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Ability for Subcontractor to Recover Damages without having a Home Improvement License

Question. Can an unlicensed home improvement subcontractor that had been hired by a general contractor to construct various concrete walls on a house recover damages from a general contractor based on either breach of contract or for the reasonable value of the goods and services?

Answer. No. The contract was for the performance of home improvement services which required the subcontractor to obtain a home improvement contractor license and the subcontractor did not comply with that licensing requirement.

The general contractor, was a general contractor for improvements to be performed on certain real property owned by homeowners. The general contractor hired the subcontractor to perform a portion of the work by constructing various concrete walls as outlined in a subcontractor agreement.

The subcontractor alleges, that the general contractor breached the subcontractor agreement by failing to tender the full amount due. The general contractor responds that the subcontractor was not a licensed home improvement contractor and therefore cannot sue.

A home improvement contractor who is unlicensed at the time of the performance of the work for which he or she seeks compensation forfeits the right to recover damages based on either breach of contract or quantum meruit. Pursuant to CPLR 3015(e), a complaint that seeks to recover damages for breach of a home improvement contract or to recover in quantum meruit for home improvement services is subject to dismissal … if it does not allege compliance with the licensing requirement.

Here, the general contractor established, that the subcontractor sought to recover damages for breach of a contract to perform home improvement services which required it to obtain a home improvement contractor license and that the subcontractor did not comply with that licensing requirement.

Although the licensing statutes are generally consumer protection statutes designed to protect homeowners they can be enforced by general contractors as well.

Safety Policy: Most Construction Employers Should Have Written Heat Stress Management Programs

With warm weather returning, you should be thinking of your company’s responsibility to protect employees against the dangers of heat stress. As most construction trades involve outdoor work and/or exposure to high temperatures, if you don’t have a formal, written program, you need to develop one. And, if you do have a program, you should review it to ensure its adequacy, and consider extra training for your workforce.

While heat stroke is the most acute danger associated with exposure to high temperatures and humidity, heat stress poses many additional dangers. It lowers physical performance and mental alertness, and promotes irritability, anger, and inattention. It can also complicate many medical conditions. A particular danger of heat stress is that it can go unrecognized, and affected persons will often attempt to shrug it off, with dangerous or even fatal consequences.

In Secretary v. Post Buckley Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., the employer was a consultant in engineering and architectural design. The job at hand involved “archeological field work,” or surveying a site for artifacts. A team, consisting of archeologists or anthropologists, clears an area of brush, and uses hand shovels to dig 1-square-foot holes about 3 feet in depth. The extracted soil is then screened for artifacts, and the results recorded.

This work was in preparation for the installation of a 100-mile long pipeline in Texas, south of San Antonio. Employee “C.L.” had missed discussion of protection against the summer heat at an initial orientation. On his first day, his supervisor had returned to her hotel after being stung by a bee. C.L. and a second new hire were not, therefore, given any instructions regarding heat stress, other than an admonition to “take it pretty slow and easy” and to work “at any pace they could.”

As the temperature climbed from about 84¬∞ (with 63% humidity) toward an afternoon high of 97¬∞, the team members set about performing their “shovel tests.” Ms. Hopwood, the archeologist filling in for the absent team leader, checked on C.L. at roughly 10:30 A.M. C.L. stated he was “not feeling well,” and was instructed by Ms. Hopwood to sit down, rest, and drink some water. The only available shade in the immediate area was provided by small mesquite trees.

About 15 minutes later, Ms. Hopwood again checked with C.L. and, when he reported that he still wasn’t feeling well, she told him to go sit in the company truck (some 300 feet distant, on the main road) with the air conditioning on.

About an hour later, C.L. returned, said that he had drunk some water and eaten some almonds while sitting in the air-conditioned truck, and that he felt much better. Later, Ms. Hopwood would say that she found C.L.’s “exuberance” rather strange, but dismissed it as C.L. was viewed as rather odd, generally, wherefore his behavior was not seen as a sign of disorientation.

As lunchtime was approaching, Ms. Hopwood had C.L. finish a shovel test, and then asked him to return to the truck, and drive it near to where the team was working, so that the water cooler, which was in the truck, would be nearby. When C.L. did not return promptly, team members dispatched to look for him found him driving the truck, much too fast, up and down the dirt road. He had been unable to locate the team, even though he had gone to and from the truck scarcely an hour before.

C.L. spent much of the lunch hour in the air-conditioned truck, but between 15 and 30 minutes outside, exposed to the heat. About 20 minutes after work resumed, Ms. Hopwood checked on him and found that, although instructed to clear brush only in a 1′ x 1′ area, C.L. had cleared an area about 5′ x 9′. She found this to be very strange, but merely instructed him not to clear so large an area.

Again checking on C.L. at around 3:00 P.M., Ms. Hopwood founding him standing some 20 yards away from his test area, holding grass in his hand. He reported that he was “not lollygagging but feeling a bit disoriented.” She told him to go sit in the shade and drink some water; later, it was determined that he did not take any water.

About half an hour later, Ms. Hopwood again encountered C.L., who was unable to respond intelligibly to a question. She told C.L. to go sit in the air conditioned truck, and that the rest of the team would join him upon finishing work for the day, in about 20 minutes. C.L. said he thought that would be a good idea, and headed off in the direction of the truck, some 300 feet away.

When the crew headed back to the vehicles at about 4:00 P.M., C.L. was nowhere to be seen. Team members went looking for him, and found him, face down and curled up in a ditch, about 300 yards down the road from the truck. He was unconscious, breathing heavily, and hot to the touch. Team members poured water on him and applied wet handkerchiefs, while waiting for the ambulance.

C.L. was removed to the hospital, and died there a few days later. The autopsy found that his initial core temperature was 107.8° F.

Because there is not an OSHA standard directly on point, the employer was cited for a “Serious” violation under the General Duty Clause. The only doubtful element of a General Duty Clause violation was the existence of a feasible and acceptable method to abate a recognized hazard. The Secretary proposed that a “heat stress management program,” including “threshold limit values” and “biological exposure indices” published by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, and/or procedures set forth in a document entitled, “Working in Hot Environments,” by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health was such a method.

The ALJ found that the test as to both documents was whether their standards (1) had been adopted by the Secretary as a regulation or a consensus standard, or (2) recognized by the industry. With the help of expert witness testimony from both sides, the ALJ found that the NIOSH document (but not the ACGIH guidelines) had gained recognition in the industry, and should therefore be seen as establishing the existence of an acceptable means of abating heat stress.

Briefly, the six elements (the first five of which are contained in the NIOSH document, “Working in Hot Environments”) (available online) are these:

  1. Acclimatize employees beginning work in a hot environment, or returning from absences of 3 or more days. Increments are not provided, but adjusting to heat generally takes 5-7 days.
  2. Development a work/rest regimen. How much rest following how much work is not stated, but the concept is that there should be rest periods at regular intervals, in lieu of requiring workers to ask for permission to rest. Brief, but frequent, rest periods are best.
  3. Provide cool water and encourage employees to drink 5-7 oz. of water every 15-20 minutes. Do not rely on employees’ drinking water only when they are thirsty.
  4. Provide for a cool rest area. A maximum temperature of 76° F. is recommended. The ALJ was troubled that, in the case before him, the air-conditioned company truck could take up to 15 minutes to reach on foot.
  5. Train employees regarding health effects of heat stress, symptoms of heat-induced illnesses, and methods of preventing such illnesses. In addition to training employees, you should keep written records, with the names of employees trained, and dates.
  6. Establish a screening program to identify health conditions aggravated by exposure to heat stress.

While the ALJ did not accept item (6) as recognized by the industry and the respondent (as the same does not appear in the NIOSH Document) the employer’s heat stress management program was found deficient as to all of items 1-5, and so the citation and penalty were affirmed.

The ALJ rejected the employer’s view that all elements of its program need not be in writing. “Without written policies to facilitate training…or to provide employees with the [employer’s] expectations, respondent cannot have an effective heat safety program.” This statement probably doesn’t have the full force of law, but your program will be more effective, and you will be better able to demonstrate compliance with the OSH Act’s training requirements, if your program is in writing.

Contractor Liable for Willful Exaggeration of Lien

New York’s Lien Law allows an owner to sue the contractor or subcontractor for a “willful exaggeration” of the mechanic’s lien claim. A lien that is intentionally and deliberately exaggerated is void and the lienor is held liable for damages to the owner or contractor.

Damages that may be recovered are the amount of the lien found to be willfully exaggerated, premiums paid for a bond or interest on any money given to obtain the discharge of the lien, and the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in discharging the lien.

A lien is not void where it is simply inaccurate as the result of an honest mistake. In the recent case ofInter Metal Fabricators, Inc. v HRH Construction, LLC, a contractor was held liable for filing a willfully exaggerated mechanic’s lien.

Background

Inter Metal Fabricators, Inc. was the structural steel contractor to HRH Construction, LLC for the construction of a condominium building on Tenth Avenue in New York City. Inter Metal, in order to secure payment, filed two mechanic’s liens for work performed at the project, one for $808,787, and the other for $491,132, totaling $1,299,920. Inter Metal thereafter sued HRH for breach of contract and to foreclose its mechanic’s liens.

HRH filed various counterclaims against Inter Metal, including a counterclaim for willful exaggeration of its mechanic’s liens. HRH argued that Inter Metal’s own project documents submitted to its payment bond surety, showed that only $1,107,672 was claimed due to Inter Metal. This amount was $192,248 less than the total amount of its two liens. In addition, when confronted with what appeared to be an exaggerated markup of the crane charges, Inter Metal’s principal witness testified at his deposition that he was “entitled to mark it up to whatever number I want”, and “You know what? People do a lot of things”.

Decision

The trial court found that the discrepancies between the amounts set forth in Inter Metal’s liens and its actual charges were not honest mistakes but, rather, deliberate exaggerations. The trial court noted the overall difference between the amounts shown to its own surety and the amounts claimed in the liens. The court also pointed out that Inter Metal had offered no explanation why the numbers in its liens did not agree with its own documents. The court also relied on the deposition testimony of Inter Metal’s principal witness. When asked how to reconcile the numbers between the amount invoiced to Inter Metal by its steel material supplier and the amount billed to HRH, Inter Metal’s principal responded “Why should I give HRH the price I got from [its supplier]? Tell me why, give me a good reason why”.

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that Inter Metal willfully exaggerated the amount of its liens.

Comment

A lien is not willfully exaggerated where the lienor acted in a good faith belief, although mistaken, that the lien claim was legitimate. For instance, good faith disputes as to work performed or the amount owed does not constitute a willful exaggeration. The Inter Metal case, however, presents that rare case of self-incrimination where the court relied upon the contractor’s own internal documents and testimony to hold that it intentionally inflated the amount of its lien claims. A contractor or subcontractor is well advised to consult with its attorney and thoroughly review exactly how its claim was compiled, rather than risk the consequences of a willfully exaggerated lien.

Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law License Entitlement

Question. Is a Project Owner, under Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ¬ß881, entitled to a license requiring Adjacent Owner to remove a five-foot section of a sidewalk construction bridge to permit Project Owner to erect a construction crane needed for its own project? Adjacent Owner refused Project Owner permission to take down the bridge, claiming it was doing “statutorily required” facade maintenance work. Adjacent Owner argued it might not be able to get New York City’s permission to remove, then replace, the bridge. Project Owner contended the city already approved the removal of the bridge, producing proof of same.

Answer. Yes. The Project Owner is entitled to a license under ¬ß881 to remove Adjacent Owner’s bridge.The Project Owner is however, liable for all damages suffered by Adjacent Owner’s property in carrying out the license under ¬ß881.

Project Owner pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) ¬ß881, seeks a license requiring Adjacent Owner to remove a five-foot section of a sidewalk construction bridge erected in front of the Project Owner’s property, to allow the Project Owner to erect a construction crane (crane) in furtherance of a construction project (Project) taking place on the Project Owner’s property (Project Premises).

The Project Owner is the net lessee of the Project Property. The Project Owner is building a 29-story building on the Project Property to house a hotel (Project).

The Adjacent Owner owns the next door premises which houses a hotel (Adjacent Property), and which has, apparently, been undergoing facade restoration for some time, requiring the construction of a construction bridge (Bridge). The Bridge covers the front of the Adjacent Property, abuts the Project Premises, and extends five feet in front of the Project Premises. No part of the Bridge actually rests on the Project Premises.

The Project Owner has reached the point in its construction activities that it wishes to erect a crane. A pad for the crane has been built abutting the Adjacent Property. The Project Owner claims that it cannot erect the crane on the pad without removing the encroaching five-foot section of the Bridge. It claims that removing the Bridge’s five-foot extension, erecting the crane, and putting up a new bridge would only inconvenience the Adjacent Owner’s work by three days, noting that the Adjacent Owner’s work has been proceeding only intermittently.

Although the parties have had some negotiations on the subject, the Adjacent Owner refuses to give the Project Owner permission to take the five-foot section of the Bridge down. The matter is time-sensitive, as the Project Owner’s construction schedule depends on getting the crane installed expeditiously.

The Adjacent Owner claims that it is doing statutorily-required facade maintenance work. It claims that it cannot ignore its legal obligations to the Department of Buildings (DOB) by removing the safety features required for its own work. The Adjacent Owner insists that it must, by law, continue and complete its facade work, which will only be done when the DOB approves removal of the Bridge.

The Adjacent Owner also claims that the scaffolding rests on the Bridge, and that it would be required to remove all of the scaffolding on the side of its building which abuts the Project Premises if it removed the five-foot section. It argues that this would be an unreasonable and impracticable burden, calling for, essentially, the secession of its entire facade project until the Project next door was completed. The Adjacent Owner claims that it would have to recommence the permit process before it could return to its facade work, another intolerable burden. The Adjacent Owner claims that the Project Owner could easily relocate the position of its crane to the other side of the Project.

Pursuant to RPAPL 881:

[w]hen an owner or lessee seeks to make improvements or repairs to real property so situated that such improvements or repairs cannot be made by the owner or lessee without entering the premises of an adjoining owner or his lessee, and permission so to enter has been refused, the owner or lessee seeking to make such improvements or repairs may commence a special proceeding for a license so to enter pursuant to article four of the civil practice law and rules… Such license shall be granted by the court in an appropriate case upon such terms as justice requires. The licensee shall be liable to the adjoining owner or his lessee for actual damages occurring as a result of the entry.

The court adopts a standard of reasonableness in judging whether the licensee can do all that is feasible to avoid injuries resulting from its entry on the adjoining owner’s property.

While the Adjoining Owner claims that it will not be able to get DOB permission to remove, and then replace, the overhanging Bridge, the Project Owner, produces an amended “Site Safety and Logistics Plan” (SSP) presented to the DOB, which shows that the DOB has approved the removal of the overhang, the positioning of the crane, and the replacement of abutting bridges on the sites.

The Adjoining Owner’s claim that the Bridge and scaffolding are intertwined, so one cannot be removed without the other, is at odds with the DOB’s approval of the removal of the five-foot extension of the Bridge, and the erection of the crane. In any event, under RPAPL 881, the project Owner is liable for all damages suffered by the Adjoining Owner’s property in carrying out the license, and the Project Owner has stated that it will pay for the removal of the overhang, and any complications which may arise therefrom. The Adjoining Owner’s fears that it will get on the wrong side of the DOB by being asked to delay legally required facade repairs is belied by the DOB approval of the Project Owner’s SSP, and its finding that the Adjacent Owner need not even supply a new SSP.

City Charter Bars Contractor’s Claim – Harsh Reminder of what to Know when Contracting with Municipalities

Statutes of limitations set time periods by which a lawsuit must be commenced. Under New York’s statute of limitations, a breach of contract claim must be brought within six years from the date upon which the cause of action accrued. Contractors should be aware that their contract may substantially reduce the statutory period to bring an action. Likewise, local and state laws may reduce the period to bring an action in a contract dispute against municipal corporations and public benefit corporations.

In Frank Tricarico Contractors, Inc. v. City of New Rochelle (2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 02450 [2012]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed, a dismissal of a breach of contract claim, by a contractor that performed work for the City of New Rochelle, as time-barred. In Contractors, the City of New Rochelle entered into contract whereby contractor was to provide trenching for underground services to install conduit at an agreed upon price. After partial completion of the job, the contractor submitted a requisition to the City of New Rochelle, and shortly thereafter filed a Notice of Claim with the City dated July 5, 2006, setting forth a claim for “a sum in excess of $500,000.” By letter dated July 19, 2006, the City rejected Plaintiff’s claim. Although, the Notice of Claim was rejected contractor continued work on the project until about May 2008, and during this time took no further steps to commence legal action. On August, 30 2008, contractor filed a Summons and Complaint seeking an unpaid contract balance of $200,688.03.

The City quickly moved to dismiss the claim based on the one year statute of limitations. The City of New Rochelle Charter Section 127, perhaps unbeknownst to contractor, states “all actions brought against the city upon a contractual liability, expressed or implied, must begin within one year from the time when the cause of action accrued.” The Trial Court dismissed the action rejecting contractor’s contention that his claim did not accrue, i.e., the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until completion of work on the project. The Appellate Division agreed stating that “the period of limitations began to run when its damages became ascertainable, which occurred in this case on or before the date on which plaintiff filed its initial notice of claim.” Thus, contractor’s breach of contract claim was barred.

Courts do not have discretion to extend the statute of limitations periods. Contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and materialmen far too often lose out on their right to bring a lawsuit. Acting quickly when disputes arise can make the difference between full recovery and a complete loss not to mention avoiding responsibility for attorney’s fees and litigation costs.

Please be advised you should contact an attorney to ensure proper commencement of an action due to the highly technical and rigidly enforced accrual dates (when the time to bring an action starts) and notice of claim requirements (how to notify a municipality). As of April 23, 2012, the table below provides a summary of the current notice of claim deadlines and the statutes of limitations for contract disputes with some local municipalities and authorities. Contractors have to be mindful of two periods of limitations: the Notice of Claim deadlines and the Statutes of Limitations. It is necessary to comply with both otherwise your claim will be lost.

MUNICIPALITY*NOTICE OF CLAIM DEADLINESSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONSSTATUTE / RULE
New York StateWithin 6 months of accrual6 yearsCourt of Claims Act § 10 CPLR § 213
TownsWithin 6 months of accrual & 40 days prior to commencing action18 monthsTown Law § 65
VillagesWithin 1 year of accrual & 40 days prior to commencing action18 monthsCPLR § 9802
School DistrictsWithin 3 months of accrual & 30 days prior to commencing action1 yearEducation Law § 3813
Fire DistrictsWithin 6 months of accrual & 40 days prior to commencing action18 monthsTown Law § 180
New York City1 month prior to commencing action6 yearsNYC ADC § 7-201 /CPLR § 213
City of New Rochelle30 days prior to commencing action1 yearCity Charter § 127
City of NewburgWithin 3 months of accrual6 yearsCity Charter § C6.47
City of Beacon30 days prior to commencing action1 yearCity Charter § 9.10
City of Port Jervis90 days prior to commencing action1 yearCity Charter § C11-1
NYCSCAWithin 3 months of accrual & 30 days prior to commencing action1 yearPublic Authorities Law §1744
MTA6 yearsCPLR § 213
NYCHA30 days prior to commencing action6 yearsPublic Housing Law §157
DASNY6 yearsCPLR § 213
PORT AUTHORITY60 days prior to commencing action1 yearUnconsol. Laws § 7107

* Accrual dates and notice of claim requirements not identified.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP at (914) 428-2100.

Safety Policy: Getting the Most from Toolbox Meetings

The OSH Act imposes on employers a duty to train employees to recognize and avoid recognized safety and health hazards in the workplace.

Full-bore formal training for the rank-and-file in the dizzying array of OSHA construction standards is problematic. Studies have shown that even the OSHA 10-hour and 30-hour courses have limited effectiveness, among other things because these (as well as many programs designed by safety consultants) assume a higher level of sophistication than the attendees possess, and befuddle many of them with an excess of jargon, acronyms, and “buzzwords.” A further problem is that many construction workers, in the New York metro region as in many other parts of the country, have limited proficiency in English.

OSHA compliance is important, but the paramount goal of your company’s safety program is not to avoid OSHA citations, but to minimize injuries and job-related illness among your workforce. While there is no comprehensive “one size fits all” strategy, elements I recommend for consideration include the following.

First, without suggesting that you forego efforts to train all your workers, I believe it gets you more “bang for the buck” to hire, strive to retain, and train thoroughly field supervisors in OSHA compliance and construction safety.

Second, while you can be cited for any of scores of distinct construction hazards, a relative handful of dangers account for most deaths and serious injuries (and most OSHA citations, as well). Fall protection, scaffolding, excavations, “caught-between” and “struck-by” hazards, unsafe ladders and usage of ladders, and electrocutions are the primary construction safety issues. Nearly every construction employer will be cited by OSHA from time to time, but your employees’ onsite conduct, in recognizing and avoiding the hazards mentioned, is probably the best indicator of whether your company is a safe place to work.

Conversely, you can spend on glossy manuals and consultants, but if your employees work on elevated surfaces without tying off, or go down into unshored trenches, you’re not getting the job done.

An indispensable element to safety success is leadership. Everybody in your employ should be absolutely convinced that his or her safety is a major concern of ownership and management. This implies that supervisors will be knowledgeable concerning OSHA requirements, but also that they be encouraged to call out, and to discipline, workers who disregard safety rules.

A fundamental part of every company’s safety program is so-called “toolbox” (or “tailgate”) meetings, at which safety issues are discussed. Such meetings should not only not be neglected, but they can be done in a way that imparts important information, while stressing a genuine concern for worker safety, or in a way that suggests that you are just going through the motions.

Toolbox meetings should be kept short (5 to 15 minutes) but they should not be done perfunctorily. The beginning or end of the work day is generally the best time to have them. After everyone has clocked in on the morning of the first workday of the week is probably ideal. The meeting should be held in a comfortable area where the presenter can be heard, and extraneous noise and distractions are at a minimum. Whether to have such meetings with your entire workforce, or in small groups of workers who work together, or perform similar tasks, is a judgment call that should take into account many factors, to include logistics, scheduling conflicts, potential language issues, and the desirability of getting employees actively involved in the discussion.

Every toolbox meeting should be memorialized in writing, attendees’ names should be legibly recorded on a sign-in sheet, and the name of the presenter, and the subject(s) discussed, should be recorded (and don’t forget to write down the date!) These records should be preserved. One reason for them is to document training for purposes of OSHA compliance, but another is that critical topics – such as fall protection and the others mentioned above – need to be repeated, necessitating a record as to when each such subject was last discussed. Additionally, the regular presenter may be unavailable on a given day, or need to be replaced more permanently. His or her replacement should know which topics have been covered.

The best topics are, obviously, ones that are relevant to current working conditions. While hand-outs are a good idea, reading in a flat tone of voice from a manual is not. The presenter should review in advance, and understand, the topic to be discussed. Employees should be encouraged to ask questions, and to recount experiences or observations related to the topic. Questions to which the presenter does not know the answer should be checked into, and reported on at the next meeting. Each meeting should begin with a brief review of what was discussed at the preceding meeting, for the benefit of employees who may have been absent.

Certain topics (medical emergencies in particular) should be gone over briefly, not less than once a month. This will often include reminding employees as to the location of first-aid equipment, how to summon first responders, how to respond to electrical shocks, and the location of fire extinguishers.

In addition to the topics mentioned above, additional topics can be adapted from the OSHA 10-hour materials, or from a wide variety of commercial and online safety resources.

One resource I came across that looks highly useful is the website safetyawakenings.com. That site offers free access to a menu of about 300 safety topics, with short outlines in both English and Spanish. The topics include both general industry and construction topics (wherefore, not all 300 will be useful) and was compiled especially for use in California. Nevertheless, it’s a terrific source of ideas for meetings and hand-outs (and bilingual as well).

Brief toolbox meetings should complement, not substitute for, more in-depth safety training. They’re important, however, both for the information they impart, as well as being a frequent reminder that safety should be kept in mind at all times.

Court Allows Subcontractor’s Unjust Enrichment Claim

Unjust enrichment is a legal theory of recovery holding that no person should be allowed to unfairly profit at another’s expense without making restitution or compensation to the other person. The concept of unjust enrichment is often used in construction litigation as an alternative to breach of contract or when there is no adequate remedy at law.

Recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment typically occurs when there was no contract between the parties or a contract turns out to be invalid.

In the case of Power v Darren Henault Interiors, Inc., the court ruled on whether a subcontractor stated a claim for unjust enrichment against a contractor.

Background

N. Power Painting, Inc. performed painting services at the 2010 Kips Bay Decorating Showhouse. The Showhouse is a charitable event which benefits the Boys and Girls Clubs. Darren Henault Interiors, Inc., was one of the designers who designed rooms at the Showhouse without compensation. Duce Construction Corp. was employed as a contractor on that jobsite. Duce approached Power to provide painting services at the Showhouse.

Duce informed the painting subcontractor that the painting job would not be compensated, but Power was assured that it would be worth it to work for free on the charity project since Darren, the designer, would then engage Duce on a future project on West 70th Street and Duce would, in turn, then engage Power as the painting subcontractor on the project.

No contract was entered into by the painting subcontractor with either Darren or Duce. Although Duce informed Power that the Showhouse project “was not a paying job”, he assured Power that it would be “worth it for [Power] in the long run to eat this one, because if we do , Darren will give us the job he has coming up on West 70th Street”.

Duce was given the West 70th Street project, but did not hire Power for the project. Power sued Duce and Darren on the basis of unjust enrichment to recover the cost of performing the painting work at the Showhouse. Duce and Darren moved to dismiss the claims of the painting subcontractor.

Decision

The Court ruled that the painting subcontractor’s claim against both Duce and Darren sufficiently established a cause of action for unjust enrichment. In doing so, the Court held that unjust enrichment is an obligation imposed by equity to prevent injustice, in the absence of an actual agreement between the parties concerned. According to the Court, “the essential inquiry…is whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered…A plaintiff must show that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit [the defendant] to retain what is sought to be recovered”.

The Court pointed out that that: (1) Darren was enriched by having received a finished showroom at the Showhouse project for which he received positive publicity; (2) Power contributed its time and effort before, during and after the project and expended $13,500 in performing their services at the Showhouse; (3) because of Power’s efforts, Duce did not have to send one of its own men to paint the showroom or hire another sub-contractor to do the work plaintiffs performed; and (4) because Power would be working with Duce and Darren on the more lucrative project at West 70th Street, it withdrew its demand for compensation on the Showhouse project and chose to forego other possible paying work to complete the work at the Showhouse. However, because Duce was given the project at West 70th Street by Darren and failed to hire Power as the subcontractor on the project as promised, the Court found that a claim for unjust enrichment had been established against Darren and Duce.

Comment

Here, the Court found that the elements of an unjust enrichment claim were sufficiently alleged to withstand a motion to dismiss the claim. If proven at a trial, Duce and Darren unjustly retained a benefit to the detriment of the painting subcontractor, and the retention of those benefits violated the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

Does a contractual forum selection clause trump statute?

Question. In an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, defendant (property owner) asserts that the action must be transferred to the county contractually designated by the parties for the commencement of all litigation arising under their construction contract. Lienor claims that CPLR 507 precludes such a transfer and that venue must remain in the county where the subject property is situated. Notwithstanding the seemingly mandatory nature of CPLR 507, which requires that a foreclosure action be brought in the county where the property is situated does a contractual forum selection clause, such as the one at issue here, trump the statute?

Answer. Yes. The contractual forum selection clause is controlling.

This action has its genesis in a construction contract between the property owner and Lienor-a contract that required Lienor to furnish labor, equipment, and materials for the installation of elevators at a property located in Brooklyn, New York. Lienor timely filed a mechanic’s lien with the Kings County Clerk. Subsequently, Lienor also filed a notice of pendency with the Kings County Clerk and commenced an action in Kings County seeking a judgment foreclosing its lien, as well as related relief. Owner responded with a demand to change venue to New York County, and, upon Lienor’s failure to acquiesce in that demand, moved for a change of venue.

In seeking a change of venue, owner points to the parties’ construction contract, which provides that: “Any and all action [sic], proceedings and lawsuits must be brought in the Supreme Court of the State of New York and County of New York unless such action or suit is founded upon a dollar amount that is less than the jurisdictional threshold of the Supreme Court.” Thus, owner argues that this broad forum selection clause is controlling and requires this action to be transferred from Kings County to New York County.

Lienor alleges that CPLR 507 mandates that an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien be brought in the county where the property is situated (here Kings County), and that a forum selection clause may not subvert the statutory mandate. Additionally, Lienor argues that a change of venue would be contrary to public policy because placing venue in another county would deprive it of its security interest and remedies under the Lien Law. Analysis of the issues presented must begin with an examination of the relevant statutory framework.

Pursuant to CPLR 507,

The place of trial of an action in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property shall be in the county in which any part of the subject of the action is situated [emphasis added].

CPLR 501, in turn, provides that:

Subject to the provisions of subdivision two of section 510, written agreement fixing place of trial, made before an action is commenced, shall be enforced upon a motion for change of place of trial.

Notwithstanding that CPLR 501 authorizes the enforcement of forum selection clauses generally, Lienor initially argues that this statute is inoperative when the cause of action, such as here, is governed by CPLR 507. This, it is urged, flows from the mandatory language of CPLR 507, which allegedly creates an inviolable rule requiring an action affecting real property to be commenced only in the county where the property is situated. I agree but there is case law supporting the property owner’s position.

CPLR 501 provides that the parties may contractually fix the venue of an action, which, of course, is the location where the trial will take place. The statute, however, does not dictate where the notice of mechanic’s lien and notice of pendency must be filed, which is governed by Lien Law ¬ß 10 and CPLR 6511. Nor does it dictate where the property must be sold, which is controlled by CPLR 5103. Thus, while CPLR 501 permits parties to select the venue of an action, it may harmoniously co-exist with these other statutory provisions. Viewed otherwise, a foreclosing lienor may comply with the forum selection clause of its contract while simultaneously complying with the procedural prerequisites to enforcement of its lien.

This creates some difficulties to a foreclosing lien holder who will be forced to proceed through various procedural hoops and submit filings in two counties. For example, if a trial in New York County results in a judgment of foreclosure, Lienor will have to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and file it in Kings County in order to enforce the judgment (see, CPLR 5103[a] ). However, whatever burden is imposed by these additional procedural hoops is a burden of Lienor’s own creation and one arising out of its decision to enter into the subject construction contract. I also note that, to the extent that Lienor will be compelled to perform additional procedural steps to enforce its lien, this is hardly tantamount to losing its rights under the Lien Law, as it has claimed.

In sum, Lienor, a sophisticated commercial enterprise, contractually agreed that the venue of any action arising out of this construction contract would be in New York County. Since enforcement of this contractual provision will not affect its rights as a lienor, the forum selection clause should be enforced as written and as authorized by CPLR 501.

Recent Cases Breaching the Rule that “Willful Exaggeration” of a Mechanic’s Lien Can Be Determined Only at the Trial of the Action to Foreclose the Lien.

Articles 1 through 3-A of New York’s Lien Law have, as their bedrock purpose, the protection of those who perform labor, or furnish materials, for the improvement of real property in the State. Few things are simpler than to follow the checklist in Lien Law ¬ß 9 to complete a notice of lien (for a lien on a private improvement; the requirements for the contents of a notice of lien are found in Lien Law ¬ß 12) and to serve and file the lien notice.

While the lien notice must be prepared with some care, and the procedures for service and filing followed precisely within deadlines set forth in the statute, a facially valid, timely, and properly served notice is a powerful, and inexpensive, weapon for the unpaid contractor or supplier.

Moreover, once the notice of lien is on file, although to be sure it can be “bonded off” (or paid!) generally the party against whom the lien is filed will not readily be able to get rid of it. For the private owner, of course, a mechanic’s lien is a cloud on title, and may be an event of default under a mortgage. While publicly-owned real property cannot, of course, be foreclosed upon (public liens run only against unpaid contract balances) a general contractor, against whom a public or private lien is filed, may have funds withheld, which can cause problems in paying other “downstream” parties. Plus, the general contractor against whom a lien is filed may go into default under his contract by reason of the lien, incur difficulties with sureties, lenders, etc.

Because the notice of lien is so easily filed, and there is no judicial or other oversight (apart from a clerk who will verify only that the notice looks proper as to form) the device is sometimes abused. While the lienor is at liberty to insert any figure he wishes as the dollar amount for which the lien is filed, to deter undue exuberance in this regard, the Legislature has provided Lien Law ¬ß¬ß 39 and 39-a. Section 39 makes a “willfully exaggerated” lien void, forbids the lienor to file another or further lien for the same claim as one judicially determined to be void, and provides a summary procedure for the speedy vacatur of second or subsequent liens filed in violation of the prohibition.

Lien Law ¬ß 39-a goes further, and provides that, in an action in which the court shall have declared a lien to be void by reason of willful exaggeration, the lienor may be required to pay costs incurred to bond off the invalid lien (or interest on funds deposited to discharge the lien), reasonable attorneys’ fees, and an amount stated in the statute as being equal to “the difference by which the amount claimed . . . in the notice of lien exceeded the amount actually due or to become due thereon.” Notwithstanding the language just quoted, as it is willfulness, rather than error, which the statute is intended to deter, recent case law states that the damages recoverable will only correspond to the extent by which the lien was willfully exaggerated, not any greater amount by which the lien, although incorrect, was not willfully over-stated.

A problem with Lien Law ¬ß¬ß 39 and 39-a is that each section contains language that the finding of willful exaggeration must be “in an action or proceeding to enforce a mechanic’s lien.” Long ago, courts inferred from such language that a determination of willful exaggeration could only be made upon the trial of the action to enforce (foreclose upon) the lien. Since that the wheels of litigation grind slowly, not to mention that the statute allows a generous amount of time between the filing of the lien and commencement of the foreclosure action (which time may be extended, variously by court order or in some cases by a simple filing) often an unhappy result will be that the trial of a willful exaggeration claim may arrive only years after the lien notice was first filed.

At stages of the litigation prior to trial, generally liens will not be vacated on motion, other than for defects mentioned in Lien Law ¬ß 19(6) (private liens) or ¬ß 21(7) (public improvement liens). Essentially, these provisions allow the lien to be vacated only where “it appears from the face of the notice of lien that the claimant has no valid lien by reason of the character of the labor or materials . . . for which a lien is claimed,” or there is a clear formal defect in the lien notice, or the same was not duly and timely filed.

Based on the foregoing, courts have held – and some continue to hold – that absent one of the grounds stated in Lien ¬ß 19(6) or ¬ß 21(7), a court lacks “inherent power” to summarily discharge, on motion, a lien claimed to be willfully exaggerated, and that the requisite proof that the lienor “deliberately and intentionally exaggerated the lien amount,” which proof can be made only at trial.

Notwithstanding the numerous cases so holding, however, now and then there have been cases in which summary judgment finding willful lien exaggeration has been granted or, more significantly, upheld on appeal (as appellate decisions are more influential than trial-level decisions). If you have a strong case that a lien against you has been willfully exaggerated, and you would like to dispose of the lien without waiting months or years for the case to come to trial you should immediately contact your construction attorney.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Safety Policy: Commercial Diving Employer Held Responsible to Assess Danger From Construction Operations

OSHA compliance can be doubly thorny whenever your company is working in collaboration with, or in proximity to, operations of another employer of the same “tier.” This is especially so, if the other company’s trade is one you don’t often work with. While you probably know that OSHA imposes a duty to protect your employees against hazards created by others, you may lack sufficient familiarity with the other trade to feel qualified to question the other employer’s procedures. Plus, obviously, you lack authority to direct the other employer’s activities, and may feel the need to defer in the interests of advancing the project.

The better practice in such situations, however, is to err on the side of safety, and to make all inquiries necessary to detect potential hazards to your employees from hazards created by others.

In Secretary of Labor v. Associated Underwater Services, the respondent (“AUS”) was a commercial diving company, and a subcontractor to British Petroleum in the construction of an oil containment boom off the coast of Washington.

Another sub, General Construction (“GC”) was installing metal pilings in the ocean floor, at a depth of 140 feet, as structural support for the containment boom.

Because the piles had to be installed at “slack tide,” and AUS’s hourly costs were higher than those of the GC crew, AUS arrived onsite only when GC employees had completed the work of taking each pile, by barge, to the place where it was to be installed, and lowering it into the water. Each pile was 22 feet long, and weighed about 8,600 lbs.

The piles were driven into the sea floor by one of two methods: an “impact hammer” and a “vibratory hammer.” On the day of the occurrence, it was the vibratory hammer that was in use. This device is secured to a crane on the barge, controlled by a network of hoses, and fastened by a hydraulic jaw to a “pad eye,” or steel plate welded to the top of the pile. The hammer, when activated, causes the piling to vibrate at 25 vibrations per second, while downward pressure from the weight of the hammer causes it to work itself into the sea floor.

Once the piling had been lowered in place, GC raised it by 1-2′, and an AUS diver, Chris Primeau, entered the water, and followed hydraulic control lines down to the location of the piling. His first task was to ensure that the area beneath the piling was free from obstructions.

The procedure was that, once the diver had determined that the place where the pile was to be driven was unobstructed, he would radio instructions to GC to lower the piling, until it reached its “point of refusal” in the ocean floor. This was the depth in the ocean floor that the piling would reach, through the force of its own weight, and the weight of the hammer.

Then, the diver would instruct GC to activate the hammer. During the approximately six minutes necessary to drive the pile to the required depth, the diver either had to remain in place near the base of the piling, or ascend a few feet to a position above the piling ? in which case, he periodically had to ask GC to stop the vibration of the hammer, to permit him to return to the base of the piling, to verify that it was being driven plumb. (Visibility at that depth is only about 3-4′).

If, at any time, the AUS diver observed any problem with the piling, he could transmit an “all stop” to the Dive Supervisor on the barge.

The vibratory hammer GC was using had jaws that opened to a maximum of 1.17″, but the thickness of the pad-eye, to which it was clamped, was 1.25″. OSHA later determined that GC employees had to “beat on it every time,” indicating that something was obviously wrong with the connection between the hammer and the 8,600 lb. piling. However, no evidence was presented that AUS was aware of any such “beating” of the hammer onto the piling, or should have suspected that GC would use a hammer .08″ too small to properly connect to the piling.

On the day in question, Primeau’s dive was preceded by the customary pre-dive “toolbox” meeting, which did not address any hazards associated with suspended loads, or diving near crane and pile-driving operations. A falling piling, both sides’ experts later agreed, is not a “general type of diving issue common to all diving.”

Once in the water and at the base of the pile, Primeau reported that too much of the cluster of hoses that control the hammer’s functions had accumulated in the water. While GC adjusted the hoses, Primeau, with the approval of his Dive Supervisor, disconnected a wire cable that GC had, for the first time on the project in question, affixed to the piling before lowering it into the water.

That accomplished, Primeau returned to the base of the piling, and gave the go-ahead to activate the hammer. Within seconds, Primeau radioed an “all stop,” and his video feed was lost. The pile had come loose from the hammer’s damaged jaws and had fallen on him, killing him.

Of three citation items that OSHA issued following this accident, the only one that came to trial requires a pre-dive assessment of the safety and health aspects of surface and underwater conditions and hazards.

The Secretary asserted that a reasonably prudent employer would have assessed hazards arising from GC’s pile-driving operation ? notably, the recognized hazard of a falling piling. GC’s written safety program called for employees to be kept clear of the fall radius, and the vibratory hammer’s operating manual cautioned that a safety line should always be attached to the pile, when extracting or hoisting it into position.

Indeed, a warning sign on the hammer itself, which AUS’s dive supervisor admitted he saw at the worksite, forbade the use of the hammer as a pile-lifting device, and cautioned that falling piles could result in serious injury or death.

At the trial level, the ALJ vacated the citation, agreeing with AUS that it was responsible only for assessing hazards from its own diving activities, and that it could not foresee that GC would use a hammer with damaged jaws, or jaws too small to securely grip the pad-eye.

On appeal, however, the Commission reversed and upheld the citation, finding that it was legally irrelevant whether the accident, or its precise cause, was foreseeable. The hazard was that the piling could fall, not that the jaws of the hammer were too small.

The Commission ruled that AUS had been assisting GC with work plainly within the definition of construction, and was therefore required to assess not only potential hazards unique to the commercial diving industry, but also construction hazards created by its fellow employers.

Had AUS inquired into procedures for installing underwater piles, it would likely have found that construction industry practice requires the use of safety lines between the piling and the crane. Especially where low-visibility conditions require the diver to carry out much of his work in close proximity to the pile, safety lines securing the pilings, until they were driven deep enough to stand on their own, are indicated (although, startlingly, they are not a consensus standard of the Association of Diving Contractors International).

The lesson here, of course, is that OSHA compliance, and protecting your employees from injury or death, requires that you make all necessary inquiries to detect and assess hazards to which your employees may be exposed, even if they are not peculiar to your trade, and are created by others.