Skip to main content

Subcontractor Allowed Recrovery Based On Quantium Meruit and Unjust Enrichment

Where there is no written or oral contract between the parties, a contractor cannot recover for work performed based on a breach of contract. His recourse is to sue under the legal theories of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment to recover the value of the labor and materials. To recover on a claim of quantum meruit, a claimant must establish the performance of services in good faith, which were accepted, and for which it reasonably expected to be compensated, and the reasonable value of the services. To recover under the claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that the recipient of the work benefitted at the contractor’s expense, and that equity and good conscience require restitution to the contractor.

In the recent case of ACC Concrete Corp. v Core Continental Construction, LLC, a subcontractor recovered the value of its work performed based on claims of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

Background

ACC Concrete, an excavation contractor, provided excavation and foundation work pursuant to an oral contract as a subcontractor to Core Continental for a project owned by Marigold, LLC. During the performance of the excavation work ACC encountered rock. However, because the parties did not anticipate encountering rocks, there was no discussion as to what ACC’s charge would be for rock removal. ACC proceeded with the work based upon Core Continential’s reassurances that ACC would be paid. The amount of that payment, and whether payment would come from Core Continental or Marigold, however, were not discussed. Further, the change orders that ACC sent to Core Continental were never signed by either Core Continental or Marigold.

ACC sued both Core Continental and Marigold to recover for the cost of the rock removal. ACC asserted a breach of contract claim and quasi-contractual quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims. All parties moved for summary judgment. Core Continental and Marigold relied on the fact that there was no specific agreement relating to the extra rock removal work. ACC sought relief based on breach of contract and on the quasi-contractual theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

Decision

The Court dismissed ACC’s breach of contract claim, holding that there was no contract because the parties had failed to agree on the essential terms. However, the court found that ACC had established the elements of its quasi-contractual claims. As to the quantum meruit claim, the Court held that ACC demonstrated that it performed its services in good faith, Core Continental had accepted those services, ACC reasonably expected to be compensated for those services, and that the rate ACC charged represented a reasonable value of its services sufficient to recover on its claim. As to ACC’s unjust enrichment claim, the Court held that ACC had demonstrated that Core Continental was enriched at ACC’s expense such that it was inequitable and unconscionable to allow Core Continental to retain the benefit of ACC’s services without payment. The court also found that Core Continental had induced ACC’s performance by assuring ACC that it would be paid for the extra rock work.

Comment

While the best practice is to get the agreement in writing, a contractor can nevertheless recover on one of the quasi-contractual theories when it can establish the essential elements of its claim. A person would be unjustly enriched if he received a benefit and did not pay for it when fairness required that payment be made. Quantum meruit can be used to address situations where no contract exists or where a contract exists but for some reason is unenforceable. In such cases courts may imply a contract to avoid an unjust result. 

About the author:  Mr. Miuccio is a partner of the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP and General Counsel to the Construction Industry Council of Westchester & Hudson Valley, Inc.  Gregory J. Spaun, an associate with the firm, assisted with the preparation of this article.

A Notice of Mechanic’s Lien is Void if it Fails to State the Date when Materials were Manufactured eventhough Not Delivered to a Project

Potential lienors must keep in mind that the categories of information required to be furnished in the contents for a notice of mechanic’s lien by the Lien Law must be provided, even under circumstances where a literal reading of that statute would not seem to require the information to be furnished. So found a lienor, who had its lien discharged by a court in a recent case.

In 40 West 53rd Associates Ltd. Partnership v. H. Weiss Equipment Corp., 2011 WL 3022207 (N.Y.Sup. July 18, 2011), a tenant occupied the subject project (the “Property”) and contracted with F.J. Sciame Construction Co., Inc. (“Sciame”) to perform construction work on the Property. Sciame subsequently retained the H. Weiss Equipment Corp. (“H. Weiss”) to perform additional work in connection with the Property. H. Weiss filed a mechanic’s lien against the Property alleging that it was owed $222,000.00 for materials manufactured but not delivered to the Property (specifically manufactured hoods for installation in a commercial kitchen).

The owner of the Property brought on a special proceeding to discharge the lien. In its petition, the owner argued that the lien was defective and invalid, because it failed to comply with the requirements of New York Lien Law ¬ß9(6) (“Lien Law ¬ß9”), which provides that a notice of lien “shall” state the “time when the first and last items of work were performed and materials were furnished.” New York Lien Law ¬ß9(6). Specifically, the owner argued that the information stated on the notice of lien was insufficient, because it failed to provide the required information regarding the time when the first and last items of work were performed and materials were furnished. In response, H. Weiss argued that its lien was valid, because the materials were never delivered to the Property and that, therefore, the required dates could not be provided in the notice of lien.

The court disagreed with H. Weiss, noting that a failure to set forth any date regarding when the first or last item of work was performed or materials supplied constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the notice of lien. The court also noted that Lien Law ¬ß9(6) exists in part to ensure the timely filing of a lien. In this case, the court found that because the notice of lien failed to provide the owner with any information regarding when the items were ordered, manufactured or produced, H. Weiss’ mechanic’s lien did not comply with the notice requirements of Lien Law ¬ß9(6) and, therefore granted the owner’s petition and discharged the lien.

Lienors should be aware that when filing a mechanic’s lien, all the categories of information required to be furnished by the Lien Law should be supplied, even if a literal reading of that statute would not seem to require the information. Of course, potential lienors should consult with an attorney knowledgeable in this field to be sure that their notice of mechanic’s lien complies with the Lien Law and is valid and enforceable.

Pay Attention to Those Notice Provisions in Your Contract

The importance of accurately following the notice provisions in your construction contract has been reiterated by the Appellate Division inDiPizio Construction Company, Inc. v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 2013 WL 2678511 (4th Dept. 2013). DiPizio Construction Company, Inc. (“DiPizio”) entered into a contract with the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (“NFTA”) to construct and/or renovate runways and taxiways at the Buffalo Niagara International Airport. DiPizio encountered delays during the project, and sought extensions of time from the NFTA to complete its work. The NFTA denied DiPizio’s requests for extensions, and DiPizio asserted delay claims for the extra costs it subsequently incurred.

Following the completion of the project, DiPizio sued the NFTA, seeking damages under several theories, including for breach of contract due to the NFTA’s refusal to grant DiPizio’s requested extensions of time. In a motion for partial summary judgment, the NFTA argued that DiPizio had failed to strictly comply with the requisite contractual notice provisions when it asserted its delay claims.

The contract specifically required that claims for extra costs “be in sufficient detail to enable the [e]ngineer to ascertain the basis and amount of said claims…any claim for equitable adjustment on account of delay for any cause must be accompanied by a revised schedule reflecting the effects of the delay and proposals to minimize those effects.” Id. at 1 (emphasis supplied).

The above-cited contractual provision clearly places a burden on DiPizio to first prove the amounts of any extra costs allegedly incurred because of a delay, and to further assist the NFTA in remedying the delay with minimization solutions.

DiPizio did not provide the requisite detail, and, in countering the NFTA’s argument of non-compliance with the notice provision, argued that it did not provide said detail because it was too difficult to precisely calculate those extra costs. It is unknown if DiPizio included such a statement in his actual notice. Unfortunately for DiPizio, the Court disagreed and upheld the lower court’s determination that DiPizio was not entitled to recovery under its breach of contract cause of action.

This is certainly not a new principle in New York. The oft cited Court of Appeals case, A.H.A. General Construction v. New York City Housing Authority, 92 N.Y.2d 20 (1998), held, in part, that strict compliance with contractual notice provisions was a condition precedent to suit or recovery for extra costs, where the contractor has not otherwise been prevented from complying. Notice provision for extra costs can impose even more stringent requirements than those in DiPizio’s contract – such as descriptions as to each laborer associated with the extra cost, the materials and equipment associated with the extra cost and daily reports for each and every day associated with the claimed delay, as inA.H.A. It is therefore necessary to refer back to the contract to remind oneself of those requirements.

DiPizio serves as a good reminder for all contractors: follow, to the letter, the requirements of notice provisions in your contracts, or else you may have to swallow those extra costs.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

In the Matter of the Liquidation of Ullico Casualty Company

On May 30, 2013, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware ordered Ullico Casualty Company (“Ullico”), a surety licensed to do business in NY, NJ and CT into liquidation. All insurance policies, surety bonds and contracts of insurance issued by Ullico shall be cancelled at 12:01 a.m. on the 31st day following the effective date of the Order of Liquidation or upon the specified expiration date, whichever is earlier. All claims against Ullico, along with proof of said claims, must be filed on or before June 30, 2014. Claimants are barred from commencing actions against Ullico after the date of the liquidation order and pending actions against Ullico are stayed. The liquidation order does not apply to other subsidiary companies that are part of Ullico, Inc. A copy of the liquidation order is available here. Additional information about this liquidation, including proof of claim form, will be updated here.

If you would like more information on this issue or any other construction related issue, please contact Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, L.L.P., at (914) 428-2100.

Connecticut Affirms Nullifications of Statutes of Limitation on Public Work Projects

The doctrine of Nullum Tempus is a legal doctrine whereby ordinary statutes of limitation do not apply to the government unless they are specifically made applicable. When the State had enacted its most recent statutes of limitation, it was presumed that the statutory language was broad enough to evidence the State’s intent to be bound by those time limitations.

Last November, in the case of State v Lombardo Brothers Mason Contractors, Inc. et. al., the Connecticut Supreme Court handed down a ruling which, it claimed, merely reaffirmed the common law doctrine of Nullum Tempus. However, as will be discussed below, by holding that nothing has changed, the Connecticut 1 Supreme Court has completely changed the way contractors, design and insurance professionals will have to approach public works projects.

The facts of the Lombardo Brothers case are relatively straightforward. The University of Connecticut system is a state-run university. The defendants were the various contractors who had worked on the design and construction of the library at the UConn Law School. Once the project was completed, the State found numerous defects with the construction which led to water infiltration. The state commenced its lawsuit in 2008 seeking reimbursement of the repair costs. It was not disputed that the case was brought well after the statutes of limitation expired. All parties moved to dismiss, and the State claimed that they were exempt under the Nullum Tempus doctrine. The Connecticut Supreme Court, relying on the “great public policy of preserving public rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers”, affirmed that Nullum Tempus has always existed in Connecticut common law, and that in the absence of specific statutory language making statutes of limitation applicable to the State (which was not present), they could not serve as a bar to these otherwise untimely claims.

In essence, the Connecticut Supreme Court held Nullum Tempus has always been a part of Connecticut law. However, the reemergence of this doctrine long presumed dead has led to concerns throughout the public works construction industry. For instance, as a result of the Court’s November 2012 decision, the design professional defendants here are defending a lawsuit relating to a building they designed between 18 and 20 years ago, and the contractor defendants are defending a lawsuit relating to a building they built between 16 and 18 years ago. The obvious issue which arises relates to records retention. In the digital age, this means not only retention of traditional paper records (which gets increasingly expensive when, as a practical matter, you cannot discard older records), but also the retention of obsolete software and computer systems capable of reading and showing plans, schematics and other documents which would be necessary to defend against these future claims.

Other practical considerations involve the sale and purchase of design firms. For instance, when you are purchasing a design firm, you are now purchasing (and effectively warranting) all of the past public work project designs the purchased firm undertook. Will the purchasing party’s insurance policy cover all of these projects? Does the subject of the purchase have any insurance that will cover these projects? Further, to the extent that a licensed individual sealed any of these plans, would liability follow the individual through death and the probate of his estate? If so, this would have to be addressed when the individual set forth his estate plans.

Contractors will have to deal with similar issues relating to insurance and bonding. As a practical matter, insurance agents and sureties, in calculating the amount of premiums to charge for a particular policy or bond, previously presumed that there would be some period after which they could be assured that they would no longer be exposed to liability. Now, with potentially perpetual liability, the premiums for these products is sure to be adjusted accordingly. Further, and similar to the issue faced by design professionals, potential perpetual liability will affect the sale or transfer of the contractor. The purchasing contractor will be assuming the liabilities of the purchased contractor and will have to effectively warrant the purchased contractor’s previous public work.

The above issues have been posed as open questions because the industry is only now coping with the effects of this decision. Clearly, each of the above issues, from document retention to effectively warranting the work of your predecessor to having to obtain insurance sufficient to cover claims made decades later, will impose a significant cost on design and construction firms undertaking state work. Accordingly, while the state may be trumpeting the Lombardo Brothers decision as a great victory, such a view may be shortsighted in light of the added costs which will necessarily find their way into competitive bids. As to the contractor or design professional looking to undertake such a project, they would be cautioned to discuss these perpetual liability issues with all those who they would normally involve in such a project (insurance and surety professionals, subcontractors and suppliers, amongst others) so as to ascertain the true cost of taking on the project so that these increased costs can be reflected in the bid.


1 New York and New Jersey courts have recognized the abolition of the Nullum Tempus doctrine in those states, while the doctrine is alive and well in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Lumbermens Mutual, American Manufacturers Mutual, and American Motorists Placed in Liquidation

An Order of Liquidation for Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. and American Motorists Insurance Co. was entered on May 8, 2013, by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. All direct policies and/or certificates of insurance and bonds issued by these companies shall be cancelled at 12:01 a.m. on the 31st day following the effective date of the Order of Liquidation or upon expiration date, whichever is earlier. These companies are licensed in 49 states and the District of Columbia. A copy of the liquidation order can be obtained here

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

The Prevailing Wage Loophole in Labor Law Section 220 is Closed…for Good

The New York Court of Appeals issued a decision on February 19, 2013, demonstrating that the prevailing wage loophole that once existed in Labor Law § 220 is officially closed.

In the Matter of M.G.M. Insulation Inc. v. Gardner, 2013 NY Slip Op. 01017 (2013), a not-for-profit volunteer fire department (the “Department”), located in the Village of Bath (the “Village”), sought financing for the construction of a new firehouse. Historically, the Department operated from a building that was owned and operated by the Village but had since grown inadequate for the Department’s needs. After the Village declined to take part in the construction of the new firehouse, the Department solicited bids for the job and selected R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. (“Taylor”) as its general contractor. Taylor then proceeded to hire a number of subcontractors to construct the various portions of the fire house.

Shortly thereafter, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued an opinion letter, concluding that the firehouse project was a public work and thus subject to the prevailing wage law. The subcontractors learned of the DOL’s determination and work on the project came to a halt. In an effort to keep the project on schedule, the Department agreed to indemnify Taylor and its subcontractors from any liability resulting from their failure to pay the prevailing wages. In the meantime, an administrative hearing was held on the question of whether the prevailing wage law applied to the firehouse project.

The Hearing Officer determined that the project was in fact subject to the prevailing wage law. Specifically, the Hearing Officer concluded that volunteer fire corporations, such as the one involved in this case, are the “functional equivalents” of municipal corporations making them “covered entities” under Labor Law ¬ß 220. Alternatively, the Hearing Officer concluded that the protection services agreement in place between the Department and the Village made the Department a public entity. Further emphasis was placed on the fact that the Village authorized and supported the firehouse project, the object of which was to provide protective services for the community.

Taylor petitioned for an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the Hearing Officer’s determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Hearing Officer’s decision and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the determination of the Hearing Officer.

In reversing the Hearing Officer’s determination, the Court of Appeals conducted an analysis using the framework of the two-pronged “Erie County” test arising out of Erie County Indus. Dev. Agency v. Roberts, 63 NY2d 810 (Ct App 1984). The first prong of the test considers whether the entity involved is a public agency as defined in the Labor Law, and the second prong considers whether the project meets the criteria of a public work.

In evaluating the first prong, the Court of Appeals noted that Labor Law ¬ß 220 covers contracts involving each of four specific entities: the State, public benefit corporations, municipal corporations, or commissions appointed pursuant to law. The Court found it undisputed that the Department was not one of the four entities listed in the statute and that it could therefore not be considered the “functional equivalent” of a municipal corporation. In dismissing the “functional equivalent” argument, the Court relied on its decision in the Matter of New York Charter School Assn. v. Smith, 15 NY3d 403 (Ct App 2010). There, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that charter schools are public benefit corporations because they serve a valuable public purpose and their existence is the result of a charter issued by a state or local municipal entity. Importantly, the Court of Appeals stated the following: “…while charter schools, like volunteer fire corporations, may be “quasi-public” in nature, they are not a specified public entity and thus, do not fit within the ambit of the statute.”

In finalizing its reversal, the Court of Appeals pointed out that in 2007, the Legislature expanded Labor Law ¬ß 220’s coverage to include contracts involving other types of entities, but only when it can be shown they were acting on behalf of the public entity. While under the amended statute the fire department likely would have been considered a public entity, the Court pointed out that the contract involved was entered into prior to 2007 when the amendment to the prevailing wage law did not exist. The Court of Appeals did not move on to the second prong of the Erie test since it determined the Department was not a public entity.

The importance of this case comes to life in Chief Judge Lippman’s dissenting opinion. There, Judge Lippman points out that the relevant provisions of the State Constitution and Labor Law have been judicially read as limiting the prevailing wage requirement to work contracted for by a public agency. Judge Lippman notes that despite this construction being addressed as mere dicta in Erie, such interpretation has stuck with unforeseen consequences. To highlight the misapplication of the prevailing wage law since Erie, and prior to its 2007 amendment, Judge Lippman briefly discusses the Matter of Pyramid Co. of Onondaga v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 223 AD2d 285 (3d Dept 1996). In that case, a highway ramp constructed by a private party pursuant to a State Department of Transportation permit was found to be a public work. However, the Appellate Division was compelled to deem it immune from Labor Law ¬ß 220’s prevailing wage requirement because, notwithstanding the State permit and the contemplated State ownership of the ramp once completed, the State had not itself contracted for the improvement.

The Onondaga case provides a prime example of the loophole that existed in Labor Law ¬ß 220 prior to its 2007 amendment. Specifically, the loophole allowed certain contracts to be exempt from the prevailing wage requirements simply because a public entity had not contracted for it. To address and essentially close this loophole, Labor Law ¬ß 220 was amended in 2007 to provide that the public agency contract requirement could be met not only by the already specifically enumerated public entities, but also by third-parties contracting for a public work on a public entity’s behalf. In Judge Lippman’s view, such amendment is on par with the Legislature’s original intent as to how the prevailing wage laws are to be applied.

In concluding his dissent, Chief Judge Lippman went on to state that had the contract between the fire department and R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. been entered into subsequent to Labor Law ¬ß 220’s amendment, it would have qualified as a prevailing wage trigger because (1) it was for the construction of a firehouse having as its purpose the provision of a quintessentially governmental service under municipal control; and (2) it was executed by a party (the fire department) contracting on behalf of a municipal entity.

Recommendation:

When entering into a contract that may at first glance appear private and therefore exempt from Labor Law ¬ß 220’s prevailing wage requirements, one must consider whether they are contracting with a third-party on behalf of a public entity. While such a situation would not act as a prevailing wage trigger in contracts entered into prior to Labor Law ¬ß 220’s 2007 amendment, as Chief Judge Lippman pointed out this loophole is now closed and the prevailing wage requirements are applicable to such contracts. The cases above highlight the importance of being completely aware of the status of the entity you are contracting with. Such awareness can prevent unnecessary project delays, litigation, and in extreme cases, criminal convictions.

If you have any questions about the information set forth in this Legal Alert, call us at 914-428-2100.

Can parties fix a different rate of interest on judgements in New York State?

Question. I know that that the statutory interest rate on judgments in New York is 9 percent. This is a great return on investment (assuming the debtor can pay) these days. If it’s statutory though can the parties fix a different rate of interest or even waive it?

Answer. Yes. Under NY law, interest on a sum awarded as a result of a breach of contract is computed from the earliest date that the claim accrued, “except that interest upon damages incurred thereafter shall be computed from the date incurred” (CPLR 5001 [a], [b]). Thus, CPLR 5001 permits a party that prevailed in a breach of contract action to obtain prejudgment interest. And where a contract provides for periodic payments or installments, the defaulting party is required to pay prejudgment interest on any missed payment from the date the payment became due.

When a claim is predicated on a breach of contract, the applicable rate of prejudgment interest varies depending on the nature and terms of the contract. Most agreements associated with indebtedness provide a “contract rate” of interest (which may be higher or lower than the statutory rate) that determines the value of the loan and that rate is used to calculate interest on principal prior to loan maturity or a default in performance. If the parties failed to include a provision in the contract addressing the interest rate that governs after principal is due or in the event of a breach, New York’s statutory rate (currently 9%) will be applied as the default rate

As an important corollary, when the principal on a loan is due on a date certain and the debtor fails to make payment, the interest rate in the contract will be used to calculate interest on unpaid principal from the date of maturity of the loan to the entry of judgment Thus, inclusion of a clause directing that interest accrues at a particular rate “until the principal is paid” (or words to that effect) alters the general rule that interest on principal is calculated pursuant to New York’s statutory interest rate after the loan matures or the debtor defaults.

Similarly, the parties are free to agree upon a complete waiver of interest. For example, in the context of a real estate transaction, where the parties’ contract language specifying that the seller’s “sole remedy” was liquidated damages in the form of retention of the down payment and the seller had “no further rights” against the defaulting purchaser, that trumps language in CPLR 5001 (a) directing that statutory interest be awarded in a contract dispute. The terms of the contract are controlling, and the seller is not entitled to statutory interest.

Arbitration Award in Favor of Subcontractor

On February 13, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a decision holding that an arbitration award in favor of a subcontractor disposed of the general contractor’s claim that the subcontractor willfully exaggerated its mechanic’s lien.1

In 5 Bros., Inc. v D.C.M. of New York, LLC, 39 Misc 3d 711 [Kings Co. 2013], a subcontractor and general contractor arbitrated their claims pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause contained in their agreement. The arbitrator, Melvin J. Kalish, rendered a decision in favor of the subcontractor in the amount of $76,539.13 and indicated that the “monetary award … is intended to include all claims of [the subcontractor], its subcontractors, and suppliers” and directed the subcontractor to “simultaneously [with payment] provide … a Satisfaction of Mechanic’s Lien of the $207,000.00 Mechanic’s Lien.” Thereafter, the general contractor, who had a pending claim against the subcontractor for willful exaggeration of its mechanic’s lien in a separate lien foreclosure cause of action that was pending before the Court, moved to (1) vacate the arbitration award, (2) for summary judgment dismissing the subcontractor’s lien claim, and (3) for summary judgment on its lien exaggeration claim.

Among other things, the general contractor argued that (1) “the award [was] irrational because it [was] based on an exaggerated mechanic’s lien, pointing to the disparity between the award amount of $76,539.13 and the subcontractor’s lien amount of $207,000.00” and (2) “the award must [be] vacated as indefinite and contrary to public policy because the arbitrator was without authority to address the willfully exaggerated lien claim, thus precluding [the general contractor’s] recovery of treble damages” under Lien Law ¬ß 39-a.

Judge Demarest denied the general contractor’s motion for summary judgment on its lien exaggeration claim on the basis that the correct amount of the lien had already been determined in the arbitration. Judge Demarest determined that the arbitrator did not “irrationally” rely upon or endorse the subcontractor’s lien given the substantial documentary evidence, testimony, and briefs which the arbitrator relied upon to determine the amount of the arbitration award. Furthermore, Judge Demarest found that the arbitrator was within his authority to dispose of the claim for willfull exaggeration of the lien, and did so since the “issue [was] necessarily subsumed within the agreement to arbitrate” and since the arbitrator did not award any penalties. The Court determined that the arbitrator had assessed the relative values of each parties claims, weighed the contentions of both sides, made findings well-supported by the evidence, and that in finding the subcontractor’s claim meritorious, the arbitrator implicitly rejected the general contractor’s exaggeration claim. The Court ruled that the parties effectively waived litigation of the viability of the lien claim in agreeing to arbitrate the dispute as to compensation under the contract.

As demonstrated in this case, construction professionals and their counsel should take the time to understand the claims covered by mandatory arbitration clauses, and to raise all of their claims to the arbitrator during the arbitration.