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Court Rules On Owner’s Termination of Contract for Convenience

Construction contracts in public works and some private works contain a termination for convenience clause allowing the owner to terminate a contract for its own convenience, with or without cause, and without constituting a breach of contract. The contractor is entitled to costs reasonably incurred prior to the termination, including its potential liability to subcontractors

In the recent case of Matter of Strong Steel Door Corp. v City of New York, a contractor challenged the termination of its contract with the City of New York.

Background

In 2009, Strong Steel Door Corp. submitted a bid to the New York City Department of Environmental Protection on a Job Order Contract and was approved as a contractor. Subsequent to the award, Strong Steel was awarded three projects under the Job Order Contract. During the performance of these projects, several disputes arose relating to work where Strong Steel claimed that the City was requiring that it take safety shortcuts. Shortly after these disputes arose, the City cancelled the projects on which Strong Steel was working, did not proceed with other projects it had previously informed Strong Steel that it would be performing, and did not award Strong Steel any additional projects under the Job Order Contract. The City claimed the parties met to discuss what the City described as Strong Steel’s lack of adequate progress and agreed to cancel two of the projects, and that with regard to the other projects, Strong Steel never submitted acceptable proposals.

Strong Steel sued the City to have its project cancellations annulled and for an award of money damages for lost profits, lost business opportunities and injury to reputation. The City opposed, arguing that its actions were permissible under the contract’s termination for convenience clause.

Decision

The court dismissed Strong Steel’s lawsuit, relying on the presence of the termination for convenience clause. The court noted that where a party has an unconditional, absolute right to terminate a contract on notice pursuant to such a clause, the termination is an exercise of a contractual right that is not subject to any judicial review.

Comment

Where a contract contains a termination for convenience clause, the owner may terminate it for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever, provided that the termination is in good faith and does not involve fraud or an improper motive. The only requirement imposed on the owner is that it comply with the notice provisions and compensate the terminated contractor for the costs incurred to the date of the termination.

About the author: Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc. Gregory J. Spaun, an associate with the firm, assisted with the preparation of this article.

Safety Policy:Scaffold Safety: Don’t Let Familiarity Breed Danger

Few things are more common on construction sites than scaffolds made of steel tubing and lumber planking. However familiar, by definition scaffolds are temporary structures, used to put men and materials on elevated platforms to perform work. If not properly designed, erected, inspected and maintained — or if used by workers insufficiently trained or not employing fall protection — scaffolds are accidents getting ready to happen.

While most larger projects use modular “tube and coupler” scaffolding, supplied and erected by specialized subcontractors, small projects, especially residential repairs done by non-union contractors, are notorious for accidents due to poor scaffolding practices. Scaffold safety isn’t “rocket science,” but many details require careful attention. And, while proper design and erection are obviously critical, frequent inspections, maintenance, employee training, and work rule enforcement are also essential.

There are many kinds of scaffolds. In addition to tubular-frame scaffolds, the varieties mentioned in OSHA ¬ß 1910.28 include (among others) mason’s and stone setters’ adjustable multiple-point suspension scaffolds, “boatswains’ chairs,” bricklayers’ square scaffolds, carpenters’ bracket scaffolds, needle-beam scaffolds, plasterers’, decorators, and large-area scaffolds, roofing brackets, and window-jack scaffolds. Many of these have specialized applications, or are restricted to light-duty or limited height applications.

Once a mainstay but now outmoded and rare, are wood-pole scaffolds. General-purpose scaffolds of this type, once common, are now seldom seen, as they must be built “from scratch,” and cannot readily be moved.

Design and erection fundamentals for scaffolds begin with the necessity to have a safety rating of at least four, and placement on a firm, level surface. Scaffold legs must be set on plain or adjustable bases, placed on mud sills or other foundations adequate to support the maximum intended load. If you can’t avoid placing the base plates on soft ground, use plywood pads (minimum 24″ square) beneath them. Any scaffold must be designed by a competent person. A tube scaffold, more than 125 feet in height above the base plates, must have written drawings and specs, designed by a professional engineer.

Frames must be placed one on top of the other with coupling or stacking pins, to provide proper vertical alignment of the legs. Scaffolds must be braced by cross-bracing or diagonal braces, or both, of such length as will automatically square and align vertical members, so that the erected scaffold remains plumb, square, and rigid. Planks and walk boards must be a minimum of 36″ below the stop of the scaffolding. All planking must be of “Scaffold Grade;” the maximum permissible span for 1-1/4″ x 9″ or wider plank of full thickness is 4′, with medium loading of 50 psf. Planking or platforms must be overlapped a minimum of 12″, or secured from movement. They should extend over their end supports not less than 6″, or more than 18″.

No part of the scaffold should be located within 10 feet of energized power lines. All platforms must be provided with 2″ x 4″ guardrails, at a height of between 36″ and 42.” Unless the area below is barricaded off, or the scaffold will not have open sides more than 10′ high, it must also have toeboards, not less than 4″ in height. If anyone will be required to work or pass under the scaffold, it must be provided with a ¬Ω” wire-mesh screen, covering the entire opening between the toeboard and the guardrail. Overhead protection must be provided on a scaffold exposed to overhead hazards.

Where the height of a scaffold is to exceed 20′, outriggers must be used to enlarge the base, and the scaffold must be tied into the building if feasible. The scaffold should be affixed to the building at intervals of not more than 30′ horizontally, and 26′ vertically. Where scaffolds are to be suspended using wire or fiber rope, the same must be capable of supporting at least six times the intended load. Only treated fiber rope should be used for or near work involving the use of corrosive substances or chemicals, and only wire rope-supported scaffolds used for cleaning buildings over 50′ in height with acid solutions. Special precautions should be taken to protect scaffold members, including wire or fiber ropes, when using a heat-producing process.

The most fundamental day-to-day safety rules in using scaffolds include the following. First, no one should be permitted to go up on a scaffold who is untrained in safe practices. Training should be repeated from time to time, and written records of topics covered, and the names of attendees, maintained. If work conditions, or the type or use of scaffolding changes, the training must be updated, and provided anew.

The scaffold should be checked before each work shift (and every time before use after it has been modified or moved) by a “competent person.” Everyone using the scaffold should be instructed to report signs of cracks, loose fasteners or bolts, or indications that the scaffold is out of plumb, or that vertical and horizontal members are not perpendicular.

Wheels must be locked before anyone climbs on the scaffold. The scaffold must never be moved with anyone on it. Safe access (normally, fixed ladders or ramps) must be provided, especially where the work requires a gap of 2 feet or more between the work area and the scaffold. Adjustable legs, intended for use in leveling the scaffold, must not be used to stretch the platform height. Where additional height is required, add one or more scaffold sections. Leveling should not be performed while anyone is on the scaffold.

Persons working on the scaffold must keep their center of gravity above the scaffolding. Employees must be forbidden to push/pull or lean against the wall or ceiling when standing or sitting on a scaffold, unless it is securely tied into the building. Employees must not climb or stand on diagonal braces, and should work only while standing on one of the platforms. No one shall work below or in the fall zone of the scaffolding. Portable ladders must not be leaned against the scaffold, or used on a scaffold platform. If there is a storm or heavy winds, a worker must not climb on the scaffolding unless he is using fall protection or a wind screen. Workers should not go onto the scaffold with snow or ice on it, except to remove the same, and to apply sand to the planking to prevent slipping when work resumes in clear conditions.

Open sides of the scaffold must be equipped with guardrails. Platforms must be kept clear of clutter, to prevent trips and falls. Last but not least, all workers on scaffolds working or walking at a height of 10′ or greater must have adequate fall protection in the form of a harness, and must tie off religiously. Since falls are the #1 cause of preventable construction fatalities, supervisors must be instructed to remind workers of the foregoing rules regularly, to call out violations, and to enforce the rules with a graduated system of disciplinary penalties. I am reminded of an incident in Brooklyn a couple of years ago, in which a scaffold collapsed beneath three men working five stories above grade. All three men had been provided with harnesses. The two men who were tied off got a bad scare, and spent 20 minutes dangling, until they were rescued by firefighters. The third man, who was not tied off, fell to his death. Safety rules are useless in preventing accidents — and OSHA citations — unless they are enforced. No one seen working aloft without his lanyard fastened should ever escape being spoken to, at least.

Needless to say, any scaffold seen to be damaged or improperly erected should not be used until repaired or corrected.

The foregoing covers most of the basics, but be sure to consult the OSHA regs if you plan to use a wood-pole or “specialty” scaffold. And, while most scaffolding subs are knowledgeable and conscientious, remember that, ultimately, if your employees will use the scaffold, or you’re the general contractor, it’s your responsibility.

Thomas H. Welby is a licensed professional engineer, as well as an attorney and managing partner of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, a construction law firm with its main office in White Plains. Geoffrey S. Pope, counsel to the firm, assists in the preparation of this series. Articles in this series are for general guidance only, and should not be relied upon as providing all information necessary for compliance with OSHA and other legal requirements.


Thomas H. Welby is a licensed professional engineer, as well as an attorney and managing partner at Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, a construction law firm with its main office in White Plains. Geoffrey S. Pope, counsel to the firm, collaborates in the preparation of this series. Articles in this series are for general guidance only, and should not be relied upon as providing all information necessary for compliance with OSHA and other legal requirements.

Failing to Comply with the Timing Requirements Surrounding Discovery Demands may have Harsh Consequences…

In the course of a lawsuit each party is given an opportunity to inspect the other side’s documents and question key witnesses. This exchange of information is broadly referred to as discovery. New York’s rules of procedure and the judges charged with enforcing those rules provide guidance as to how and when this exchange is to occur. This is to ensure that our judicial process moves quickly and efficiently without sacrificing judicial integrity. On July 11, 2013, the Appellate Division, Third Department, issued a decision demonstrating the importance of strictly complying with the timing requirements surrounding discovery demands.

In Hameroff and Sons, LLC v. Plank, LLC, 2013 N.Y. Slip. Op. 05271 (2013), the parties negotiated a stipulation of settlement requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant $105,000 in satisfaction of its obligations under a construction contract and requiring Defendant to, among other things, complete the building. Neither party complied with the stipulation of settlement thus leading to litigation and eventually a discovery schedule being put into place by the court.

After Defendant, although having failed to comply with Plaintiff’s December 2010 discovery demands, moved for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff cross-moved to compel discovery. The Court denied Defendant’s motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the settlement agreement entered into was ambiguous, and granted Plaintiff’s cross-motion, directing Defendant to serve discovery responses within 20 days. Defendant again failed to comply and the Supreme Court set another deadline for discovery responses to be served.

While the Defendant again failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s discovery demands, it did allow Plaintiff to review documents. Defendant, however, did not provide written responses to the demands and Plaintiff complained of irregularities and missing documents without any response from Defendant. Finally, 15 months after initial service of the discovery demands, Plaintiff moved, pursuant to CPLR ¬ß 3126, for preclusion and issue resolution. After giving the parties extensive opportunities to submit additional papers, the Supreme Court partially granted Plaintiff’s motion and found that Defendant willfully failed to comply with discovery demands and was therefore precluded from offering evidence concerning the stipulation of settlement.

On Appeal, it was determined that the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant from offering certain evidence. Trial courts have “broad discretionary power in controlling discovery and disclosure, and only a clear abuse of discretion will prompt appellate action.” The Appellate Division placed emphasis on the fact that between December 2010 and March 2102, Plaintiff repeatedly requested that Defendant respond to its discovery demands. Despite such requests, established deadlines and three court orders, Defendant, without objecting to the demands, still failed to respond.

The Court further reasoned that an inference of willful non-compliance arose given that Defendant repeatedly failed to respond, and because of documentary evidence establishing that Defendant deleted certain electronic communications after being aware of the potential for litigation, and possibly after litigation had already begun. Although Defendant argued that the emails it deleted were irrelevant, the Court found that relevance of destroyed documents is presumed if the destruction was intentional or willful.

For these reasons, it was held that the Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant from offering evidence on a particular issue.

Recommendation:

Whether plaintiff or defendant, a party to a lawsuit must always strive to strictly comply with the time requirements surrounding discovery demands. In the event that compliance is not possible, communication should always be maintained with your attorney and adversary to prevent situations such as the one presented above. Further, if litigation appears possible in the future, no matter how slight the chances and how irrelevant certain documents may seem, electronic records and correspondence should never be deleted. Such deletions may lead to an inference of relevance, willful non-compliance, and can result in sanctions disallowing the presentation of evidence on essential issues. For all of these reasons it is important to manage your time wisely and always produce documents to your attorney when requested. As in the case above, the failure to timely do so may have harsh consequnces.

Court Voids Payment Bonds’ 30 Day Notice Requirement

Labor and material payment bonds are normally required of contractors on public improvement projects under Section 137 of the State Finance Law. The purpose of a payment bond is to protect subcontractors, materialmen and laborers against a default of the contractor. When the contractor fails to pay, the surety company, as guarantor, can be forced to pay if the bond claimant has complied with the terms and conditions of the bond.

In the case of Navillus Tile, Inc. v Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc., the prime contract imposed a 30-day notice of claim requirement as a condition precedent to payment. The question before the court is whether such a short 30 day notice requirement is enforceable under Section 137 of the State Finance Law.

Background 

In 2002, the City of New York entered into a Prime Contract with Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. for Bovis to act as the construction manager for the construction of the City’s new Office of Emergency Management headquarters. Rather than require a traditional labor and material payment bond under Section 137 of the State Finance Law, the Prime Contract contained a “payment guarantee” by the City for the claims of subcontractors and material suppliers. The Prime Contract further provided that the guarantee would be construed “in a manner consistent with Section 137 of the State Finance Law”.

State Finance Law Section 137 requires bond claimants, such as subcontractors or material suppliers, to give written notice of their claims within 120 days after the last performance of work or furnishing of materials to the project. The Prime Contract, however, contained a requirement that claimants had to provide the City with notice of any claim under its payment guarantee within 30 days after last performance of the work or furnishing of materials.

Navillus sued Bovis for unpaid work under the contract and also sued the City on the payment guarantee. The City moved to dismiss Navillus’ payment guarantee claim on the grounds that Navillus did not comply with the 30 day notice of claim requirement. The trial court granted the City’s motion and dismissed Navillus’ claim based on its failure to comply with the 30 day notice requirement.

Decision

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the claim. The court noted that the City’s payment guarantee specifically replaced the traditional payment bond. Accordingly, although not a payment bond per se, the court held that the City was obligated to afford all claimants with the rights set forth in Section 137 of the State Finance Law, including its granting bond claimants 120 day notice of claim requirement, rather than the onerous 30 day notice requirement set forth under the payment guarantee.

The court quoted from an appellate court case that held that a payment bond cannot impose more stringent requirements than that required by State Finance Law Section 137: “Any such more burdensome notice provision having the effect of weakening the financial protection afforded statutory beneficiaries would be void as violative of public policy embodied in State Finance Law Section 137”.

Comment

While the appellate court held that a payment guarantee issued in lieu of a payment bond cannot have terms which are more restrictive than the terms of a statutory bond, it is in a claimant’s best interest to act with best possible speed so as to comply with the 120 day requirement contained in the statute. A surety will only pay a claim if all procedural requirements are satisfied, including the notice requirement.

About the author: Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc. Gregory J. Spaun, an associate with the firm, assisted with the preparation of this article.

Safety Policy: Estate Of Decedent, Crushed By Tipover Of Crate, Wins Summary Judgement Under “Scaffold Law”

In the years between 1995 and 2011, there occurred a “swing in the pendulum” at the New York Court of Appeals, regarding the interpretation of the State’s “Scaffold Law,” Labor Law ¬ß 240(1).

The Scaffold Law is best-known for providing enhanced protection, where construction workers suffer falls from elevated surfaces to a lower level. While ¬ß 240(1) is not quite a “strict liability” statute, imposing liability in all “gravity-related” accidents involving both falls and “struck-by” injuries from falling objects, an injured plaintiff’s “comparative negligence” will not be considered in mitigation of the damages recoverable. The plaintiff’s own negligence is a bar to recovery only where it is so pronounced as to be the “sole proximate cause” of his injuries. It is, nevertheless, a condition to recovery that the injury not only be caused by the force of gravity, but that it result from the employer’s failure to provide a statutorily-prescribed protective device.

In 1995, at which time the dominant faction on the Court of Appeals favored a restrictive reading of ¬ß 240(1), the Court’s decision in Misseritti v. Mark IV Construction Co. stated that Labor Law ¬ß 240(1) could not be the basis for recovery, where a worker suffered an injury caused by a falling object whose base stood at the same level as the worker.

In 2011, by which time the “barrel had rolled” in favor of a more liberal reading of ¬ß 240(1), the Court distanced itself from Misseritti, in the case of Willinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp. In Willinski, the plaintiff and co-workers were demolishing brick walls in a warehouse. Prior demolition had left standing two vertical plumbing pipes, rising about 10′ from the floor on which the plaintiff was working. Debris from a wall being demolished struck the pipes, and the pipes fell over and struck the plaintiff, injuring him. The Court of Appeals did not hold in Willinski that Scaffold Law liability necessarily existed on the facts presented, but rather that it would no longer apply a “same level” rule to categorically bar liability.

Thus, the Court in Willinski did not make a definitive ruling as to liability or non-liability, but found an issue of fact, to be resolved at the trial court level, regarding whether the worker’s injury resulted from the lack of a statutorily-prescribed protective device. If a device mentioned in the statute would not be necessary or expected in the circumstances, the peril would be incidental to construction work, and not within the statute’s coverage. If, however, a device ought to have been in place, liability would not be excluded as a matter of law, merely because the falling object stood at the same level as the injured worker.

The trend toward more expansive coverage may not continue indefinitely, as two of its proponents have left the Court (Judge Jones having died, and Judge Ciparick – the author of the decision in Willinski – having retired). However, the trend seems, for now at least, to be continuing, as illustrated in Toney v. Raichoudhury, recently decided in Kings County Supreme Court.

The project in Toney was a residential remodeling job in Nassau County. Defendant Lee Remodeling was the general contractor, and defendant M&M Metals (“M&M”) was a subcontractor, whose scope of work included the installation of curtain wall framing and glazing.

On the day of the accident, Erwin Toney was one of three M&M employees, whose only task for that day was to receive the delivery of six wooden crates of double-insulated thermal glass. The crates were delivered on a flatbed truck. The truck parked on the street in front of the residence. The truck was equipped with a crane, which was used to move the crates, one by one, to the driveway.

To facilitate installation, the workers staged the offloaded crates, each containing multiple plates of glass, so that when the crates were opened, the plates would not fall out, and the topmost sheet could be readily accessible.

This was accomplished in a fashion which was shown to be consistent with industry practice, and consisted of placing two crates upright, and parallel to each other on the driveway. The crates, each of which was roughly 9-10′ tall, and weighed more than 1900 lbs., were then tilted towards each other, until the tops of the crates touched and supported each other, forming an “A”. Then, the workers would use a screw gun to screw two wooden braces to the crates, one on each side, which braces served as crossbars to hold the crates in place.

While unloading the last two of the six crates, one of Toney’s co-workers was attempting to secure the horizontal braces on the “A,” as Toney and the other co-worker tilted the crates towards each other. Toney left his position to the side of the crates, and walked in front of the crates, to adjust the crate that was “off.” The crate nearest to Toney began to shift, and he may have been trapped by the toes of his boots coming under the weight of the crate. The crate fell onto Toney, causing crush injuries that proved to be fatal. The two crates were not secured to each other with braces when they fell, and they were no longer attached to the crane. No chocks had been placed on the ground to prevent them from tilting outward before the wooden braces were secured.

A wrongful death and personal injury action by Toney’s administratrix came before the trial-level Supreme Court on motions for summary judgment by Lee Remodeling, the general contractor, and M&M, Toney’s employer. So far as relevant to our Scaffold Law discussion, the Court first declined to dismiss the ¬ß 240(1) claim, holding that the sufficiency of an elevation differential and a fall from a height should take into account the weight of the object and the amount of force it is capable of generating, even over the course of a relatively short descent.

The trial court in Toney then went even further, and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of liability. It held:

  • that Toney was not the sole proximate cause of his injuries;
  • that the crates were not properly secured (or braced and chocked) before the crane line was released; and
  • that the crates – notwithstanding that they stood on the same level as the plaintiff – came within the purview of ¬ß 240(1), due to their size and weight, and the force they were capable of generating.

Toney is a trial-level decision. If the defendant chooses to appeal, it’s a respectable argument that the better course would have been for Supreme Court to leave the ultimate issue of liability for the trier of fact, rather than granting summary judgment for the plaintiff.

Willinski and other recent cases, however, do seem to offer adequate support for the legal conclusions that, in falling object cases under ¬ß 240(1), there is no per se “same level” rule that excludes liability; that the weight of the falling object must be considered; and that the crucial factor is not the elevation differential, but the presence or absence of a statutorily-prescribed protective device.

Court Construes an “EIFS” Insurance Exclusion to Include all Work on Structure, Roofer Left without Coverage

Exterior Insulation and Finish Systems, or “EIFS”, is a multi-layer wall system attached to the exterior of a residential or commercial structure. EIFS generally consists of a substrate, an adhesive to adhere the system to the building, an insulating layer (generally stiff EPS foamboard), a reinforcing mesh and the exterior finish. Users of EIFS are attracted by the variety of exterior finishes which are available, many of which resemble stucco, at a relatively low cost. Also, because of the insulation component of the system, energy savings are touted. Further adding to EIFS’ popularity is its durability and need for only minimal maintenance.

Problems arise, nevertheless, where the EIFS system is not sealed properly. In such situations, water can infiltrate and reach the structure of the building. Perversely, because the EIFS system is a sealed system, the infiltrating water has no place to go and, instead of manifesting itself as a small leak, it remains in the structure-hidden-where it can cause rotting of the underlying structure. By the time the first rotting is discovered, the problem is actually widespread and the damage extensive.

Liability insurers came to the realization that the failure of an EIFS system was certain to lead to significant exposures. Accordingly, insurers issuing CGL policies began to draft exclusions of coverage related to EIFS systems, and many contractors ceased to install EIFS or any work which interfaced with an EIFS system. However, the recent case of First Mercury Insurance Company v. Miller Roofing Enterprises highlights just how a broad EIFS exclusion can be enforced.

The facts of Miller Roofing were not disputed. Miller Roofing was retained by the owner to replace three roofs in 1998. The structures on which the roofs were installed were clad in EIFS, although the roof did not interface with the EIFS system, and Miller Roofing performed no EIFS-related work. In 2006, one of the roofs began to leak, causing water infiltration into the owner’s showroom. Miller Roofing attempted some repairs but, after some heavy rain and snowstorms in 2007, significant amounts of water damaged the ceiling, walls, and product which was on the showroom floor.

The owner sued Miller Roofing for breach of contract and for negligence to recover for both the cost to remediate the roof, as well as the cost of the non-roof related items damaged in the flood. First Mercury accepted Miller Roofing’s defense under a reservation of rights, but then commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to disclaim coverage. The policy at issue contained the following EIFS exclusion:

This insurance does not apply to … “property damage” included in the “products-completed operations hazard” and arising out of “your work” described as … [a]ny work or operation with respect to any exterior component, fixture or feature of any structure if any “exterior insulation and finish system” is used on any part of that structure.

First Mercury moved for summary judgment on its complaint, contending that inasmuch as the building admittedly contained an EIFS system, the exclusion applied. Miller Roofing opposed, contending that the exclusion did not apply because the defective workmanship was to the roof, not the EIFS system and, in any event, Miller Roofing did no work involving the EIFS system. While the court credited Miller Roofing’s explanation that its work did not involve the EIFS-system, it held that such was irrelevant in light of the policy language triggering the exclusion if “any exterior insulation and finish system is used on any part of the structure” (emphasis supplied). As to Miller Roofing’s contention that First Mercury would be allowed to escape liability for any otherwise covered act at the building simply because EIFS cladding was placed on the exterior walls, the Court held that this was precisely the policy Miller Roofing paid for and signed, and the Court was constrained to apply the exclusion.

Clearly, a roofer is going to be performing work on the exterior of a structure. While insureds should always read the terms of their policies, a broker would be well advised that the best way to service such a client would be to see to it that exclusions such as the one the Court relied upon in Miller Roofing are removed or tailored as narrowly as possible so that the insured’s foreseeable work is not caught up in the breadth of the exclusion.

Wicks Law

The highest court in New York, the Court of Appeals, recently issued an important decision affecting what is often referred to as the “Wicks Law”. Prior to 2008, the Wicks Law required that public entities throughout New York obtain separate specifications for plumbing, electrical and HVAC scopes of work on construction projects in excess of $50,000.00. In 2008, the New York Legislature increased this threshold to $3 million for projects in Kings, Queens, Bronx, Richmond and New York Counties, $1.5 million for projects in Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester counties, and $500,000.00 in every other county within the State.

In Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Smith, 2013 N.Y. Slip. Op. 04038 (2013), the increase in the monetary thresholds was challenged as unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued, in part, that the varying threshold amounts between counties rendered the legislation unconstitutional under the New York State Constitution’s “Home Rule”.

The Home Rule is designed to prohibit the State Legislature from passing “special laws” (in this case, laws that would apply to some, but not all, counties) which intervene in a localities’ laws affecting the localities’ property, affairs or government. However, the Home Rule is not a blanket prohibition, as the State Legislature is permitted to intervene where there is a substantial degree of State concern. In this case, the Court of Appeals needed to determine whether the State Legislature’s imposition of differing monetary thresholds among counties was in furtherance of a matter of substantial State concern.

The Court of Appeals held that bidding on public construction contracts was a matter of substantial State concern, and that the Home Rule was only designed to prevent unjustified State interference in issues of pure local concern. Id. Here, the State’s interference was determined to be justified.

Plaintiffs also challenged the legislation on several other grounds, many of which are not addressed here, as the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a majority of them. However, the Court determined that one ground had merit. The legislation added a section to the New York Labor Law, that states that the public entity must require bidding contractors to participate in apprentice training programs that have been approved by the New York Department of Labor. The claimed problem with this is that such apprentice training programs are not available to out-of-state contractors. Therefore, the plaintiffs argued, out-of-state contractors are not able to work on Wicks Law projects, which is a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

These two clauses limit states from giving favored treatment to their citizens over non-citizens. Here, the apprenticeship requirement appears to give New York contractors the advantage over out-of-state contractors. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the lower court’s rejection of this argument, and sent the case back down to the lower court for litigation as to the issue.

In conclusion, public works contractors and governmental entities should be aware that the differing monetary thresholds in the Wicks Law will remain, although the apprenticeship portion of the legislation may not. In addition, New York contractors will face increased competition for Wicks Law projects if the apprenticeship provision is struck down.

If you have any questions about the information set forth herein, call us at 914-428-2100.

Arbitrating Claim Against Employer

Question. Can I be compelled to arbitrate my claim against my employer if the costs of arbitration are prohibitively expensive and I am effectively prevented from vindicating my rights due to financial hardship even if arbitration provision is contained in my employment agreement?

Answer. Not necessarily. Claimant commenced a lawsuit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, for damages arising from Employer’s alleged failure to pay overtime wages. Employer moves to compel arbitration under the employment agreement pursuant to CPLR 7501 & 7503.

The effect of an arbitration agreement is provided for in CPLR 7501 which states that:

[a] written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising or any existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without regard to the justiciable character of the controversy and confers jurisdiction on the courts of the state to enforce it and to enter judgment on an award. In determining any matter arising under this article, the court shall not consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute (CPLR 7501).

CPLR 7503(a) provides the procedure for a party to compel arbitration.

Application to compel or stay arbitration; stay of action; notice of intention to arbitrate (a) Application to compel arbitration; stay of action. A party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate may apply for an order compelling arbitration. Where there is no substantial question whether a valid agreement was made or complied with, and the claim sought to be arbitrated is not barred by limitation under subdivision (b) of section 7502, the court shall direct the parties to arbitrate. Where any such question is raised, it shall be tried forthwith in said court. If an issue claimed to be arbitrable is involved in an action pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear a motion to compel arbitration, the application shall be made by motion in that action. If the application is granted, the order shall operate to stay a pending or subsequent action, or so much of it as is referable to arbitration (CPLR 7503).

Arbitration is a creature of contract and the long established policy of New York courts is to interfere as little as possible with the freedom of consenting parties in structuring their arbitration relationship. However, that policy is not without caveats or scrutiny. It has also been established that so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.

It has been further recognized that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant from effectively vindicating their federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum, a result which cuts against the broad public policy in favor of arbitration. Where a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring the costs that would deter the party from arbitrating the claim.

The issue of a Claimant’s financial ability is to be resolved on a case-by-case basis and that inquiry should at minimum consider the following questions: (1) whether the litigant can pay the arbitration fees and costs; (2) what is the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court; and (3) whether the cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims in the arbitral forum.

Safety Policy: “Willful” OSHA Violations: What They Are, and Why You Should Avoid Them

Construction employers know that most OSHA violations are classified as belonging to one of four levels of gravity: Other-Than-Serious, Serious, Repeat, and Willful. (I say “most,” because there is a fifth level:de minimis violations, mere technical violations of a standard, for which monetary penalties and abatement orders are inappropriate).

What distinguishes “Serious” violations is that they involve a substantial probability of death or serious bodily harm. To sustain a “Serious” citation, the Secretary does not need to prove that an accident based on the cited hazard is likely, only that, were an accident to occur, death or serious injury would likely result. Examples of “Other-Than-Serious” violations are record-keeping violations, or a missing guardrail at a height where a fall would probably result in a mild sprain, cuts or abrasions.

In determining whether a violation is “Serious,” OSHA compliance officers consider the following four elements:

  • The type of accident or health hazard exposure that the standard in question is designed to prevent;
  • The most serious injury or illness that could reasonably result from the violation of the subject standard;
  • Whether the injury or illness identified in the preceding step includes death, or serious physical harm; and
  • Whether the employer knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known, of the hazardous condition.

“Other-Than-Serious” violations generally have no immediate impact on your ability to obtain contracts for public work. Also, although monetary penalties can be as large as for “Serious” violations, as a matter of policy, OSHA generally does not assess penalties for first-time, “Other-Than-Serious” violations by employers having fewer than ten employees, where the total number of violations is less than ten. Accordingly, often it will not be in the employer’s interest to make the considerable investment necessary to contest “Other-Than-Serious” citation items.

Be aware, however, that “Other-Than-Serious” does not mean entirely inconsequential. An “Other-Than-Serious” violation that becomes a final order may later become the predicate for a “Repeat,” or even a “Willful,” violation.

A “Repeat” violation, although not defined in the OSH Act, is roughly what you think it is, and will subject you to enhanced penalties. Two things you ought to know are that the “Repeat” violation does not need to be of the very same standard; a prior violation of a “substantially similar” standard will suffice. Also, while older “Serious” citations may not impair your ability to get public work, there is no prescribed “lookback” period for a “Repeat” violation.

Also, while the prior violation must have become a final order to serve as the basis for a “Repeat” violation, some courts have held that citations that were settled, even where the stipulation contained exculpatory language, may qualify.

“Willful” violations, as you already know, are the most damaging, carry the highest penalties (which may include criminal sanctions) and are the most likely to impair your ability to get work, especially public work. What is it that defines a “Willful” OSHA violation?

Here again, the OSH Act fails to provide a definition, and there is still not a precise, universally-accepted formulation.

The following is, however, a working definition sufficient for nearly every case. A “Willful” OSHA violation requires, as a preliminary matter, that the cited party cited be an employer subject to the OSH Act. It involves a conscious, intentional, deliberate, voluntary decision. It differs from a “Serious” violation, in that it contains both (1) a heightened awareness of the illegality of the violative conduct or conditions; and (2) either conscious disregard for OSHA requirements, or plain indifference to employee safety.

While small differences survive among the OSH Review Commission and the courts as to the exact contours of “Willfulness,” all agree that the classification requires proof that: (1) the employer knew, or should have known, that the violation existed; (2) the employer voluntarily chose not to comply with the Act by correcting the violation; and (3) that choice was made with intentional disregard for the Act’s requirements, or plain indifference amounting to recklessness.

On occasion, we have thought OSHA a little too enthusiastic in characterizing violations as “Willful.” However, in part because such a violation is potentially so damaging to the employer, there is usually some “pushback” where a violation has been over-charged as to degree. The Administrative Law Judges seldom hesitate to downgrade violations to “Serious,” where the employer’s heightened awareness, and conscious disregard or plain indifference, are not established.

For example, in Secretary v. D. W. Caldwell, Inc., the respondent was a commercial sheet metal and roofing contractor that was installing a metal roof on a large campus building in Alabama. It was cited for having employees on a steep roof whose safety harnesses were not tied off, exposing them to a fall hazard of 32 feet.

The work, the judge found, was hazardous because of the slope (5:12) and height of the roof, and numerous tripping threats (panels, boxes, ropes, drills, etc.) The ALJ was unimpressed by the foreman’s claim that the crew could not use fall protection, because they could not transport the panels as required with their harnesses connected to anchor points.

Although the ALJ rejected an “unpreventable employee misconduct” defense, affirmed the violation as “Serious,” and upbraided the employer for its poor judgment, he declined to find that the violation was “Willful.”

In rejecting the classification of the violation as “Willful,” the ALJ made extensive findings, including the following. The employer had only 15 employees. It had a written safety program which, although inadequate, was augmented by weekly safety meetings and weekly visits from the company’s principal. It issued verbal warnings and filed written reprimands, as a means to enforce safety rules. Employees were provided with the necessary fall protection equipment. The foreman was experienced, and had attended OSHA’s 10-hour safety program. Following inspection, the entire crew received formal, third-party fall-protection training.

The CO agreed that the crew was properly trained in fall protection, and that the employer’s safety program, training, communication, and enforcement were “average.” The foreman was criticized for his “unfortunate” belief that not tying off while carrying the metal panels on the roof was not a fall hazard owing to the roof’s expanse, and that most work was being done near the peak. However, after inspection, the employer purchased retractable lines, allowing the employees to keep their hands free while tied off.

The CO agreed that the crew was properly trained in fall protection, and that the employer’s safety program, training, communication, and enforcement were “average.” The foreman was criticized for his “unfortunate” belief that not tying off while carrying the metal panels on the roof was not a fall hazard owing to the roof’s expanse, and that most work was being done near the peak. However, after inspection, the employer purchased retractable lines, allowing the employees to keep their hands free while tied off.

Overall, the ALJ felt that the employer had demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with OSHA requirements, and did not merit a “Willful” violation. The penalty imposed was reduced from the $28,000 proposed by the Secretary to $6,000.

If, following an inspection, you are cited for a “Willful” violation, keep in mind the 15 working day time limitation to file a notice of contest. A “Willful” OSHA citation is a matter of the utmost urgency, and you should contact experienced OSHA counsel at once.

Contractor Held Liable for Diversion of Trust Funds

Article 3A of the Lien Law provides that monies received by a contractor or subcontractor for a construction project are trust funds to be held by them as trustees for payment to those performing work or supplying materials for the project. The statute is intended to prevent owners, contractors and subcontractors from either using the trust monies to pay creditors on other projects or keeping the monies for themselves, rather than paying for the costs of construction on the project. If the trust funds available for a project are diverted from that trust, the owner, contractor or subcontractor may incur liability for the trust diversion.

In the recent case of Marcor Construction, Inc. v Bil-Ray Aluminum Siding of Queens, Inc., the court held that the contractor and its chief operating officer were liable for diversion of trust funds.

Background 

Bil-Ray retained Marcor as a subcontractor to perform roofing and siding work on homes owned by customers of Bil-Ray. The jobs were funded either directly by the homeowners or by a third-party lender who extended credit to the homeowners. Bil-Ray received payments either directly from its customers or from third party lenders on behalf of those homeowners. When Bil-Ray ceased operations, its chief operating officer used his discretion in determining which invoices submitted by Marcor and other subcontractors and suppliers would be paid.

Marcor sued Bil-Ray for the unpaid work it performed and moved for summary judgment, claiming that Bil-Ray diverted trust funds in its possession that should have been used to pay for work performed by Marcor as a subcontractor. The trust funds consisted of the payments received by Bil-Ray from the homeowners and third-party lenders. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Marcor submitted an affidavit from one of Bil-Ray’s former employees attesting to the existence of the trust funds and Bil-Ray’s (and its chief operating officer’s) failure to apply the trust monies to pay Marcor the amount due for work performed under its subcontract.

Decision

The court granted Marcor’s motion and held both Bil-Ray and its chief operating officer liable for the diversion. In so holding, the court credited the former employee’s account of Bil-Ray’s chief operating officer diverting trust funds from Marcor’s project for non-trust purposes. The court also noted that Bil-Ray submitted no explanation other than stating that someone other than its chief executive officer was responsible. The court further held that Bil-Ray’s chief operating officer was personally liable to Marcor because he knowingly and actually participated in the diversion.

Comment

The construction trust fund statute is a valuable tool for collecting money for work performed or materials supplied for a project. This may be the only source of recovery where mechanic’s lien rights have expired and the claimant is not protected under a labor and material payment bond. Personal liability of corporate officers for diversion of trusts funds is not dischargeable in bankruptcy and, in extreme cases, could result in criminal prosecution for larceny.

It is only fair that project claimants who have provided the labor and material that made possible the construction of the project should be allowed to sue corporate officers for personal liability where they divert trust funds for purposes other than paying the claims of unpaid contractors, subcontractors or material suppliers on that project.