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Contractors Omnibus General Liability Insurance Policy

Question. Did an insurer waive its right under New York law to rescind a contractors omnibus general liability insurance policy when it chose to cancel the policy with full knowledge of an alleged material misrepresentation that would have allowed it to rescind the policy as void from the beginning?

Answer. YES. Insurance Company issued a Contractors Omnibus General Liability Policy (the “2005 Policy”) to Contractor. The 2005 Policy had liability limits of $1,000,000 for each occurrence and a policy term of one year, from April, 2005 to April, 2006.

For purposes of the policy, Contractor was classified as Carpentry NOC, which stands for “Carpentry not otherwise classified .” The classification “Carpentry NOC” includes carpentry of a commercial or industrial nature as well as carpentry on structures greater than three stories in height and incidental roofing work. Insurance Company’s underwriting guidelines provide illustrations of what might be considered “incidental” roofing work. In a section entitled “Roofing Exposure,” the guidelines state:

It is not unusual for our typical carpentry contractor to be involved with incidental roofing work over a period of time. This is most likely to occur as part of a remodeling or small addition job but may be a re-roofing job not associated with other work for that customer … We do not want to write insureds that do roofing as described above if it is more than incidental to their operation. Incidental is defined as 1-2 roofs per year for a one or two-man operation and 3-5 roofs per year for a three to five-man operation. It is referred to in number of roofs per year since that is the easiest way to quantify the amount of work, but [this] could also equate to approximately 5-10% of annual receipts…. Risks that do more roofing than this must be classed and rated as roofers.

In 2006, the policy was renewed (the “2006 Policy”) with a policy term of April, 2006 to April, 2007. The policy was renewed again (the “2007 Policy”), with a policy term extending from April, 2007 to April, 2008.The 2007 Policy contained the following provision in the section, “Business owners Common Policy Conditions”:

C. Concealment, Misrepresentation or Fraud This policy is void in any case of fraud by you as it relates to this policy at any time. It is also void if you or any other insured, at any time, intentionally conceal or misrepresent a material fact concerning:
  1. This policy;
  2. The Covered Property;
  3. Your interest in the Covered Property; or
  4. A claim under this policy.

The above provision of the 2007 Policy was amended by the following endorsement, entitled “New York Changes-Fraud”:

The CONCEALMENT, MISREPRESENTATION OR FRAUD Condition is replaced by the following: FRAUD
We do not provide coverage for any insured (“insured”) who has made fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with any loss (“loss”) or damage for which coverage is sought under this policy.

Part of the Commercial Insurance Application Contractor submitted in April 2005 included a form called a Contractor Supplement. The Contractor Supplement contained various questions related to, among other things, Contractor’s general exposure to liability. Contractor was asked, “Does the applicant do any roofing or re-roofing? If yes, how many in the past year?” Contractor answered the first question, “no” and thus did not provide a number of roofing jobs Contractor had performed in the prior year.

In July, 2007, Worker suffered a fatal injury while working for Contractor at a job site. In August, 2007, an employee in Insurance Company’s Claim Department prepared a Report on Risk Characteristics regarding the incident, which recited that Worker was a 17 year-old female summer employee who fell off a three-story roof and died nine days later. It also stated that the insured was doing roofing work at the time. The report concluded that the incident entailed a risk by the insured that appeared to be misclassified, that the insured engaged in unsafe practices and that the insured employed minors.

In late August, 2007, Insurance Company mailed a written notice of policy cancellation, effective September, 2007. This cancellation notice stated that the policy was being cancelled because: “Type of operations unacceptable to company. A material change in the nature or extent of the risk which causes the risk of loss to be substantially and materially increased beyond that contemplated at the time the policy was last renewed.” This letter reflects that in August 2007, Insurance Company elected to cancel rather than rescind the 2007 Policy.

Insurance Company asserts that it is not obligated to perform under the subject insurance contract as it was rendered void ab initio [meaning from the beginning] as a result of the defendants’ material misrepresentation(s) in obtaining the original policy and subsequent renewals.

Insurance Company waived its right to rescind the 2007 Policy as void ab initio because it elected to cancel rather than rescind the policy in September 2007. The cancellation of an insurance policy should be distinguished from the concept of rescission by the insurer. A rescission avoids the contract ab initio, while cancellation merely terminates the policy prospectively, as of the time the cancellation became effective.

Under New York law, where an insurer has knowledge of a misrepresentation that constitutes a basis for rescission of the policy but elects instead to cancel that policy, the insurer has waived its right to thereafter rescind the policy, at least to the extent rescission would be based on the same misrepresentation. Conversely, where an insurer cancels a policy and has not learned of facts that give it the right to rescind the policy, the insurer has not waived its right to rescind the policy. There are situations that these two principles do not address, but these principles are sufficient to address the circumstances presented in the instant case.

Here, Contractor submitted a Contractor Supplement form with the Commercial Insurance Application in April 2005. This form indicated that Contractor did not do roofing jobs. Worker’s accident in July 2007 involved her falling off the roof of a home on which Contractor was performing a roofing job. Insurance Company was in possession of evidence reflecting the alleged material misrepresentation and was at least part of the basis for the decision to cancel the policy. There is no genuine issue as to the fact that Insurance Company was aware of the alleged material misrepresentation at the time it made the decision to cancel the policy.

Insurance Company waived its right to rescind because it chose to cancel the policy with full knowledge of the alleged material misrepresentation that would have allowed it to rescind the policy as void ab initio.

The Uniform Notice of Claim Act Applies Solely to Notice of Claim Requirements for Tort Claims

On December 17, 2012, the New York Legislature passed bill S. 7641-B, also known as the “Uniform Notice of Claim Act” to become effective June 15, 2013. The Legislature stated that the purpose of the Act is to establish a uniform process for filing a Notice of Claim against any state or municipal entity, public authority, or public benefit corporation. However, the title and purpose of the Act is, in fact, misleading, as it applies solely to tort claims and does NOT apply to contract claims.

The act seeks to accomplish its purported goal by incorporating the Notice of Claim requirements set forth in General Municipal Law ¬ß 50-e to every action for damages or injuries to real or personal property, or for the destruction thereof, or for personal injuries or wrongful death against a public entity entitled to a notice of claim as a condition precedent of any such action and allowing service of such Notice of Claim on the Secretary of State as the agent of each such public entity. This change purportedly removes any confusion created by differing Notice of Claim requirements in the different statutes concerning public entities such as the Education Law, Town Law, Environmental Conservation Law and Public Authorities Law. However, because the requirements of General Municipal Law ¬ß 50-e relate solely to tort actions, the statute’s requirements do not apply to contract claims against public entities.

Thus, contrary to what may be the common belief, the Notice of Claim labyrinth remains intact when it comes to contract actions against a public entity. For example, the Town Law creates Notice of Claim requirements for contract claims against a Town which differ from those contained in the Education Law for contract claims against a governing body of a school district or certain state supported schools. In addition to statutory Notice of Claim requirements for contract claims against public entities, the specific terms of the contract likely include additional claim requirements, adding layers of complication and confusion to the Notice of Claim process for contract claims.

In the end, a company contracting with a public entity will be well served by contacting its construction attorney to discuss the applicable contractual and statutory Notice of Claim provisions to avoid forfeiting claims.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Contractor’s Final Waiver and Affidavit Does Not Bar Unpaid Work Claim

Construction contracts often require as a condition to final payment that the contractor sign a waiver of lien and affidavit that the work has been completed and that it has been fully paid for the work performed at the project. Questions frequently arise as to the validity and effectiveness of such a waiver and release where, at the time the waiver was signed, the work was not completed and the contractor thereafter completed the additional work.

In the recent case of Leonard E. Riedl Construction, Inc. v Homeyer, the court addressed the enforceability of a lien waiver and affidavit.

Background 

Riedl Construction performed a construction project for the Homeyers. Towards the end of the project, Riedl’s representative signed a document entitled “Contractor’s Final Waiver and Affidavit,” which provided that the construction project was “fully completed”; “all bills for labor and/or materials furnished in connection with the construction of said buildings and work of improvement have been fully paid”; and Riedl “waives any and all lien rights which he may have or may have had on account of or arising out of the construction of said buildings and work of improvement.”

Despite Riedl’s signing of that document, there was evidence which established that at the time that document was signed, the work had not been completed, and that the Homeyers had verbally agreed to make further payments for the completion of additional work. There was also evidence that the Homeyers complied with that verbal agreement by making additional payments to Riedl after Riedl’s representative had signed the Final Waiver and Affidavit. Ultimately, the Homeyers did not pay Riedl for the completed work.

Riedl Construction commenced this action to recover for the unpaid balance owing to it for the additional work. At trial, the Homeyers argued that the “Contractor’s Final Waiver and Affidavit” form signed by Riedl constituted a release of its claim for the additional work.

Decision

The court found that although a release document will be interpreted according to its terms, where the circumstances surrounding the release and the parties’ course of action demonstrate that the parties’ intentions were not reflected in the terms of the release, the release will not bar the claim. Here, the course of conduct between the parties established that the work had not been completed, that the Homeyers had verbally agreed to make further payments for the completion of additional work, and that the Homeyers made these additional payments. This course of dealing was sufficient for the court to conclude that the parties did not treat the document signed by the contractor as a final and complete waiver of any further claims by Riedl Construction.

Comment

Courts will generally enforce release documents to the extent that it is a true reflection of the intent of the parties. Where there is evidence that the course of conduct between the parties is completely inconsistent with the terms of the release documents, the courts will not enforce the release against the contractor.

Contractors would be well advised to carve out an exception to release documents where it is contemplated that additional work is to be performed at the time that the final lien waiver and affidavit are signed.

Safety Policy: Limiting Employee Exposure to Diesel Particulate Matter

OSHA (the federal agency within the U.S. Department of Labor) is the largest, but by no means the only, government agency dedicated to occupational safety and health. Under the federal OSH Act, individual states are permitted to “opt out” of federal OSHA. New York, New Jersey and Connecticut have chosen not to opt out, and so are governed by federal OSHA as to those private-sector employees that fall within the statute. Each of these three states, however, has its own agency, within its (state) Department of Labor that covers public-sector employees. Approximately half the states do have their own “little OSHAs,” as authorized by the federal statute. The standards promulgated and enforced by “little OHSAs” generally differ but slightly from the federal standards, as the nationwide statute requires states’ “little OSHAs” to afford no less protection to employees.

Excluded from OSHA coverage are mining operations, for which there is a separate Mine Safety & Health Administration (MSHA). From 1891 until 1977, mine safety was under the U.S. Department of the Interior. Under the current statute, which moved enforcement from Interior to Labor, enforcement is under the MSHA, and adjudication under a separate MSH Review Commission. This organizational setup is borrowed from the OSH Act.

Recently, OSHA and MSHA issued a joint “Hazard Alert” concerning Diesel Exhaust and Diesel Particulate Matter. This is a major hazard in underground mines, in which diesel-powered equipment is ubiquitous, and ventilation must be mechanically supplied. However, most heavy equipment, medium and heavy-duty trucks, bucket lifts and generators found on construction sites have diesel engines, and so construction workers are at considerable risk from this hazard, too.

Diesel exhaust (DE) is a complex and unwholesome mixture of chemicals and particulates. It includes both a gas/vapor phase and a particulate phase, each of which includes both organic and inorganic components.

The major constituents of the gas/vapor phase of DE include carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, sulfur dioxide, formaldehyde and other aldehydes, benzene, 1,3-butadiene, and a number of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons.

The particulate phase includes clusters of respirable particles, composed mainly of carbon. A variety of chemicals are contained within, or adsorbed onto, the DPM, affecting the toxicity of the particulate. The particles are classified according to size as well as composition.

Of particular health concern are fine or ultrafine particles, as these can get inhaled deep into the lungs. The composition of these particles is, typically, elemental carbon, with adsorbed compounds such as various organic compounds, sulfates, nitrate, metals (including metallic abrasion particles) silicates, ash, and a variety of trace elements.

Short-term exposure to high concentrations of diesel exhaust can cause irritation to the eyes, nose, throat and lungs, as well as lightheadedness, coughing and nausea. DE can exacerbate asthma and cause allergies. Long-term exposure has shown in laboratory studies a range of dose-dependent inflammation and cell changes in lung tissue. In June 2012, the International Agency for Cancer Research classified diesel exhaust as a Group 1 human carcinogen.

Miners in underground metal/nonmetal mines have, under the MSH Act, a permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 160 µg/m3 when measured as an 8-hour time-weighted average. If engineering and administrative controls do not reduce exposures below the PEL, respiratory protection, a high-efficiency air-purifying respirator must be worn.

OSHA does not presently have a PEL for DPM. However, there do exist PELs for other components of diesel exhaust (e.g., carbon monoxide, nitric oxide, and nitrogen dioxide) and monitoring for these can give some indication of the presence of diesel exhaust, as well as the effectiveness of engineering and administrative controls aimed at minimizing employee exposure to such exhaust, when working with or around diesel-powered equipment.

Because, usually, the health impacts of exposure to toxins such as DPM and other toxins are not so sudden or dramatic as when a trench caves in, or a worker falls to his death from an elevated surface, there is some danger of these hazards being overlooked in developing and implementing a health and safety program.

Don’t think that, because OSHA’s standards don’t have a prescribed PEL for diesel exhaust that you can’t be cited for employee exposure. Since it’s a recognized hazard, it likely falls under the General Duty Clause. Another consideration to keep in mind is that, under OSHA’s “multi-employer policy,” you can be cited if your employees are exposed to unhealthful levels of DE, even if the source is diesel equipment operated by another employer or employers.

While monitoring for air quality and employing an industrial hygienist are seldom if ever bad ideas, these are definitely steps you should take, if you utilize diesel-powered equipment indoors, or in semi-enclosed spaces (such as parking garages). Likewise, if your employees must work where other employers’ activities are creating a potential DE hazard, having an industrial hygienist monitor the air provides you with a stronger basis to negotiate abatement, if needed, with the trade creating the hazard, the GC, and/or the owner.

Assuming only open-air use of diesel-powered equipment, except in unusual circumstances the primary strategy in keeping employee exposure to DE at tolerable levels will be a combination of engineering controls. Examples of these include:

  • Routine preventive maintenance of diesel engines to minimize emissions;
  • Installing cleaner-burning engines;
  • Installing diesel oxidation catalysts;
  • Using engine exhaust filters;
  • Using special fuels or additives;
  • Installing or upgrading main or auxiliary ventilation systems, e.g., tailpipe or stack exhaust vents to capture and remove emissions in maintenance shops or other indoor locations; and
  • Providing equipment cabs with filtered air.

Administrative controls (changing procedures to reduce or eliminate the hazard) should also be employed. A few you should consider are these:

  • Limiting speeds and using one-way travel routes to reduce traffic congestion;
  • Limiting or prohibiting unnecessary idling or lugging of engines;
  • Limiting the total amount of diesel-powered equipment or total engine horsepower operating in a given area;
  • Employing an industrial hygienist to confirm that DE output does not exceed the capacity of the ventilation system; and
  • Restricting unnecessary employee access to areas in which diesel equipment is being used, and keeping diesel equipment, insofar as it is practicable to do so, away from employees not involved in its use.

Sign Alleging Drainage Problem

Question. Can purchaser erect a sign on his property inviting prospective home buyers of adjacent property to examine drainage problem allegedly caused by builder at his house?

Answer. NO. The sign is an instrument and incident to primary motive of Purchaser to interfere with Builder’s business and coerce settlement.

Purchaser has brought a claim against the Builder, a residential home builder, for damages resulting from improper grading of the Purchaser’s lot and the lot to his rear.

After the commencement of the lawsuit, Purchaser erected on his lot a sign 30 inches wide and 4 feet high, saying: ‘PROSPECTIVE HOME BUYERS! YOU ARE INVITED TO EXAMINE THE DRAINAGE PROBLEM ON THIS LOT, CAUSED BY [XYZ] HOMES, INC.’

Builder owns other building lots in the same subdivision where the Purchaser’s home is located and wants to prevent the Purchaser from the display of signs referring to the Builder and from any other acts which would harm the business reputation of the Builder.

The Builder argues that allowing the Purchaser to continue to display of the sign during the pendency of the action will produce irreparable injury to the Builder.

When the courts will and will not grant a temporary restraining order in these situations appears to be based upon certain criteria, as follows:

1. Are the signs being displayed at or near the property of the Builder and are they away from the property of the Purchaser?

2. Is the publication of the words merely an instrument and incident to wrongful acts intended to damage the business of the Builder?

In this case the sign in question is located upon the Purchaser’s own property. It is also adjacent to the Builder’s subdivision.

The Purchaser has done more than simply commence a lawsuit. He has erected a sign bearing a message which involves the very issue raised in his suit. This contemporaneous act would seem to indicate that the publication of the words is intended as an ‘instrument and incident’ to the apparent primary motive of the Purchaser to interfere with the Builder’s business and thereby coerce a settlement of the pending action. Were there not a lawsuit pending, the conclusion might well be different, but under the existing circumstances the Purchaser should be compelled to take down the sign.

In addition, the posting of the sign by the Purchaser may also violate deed restrictions and zoning ordinances.

Owner Precluded From Recovering Consequential Damages

In the construction industry, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers are naturally concerned with their liability for consequential damages arising from their breach of contract. Consequential damages must be foreseeable and directly traceable to the breach of contract. If the losses were reasonably foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was signed, consequential damages may be recovered. Typical examples of consequential damages include business interruptions, loss of anticipated profits, and loss of rents suffered by the owner from tenants who would have occupied the building but were unable to do so because the contractor walked off the job.

Contractors may shield themselves from liability for consequential damages in the event of a breach by including a clearly worded limitation of liability in the construction contract.

In the recent case of Slade Elevator Industries, Inc. v Eretz Group, Inc., the court ruled on the validity of a contractual clause that excluded liability for consequential damages.

Background 

In September of 2009, Eretz Group hired Slade Elevator to maintain the elevators at Eretz’s various commercial properties. Eretz stopped making payments to Slade, at which point Slade ceased maintaining Eretz’s elevators. Slade also sued Eretz to recover approximately $55,000 in unpaid bills. In response, Eretz filed a counterclaim seeking $500,000 in lost rental income suffered when Eretz’s commercial tenants either moved out or were given rental credits because of their dissatisfaction with the operation of the elevators.

Slade moved to dismiss Eretz’s counterclaim, arguing that the claim for consequential damages was barred by the contract. The contract provided that Slade would not be held “responsible or liable for any loss, damage, detention or delay caused by nonoperation of said equipment or authorities, or by insurrection or riot, or by any other cause which is unavoidable or beyond its control, or in any event for consequential damage”. Eretz made various arguments in opposition, including claiming that this clause only applied to events beyond Slade’s control and its ceasing of elevator maintenance work was fully within its control.

Decision

The court, relying upon the clear language of the contract, dismissed Eretz’s counterclaim. The court held that the clause to exclude liability for consequential damages covers damages for loss of rents sought by the owner in its counterclaim.

Comment

Contractors, subcontractors and suppliers can exclude liability for consequential damages in the event of their breach of contract by negotiating an exclusion clause in the contract. This case illustrates that when a contract contains a properly drafted limitation of liability provision, a court will not permit recovery for consequential damages. 

Safety Policy: OSH Review Commission Clarifies Meaning of “Immediately Available” with Reference to Lifesaving Skiff Requirement

The OSH Act requires that “at least one lifesaving skiff shall be immediately available at locations where employees are working over or adjacent to water.” In a case of interest, also, because it disapproved the so-called “pick and carry” operation of mobile hydraulic cranes, the OSH Review Commission, affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s findings, clarified what “immediately available” means.

The employer in Secretary v. Boh Brothers Construction Company was building two bridges over Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana for the “Interstate 10 Twin Span Project.” These bridges, both more than five miles long, extend between Slidell, La. and New Orleans. Boh had numerous crews at work, in multiple areas on and around the bridges. It also had more than a dozen boats in the vicinity, which it used for transporting workers and materials, as well as to respond to water emergencies.

On the day in question, two boats were continuously manned by Boh employees. Additional boats available for water rescue were docked in a boat pen at the north shore. The pen was located 150 to 200 yards away from an office trailer, staffed with at least one employee qualified to operate a boat, and provide first aid.

On the bridge deck near the north shore, Boh was building curbs along the edges of the deck using curb forms. Once a curb was finished in one location, laborers disengaged the forms, and a mobile hydraulic crane lifted them and traveled up to 150 feet, to deposit them at the next location. This procedure is known as “pick and carry.” Each load, with rigging and attachments, weighed just under 3,000 lbs. At the location, the deck had a slope of 1.43 degrees (2.5%) and a downward gradient, toward the north shore, of 0.9 degrees (1.6%).

The crane operator was working only his second day on the job. Like his predecessor, he was operating the crane on an uneven surface, with the crane’s outriggers retracted. The prior operator kept the curb forms in front of the crane, both when lifting the load, and while traveling with it. The new operator swung the load from the front of the crane to the back before traveling, which meant that the load was to the side of the crane as he rotated the boom.

A supervisor, concerned that the new operator’s technique might not be safe, exhorted him to “at least keep the boom scoped in” (to its shortest length) to reduce the radius of the swing. On the day in question, the operator followed these instructions, and carried out two “pick and carry” procedures without incident. The third time, the operator did not follow his instructions. As he hoisted a form, and began to swing it to the side, the crane tipped over, and fell onto the guardrail.

The operator lost consciousness and remained in the cab, dangling over the water, for between 2 and 7 minutes, while other employees held onto the crane, attempting to keep if from falling into the lake. Tompkins, the foreman supervising the crane’s operations, immediately made a cell phone call to Moulton, the senior project superintendent, to report the accident. Moulton used his cell phone to place multiple calls, including one to Solis, the field project manager, who was in the officer trailer at the north end of the bridge; and one to foreman Bailey, who was also at work on the bridge’s north side.

Bailey used his cell phone to call Jones, the lead boatman. Jones then called Byrd on his marine radio. At that time, Jones and Byrd were both in their boats on the water near the south shore. Bailey drove to the accident scene on the bridge, and was on the phone with Moulton, when the crane operator fell from the crane into the water.

Byrd was between 3 and 4 miles from the accident scene when he received the call from Jones. It took him between 6 and 10 minutes to reach the crane operator in the water. Project manager Solis, in the meantime, ran 150-200 yards from his office in the trailer to the boat pen. He traveled 250 to 300 feet, reaching the rescue location shortly after Byrd did. Byrd and Solis were not able to pull the unconscious operator out of the water and into the boat, but held his head above water, while steering the boat to the shore, where emergency personnel were waiting. Unfortunately, the operator died a week later from his injuries. OSHA cited Boh for failure to have a lifesaving skiff “immediately available,” and for the operator’s improper use of the mobile crane.

While the standard does not define “immediately available,” an OSHA interpretation letter identified factors relevant to that determination. While an interpretation letter is not binding precedent, the Administrative Law Judge ruled that whether Boh had made a lifesaving skiff “immediately available” turned on whether it had a water rescue system in place that could be expected to rescue a worker from the water within the three-to-four minute period before permanent brain damage could occur.

The ALJ determined that Boh’s response was prolonged by its failure to equip crew boats with radios capable of receiving an emergency broadcast channel. He also discounted the availability of boats and operators on the north shore, in part because Solis was not assigned lifesaving duties on that day, and the only active crew boat operators were miles away from the accident. The office trailer on the north shore, the Secretary argued, was too far away from the boat pen, for an operator stationed there to be considered in the “immediate area.” Accordingly, and based on the operator having been in the water for between 8 and 12 minutes, the ALJ found that the requirement of a lifesaving skiff “immediately available” had not been complied with. The citation and the associated penalty were therefore affirmed, and that outcome was upheld on appeal.

The Commission also agreed with the ALJ that Boh had violated the standard requiring that a crane be operated only within the manufacturer’s specifications and limitations. In defense of the “pick and carry” operations on the bridge deck, Boh attempted to show at trial by expert witness testimony that “pick and carry” is an accepted practice in the bridge construction industry – even when performed on a sloped surface, and without outriggers.

The ALJ stressed that the manual for the crane used (a Link-Belt RTC 8030 Series II) states that:

  • The crane must be level, on firm ground, with the outriggers fully extended and the tires clear of the ground before beginning any operation.
  • The crane must be level before making a lift: a 3-degree side tilt can reduce capacities by 50% or more.
  • “If a smooth level route is not available, don’t travel with a suspended load.”

The prior crane operator testified that he had done “pick and carry” operations even though the deck was not level, and he was generally aware that a gradient affects load capacity. The employer’s expert testified that the key to safe operation (and accepted industry practice) when operating a mobile crane “on rubber” on a sloped surface, is to “derate” the crane. This means adjusting the load charts to compensate for the slope, and staying within the crane’s reduced capacity.

The crane was equipped with a computerized “Capacity Limiter,” which monitored crane functions, and continuously compared the load with a copy of the crane capacity chart in the computer’s memory. However, the viewing screen was faded, such that, in daylight, the operator would have to shade the screen to read it.

Rejecting the expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that “derating” is irreconcilable with the manufacturer’s instructions, and that traveling with a load on a sloped surface during “pick and carry,” without outrigger beams extended and jacks partially deployed, is impermissible.

When a Lien is Deemed “Willfully Exaggerated”

Question. Can a lienor recover for work performed outside the contract even if the lien is deemed to be willfully exaggerated

Answer. YES. This case gives us the opportunity to examine how and when a lien is deemed “willfully exaggerated” under the Mechanics Lien Law.

Architect seeks foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien and money damages based upon breach of contract, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Owner counterclaims for damages based upon willful exaggeration of a mechanic’s lien and breach of contract.

Architect entered into a written contract with Owner whereby Architect agreed to provide architectural services to Owner in connection with the construction of a multi-use building for the sum of $50,000. Pursuant to the contract, which was drafted by Architect, additional fees were permitted, for preparation of amendments to conform to as-built conditions if required. Additionally, Owner was responsible for all fees including filing fees, microfilming, and permit fees. Pursuant to the agreement, Owner paid $74,555.50 to Architect for services rendered and costs incurred. Architect’s invoices, which do not seem to have been prepared or sent to Owner on a regular basis, indicate that Owner still owed Architect an additional $68,664.21.

Several months later Architect added $46,200 to Owner’s invoice for “coordination of plans and applications due to excessive construction delays.” Then ten days later, Architect added an additional $12,357.75, which represented 18 percent interest, to Owner’s bill, even though the contract entered into between the parties made no provision for interest. This increased the amount allegedly owed to Architect to $127,938.96.

Eventually, an agreement was reached between the parties whereby Owner would pay Architect an additional $20,000 in settlement of all claims for services performed and fees incurred. As part of this agreement, Architect agreed to remove the mechanic’s lien, replace some documents in the file of the Department of Buildings and obtain a final certificate of occupancy.

Owner paid Architect $15,000 and Architect filed a satisfaction of mechanic’s lien. The final payment of $5,000 pursuant to the agreement was to be made upon the issuance of a final certificate of occupancy. During this time, however, Architect was being investigated and was stripped of his ability to make any filings with the Department of Buildings. Owner went to the Department of Buildings and obtained a final certificate of occupancy and refused to pay the final $5,000 to Architect.

Architect then added 18 percent interest ($8,470.42) to the invoice of Owner, and $5,000 for the filing of the final certificate of occupancy. Shortly thereafter, Architect filed mechanic’s liens in the amount of $126,409.38.

While the mechanic’s liens filed herein included amounts which were not authorized by the contract between the parties, the issue is whether any of the amounts charged were “wilfully exaggerated” pursuant to Lien Law ¬ß39.

The burden of proving “wilful exaggeration,” namely that the amounts set forth were “intentionally and deliberately exaggerated,” is on the owner of the property. To be “wilful,” the exaggeration cannot be based upon an honest mistake, inaccuracies or a difference in opinion.

In this case, the parties did not memorialize most of their conversations and any agreements subsequent to the written contract. Although Owner paid Architect $39,555.50 more than the contracted amount, except for the $15,000 toward the settlement, there is no documentary evidence corresponding to or explaining any of these additional payments. Although much of the work appears to have been performed and necessary, some of the charges were clearly unilaterally concocted by Architect without any reasonable explanation. These charges include the $46,200 which was added right before the filing of the first mechanic’s lien, and the seemingly random $12,357.75 and $8,470.42 of 18 percent interest charges. The interest charges were neither authorized nor mentioned in the written contract which was drafted by Architect. These interest charges cannot be claimed to be an honest mistake since a similar interest charge was made and reversed seemingly after Owner complained. Additionally, the timing of these charges support the finding of willfulness since they were made either immediately prior to the filing of a mechanic’s lien and/or so far removed in time from when the charges accrued indicating that they were retaliatory and/or merely to inflate the bill. Regardless of the motive, the foregoing charges were added to Owner’s invoice without any reasonable justification. Accordingly, Architect, prior to filing the mechanic’s liens sought to be foreclosed knowingly, purposefully and intentionally added unauthorized charges to Owner’s account in the amount of $67,028.07.

Since Owner sustained it’s burden of proving willful exaggeration of the mechanic’s lien, pursuant to ¬ß39 of the Lien Law, Architect’s mechanic’s liens should be declared to be void and Architect’s cause of action to foreclose is dismissed. Additionally, Owner is entitled to damages in the amount of $67,028.17, the exaggerated amount of the liens.

Even though Architect’s foreclosure action is dismissed based upon its willful exaggeration of its mechanic’s lien, it’s claims seeking to recover damages for unpaid work performed can still be maintained.

Court Rejects Contractor’s Delay Claim

New York courts continue to rigidly enforce the “no-damages-for-delay” contract clause against contractors, which bars contractor delay claims. This clause is found mostly in public works contracts. The courts, however, have recognized certain exceptions to enforceability of a no-damages-for-delay provision.

The clause may not be invoked to bar damages for (1) delays caused by bad faith or willful, malicious or grossly negligent conduct; (2) delays not contemplated by the parties when they entered into the contract; (3) delays resulting from the breach of a fundamental obligations of the contract; and (4) delays so unreasonably that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract.

In the recent case of LoDuca Associates, Inc. v PMS Construction Management Corp., the appellate court demonstrates the difficulty faced by a contractor in seeking to persuade the court that the delay falls within one of the four recognized exceptions to the enforceability of a no-damage-for-delay clause.

Background

LoDuca entered into a $3.8 million contract with the New York City Department of Design and Construction for the construction of the New Aquatic Animal Medical Facility at the New York Aquarium. As the project progressed, major design revisions were undertaken (which LoDuca blamed on an improper initial design), and 111 change orders were issued. These change orders resulted in a $1.2 million increase in the contract price, as well as a delay of 27 months.

After the completion of the project, LoDuca commenced suit seeking to recover damages arising out of the 27 month delay. The defendant, who was the City’s construction manager, moved to dismiss the claim based upon the presence of a no-damages-for-delay clause in the contract.

Decision

The trial court dismissed the contractor’s delay claim, finding that the contract contemplated that delays resulting from “any act, neglect or default of the Construction Manager, the Owner, the Architect, another contractor or subcontractor or by any cause acknowledged by the Contractor to be beyond the control of the Subcontractor”, and that “since a defective design arises from an act of the owner and architect, this provision must be read to prohibit claims for damages on that basis”.

The appellate court agreed, finding that the design defects “constitute merely inept administration or poor planning which does not negate the application of the no damages for delay provisions”. The court also rejected the argument that the 27 month delay was so unreasonable that it went beyond the contemplation of the parties when they signed the contract. According to the court, the length of the delay is relevant to whether an exception to the no damage for delay clause may apply, but held that “the length of the delay does not transform a delay caused by an event specifically contemplated by the no damages for delay clause into something uncontemplated”. In doing so, the appellate court cited one of its prior decisions where it held that a 32 month delay was contemplated.

Comment

The court here reaffirms its rigor in upholding no damages for delay clauses by claiming that delays of 27 months and 32 months – nearly three years – are specifically contemplated by the contract. Clearly, contractors do not enter into construction contracts contemplating that the job will be delayed by years. However, under these latest court decisions, one is left to wonder whether under similar factual circumstances, a delay of any length can be found to be an uncontemplated delay.

Safety Policy: Preparation and Attentiveness as Keys to Safe Demolition Operations

Performing demolition safely is a tough challenge. Two key elements in meeting it successfully are conscientious preparation, and – as with most OSHA matters – paying attention.

OSHA’s demolition standards are largely (but not entirely) within 29 C.F.R. 1926, subpart T, “Demolition.” Of particular importance is ¬ß 1926.850, “Preparatory Operations.”

Neglecting prescribed pre-demolition measures often results in OSHA citations. Before employees are permitted to start demolition operations:

…an engineering survey shall be made, by a competent person, of the structure to determine the condition of the framing, floors, and walls, and possibility of unplanned collapse of any portion of the structure. Any adjacent structure where employees may be exposed shall also be similarly checked. The employer shall have in writing evidence that such a survey has been performed.

Identifying the presence and location of lead, asbestos, and other hazardous substances is an important part of the pre-demolition survey. If “any type of hazardous chemicals, gases, explosives, flammable materials, or similarly dangerous substances” has been used in “any pipes, tanks, or other equipment on the property,” or is even suspected of being present, testing and purging must precede actual demolition. The failure to comply with this requirement is another frequently-cited OSHA violation. All utility service lines must be shut off, capped, or otherwise controlled, and the service providers notified. If any power, water, or other utilities are to be maintained during demolition, the lines must be temporarily relocated and protected.

Another key component of the survey is identifying the structure’s weak points. OSHA frequently cites employers for failing to provide shoring or bracing for walls, to prevent premature collapse. Where the structure to be demolished has been damaged by fire, flood, explosion or other cause, the walls and/or floor must be shored or braced, as appropriate.

Another often-neglected precaution is the erection of an overhead shed and/or canopy to provide safe entrance into the structure to be demolished, and protection from falling objects. Any multistory building must be protected for a minimum of 8 feet from the perimeter of the building. All canopies shall be at least two feet wider than the building entrances or openings (1 foot wider on each side) and capable of sustaining a load of 150 pounds per square foot

The #1 cause of construction injuries – fall hazards – is very much present on demolition projects. Wherever a hazard exists to employees falling through wall openings, each opening must be protected to a height of approximately 42″.

Since demolition operations are subject to the fall protection standards of Subpart M, note that employees on walking/working surfaces must be protected from falling through holes (a “hole” being defined as “a gap or void 2″ or more in its least dimension”) more than 6′ above lower levels, by covers, guardrail systems, or personal fall arrest systems. Covers are required, also, to protect against objects falling through holes. Floor openings not used as material drops “shall be covered over with material substantial enough to support the weight of any load which may be imposed,” the covering to be “properly secured to prevent its accidental movement.”

As guardrails are a preferred means of fall protection in building interiors, you should become intimately familiar with the provisions of 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.502. In addition to other, technical requirements, guardrails must be capable of withstanding, without failure, a force of at least 200 lbs., applied within 2″ of the top edge in any outward of downward direction.

Access ways to the structure of the building are to be entirely closed at all times, excepting designated stairways, passageways and ladders. These must be periodically inspected, and maintained in a clean safe condition. Where a stairwell is being used in a multistory building, it must be properly illuminated, and completely and substantially covered over at a point not less than two floors below the floor on which work is being performed. Access to the floor where demolition is in progress shall be through a properly-lighted, protected, and separate passageway.

Where debris is to be dropped through holes in the floor, without the use of chutes, the area onto which the material will be dropped must be completely enclosed, with barricades not less than 42″ high, and not less than 6′ back from the projected edge in the opening above. Signs warning of the hazard of falling materials must be posted at each level. The removal of debris from the lower area shall not be permitted, until debris handling above has stopped.

Where chutes are employed, the chute openings must be protected by a guardrail about 42″ above the floor, and any gap between the chute and the edge of openings in the floors through which it passes must be solidly covered over. Except at ground level, chute openings must be kept closed when not in use. No material may be dropped to any point lying outside the structure’s exterior walls, unless the area is effectively protected. Where material is deposited into chutes by wheelbarrows or mechanical equipment, a securely-attached toeboard or bumper, at least 4″ thick and 6″ high, must be provided at each chute opening.

At the top of this article, I mentioned that in addition to careful preparation, “paying attention” is a major component of demolition safety. The regulations codify a number of requirements where watchfulness is needed. To cite just a few examples: “a substantial gate shall be installed in each chute at or near the discharge end. A competent employee shall be assigned to control the operation of the gate, and the backing and loading of trucks.”/p>

Where floor arches are being removed, “employees shall not be allowed in the area directly underneath, and such an area shall be barricaded to prevent access to it.” Notwithstanding that the lower level has been closed off, it’s necessary to confirm that no one is present there, before the arch removal proceeds.

Where balling or clamming is being performed, “no workers shall be permitted in any area, which can be adversely affected.” Only workers necessary for the performance of the operations may be permitted in the affected area at any other time.

As demolition proceeds, “continuing inspections by a competent person shall be made . . . to detect hazards resulting from weakened or deteriorated floors, or walls, or loosened material. No employee shall be permitted to work where such hazards exist until they are corrected by shoring, bracing, or other effective means.”

Since demolition (not involving explosives) consists essentially of workers tearing down a structure from the inside, and entails many potentially hidden hazards and tons of debris being dropped through floors or chutes, it’s a hazardous undertaking indeed.

In addition to observing specific regulations like the few just mentioned, you need leadership from your supervisory personnel, and trained workers who will communicate with one another, and with supervisors, regarding dangers observed.

The cost of lapses can be great. In one recent case, a bobcat collecting debris on the 19th floor of a building being demolished struck a steel beam concealed under concrete rubble. The beam was propelled through the parapet wall, causing a twenty-foor-long section of the wall to collapse into a pit outside the structure. Ordinarily, radio communications were used to ensure that no one was in the pit when work was in progress above. Unfortunately, that precaution was not carried out, and a flagger who was chatting with a driver who had backed his truck into the area to remove debris were killed when the parapet wall collapsed onto them.