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Protecting The Rights Of Subcontractors And Suppliers Under New York State Law

The following information is intended as general guidance on how subcontractors and suppliers can secure and receive payments that are due. There are four main methods for obtaining security and enforcing payment obligations in New York State.

1. The Mechanic’s Lien Law. The two broad categories are a public lien and private lien. The determination of which type of lien to is appropriate to file depends on ownership of the subject real property and the source of funding for the project.

A. Public Lien. A public lien must be filed within thirty days after final completion of the project is achieved. This time limit does not depend on when a subcontractor performs its work or when a supplier delivers its materials to the project. Instead, the period of time within which the lien must be filed is measured from final completion of the entire project. Some public agencies issue certificates of final completion so that this time frame can be determined.  Most often, as long as the public funds have not been fully dispersed the lien will attach. 

B. Private Lien. A private lien must be filed within four months of last performing work or delivering materials to a project if the project is a residence or within eight months if the project is commercial in nature.

A private lien has a duration of one year from the date of filing and can be extended for an additional one year by the filing of a notice of extension of the lien, except for single family residences which require a court order to be extended.

In either case, before the expiration of the lien, a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action must be commenced in order to preserve the lien. The mechanic’s lien foreclosure action requires a summons and complaint be filed and served. Typically, a notice of pendency also must be filed.

It is important to recognize that a lien acts only as security for an underlying contractual or quasi-contractual debt. Although a lien can be filed for the full amount due, it is only enforceable to the extent that moneys are due and owing “upstream” to the party against whom the lien is claimed. If, for example, a general contractor has back charges, even if completely unrelated to the materials the supplier delivered to its subcontractor, the supplier’s right to enforce its mechanics’ lien are reduced. Even if a lien is unenforceable, subcontractors and suppliers can still maintain a breach of contract action directly against the party with whom they contracted. The derivative nature of a mechanic’s lien makes it important to file a lien as soon as possible. The filing of a lien typically results in the owner and/or general contractor withholding payments “down stream”. Consequently, the prompt filing of a lien will usually result in greater funds against which the lien can attach and be enforced.

Additional devices to consider in the mechanic’s lien area include a demand for terms of contract and a demand for a verified statement. The demand for terms of contract, if not responded to within thirty days, can create direct liability on the part of a remote party if the claimant cannot collect against the party with whom it contracted. The demand for a verified statement will be discussed below.

2. Payment Bond Claims. Independent of mechanic’s lien rights, subcontractors and suppliers should be conscious of the possibility of a payment bond existing. The larger the job the more likely a payment bond exists. Also note, nearly all public jobs require payment bonds. A typical payment bond requires suppliers (but not subcontractors in direct contract with the prime contractor) to provide written notice, sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to all parties “upstream” within ninety days of last supplying materials to the subject project. Bond terms vary, but ninety days is typical.

The payment bond claim should include the name of the project, the contractual relationships (i.e., owner, general contractor and subcontractor, etc.), and the amount owed.

A payment bond claim can be made even if the name of the surety is not known. All that is required is that written notice be sent certified mail, return receipt requested within the appropriate period of time to the owner and contractor (i.e., the principal on the bond). Some bonds excuse the written notice requirement if the bond claimant has a direct contract with the principal on the bond. Unless the bond terms are known, it is best to send the written notice to all interested parties.

Bonds typically have two time limits. First, a written notice requirement such as the one detailed above acts a condition precedent to a bond claim. And second, a period of limitations requirement usually exists which requires that any lawsuit on the bond be commenced within a certain period of time. The typical time limitation to commence a lawsuit is one year from the last day worked or the last day materials are supplied to a particular project.

A supplier’s payment bond claim is enforceable against the bonding company regardless of whether or not the general contractor (the principal on the bond) has paid its subcontractor in full. Thus, the inherent limitation on the enforceability of liens (i.e., derivative rights) is not an obstacle to the enforcement of a payment bond claim. Accordingly, a payment bond claim is of greater value than a lien because it provides greater security for payment if it can be proven that work was performed or deliveries of materials occurred.

Note: In the case of either a mechanic’s lien or a payment bond claim, it is critical to prove that moneys are due under a contract, etc. For suppliers, proof that materials were actually delivered to a particular job is needed. Accordingly, approved requisitions for payment, signed delivery tickets showing the name of the project, etc., are important proof of the amount due. Suppliers, if possible, should avoid shipments to a customer’s warehouse, as lien and bond rights may be limited in such a case.

3. Trust Fund Diversion Claims. Article 3-A of the New York State Lien Law, which operates completely independent of the mechanic’s lien law itself, has the potential to create personal liability on the part of the officers of the contractor if a corporation. Contractors are duty bound to make sure that moneys intended for the costs of improvement on a given project are used to first to pay those that actually improve the project. If a general contractor pays a subcontractor and the subcontractor pays, for example, a supplier from another job (or goes on vacation to Italy), the officers of the subcontractor could be personally liable. The first step to create liability is to serve a demand for a verified statement which demands information, under oath, as to the application of the funds received upstream.

4. Personal Guaranty. Credit applications and contracts may provide for a personal guaranty so that a direct action and/or arbitration against the individual guarantor can be maintained. There are expedited procedures available in court when a lawsuit is based on a personal guaranty.

The best way for subcontractors and suppliers to enforce payment rights is to be conscious of their lien and payment bond rights, which act as security for contractual and quasi-contractual debts. Merely filing a mechanic’s lien and making a payment bond claim will not typically result in payment. Sureties as a rule do not voluntarily pay claims and an owner or contractor will likewise not pay until the subcontractor and/or supplier “judicially” establishes its right to payment. While it is important to file a lien and/or make a payment bond claim for security purposes, it is equally important to speedily obtain a judgment or arbitrator’s award. The time within which a recovery can be had depend on numerous factors, the most important of which is the claimant’s ability to clearly document the amount owed.

Various legislative initiatives like the New York Prompt Payment Act should also be considered as possible tools to expedite payments.

Subcontractors and suppliers should consult with counsel as soon as it become apparent that a payment risk exists as the information contained in this article is intended as general guidance only.

Safety Policy: Written Records and the”Unavoidable Employee Misconduct” Defense

Since your company devotes considerable time and money to safety training and OSHA compliance, those efforts should include making and keeping records of training content, rule enforcement, and the like.

As you are probably aware, OSHA practice recognizes, in limited circumstances, the doctrine of “unavoidable employee misconduct” as a defense to a citation.  

Several of our clients have had the experience of being cited for OSHA violations, in circumstances in which they felt that the violation occurred wholly due to an experienced, knowledgeable employee forsaking ordinary common sense, and breaking a work rule of which he certainly ought to have been aware.

While it’s vexing to get cited for an obvious and common OSHA violation that has been discussed over and over in “toolbox talks” and safety meetings, unfortunately the defense of “unavoidable employee misconduct” is somewhat technical, and will save the employer an adverse finding and the associated penalty only where conditions, not easily met, are shown.

To illustrate the doctrine and its limitations, I’ll discuss Secretary v. P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc., which serves the further beneficial purpose of reminding readers of one of the deadliest, and most commonly-cited, construction-related hazards:  employees unprotected while working in trenches.

In Gioioso, an OSHA inspector passing a construction site in Boston observed employees working in a trench.  Since this compliance officer worked in a suburban OSHA office that did not have primary jurisdiction over the site, he did not immediately demand to inspect the trench, but returned later when no one from the primary office was available.

On returning to the site, Compliance Officer Henrikson saw an employee climbing out of a trench that appeared to be 6′ deep, and which had no shoring or other protection.  Seeing no other workers about, and it being around noon, CO Henrikson deduced that most of the workforce was at lunch, and so went to lunch himself.

Returning after lunch, Henrikson saw an employee exiting the east end of a second trench.  He left this trench briefly to look at two additional trenches which proved to have no one working in them.  Upon returning to the second trench, he saw one employee standing alongside it, and another in the east end of the trench digging with a shovel.  The trench was up to the top of the employee’s head.  The walls were vertical, and there was no protection in the trench.  The CO identified himself, and asked the employee to exit the trench, which he did by stepping onto an electrical duct bank near the east end.  This employee identified himself as Jos√© Ourique, and stated that he was the foreman at the site.

Gioioso’s superintendent, Joseph Zenga, arrived a few minutes later, and told the CO that he had not inspected or measured the trench before employees entered it.  Ourique told the CO that he was not the “competent person” at the site, and had not measured the trench.  He had been hand-digging in the trench, to locate the “corporation valve” to which the new water service pipe was to be connected.

CO Henrikson spoke with Gregory Perreira, an equipment operator, who had been standing alongside the trench when the CO first saw him.  Perreira said that superintendent Zenga came by the trench six to eight times a day.  Zenga, he reported, had been by the trench at lunchtime.  Ourique had been in the trench then, but Zenga had said nothing to him, or to anyone else, about trench protection.  Perreira said that Robert Bruni was the employee the CO had seen exiting the trench, and that he himself also had been in the trench, albeit at the shallow end.

The CO measured the trench as being 5’8″ deep at the deep (east) end.  A trench box was onsite, but could not have been used due to the various utility lines in the trench.  The trench could have been shored, but the CO found no shoring materials onsite.  The CO determined the soil in the trench to be gravelly “Type C” soil (the most unstable kind) that had been sloughing from the trench walls, and was particularly susceptible to cave-ins due to vibrations caused by construction and vehicles being operated in the area.

Gioioso was cited for one “Repeat” violation, for having employees in an unshored trench more than 5 feet deep; and for two “Serious” violations, for not having the trench inspected by a “competent person,” and for failure to provide a ladder or other suitable means of egress.  Gioioso contested the citations.

As always, the Secretary had the burden to prove, as to each citation item, that (1) the cited standard applied; (2) there was a failure to comply with the standard; and (3) employees had access to the violative condition.  In Gioioso, in addition to arguing that the Secretary failed at the trial to meet her burden of proof, the employer raised as a defense that any violations of the cited standards were due to “unpreventable employee misconduct.”

Gioioso’s arguments that the Secretary had not proved the violations were unconvincing.  For example, it offered speculation that possibly the trench had been dug deeper in the ten minutes between the time that the CO saw Mr. Bruni emerge, and when he saw Mr. Ourique in the trench.

The “Unavoidable Employee Misconduct” defense requires proof that the employer (1) had an established work rule; (2) communicated it; (3) took steps to discover incidents of noncompliance; and (4) enforced it with disciplinary measures.

In the Gioioso case, the defense was rejected in part because Ourique ? one of two employees who had violated the rules ? was a foreman.  Also, although visits by supervisory personnel were claimed as demonstrating steps to discover transgressions, Zenga’s appearance on the day of the inspection, at which time he saw Ourique in the trench without protection but failed to say anything, pretty much let the air out of that argument.

The ALJ made special mention of a prior case involving Gioioso, in which an appellate court had stressed the absence of documentary evidence in rejecting the UEM defense.  Without corroborative paperwork to show, e.g., unscheduled safety audits, mandatory safety checklists, actual implementation of a disciplinary policy, the contents of safety talks and attendance records, an employer cannot persuasively argue that it met the criteria necessary to establish the defense.

While reducing risk should be your safety program’s primary goal and avoiding or defending OSHA citations a secondary goal, everything you do ought to be recorded, and the records preserved.  A potential defense should not be lost due to a lack of supporting documentation.

Subcontractor Allowed Recovery For Work Performed

Disputes between contractors and subcontractors may ultimately require recourse to the courts.  A trial judge will allow both sides to present witnesses and produce documents as to the issues in dispute.  The judge will then make credibility determinations, resolve factual disputes and grant judgment upon application of the appropriate legal standard.

At times, however, a judge may grant summary judgment without a trial where the affidavits and supporting documents demonstrate the absence of factual disputes.  In the recent case of Durao Concrete, Inc. v. RJD Construction, Inc., a subcontractor was able to convince the court that it should enter summary judgment in its favor.

Background 

RJD Construction, Inc. was hired as a general contractor in connection with a construction project located in Yaphank, New York.  Under its agreement with the owner, RJD was to be paid $591,375.  RJD subcontracted the installation of a concrete foundation, footings, walls and slabs to Durao Concrete, Inc. for the agreed price of $40,000.  The subcontractor completed its work in August 2007 and submitted invoices to the general contractor totaling $41,800.  The additional $1,800 was for the use of a pump truck to pump the cement to the job.  After the general contractor failed to pay the subcontractor’s invoices, the subcontractor filed a mechanic’s lien, sued the general contractor, and moved for summary judgment.

In opposition to the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment, the general contractor argued that the subcontractor’s work was not properly performed, which led to cracks in the concrete.  The contractor also argued that since the parties’ agreement was for $40,000 it was not required to pay the subcontractor the $41,800 billed for the completed work. The contractor also claimed that the debt due to the subcontractor had been consolidated with monies due on other projects, which were settled and paid.  However, the contractor did not indicate the amount of the settlement, or how or when it was paid.  According to the general contractor, proof of the settlement and payment had been lost in a flood.

In response, the subcontractor submitted evidence that the owner had paid the general contractor in full for the subcontractor’s work, that the general contractor never complained of the quality of the subcontractor’s work until after the lawsuit was commenced, that only $40,000 was being claimed as due in the lawsuit, that no such settlement or payment ever occurred, and that the subcontractor was entitled to be paid as agreed for the work performed and completed.

Decision

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor as to liability and directed a trial as to the amount of money actually due to the subcontractor.  According to the court, the subcontractor established that the general contractor agreed to pay the subcontractor $40,000 for its work at the project; the subcontractor performed its work at the project in accordance with its initial proposal and estimate; the general contractor received payment in full from the owner; and the general contractor failed to pay the subcontractor any monies with respect to the work performed.

As to the general contractor’s claim that the parties had agreed to settle the debt due to the subcontractor together with the debt owed on other jobs, the court noted that the alleged settlement payment was by check, and notwithstanding the alleged flood, the general contractor could have obtained duplicate records from its banking institution, which the general contractor failed to do.  Under these circumstances, the court determined that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor was appropriate.

Comment 

It is difficult to persuade a court to grant summary judgment without a trial because in most cases credibility questions require a trial.  Here, however, the general contractor failed to produce any documents to justify his refusal to make payment to the subcontractor.  If there is no material factual dispute to decide, why have a trial?  It was therefore appropriate for the court to grant summary judgment to the subcontractor.


Defending Against An OSHA Citation: A General Contractor’s Perspective

General Contractors have a dual concern when it comes to protecting their companies from OSHA citations: they must not only be on guard against OSHA violations committed by their own employees, but a prudent General Contractor should also be vigilant with respect to a subcontractor’s employees whose violative acts will often be imputed by OSHA to the General Contractor because of the General Contractor’s control over a site. It is particularly difficult for a general contractor to protect itself against violations caused by independent acts and omissions of employees and subcontractors of which the General Contractor has no knowledge. For these reasons, there are a series of steps which every General Contractor should consider taking in order to protect their companies from OSHA citations in such instances.

In general, applicable OSHA case law has held that an employer cannot be held responsible for the violation of an OSHA standard resulting from an act by an employee (and by analogy, a subcontractor), for which the employer ( or General Contractor) has no knowledge and which was contrary to the employer’s instructions. In order to establish this defense, known as “unpreventable employee misconduct,” the employer must demonstrate the following:

(1) the violation must have been caused by or resulted from exclusively employee action; (2) it must have been an isolated and unanticipated instance; (3) it must have been of short duration; (4) it must not have been participated in, observed by, or performed with the knowledge of supervisory personnel and must not have been foreseen by the employer in the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (5) the employee’s action was in contravention of well established policy, program or rule which was used to instruct employees in safe work practices and which was enforced by disciplinary action when necessary.

Therefore, with respect to employees, a General Contractor should have in place a well established written company-wide safety plan covering all aspects of the contractor’s operations, including both management and employees. Having the safety plan reviewed by an independent consultant, and then implementing any suggestions made by that consultant further strengthens the safety plan.

Next, elements of the company-wide safety plan need to be communicated to the employees by whatever means possible, including at “tool box meetings”. For example, a General Contractor should consider covering a different topic of workplace safety each week at “tool box meetings”, and at those meetings, handing out pamphlets and literature to the employees regarding various topical OSHA rules. Employee attendance at those meetings should be documented.

Finally, the safety plan needs to be actively enforced by the General Contractor, including reprimanding and dismissing employees that disregard explicit safety rules. Enforcement should similarly be documented with memos, letters and other employment records.

With respect to subcontractors, by analogy, the Contractor should have a written company-wide safety plan describing how the General Contractor communicates and enforces safety issues with subcontractors, including the use of comprehensive contract clauses concerning workplace safety. It should be made clear that a breach of OSHA rules is a breach of the subcontract and the failure to cure could, as with any material breach, be grounds for termination.

During the course of the project, those safety issues need to be effectively communicated to the subcontractors at project meetings and later confirmed in meeting minutes. Correspondence and field memos should also memorialize the communication of safety concerns. For example, the site superintendent should immediately notify a subcontractor in writing when he or she witnesses an unsafe situation and the superintendent should then follow-up on those notifications.

Finally, safety issues should be actively enforced with the subcontractors through various contractual mechanisms, including withholding funds, threatening termination, and even terminating recalcitrant subcontractors when the circumstances warrant it.

In the event a General Contractor is issued a citation by OSHA resulting from the independent act of an employee or a subcontractor, documentation of the aforementioned steps could prove in valuable in defending against the citation at an informal conference or a full hearing.

Does the Owner’s request for detailed information go beyond the scope of Section 38’s requirements?

Question. Lienor, filed a mechanics lien against Owner for work performed on property. The lien was based on work Lienor performed under contracts with Owner, which were provided in the verified statement. Owner demanded Lienor produce a verified statement under Lien Law Section 38, including the names and addresses of the subcontractors and the work performed. Lienor argues the information requested goes beyond the scope of Section 38. Owner argues it should be provided with more detailed information to ensure it is not “double liened.” Does the Owner’s request for detailed information go beyond the scope of Section 38’s requirements?

Answer. Yes.  Where the lien is based on a contract, nothing would be accomplished by requiring the lienor to furnish an itemization of materials and labor performed under that contract. Only those items in dispute must be provided in a detailed statement.

Under Section 38 of the Lien Law, “on demand in writing” a lienor must deliver to the owner a verified statement that sets forth “the items of labor and/or material and the value thereof which make up the amount for which he claims a lien, and which shall also set forth the terms of the contract under which such items were furnished.” If the lienor fails to produce this statement within five days of the demand, the lienee may petition the court for an order “directing such compliance.” The intent of these provisions is to ensure that the lienee is apprised of the detail of the lienor’s claim, and of the basis for the statement of value as set forth in the lien.

Section 38, however, does not give a lienee an absolute right to a detailed statement from a lienor as to all the items for which he claims a lien. Itemization of all materials and labor is required only in a case where the lien is based on quantum meruit i.e. the reasonable value of the work. Where the lien is based on a contract for an agreed price, nothing would be accomplished by requiring the lienor to furnish an itemization of materials furnished and labor performed in performance of the contract. Only those items in dispute such as claims for extra work and material must be provided in the detailed statement.

Here, it appears that the lien is based on work that Lienor and its subcontractors performed pursuant to contracts with Owner’s general contractor. The Verified Statement contains copies of these contracts setting forth the work performed and the agreed upon price. Lienor has also provided signed change orders to the contracts. Furthermore, Owner has not indicated that there are specific items in dispute or that Lienor is asking for quantum meruit compensation. Instead, its only argument is that it should be provided more detailed information to ensure it has not been double liened.

If, as it appears here, the claim is based on agreed upon contracts that have been performed, Lienor need only supply enough information to allow Owner to check whether it has been double liened by subcontractors of Lienor. It has no obligation to provide more information than is already in the contracts. Requiring itemization of all material, work performed, and labor rates as Owner requests would accomplish nothing. Lienor’s Verified Statement includes the names of its subcontractors on which the lien is based, providing the information necessary to allow Owner to determine if it has been double liened.

Safety Policy: Maintaining Workplace Safety in Difficult Economic Times

For those of us operating small businesses, it’s not easy, as 2010 winds down, to avoid mixed emotions.  Those of us whose businesses have come through the past two, difficult years in good shape have much to be thankful for.  Yet, all of us have friends, clients and colleagues, many with exceptional talent and experience, who are struggling.  Pundits’ predictions of better times run counter to some of the economic data, as foretell unimproved, or even worsening, prospects.

If anything is certain, it’s that the road ahead is uncommonly uncertain.  In the meantime, of course, we have to steer the ship as best we can.  The theme of this series being health and safety in the construction workplace, this installment is to urge that, in setting your course, you not jettison care for the lives and the safety of your crew.

Governmental support for the goals underlying the OSH Act is looking somewhat shaky right now.  As you may know, 22 states have their own state-run OSHA programs.  (New York, Connecticut and New Jersey are all among the handful of states that allocate private-sector OSHA responsibility to the federal agencies, while administering their own state agencies for workers in the public sector).   In looking around to see how construction safety, including OSHA enforcement, is faring around the country, I am startled to see that, as many states wrestle with dire budget constraints, their OSHA programs are experiencing budget cuts, and laying off employees.  I see, also, that even in some substantial construction outfits, layoffs have reached the level of executive safety personnel.

Recalling the cartoon image of the fellow with an angel sitting on one shoulder and a demon on the other, I don’t doubt that your “shoulder demon” would be pleased if fewer OSHA employees translated into fewer inspections, and fewer citations.  Nonetheless, in your more sober moments, you’re probably  aware that safety consciousness is healthy not only for your soul, but your company’s bottom line.  Lawsuits, workers’ comp claims and lost man-hours are obvious perils, but a lack of attention to safety has additional, subtler negative impacts on your company as well.  The best workers gravitate to safer companies, and safety and production in reality go hand in hand.

While federal OSHA has not ? yet ? shown signs of fiscal distress or diminished enforcement activity, in broad terms it may well be that, in the next years, governmental attention to workplace safety and health will trend downward.  And, even if the economic optimists prove to be correct, you’re probably not counting on having money to burn over the next few years.

What, then, can you do, as a construction executive facing budget constraints, to maintain high health and safety standards within your company?  Leadership, transparency, communica¬≠tion, employee involvement, improved liaison with OSHA (and with any labor organizations representing your employees) and emphasizing the basics are all elements of an effective strategy.

 “Leadership” can mean a lot of things in this context, but one essential is that, come what may, employee safety and health must always be an agenda item.  Construction is inherently dangerous, so safety is a challenge in both good times and bad.  Generally, a company’s safety record reflects the owners’ attitude that the lives and the well-being of the rank-and-file are, or are not, important.  If your company has less work, has undergone layoffs, or has lost key safety or other supervisory personnel, you’ll be doing extra planning in any case.  You need to include an evaluation of what impact changed circumstances will have on safety, and what adjustments might be considered to ensure that any adverse impact is kept to a minimum.

By “transparency” I mean openness concerning safety issues and planning.  If you’re operating with 60% fewer employees than you had three years ago, and your safety director has been laid off, there’s no use pretending that you’re not facing challenges.  These days, most employees appreciate that keeping their job, not to mention keeping their employer afloat, requires added effort on their part.  I’m an advocate of giving field supervisors as much training and responsibility for safety as they can handle.  You should meet regularly with managers and supervisors to discuss safety issues generally, and accidents and near-miss occurrences in particular.  Encourage them to take responsibility to report whatever problems they observe.

“Communication” and “employee involvement” mean that the rank-and-file should be made aware that safety remains a top concern, but requires greater alertness and responsibility on their part.  More broadly, communication means reaching out to people outside your company who may be able to assist you in making your workplace safer, while conserving money.

To give just a few examples, if yours is a union shop, your employees’ union may have training or other resources to offer.  Shop stewards should be enlisted to assist in impressing on your employees that OSHA compliance and injury avoidance is more than ever a shared responsibility, and that while management is striving to maintain safety (and keep the company going) obvious transgressions ? e.g., failing to tie off while working aloft, and especially such irresponsible conduct as fighting, drug or alcohol use on the job, or stunt-driving company vehicles ? cannot be tolerated.

Another potential resource is your workers’ compensation carrier.  Many carriers will evaluate your workplace for hazards, go over OSHA and N.Y. Labor Law standards that apply, and help you develop or improve your health and safety program.  That’s definitely worth a phone call.

Finally, stress the basics.  OSHA’s construction standards are complex, but most injuries result from a relative handful of hazards (falls from elevations, trench cave-ins, struck-by accidents, unsafe scaffolds and stairwells, openings in surfaces, and working too close to live power lines).  Most of the essentials, frankly, can be summarized in a three-page checklist, embracing eye, face, foot hand and head protection and PPE, scaffolding, excavations, electrical safety, floor and wall openings, elevated surfaces and fall protection, crane safety, forklift and vehicular safety, and hazard communication.  Such a limited focus may leave you exposed to the sharp eye of a zealous OSHA inspector for items not covered, but if the basics are understood and observed by your employees, most serious accidents (and most-often-cited OSHA violations) should be avoided.

Construction companies large and small are facing the need in these times to work and plan smarter, and be more cost-effective.  Employee safety is a critical element of your company’s success. Make sure it remains on your agenda.

Court Allows Change Order And Extra Work Claims But Rejects Delay Claim

There are few projects completed with no changes or additions to the original contract.  Problems arise when the contractor fails to comply with the standard contract requirement for changes and extras to be in writing.

Equally problematic for contractors is the common contract clause providing for “no damage-for-delay”, which precludes delay claims by contractor.

In the recent case of ADC Contracting & Construction, Inc. v. Town of Southampton, the court ruled on the enforceability of contract provisions requiring written approval for change orders and extra work and the “no-damage-for-delay” clause.

Background 

ADC Contracting & Construction, Inc. contracted with the Town of Southampton, New York to construct an animal shelter.  According to the contractor, the Town directed, and the contractor performed, extra work for which a written change order was never issued. 

The contractor also claimed that the Town delayed the project by poor planning and scheduling.  The Town acted as its own general contractor and entered into separate contracts with ADC, as the construction contractor, a plumbing contractor and an electric contractor.  The contractor argued that the Town’s inexperienced representatives failed to supervise and coordinate the various trades, which resulted in interference and hindrance in the contractor’s ability to orderly and efficiently perform under the contract.  The lack of supervision and coordination resulted in delays, as well as additional work, which increased the cost of the contract.

When the Town refused to pay for the extra work and the contractor’s delay claim, the contractor sued.  The Town moved for summary judgment, arguing that the parties’ contract required all change orders and extras to be in writing, and that the contract barred the contractor’s recovery of any delay damages.

Decision

The court dismissed the contractor’s delay claims, but permitted the contractor’s extra work claims to proceed to trial.  In making its decision, the court relied on the express terms of the parties’ agreement and the controlling case law.  With regard to the contractor’s delay claim, the court noted that the contract stated: “Where Contractor is prevented from completing work due to a delay beyond his control, an extension of the time to complete the specific task shall be Contractor’s sole and exclusive remedy for such a delay.”  The court went on to state that notwithstanding the owner’s poor planning and scheduling, inept administration of the project was within the scope of the no-damages-for-delay clause.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the contractor’s delay claims, ruling that an extension of time to complete the work was the contractor’s only remedy for project delays caused by the owner.

As for the contractor’s extra work claim, the court referred to contract provisions requiring all changes to be first approved in writing.  However, the court also pointed to case law which prohibited an owner from relying on such a provision to avoid payment if the absence of a written approval was caused by the owner. 

The contractor submitted written correspondence with the owner and testimony from the Town’s representatives at their examinations before trial to raise factual questions as to whether the Town had actual knowledge of the contractor’s additional work claims and whether the Town, through the conduct of its agents, waived its right to insist upon strict compliance with the requirement of written authorization.  Since the court was uncertain as to whether the absence of a written extra was caused by the owner, the court permitted the contractor’s extra work claims to remain.

Comment 

Though there are limited exceptions, no-damages-for-delay contract clauses are frequently upheld and enforced by New York courts.  Contract clauses that require extra work to be performed pursuant to a written change order prior to triggering an owner’s payment obligations produce differing results from the courts.  On one hand, courts are sometimes hesitant to deny a contractor compensation for work verbally directed by the owner.  On the other hand, courts may strictly enforce the requirement of a written authorization.  The particular facts of a case will determine whether a court will allow a waiver of the written change order requirement.  A prudent contractor should insist upon written approval before performing changes or extras, rather than risk a court’s enforcement of a contract requirement of a written authorization.

Court Rejects Extra Work Claims

Claims by contractors for extra work continue to be a major source of construction litigation.  There are few projects completed with no additions or changes to the original contract.  Most contracts have a standard provision requiring that orders for extra work be in writing.  Problems arise when the contractor does not obtain the approval for the extra work but proceeds to perform the additional work anyway.

In the recent case of Tadco Construction Corp. v. Dormitory Authority of the State of New York, the court ruled on the contractor’s extra work claims.

Background 

TADCO Construction Corp. entered into a written contract with the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York to perform certain work related to the marina rehabilitation project located at Kingsborough Community College. Under the parties’ agreement, the contractor agreed to perform all work and furnish all supplies and materials for the price of $1,436,642, subject to adjustments for extra work or alterations to or deductions from the work. 

Before construction started, the contractor determined that fixing the floating dock system would only extend the life of the dock by a few years, and that replacing the dock, although more expensive, would give the dock a significantly longer lifespan.  The contractor presented this information to DASNY, who responded that it would not entertain an increase in costs for the repair of the dock, and that it would only approve replacement of the dock if it did not increase the contract price.  The contractor responded by telling DASNY that it intended to proceed with its plan to replace the dock “under protest” and that it would seek compensation for the increased costs of this plan later, by submitting a change order request.

When the contractor submitted the change order request for the cost of the replacement dock in the amount of $155,040, DASNY refused to pay it, arguing that the contractor had chosen to replace the dock system on its own initiative and that DASNY had repeatedly told the contractor that it would not approve a change in contract price if the contractor chose to proceed with the installation of the new dock system.  Based on DASNY’s denial of the change order request, the contractor filed suit, seeking to recover the extra costs related to the replacement dock.  DASNY responded with a motion for summary judgment, seeking to have the contractor’s extra work claims dismissed.

Decision

The court ruled in favor of DASNY, denying the contractor’s extra work claims.  According to the court, recovery cannot be had for “extra” work which actually falls within the contract or the plans and specifications, but recovery may be had for work outside the contract where the contractor was in fact specifically ordered to do work that was not within the scope of that called for by the contract. 

Here, the court ruled that the contractor chose to proceed with the dock replacement plan after being told by DASNY that it would not agree to any changes in the original contract plan that would result in increased costs.  Because the work was not ordered by DASNY, the court determined that the contractor voluntarily substituted materials in the project at its own discretion, and the costs of that choice are not recoverable.  Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of DASNY.

Comment 

A contractor who wishes to be assured that he will be paid for extra work should follow the contractual requirements and obtain proper written authorization to do the additional work either from the owner or his duly authorized representative prior to performing the extra work.  As this case demonstrates, a contractor should not ignore contract provisions relating to extra work in the hope that a court may make an exception to the contract and find a waiver under particular facts and circumstances.

Strict Compliance With Notice And Reporting Provisions

A 1998 decision by the State of New York’s highest court underscores the importance of contractors strictly complying with the notice and reporting provisions contained in many construction contracts, no matter what type of “directive” they may have received from the Owner or its representatives.

In A.H.A. General Construction, Inc. v. New York City Housing Authority, 92 N.Y.2d 20, 677 N.Y.S. 2d 9 (June 11, 1998), the Court of Appeals of New York dealt with a common scenario on construction projects. According to the contractor, the public owner would, during the course of the project (as was the case on their previous projects), direct the contractor to perform extra work and the work would then be done with the expectation that a change order would be issued or that correspondence containing price proposals submitted by the contractor to the Owner would constitute sufficient notice and documentation of its claim. The contractor claimed that the parties would negotiate over claimed extra work and ultimately the contractor would be paid for same.

The public owner, however, had a different recollection. It denied the contractor’s contention that, with respect to work that the public owner claimed was contract work but the contractor contended was extra, the public owner permitted the contractor to use correspondence as a substitute for the documentation required by the contract. The public owner argued that by the express terms of the contract, only when both parties agreed that an item of work was extra and when prior to the performance of the work, the public owner ordered the contractor in writing to perform the work for an agreed upon sum, would the contractor’s obligation to submit daily reports be obviated.

By the end of the project, several disputes arose over whether the work performed by the contractor was extra work, or work required under the contract. On some occasions, the public owner issued the requested change order, on others it refused, and on still others, it issued change orders only to subsequently rescind them.

The contractor commenced an action against the public owner alleging claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment and the public owner moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, on the grounds that the contractor had waived its right to recover for extra work by failing to comply with the notice and reporting requirements of the contract.

The contractor’s president in opposing the public owner’s motion for summary judgment, swore in his affidavit that the public owner was “being less than truthful” and was “acting in bad faith” by suggesting that no documentation existed to support the contractor’s claims for extra work. The contractor noted the vast amount of correspondence between the parties on that issue, including requests by the public owner to complete certain tasks, and the contractor’s detailed cost proposals responding to those requests. The contractor’s president further stated that certified payroll reports and daily activity reports were kept regarding all of the work but that separate records for the extra work could not be kept because it was physically impossible to do so.

The lower court ruled that no matter how much correspondence existed on the issue, and how many project records existed, the contractor’s failure to strictly comply with the contract’s notice and reporting requirements(1) barred it from recovering for the extra work.

On appeal, the contractor argued that the public owner’s actions waived strict compliance with the notice and reporting provisions because of the hundreds of instances in the past where it had negotiated payment for extra work without requiring technical compliance with those provisions. This argument, coupled with the evidence that the public owner had also executed change orders acknowledging that certain work was extra work only later to rescind them, asserting that the work was actually required by the contract, was enough to sway the State of New York’s Appellate Division, First Department to find that the contractor had raised triable issues of fact as to whether the public owner had acted in bad faith or had been grossly negligent in the performance of the Contract.

The Appellate Division’s decision, however, was short lived because the New York City Housing Authority took its appeal up to New York’s Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and upheld the decision of the lower court finding that the contractor had failed to come forward with any evidence to demonstrate that the actions of the public owner had in any way prevented him from complying with the strict notice and reporting requirements contained in the contract. The Court determined that the applicable provisions of the contract required the contractor, when proceeding with disputed work, to submit contemporaneous statements and documentation of its actual damages, not proposed costs or estimates. The Court of Appeals also specifically found that the public owner’s own daily construction site reports and the contractor’s submission of certified payroll reports – neither differentiating between contract work and disputed work – did not satisfy those requirements.

The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the Appellate Division’s decision rested on its conclusion that the notice and reporting provisions of the contract were “conditions precedent” to suit or recovery for the extra work, and not “exculpatory clauses”.(2) The Court said:

That conclusion is legally significant. While an exculpatory clause will not be enforced when, “in contravention of acceptable notions of morality, the misconduct for which it would grant immunity smacks of intentional wrongdoing” (Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d at 385, 461 N.Y.S. 2d 746, 448 N.E. 2d 413, supra), the standard for excusing a condition precedent is different. A condition precedent is linked to the implied obligation of a party not to “do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract” (Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163). Thus, it is a “well-settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself” (Young v. Hunter, 6 N.Y. 203, 207; see also Arc Elec. Constr. Co. v. Fuller Co., 24 N.Y.2d 99, 104, 299, N.Y.S. 2d 129, 247 N.E.2d 111; 3A Corbin, Contracts 767, at 540 [1960]). Put another way, a party to a contract “cannot rely on the failure of another to perform a condition precedent where he has frustrated or prevented the occurrence of the condition” (Kooleraire Serv. & Installation Corp. v. Board of Educ., 28 N.Y.2d 101, 106, 320 N.Y.S.2d 46, 268, N.E.2d 782; see also, Armies v. Wesnofske, 255 N.Y. 156, 163, 174, N.E. 436; Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N.Y. 96, 100-101, 97 N.E. 472).

Therefore, New York’s Highest Court determined that the relevant inquiry is not simply whether the Owner committed bad faith or was negligent in the performance of the contract, but whether the alleged misconduct prevented or hindered the contractor’s compliance with the notice and reporting requirements. The Court ultimately decided in the case before it that none of the actions attributed to the Owner by the contractor impeded the contractor’s ability to comply with the contract requirements as to its claims of extra work, and the contractor’s complaint was dismissed.

The moral of the this saga is that every contractor or subcontractor faced with a contract containing notice and reporting provisions covering the performance of extra work or disputed work must not only give notice to the Owner but must also strictly comply with the reporting provisions while the work is being performed (e.g. submit daily time and material records for the Owner’s signature). This must be done even if you are promised a change order, directed to proceed in writing, or in the midst of negotiating a change order. If the extra work is completed without a signed change order and without complying with the contract’s reporting provisions, the contractor will be completely at the mercy of the owner and will, in all likelihood, lose its claim no matter how clear cut the issue may be.

A.H.A. General Construction, Inc. waived its rights to approximately $1 million in claimed extras by failing to follow the express terms of the contract. Don’t let it happen to you.

1. The subject contract required that in the event the Owner determines that the work being performed is not extra work, the contractor must notify the Owner within 5 days that the work is being performed “under protest”, or else the claim for extra work is waived. Also, a contractor claiming damages resulting from an act or omission of the Owner is required to give notice within 5 days of the act or omission, and provide detailed statements and proof of damages within 30 days, or the claim would also be waived.

Under another section of the contract, a contractor performing extra work or disputed work is required to furnish daily statements to the public owner, during the performance of that work, including the names and number of workmen employed on the work; the number of hours employed; the character of the work; and the nature and quantity of any materials or equipment used.

2. Exculpatory clauses like “no-damage-for-delay” clauses are meant to absolve or exculpate the Owner from liability for its acts or omissions.

Safety Policy: In a Split Decision, the OSH Review Commission Reaffirms OSHA%u2019s Multi-Employer Policy

Forty years after the passage of the OSH Act, there remains no definitive answer to a question of considerable practical importance.  On a multi-employer jobsite, does responsibility for OSHA compliance rest singly with each employer (such responsibility being limited to its own employees)?  Or does responsibility extend to any employer that creates a hazard, or controls an area in which there exists a hazard ? even if none of its own employees are exposed?

Posed another way, does the Act create a duty on the part of each employer to direct the work of others’ employees as necessary to ensure OSHA compliance, overriding the rule that each trade controls its own employees, and is responsible for its own means and methods?

In the first years following the enactment of OSHA in 1970, the Commission held (in the words of one 1973 decision) that Congress did not intend to go so far as to make a contractor who subs out work (while retaining control of the jobsite) “responsible for the safety and health of working men and women who do not work for him, who are not subject his direction and control, who are not on his payroll and who cannot be discharged by him.”

In the years that followed, however, the Secretary promulgated instructions to enforcement personnel, creating what became to be known as its “Multi-Employer Policy” (“MEP”).  This authorized citations to employers for violations they had created, or in areas under their control, even if none of their own employees had been exposed.

Changing his view, former Commissioner Cleary (who had joined in the unanimous decision quoted above, confining OSHA liability to the employment relationship) in a series of opinions in the 1970s proposed several theories expanding liability beyond the traditional employment relationship.  One such theory was that, in order to accomplish the remedial purpose of the OSH Act, “employee” should not be construed “solely according to common-law concepts of master and servant.”  For purposes of the OSH Act, he argued, “employees of a subcontractor should be considered the employees of the general or prime contractor.”

This broader view of OSHA liability came to be the prevailing one, and found wide approval in the Courts of Appeals.

The standard came to be one holding employers responsible for violations of other employers when they “could reasonably be expected to prevent or detect and abate the violations” thanks to their “supervisory authority and control over the worksite.”

In 2007, however, in a split decision, the Commission (in what came to be known as the “Summit I” case) construed 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1910.12(a) ? the applicability provision for OSHA’S construction standards ? as limiting a construction employer’s duties to its own employees. 1

“Summit I” became “Summit II” when the Commission’s determination was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis.  The Eighth Circuit decision ? technically controlling only within that Circuit ? reasoned that permitting the issuance of citations to employers whose own employees are not exposed to the hazard is justified by the mandate of ¬ß 1910.12(a) to protect not only employees, but “places of employment.”

In 2005, Summit Contractors, the employer involved in Summit I and II, was cited for a new violation.  Summit was general contractor on a project on which it subbed out nearly all of the work, having onsite only a superintendent and assistant superintendent.  Summit’s subcontracts provided that Summit “may provide . . . temporary electrical services” which the subcontractor would “make use of . . . as provided.”
Summit provided a rented portable generator and a spider box.  Summit’s super did not request that the generator be equipped with a ground fault circuit interrupter, and did not inspect it for GFCI protection when it was delivered.   The rented equipment was put into service, with the framing sub’s employees using portable electric tools that they plugged into the spider box.

OSHA cited Summit for violating the electrical standard mandating GFCI protection.  After a hearing, the ALJ affirmed the citation, and assessed the proposed penalty.  Neither of the two Summit employees on the project was among the employees exposed.

The Commission saw this case, which will presumably go down as “Summit IV“2 as appropriate for a reconsideration of “Summit I.”  In this newest case, a 2-1 majority of the Commission overruled its prior decision in Summit I, approved the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Summit II, and affirmed the citation.
In addition to making the familiar invocation of the remedial purpose of OSHA, the Commission rejected Summit’s threshold argument that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden (1992) precludes the imposition of OSH Act liability.

Darden reaffirmed a rule that terms in statutes having familiar common-law meanings should be construed accordingly, unless Congress has provided a different definition.  The Act’s definition of an “employee” is essentially the common-law one. Summit argued that, since it did not control its subcontractors’ employees, the latter could not meet traditional agency law criteria for master-servant relationships, and hence there could be no OSH Act liability.

The majority in Summit IV all but breezed past Darden, relying chiefly on an argument that the focus of the OSH Act is on workplaces, and a 2007 Third Circuit case that pronounced Darden to have “no impact” on whether the Act covers workers other than common-law employees of the employer.
Commissioner Horace A. Thompson’s dissent in Summit IV argues persuasively that the MEP arose from former Commissioner Cleary’s 1970s dissents (which, by 1975, won Commission approval in theGrossman Steel case) and represented a choice, based expressly on policy considerations, to define “employer” and “employee” broadly, to accomplish the Act’s remedial purpose.  However, to be consistent with Darden, liability should have to require not just that the employer control the overall work ? it must control the workers.  That necessitates a traditional employer-employee relationship, which ought to nullify the MEP.

As for the majority’s treatment of ¬ß 1910.12(a), Commissioner Thompson’s dissent cites two D.C. Circuit cases that noted (although they did not expressly rule) that “the relevant regulation by its terms only applies to an employer’s own employees . . . leaving little room for invocation of the [MEP].”  The dissent also points out that the Secretary’s “controlling employer” theory imposes an obligation different from that imposed by the Act, or by ¬ß 1910.12(a).  “It is one thing to protect employees by complying with appropriate standards,” the dissent notes, but “it is quite another to protect employees by requiring others to comply.

The dissent also ably refutes the Eighth Circuit’s analysis that seized upon the term, “places of employment” (and the rule of statutory interpretation that disfavors interpreting any terms in a statute as meaningless or redundant) as necessarily implying a duty to all employees, not just one’s own, in the employer’s workplace.  The dissent likens the Eighth Circuit’s approach to “slicing a single word from a sentence, mounting it on a definitional slide, and putting it under a microscope in an attempt to discern the meaning of an entire statutory provision.”

In its context, the dissent concludes, the reference to “employment and places of employment” means that employers should protect their own employees from the full array of risks, by complying with the Part 1926 standards.  It is exorbitant to construe “places of employment” as extending the employer’s duty to include employees other than or in addition to its own.

While I read Commissioner Thompson’s dissent in Summit IV as discrediting the MEP as an impermissible expansion of OSHA’S powers, it also makes a strong practical argument for limiting liability to the affected workers’ own employer, who will more often be in a readier position to identify hazards (and have the technical know-how to correct them).

While I will not be surprised if Commissioner Thompson’s views gain acceptance in the Courts of Appeals leading, eventually, to the overthrow of the MEP, for the time being you must continue to presume that you may be cited for violations as a “creating” or “controlling” employer, even if none of your own employees are exposed.

1 Section 1910.12(a) states, in relevant part, that “Each employer shall protect the employment and places of employment of each of his employees engaged in construction work by complying with the appropriate standards prescribed in this paragraph.”

2 “Summit III” was the case of “Summit II” on remand to the Commission, which upheld the citation.