent” of payment from the owner to the general contractor, a pay-if-paid clause, such a term will henceforth be legally void and unenforceable because its enforcement would run afoul of the public policy of the State of New York to protect subcontractors and suppliers. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals has overturned earlier decisions by New York’s intermediate appellate courts.

The lawsuit developed as a result of the financial failure of a project known as the Westchester Pavilion, a new mall resulting from the gut-rehab of the former Alexanders store in White Plains, New York. The owner/developer was Fischer-Reese; the general contractor/construction manager was Gilbane Building Company of Rhode Island and the architect/engineer was the Planned Expansion Group of White Plains. Several Construction Industry Council members were subcontractors to Gilbane on this project.

The cost of construction, approximately $23,000,000.00, greatly overran the original budget by approximately 62%. As a result, towards the end of the project, subcontractors and suppliers were owed millions of dollars which the owner could not pay. Mechanic’s liens were filed and bond claims were asserted.

Several of the subcontractors, including West-Fair Electric Contractors, Inc. and L.J. Coppola, Inc., were represented by Michael E. Greenblatt and Thomas H. Welby of CIC Associate Member Welby & Brady, LLP (formerly Welby & Welby), who commenced a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action against the property in State Supreme Court, Westchester County, and simultaneously, commenced a breach of contract and bond claim lawsuit in U.S. District Court. Gilbane and Aetna moved for summary judgment to dismiss the subcontractors’ lawsuit on the basis that the subcontract contained the following language: “It is specifically understood and agreed that the payment to the trade contractor is dependent, as a condition precedent, upon the construction manager receiving contract payments, including retainage from the owner…” West-Fair and Coppola cross-moved for summary judgment stating that the subcontractors had fully performed their work and that the operative language was not intended to shift credit risk to the subcontractors, particularly where their general contractor has posted a labor and material payment bond.

Hon. Charles L. Brieant held for the subcontractors stating that the position urged by Gilbane and Aetna violated the public policy of the State of New York, as stated in Section 34 of the Lien Law, which renders void and unenforceable, any contract provision which purports to waive a subcontractor’s right to file and/or enforce a mechanic’s lien.

The general contractor and the surety then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That Court determined that the central issue in the case turned on a matter of New York law on which New York’s highest court had never been called upon to decide. Therefore, the Second Circuit certified two questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which subsequently found for the subcontractors in the twelve page Decision and Opinion handed-down last week. The High Court’s Decision was unanimous.

The Court’s decision is both logical and fair in that it calls upon general contractors to be responsible for the financial risks that they, rather than the subcontractors and suppliers, stand in a better position to evaluate and manage. Needless to say, the Court’s lengthy Opinion, although resolving the central issue, leaves many questions unanswered. The full impact of this new law on general contractors, subcontractors and suppliers in both the private and public sectors will be the subject of considerable debate in the future.

Safety Policy: OSHA Issues Long-Awaited Crane Safety Rule

On July 28th, OSHA released its new safety rule aimed at reducing injuries and deaths related to the operation of construction cranes.

The new rule, most of which will come into effect on November 8th, has been a dozen years in the making, and supersedes the existing rule promulgated in 1971.

According to OSHA, the new rule “is designed to prevent the leading causes of fatalities including electrocution, crushed-by/struck-by hazards during assembly/disassembly, collapse, and overturn.  It also sets forth requirements for ground conditions and crane operator assessment.  In addition, this rule addresses tower crane hazards, the use of synthetic slings for assembly/disassembly work, and clarifies [its] scope, by providing both a functional description, and a list of examples for the equipment that is covered.”

The new rule, OSHA estimates, “will prevent 22 fatalities and 175 non-fatal injuries each year.”

The substance of the new rule will be the subject of a follow-up article, as it runs to more than 1,000 pages in the Federal Register.  The entire rule can be viewed online at www.osha.gov/doc/cranesreg.pdf.1 OSHA is promising to have fact sheets and other compliance assistance material available within the next month.

While I will own up to not having read the new rule from front to back, I can offer a heads-up and references to some of its salient provisions, as follows:

First, the new rule governs most types of cranes and derricks when used in construction-related activities (see the definition of construction at 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1911).  As you probably know, Part 1910 standards apply to general industry, and Part 1926 covers construction.   The new rule will apply to general industrial employers (and to maritime operations) only when cranes and derricks are used in construction-related activities.  The use of cranes in, for example, a manufacturing plant, not for construction purposes, will not be affected.  (For cranes used in demolition, see ¬ß 1926.1501).
Second, the new rule covers most but not all types of cranes and derricks engaged in construction activity.  You can refer online to the scope section at ¬ß 1926.1400, which outlines the types of equipment within the coverage of the rule.  Boom trucks are covered, as they are considered cranes.  Excavators used to hoist loads with a sling are not covered, but multi-purpose equipment is covered, when it is configured like a crane (as described in the preamble to ¬ß 1926.400).  Telehandlers with rotating upper units and booms are not covered, unless equipped with a winch for hoisting.  Heavy equipment service trucks, as used on construction sites to lift parts for equipment repair, are also excluded. 

Another noteworthy change is that the required minimum distance from active electrical power lines is increased from 10 feet to 20 feet.  (Information regarding construction crane activities related to electric utility work may be found in ¬ß 1926.1400, and ¬ß¬ß 1926.1407 through 1411).

Fall protection standards for employees working with cranes are set forth in § 1926.1423.

Perhaps the biggest change overall is that, nationwide, all crane operators will have to be third-party certified by 2014.  In those cities and states in which crane operators are already required to be certified, of course, those requirements continue in effect, so long as they are otherwise consistent with the new rule.  The documentation of certification is described in ¬ß 1926.1427.  

Additionally, both signal persons (see ¬ß 1926.1428) and riggers (¬ß 1926.1401) will be required to be “qualified” (although not third-party certified).

Shift and monthly inspections must be done by a “competent” person.  Annual inspections must be performed by a “qualified” person (as defined in ¬ß 1926.401).

If you have followed the progress of the rule through the lengthy rule-making process, you should be aware that a number of important changes and additions were made since the rule was proposed.  Among the notable additions and changes are the following:

  • The operator certification test may be administered in a language, other than English, understood by the candidate.
  • Under ¬ß 1926.1427 of the new rule, employers will have to provide the certification for employees employed by them on the effective date at no cost to those employees.
  • There are new requirements that require the exchange of information among employers concerning ground conditions on the job site.
  • Employers will generally be required to comply with manufacturers’ recom¬≠mendations for the use of synthetic slings.
  • Whenever employees are present in the “fall zone,” the load will have to be handled by a qualified rigger.  (The “fall zone” is defined as any area where the load can reach, if lost or out of control).
  • Tower crane parts will be required to be inspected before the crane is erected.
  • Forklifts are within the scope of the new rule, but only when they are configured like a crane.
  • Pole work related to power transmission and to telecommunications has been excluded, although it is covered by a general industry standard (¬ß 1910.269).
  • Employers whose employees are qualified in work under subpart V (power trans¬≠mission and distri¬≠bution) of Part 1926, the construction standard, may comply with ¬ß 1910.269 of the general industry standard.

The new rule also clarifies that, consistent with the overall OSHA scheme of things, federal OSHA does not pre-empt local or state rules (many states have their own rules, which are required however to be at least as effective as the federal standards).  States such as California and North Carolina which have their own OSHA statutes will have six months to update their own rules, if necessary.

OSHA estimates that about 267,000 construction, crane rental, and crane certification establishments, employing a total of 4.8 million workers, will be affected by the new standard.  

Keep in mind that, if you are a general contractor, you will generally be co-responsible for compliance with the new crane standard, even if none of your own employees are themselves involved in the operation of covered equipment.

The good news, to be sure, is that a great deal of hard work has obviously gone into this new rule and, certainly, it was the product of a process in which the voices of manufacturers, construction employers, and labor organizations were heard.

Whether the new rule might have been formulated and adopted more expeditiously, or expressed in fewer than 1,070 pages, are now moot points.  Come November, most of the key provisions (other than the third-party certification for operators) will be in effect, and you need to familiarize yourself with the new rule (look for online help after Labor Day, or contact your regional or area OSHA office) and plan accordingly.


1 An alternative link to view the entire text is www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/OFRData/2010-17818_PI.pdf.

Alter-Egos And Personal Liability Of Corporate Owners Are Triable Issues

Courts impose liability on related companies under the “alter ego” theory where two apparently separate companies are considered to be one, in spite the maintenance of two or more distinct operations.  In other words, the two separate companies are treated as an alter ego of each other for liability purposes.
Under certain circumstances, courts apply the concept of “piercing the corporate veil” to hold corporate owners personally liable for corporate debts.

In the recent case of Matter of B.R.M. Concrete, Inc. v. Portland Transit-Mix, Inc., the court addressed issues of alter ego and the personal liability of a corporate president and sole shareholder.

Background 

B.R.M. Concrete Inc. supplied concrete valued at $193,928 to Portland Transit-Mix, Inc.  When Portland refused to pay for the concrete, B.R.M. sued Portland, its corporate principals, and Bedrock Concrete Inc., which was another company owned by the same principals.

According to B.R.M., Portland and Bedrock failed to follow corporate formalities such that they were mere alter egos of the corporate principals.  Specifically, B.R.M. pointed to the follow factors: (a) there was an overlap in the corporate officers and shareholders; (b) the corporations had the same address; (c) the corporations banked at the same location; (d) the companies held no meetings; (e) the companies had no by-laws; (f) the companies had no records of meetings or documents regarding shareholders; and (g) the companies had no records of business transactions or other financial records.  In addition, Bedrock admitted that it paid for at least a portion of the concrete that was delivered to Portland.  Given defendants’ failure to follow corporate formalities, B.R.M. argued that the corporate and individual defendants were liable for the $193,928 owed.

Defendants argued that only Portland was liable for the debt, which it did not have sufficient assets to pay.  According to defendants, Portland and Bedrock were separate corporations which conducted separate businesses and maintained separate bank accounts.  Defendants also argued that the individual defendants only conducted business on behalf of the corporate defendants.  The defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking to have the claims against the corporate principals and Bedrock dismissed.

Decision

The trial court denied the defendants motion to dismiss B.R.M.’s claims.  According to the court, piercing the corporate veil requires a showing that the individual defendants (1) exercised complete dominion and control over the corporation, and (2) used such dominion and control to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in injury.  The mere claim that the corporations were completely dominated by the individual defendants, or conclusory assertions that the corporations acted as their alter ego, without more, will not suffice to support the equitable relief of piercing the corporate veil.  Since the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil, or treat two companies as alter egos in a given circumstance depends on the particular facts and circumstances, the court held that triable issues of fact existed as to whether the corporate principals and Bedrock could be found liable.

Comment 

The analysis of whether corporate principals or corporate entities can be held liable for the debts of another corporate entity under the theories of alter ego or “piercing the corporate veil” requires a fact intensive review.  Here, the court believed that a trial was necessary to determine whether all defendants should be held liable for the debt due.  The prudent contractor should take care to follow corporate formalities so as to minimize the risk of alter ego liability or personal liability resulting from corporate dealings.


False Vendex Satements Doom Contractor’s Delay Claim.

Municipalities are required by statute to award contracts to the “lowest responsible bidder.”  In making its lowest responsible bidder determination, city agencies are directed to use information supplied by prospective contractors including VENDEX (acronym for Vendor Information Exchange) and prequalification questionnaire replies.  VENDEX forms are completed by a contractor as part of the bid process, which a city relies on in evaluating the lowest responsible bidder designation.    

A responsible contractor determination is normally made prior to the award of the contract to the contractor.  But what if a city discovers that the contractor made false statements or withheld information on its VENDEX form after the contractor was paid for substantial completion of the work and the contractor sues the city to recover delay damages?  Can the city disregard the contract and avoid payment based on the contractor’s false VENDEX statements?  This question was addressed in the recent case of Omni Contracting Company, Inc. v. The City of New York.  

Background  

In June 2005 Omni Contracting Company, Inc. submitted a bid to contract for a public improvement project known as “Reconstruction of Thompson Street (Vesuvio) Playground.”  The contract was awarded to Omni.  In March 2006 the contractor entered into an agreement with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation to construct the project.  The contract price was $2,127,000.  The contractor was originally required to complete work within 270 consecutive calendar days.  During construction the contractor requested, and the City approved, six time extensions, extending the project’s completion date by nearly seven months.  The City paid the contractor $2,143,866 for its work under the contract.  Thereafter, the contractor sued the City, alleging that it had fully performed the contract, but that its performance was delayed by the acts of the City, and those delays caused the contractor to incur $319,386 in additional costs.   

 In defense to the contractor’s lawsuit, the City argued that it was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract.  According to the City, the contractor made false statements and withheld information on its VENDEX form originally filed with the City in April 2004, and reaffirmed those same false statements in July 2004, February 2005, and April 2005, in the contractor’s sworn “no change” certifications.

 Accordingly, it was the City’s argument that when the contractor submitted its bid for the playground project in June 2005, the contractor failed to make a required disclosure regarding its failure to pay employees a prevailing wage on several of the contractor’s other projects with the City.  Based on the failed disclosure, the City argued that in was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract.  The City moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the contractor’s claims.  

Decision  

 

The court ruled in favor of the City.  The court first noted the requirement that public projects be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.  It went on to note that under the New York City Procurement Policy Board Rules, the “failure of a firm to provide relevant information specifically requested by the Contracting Officer may be grounds for a determination of non-responsibility.”  Since the contractor failed to provide requested information relating to its past prevailing wage investigations and violations, which occurred in 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006, the court held that the contractor was not a “responsible” contractor.    

The court went on to state that contracts procured through fraudulent bidding are void as against public policy.  Where work is done pursuant to such an illegal contract, the court held that the contractor is not entitled to recover on its claims.  Additionally, the court pointed out that the municipality can recover from the contractor all amounts paid under the illegal contract.      

The court accordingly dismissed the contractor’s delay claim for the $319,386. Given that the City was not seeking to recover the entire amount paid to the contractor, the contractor was permitted to retain the monies previously paid to it by the City.  

Comment  

 

This case emphasizes the importance of accurately completing and updating VENDEX and prequalification questionnaire replies.  The failure to do so may not only support a non-responsible determination, but, as shown, it may also be grounds for non-payment for work performed and the recovery of payments already made for work performed.    

About the author:  Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc. 

May Lender seeking to enforce guaranty against nonresident guarantors of loan attach ownership/membership interests in various out-of-state business entities?

Question. May Lender
seeking to enforce guaranty against nonresident guarantors of loan
attach ownership/membership interests in various out-of-state business
entities?



Answer. Yes.



By agreement dated in 2005, Lender made a loan to borrower for the
purpose of developing and renovating real property. This loan was made
by Lender and accepted by the borrower in New York. Further, the
proceeds of this loan were disbursed from New York. On that same day,
Guarantors executed a guaranty of payment (guaranty) under which they
unconditionally agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the
borrower’s obligations under the loan and submitted to the jurisdiction
of any federal or state court in New York City in any suit, action or
proceeding arising out of or relating to the guaranty. By executing this
guaranty, Guarantors waived all defenses and counterclaims that might
have been asserted against Lender in the event the borrower defaulted on
the loan. In addition to being negotiated in New York, the guaranty was
to be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of New York
State.


The borrower thereafter defaulted on the loan and filed for bankruptcy
protection. Lender seeks to enforce the guaranty and recover the amounts
due under the loan. Lender sought and obtained a prejudgment order of
attachment seeking to attach Guarantors’ property interests as security
for the collection of any judgment entered against Guarantors.


Attachment simply keeps the debtor away from his property or, at least,
the free use thereof; it does not transfer the property to the creditor.
It is frequently used when the creditor suspects that the debtor is
secreting property or removing it from New York and/or when the creditor
is unable to serve the debtor, despite diligent efforts, even though
the debtor would be within the personal jurisdiction of a New York
court.


The property at issue consisted of Guarantors’ interests in 22 limited
liability companies formed in Delaware, Georgia and Florida and a
Florida corporation solely owned by Guarantor. Unlike stock
certificates, which are tangible property, Guarantors’
ownership/membership interests are intangible and uncertificated.


Lender eventually obtained a judgment against the Guarantor. To date,
the judgment has not been satisfied. Guarantor challenges the
attachment because he does not live in New York and his temporary
presence in New York when he was served was insufficient to support the
attachment and that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the ownership
interests Lender sought to attach because they were not located in New
York and, thus, could not be properly attached.


Guarantor voluntarily submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the
court by executing the personal guaranty. Because personal jurisdiction
was properly asserted over Guarantor the Court had the authority to
order pre-judgment attachment of the property Guarantor owned and/or
controlled, and service of the order upon him while he was in New York
was appropriate.


The next consideration is whether the property sought to be attached was
subject to attachment. The intangible property Lender sought to
attach-Guarantor’s ownership/membership interests in 22 out-of-state
limited liability companies-are akin to intangible contract rights, and
are clearly assignable and transferable. Thus, the interests in question
are “property”.


Here, the intangible interests sought to be attached are not evidenced
by written instruments, such as certificates or negotiable instruments.
If these interests were so evidenced, their situs would be where the
written instruments were physically present. Just as a debt clings to
the debtor when he enters a state other than the state where the debt
was incurred, it follows that Guarantors’ uncertificated ownership
interests, which Guarantor possesses or has custody over, travel with
him, and were attachable in New York based on his presence this state.

Important Changes To The 1997 AIA Standard Contract Documents

Over the past century, the construction contract documents published by the American Institute of Architects have become an industry standard. First published in 1888, these agreements are now used throughout the nation on projects of every size and scope, in both the private and public sectors. Almost everyone in the construction industry has some understanding of what is meant by a “Standard AIA Contract”, but it would be a big mistake to think of these forms as being static, and unchanging over time. On the contrary, the American Institute of Architects has a long standing program whereby each of the more significant forms is revised and updated on a ten (10) year cycle, to reflect ever-changing industry customs and practices. In late 1997, the AIA issued thoroughly-revised editions of some of the more frequently used construction contract documents.

Contractors are, by definition, those who agree to perform certain work according to the terms of a contract (including plans and specifications), and agree to be paid in accordance with the terms and conditions of that contract. The very essence of being a contractor is to bring together experience, skill, and resources (labor, equipment, working capital, etc.), to perform the specified work in accordance with the allocation of risks, responsibilities and rewards defined in the contract documents. In today’s business environment, it is more important than ever, to focus not just on the plans and specifications, but also upon the provisions in the “boilerplate” portion of the contract, regarding performance and payment, when evaluating the risks of bidding on and entering into any particular contract.

Among the most important standard agreements are the AIA A101, which defines the relationship between the Owner and Contractor, the AIA A401, which defines the relationship between the Contractor and the Subcontractor, and the AIA A201, the General Conditions which accompany both the A101 and A401. There are many significant changes between the 1987 and the 1997 editions of these standard forms of agreement. Every prudent contractor would do well to thoroughly acquaint him or herself with these changes prior to entering into any contract based upon these standard forms of agreement.

It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of those changes in detail. However, among the more important changes are: 1.) the shifting of responsibility for incidental design from the architect/engineer to the contractor (or subcontractor/supplier); 2.) a major overhaul of the Alternative Dispute Resolution procedures, including the mandatory use of mediation as a pre-requisite to arbitration or litigation; 3.) a waiver of consequential damages by both the owner and the contractor (no more home office overhead claims); 4.) new guidelines for including partial payments for disputed change order work in monthly progress payments; and 5.) the right of the owner to terminate the contract for convenience, as opposed to terminating it for cause, and the corresponding right of the general contractor to terminate the subcontract for convenience, as well. Each and every one of these areas of change creates a re-allocation of risks and responsibilities, and provides new challenges and opportunities for contractors and subcontractors.

Traditionally, it was understood that the architect/engineer was responsible for the design of the work, and the contractor was responsible to perform the work in accordance with the plans and specifications. Of course, the contractor was always responsible for design related to means and methods, for example, sheeting, shoring and underpinning, etc. Under the 1997 A201, and under recent case law in New York, this division of responsibility has been changed. By its terms, the contract now may permit the owner to make the contractor responsible for certain items of design (for example, the design of connections for structural steel members). This would, in turn, make the contractor (or its structural steel fabricator), responsible to hire a licensed professional engineer (as opposed to a “detailer”), to analyze and design the connections and furnish sealed drawings.

For quite some time, it was argued by the contracting community that such allocation of design responsibility violated the laws of the State of New York, in particular, those laws relating to the licensed practice of engineering and architecture. In a decision dated December 30, 1997, entitled General Building Contractors of New York State, etc. against New York State Education Department, et al., the Supreme Court, Albany County, held that such shifting of the design responsibility to the contractor did not violate the State Education Law. Contractors must keep this new risk in mind when drafting contracts, subcontracts or purchase orders in the future.

In summary, it is imperative that the general contractor/subcontractor take the time to thoroughly read and understand these important construction industry forms, before signing their next “Standard AIA Contract”.Over the past century, the construction contract documents published by the American Institute of Architects have become an industry standard. First published in 1888, these agreements are now used throughout the nation on projects of every size and scope, in both the private and public sectors. Almost everyone in the construction industry has some understanding of what is meant by a “Standard AIA Contract”, but it would be a big mistake to think of these forms as being static, and unchanging over time. On the contrary, the American Institute of Architects has a long standing program whereby each of the more significant forms is revised and updated on a ten (10) year cycle, to reflect ever-changing industry customs and practices. In late 1997, the AIA issued thoroughly-revised editions of some of the more frequently used construction contract documents.

Contractors are, by definition, those who agree to perform certain work according to the terms of a contract (including plans and specifications), and agree to be paid in accordance with the terms and conditions of that contract. The very essence of being a contractor is to bring together experience, skill, and resources (labor, equipment, working capital, etc.), to perform the specified work in accordance with the allocation of risks, responsibilities and rewards defined in the contract documents. In today’s business environment, it is more important than ever, to focus not just on the plans and specifications, but also upon the provisions in the “boilerplate” portion of the contract, regarding performance and payment, when evaluating the risks of bidding on and entering into any particular contract.

Among the most important standard agreements are the AIA A101, which defines the relationship between the Owner and Contractor, the AIA A401, which defines the relationship between the Contractor and the Subcontractor, and the AIA A201, the General Conditions which accompany both the A101 and A401. There are many significant changes between the 1987 and the 1997 editions of these standard forms of agreement. Every prudent contractor would do well to thoroughly acquaint him or herself with these changes prior to entering into any contract based upon these standard forms of agreement.

It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of those changes in detail. However, among the more important changes are: 1.) the shifting of responsibility for incidental design from the architect/engineer to the contractor (or subcontractor/supplier); 2.) a major overhaul of the Alternative Dispute Resolution procedures, including the mandatory use of mediation as a pre-requisite to arbitration or litigation; 3.) a waiver of consequential damages by both the owner and the contractor (no more home office overhead claims); 4.) new guidelines for including partial payments for disputed change order work in monthly progress payments; and 5.) the right of the owner to terminate the contract for convenience, as opposed to terminating it for cause, and the corresponding right of the general contractor to terminate the subcontract for convenience, as well. Each and every one of these areas of change creates a re-allocation of risks and responsibilities, and provides new challenges and opportunities for contractors and subcontractors.

Traditionally, it was understood that the architect/engineer was responsible for the design of the work, and the contractor was responsible to perform the work in accordance with the plans and specifications. Of course, the contractor was always responsible for design related to means and methods, for example, sheeting, shoring and underpinning, etc. Under the 1997 A201, and under recent case law in New York, this division of responsibility has been changed. By its terms, the contract now may permit the owner to make the contractor responsible for certain items of design (for example, the design of connections for structural steel members). This would, in turn, make the contractor (or its structural steel fabricator), responsible to hire a licensed professional engineer (as opposed to a “detailer”), to analyze and design the connections and furnish sealed drawings.

For quite some time, it was argued by the contracting community that such allocation of design responsibility violated the laws of the State of New York, in particular, those laws relating to the licensed practice of engineering and architecture. In a decision dated December 30, 1997, entitled General Building Contractors of New York State, etc. against New York State Education Department, et al., the Supreme Court, Albany County, held that such shifting of the design responsibility to the contractor did not violate the State Education Law. Contractors must keep this new risk in mind when drafting contracts, subcontracts or purchase orders in the future.

In summary, it is imperative that the general contractor/subcontractor take the time to thoroughly read and understand these important construction industry forms, before signing their next “Standard AIA Contract”.