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“Constructive” Knowledge as an Element of an OSHA Violation

To withstand a contest to an OSHA citation, the Secretary of Labor must prove four elements by a preponderance of the evidence.  The first element is that the cited standard applies.  The second is a failure to comply with the cited standard.  The third is that one or more employees have had access to the violative condition.

The fourth and last element is probably the one most often litigated:  “actual” or “constructive” knowledge of the violation on the part of the employer.  This requires that the employer (including a supervisor whose knowledge can be imputed to the employer) have known or that the employer “could have known with the exercise of reasonable diligence” of the violative condition.

The OSH Act provides for an “unpreventable employee misconduct” defense to an OSHA citation.  This is an “affirmative defense,” because an employer who fails to assert it waives it, and the employer who does assert it has the burden of proving it.  The concepts governing the “unpreventable employee misconduct” defense resemble those related to “constructive knowledge” of a violation.

Since what constitutes “reasonable diligence” can vary, based on the facts of a given case, there is no precise standard of what constitutes “constructive knowledge.”  In Secretary v. J. Reed Constructors, Inc., for example, the OSHA compliance officer espied two workers in an aerial lift, applying Tyvek to the exterior walls of a school entrance undergoing renovation.  The lift was raised about 35 feet above grade, and neither man was tied off.  This plainly violated the OSHA standard requiring that a body belt be worn, and a lanyard attached to the boom or basket, when working from an aerial lift.

Charged with a “Repeat” violation, the employer in J. Reed conceded the applicability of the standard, failure to comply with the standard’s terms, and employee access to the violative condition.  Contesting the lone citation item — which, as a “Repeat” violation, carried a $14,000 penalty — the employer based its defense on (1) a claim that “the owners and the management of the company did not know that the violation was going on;” and (2) the affirmative defense that its employees’ failure to tie off was “unpreventable employee misconduct.”

As there was no evidence that the employer’s single supervisor onsite had observed the employees working from the aerial lift without fall protection, “actual knowledge” was disproved.  The Secretary was therefore required to rely upon “constructive knowledge” to establish the violation.

The Administrative Law Judge reviewed the evidence concerning the employer’s exercise of due diligence to discover, and prevent, its employees’ violative conduct.  The employer, it found, had a safety manual stating a “100% tie-off policy” when working 6’ or more above grade, but the manual was available only in English, whereas many of the company’s employees (including both employees seen in the lift by the compliance officer) were Spanish-speaking, and the manual was distributed only to supervisors.  No safety classes for the employees in the lift were held.

The supervisor in charge on the day of the inspection spoke only a few words of Spanish, was “all over the place” and “super busy” on the day of the occurrence, and explained his failure to see men working in the lift without tying off during the six hours they were applying the Tyvek to the exterior wall by stating “I can’t be everywhere all the time” and that “there’s no way to babysit everybody.”

The employer in J. Reed had two prior citations for employees’ failing to tie off while working from aerial lifts, and admitted that it generally neglected “Job Safety Analysis” procedures. described in the company’s safety manual as the “cornerstone” of its overall safety program.

Based on the foregoing, the ALJ in J. Reed concluded that the employer had failed to adequately train its employees, to monitor its employees’ use of fall protection, and to take measures to prevent fall protection violations.  It had no specific work rule requiring that employees working in lifts be tied off, and its safety program (such as it was) was communicated at the discretion of the supervisors, without sufficient efforts to impart specific rules to non-English speaking employees.

Despite being on notice (from past OSHA citations) that its employees at times failed to tie off while working from aerial lifts, J. Reed Constructors took no steps to ensure that the crew be monitored, and did not even discipline the crew when its infraction was discovered.  This failure to discipline, the ALJ found, signaled to the employees that the company did not take its own safety program seriously, and justified a finding of a lack of due diligence.

The ALJ in J. Reed rejected the “unpreventable employee misconduct” defense “for most of the same reasons the Secretary’s case for constructive knowledge succeeded.”  The defense is established by showing that the employer established a work rule to prevent the violation, adequately communicated the rule to employees including supervisors, took reasonable steps to discover violations of the rule, and effectively enforced it.  The ALJ found that the employer had established a rule, but that none of the additional necessary elements had been shown.  The citation and proposed penalty were therefore affirmed.

The OSH Review Commission took a more lenient approach in Secretary v. LJC Dismantling Corp., finding a lack of actual and constructive knowledge, and vacating a citation item that had been affirmed by the ALJ.

The item in question involved a failure to correctly plan a scaffold, which failure resulted in an injury.  The Secretary based an argument of “actual knowledge” based on a foreman’s testimony that he had seen the injured employee “on scaffold” at the beginning of the workday.  Other evidence, however, showed that the injured employee had not even begin to erect the scaffold when the foreman was on the roof, and that the accident occurred about two hours after the workday began, at which time the injured employee had been on the scaffold for only a few minutes.  This inconsistent evidence, the ALJ found, was insufficient to establish actual knowledge.

The Secretary’s insistence that the improperly-planked scaffold was in plain view, and should therefore have been known to the employer, was also rejected.  While the gap to the planking was in plain view, the commission found, nothing in the record showed that that defect existed while the foreman (or other supervisor) was in the area prior to the accident.  The injured employee completed the scaffold, climbed up, and was injured before finishing preparations to do his work.  Since he had not begun to erect the scaffold until two hours or less before the accident, there was not sufficient evidence to show that the condition was present for a long enough time that the employer should have known about it.

If you have and communicate safety rules, take steps to discover infractions, and enforce the rules by effective disciplinary measures, not only will you have a shot at establishing the “unpreventable employee misconduct” defense, but you will almost certainly have fewer OSHA violations.

Court Rules Penalty Provision Against Contractor is Unenforceable

Many large construction contracts contain a liquidated or stipulated damages provision which provides a specific dollar amount to be assessed for each day of delay in the completion of the project. A liquidated damages clause may be included in prime contracts, subcontracts and material supply contracts.

Courts, however, will not enforce a liquidated damages provision where the agreed upon amount is grossly disproportionate to the actual damages resulting from the delay. Whether the provision is a valid liquidated damages provision or an unenforceable penalty is sometimes difficult to determine.

In the recent case of Phoenix Construction, Inc. v 70th Street Apartments Corp., the court addressed the enforceability of a clause providing for $250 to be assessed for each calendar day of delay.

Background

Phoenix was retained by 70th Street Apartments to perform certain specified roofing and façade work. The contract provided that if the work was not fully completed within 120 days, “then a penalty equaling Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per calendar day will be imposed upon the contractor”. The contractor completed the work in 302 calendar days—182 days late.

The contractor was not paid the full amount of its work and filed a mechanic’s lien against the premises for $46,285.35 to secure its payment. The contractor thereafter started a lien foreclosure action. In response, the owner attempted to offset the amount owed by asserting a counterclaim seeking $45,500, which is the stipulated $250 daily amount assessed for each of the 182 days of delay.

The owner moved for summary judgment to discharge the contractor’s mechanic’s lien, dismiss its lien foreclosure action, and also to enforce the penalty provision based on the contractor’s delayed performance. In support of its motion, and in order to demonstrate that the contractor did not complete the job until well after the time frame set forth in the contract, the owner submitted a final waiver of lien and release of claims executed by the contractor after the 302nd day of the project. The contractor opposed the owner’s motion, arguing that the delays were the owner’s fault, and that the provision—which was clearly labeled as a “penalty”—was unenforceable because the stipulated damages claimed did not rationally relate to the actual damages resulting from the delay. The contractor claimed that there were no extra costs incurred by the owner as a result of the delay because the architect, who oversaw and supervised the job, was paid on a flat-rate basis and, therefore, the owner would not have been liable for additional compensation to the architect for its extended supervision time. The contractor also noted that the owner submitted no evidence of other delay costs to justify the imposition of the stipulated amount of delay damages, but was simply relying on the fact that the project was completed late.

Decision

The court recognized that liquidated damages clauses are enforceable where the amount stipulated is a reasonable measure of the actual delay damages anticipated. The court ruled, however, that the provision here was an unenforceable penalty clause and not a valid liquidated damages provision. The owner even referred to the provision as one of a “penalty”. The court also pointed out that the contractual clause itself provides the term “penalty”.

The court also noted that the owner failed to offer any evidence of actual damages which would approximate or reasonably relate to the amount stipulated in the contract. Accordingly, the court dismissed the owner’s counterclaim, holding that such penalties are not enforceable and contrary to public policy. However, the contractor did not fare well either. The contractor’s claims were dismissed in light of the final waiver of lien and release of claims it signed and submitted to the owner.

Comment

Contractors who seek to include liquidated damages provisions in their downstream contracts would be well advised to attempt to reasonably forecast the measure of damages they would sustain in the event of an actual delay. The computation does not need scientific precision; it will be upheld so long it is “a reasonable measure of the anticipated probable harm”. If, however, the provision is inserted as a scare tactic to ensure timely performance or to impose punishment for late completion regardless of actual damage, it will be unenforceable.

Subcontractors’ Claims Timing

Question. Are Subcontractors' claims time barred despite the issuance of HUD reports providing that GC ceased work on the project a year earlier but it was undisputed that GC continued to oversee, and the subcontractors continued to perform, work on the project?

Answer. Maybe.

The instant actions arise from a general contractor's alleged failure to pay two subcontractors, Subcontractor1 and Subcontractor2 (collectively, the "Subcontractors"), for work that they performed on a multifamily housing project. Subcontractors seek to collect the unpaid amount from the general contractor, as well as Surety which issued a payment bond in connection with the underlying project.

Surety contends that Subcontractors' claims are time-barred because they failed to commence these actions within one year of the date of completion of the contracted-for work, the limitations period set forth in the payment bond.

The Construction Contract defined "[t]he date of final completion" as "the date the HUD representative signs the final HUD Trip Report provided that the Trip Report is subsequently endorsed by the Chief Architect." The Construction Contract also required GC to "correct any defects due to faulty materials or workmanship which appear within one year from the date of final completion."

Finally, the Construction Contract indicates that "the Contractor shall furnish to the Owner assurance of completion of the work in the form of…100 percent Performance and Payment Bond.".

Pursuant to written subcontract agreements GC hired Subcontractors as subcontractors to assist with carpentry related services for the Project.

Surety, issued a payment bond on behalf of GC, as principal, in favor of the owner of the Project, the Owner, as obligee (the "Bond"). The Bond was issued for the "use and benefit" of claimants supplying labor and materials for the Project; in essence, the Bond ensures that GC properly pays its subcontractors and suppliers. The Bond defines a "claimant" as "one having a direct contract with the Principal or with a subcontractor of the Principal for labor…used or reasonably required for use in the performance of the contract."  Pursuant to the Bond, every claimant "who has not been paid in full before the expiration of a period of ninety (90) days after the date on which the last of such claimant's work or labor was done or performed…may sue on this bond for the use of such claimant."  Importantly, the Bond requires that all claims brought thereunder must be initiated within one year after GC, the Principal, "ceased work" on the Construction Contract.

On December 9, 2010, it is undisputed that, HUD issued the "HUD Representative's Trip Report" (the "Trip Report"), which states as follows:

CONTRACTED WORK IS 100 percent COMPLETE WITH NO PUNCH LIST ITEMS.

THERE ARE NO ITEMS OF DELAYED COMPLETION.

WORK PERFORMED IN A SATISFACTORY WORK-LIKE MANOR [sic].

ALL UTILITIES ARE COMPLETELY INSTALLED, CONNECTED, OPERABLE AND SAFE. ALL FACILITIES FOR INGRESS AND EGRESS ARE IN PLACE.

The "scheduled progress" and "actual progress" boxes on the Trip Report form contain the value "100 percent."

On December 10, 2010, the Project Architect, issued a Certificate of Substantial Completion. The Certificate of Substantial Completion defines "Substantial Completion" as the stage when the contracted-for work "is sufficiently complete in accordance with the Contract documents so that the Owner can occupy or utilize the Work for its intended use." On its face, the Certificate of Substantial Completion covers the "Full Project," and states that the "applicable warranties required by the [Construction] Contract Documents" commence on the date of its execution. The Certificate of Substantial Completion further states that:

“A list of items to be completed or corrected is attached hereto. The failure to include any items on such list does not alter the responsibility of the Contractor to complete all Work in accordance with the Contract Documents. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing, the date of commencement of warranties for items on the attached list will be the date of issuance of the final Certificate of Payment or the date of final payment.

Cost estimate of Work that is incomplete or defective: $0.00.

The Contractor will complete or correct the Work on the list of items attached hereto within Zero (0) days from the above date of Substantial Completion.”

The Certificate of Substantial Completion has no attachments. Finally, the Owner signed the Certificate of Substantial Completion, thereby "accept[ing] the Work or designated portion as substantially complete." Id.

According to GC, as of December 2010, GC was entitled to payment of the entire Contract balance, save for a five percent retainage that the lender was holding because HUD had not finally endorsed the Owner's mortgage loan.

It is uncontested that Subcontractors performed work on the Project in 2011. The critical dispute between the parties concerns the nature of the work performed after December 2010: Surety characterizes such work as entirely remedial, and maintains that the work called for by the Construction Contract was "100 percent complete" as of December 2010, whereas Subcontractors contend that work performed after December 10 was work called for under the contract and subcontract, including "punch list work."

"'[P]unch list' work" is "work called for by the original contract (or subcontract) which the contractor (or subcontractor) has not satisfactorily completed."

Surety bears the burden of showing that the limitations period had expired before Subcontractors filed their action. New York courts construe bonds like any other contract in order to determine the parties' rights and obligations thereunder

Here, the Bond provides that the applicable limitations period starts the moment when GC, the principal, "cease[s] work on said Contract," i.e., the Construction Contract. In this context, New York courts define cease work according to its plain and ordinary meaning — when labor ceases. Given that the Bond defines claimants to include subcontractors — i.e., the subcontractors are third-party beneficiaries of the Bond — and given that the subcontract work on the Project was derivative of work called for by the Construction Contract, the phrase "work under said Contract" includes work called for by the Construction Contract as well as the subcontracts entered by GC.

The Construction Contract defines its "date of final completion" as the date on which the HUD Representative signs the final Trip Report, provided that the Chief Architect endorses it thereafter. It is undisputed that the HUD Representative signed, and the Chief Architect endorsed, the Trip Report by December 10, 2010. It is also undisputed that the Trip Report specifies "100 percent completion" of contract work with "no punch-list items" and "no items of delayed completion.” The December 2010 Certificate of Substantial Completion similarly indicates the absence of punch list items, and certifies that the Owner could occupy the premises for their "intended use."

However, it is likewise undisputed that GC continued to oversee, and subcontractors continued to perform, work in 2011. Surety argues that the work performed on the Project in 2011 was entirely remedial, and therefore does not affect the limitations period, which started running in December 2010.  Subcontractors contend they were still performing contract work.

As there is a question of fact a determination if Subcontractors’ claims are time barred cannot be made.

OSHA’s Updated Reporting and Recordkeeping Rules

OSHA recently released new, updated rules regarding the reporting of fatalities and severe injuries and illnesses.  These rules apply to states under federal OSHA jurisdiction (which include New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut).

At present, employers must report to OSHA all work-related fatalities, and all work-related hospitalizations of three or more employees.

Effective January 1, 2015, employers will be required to report:

  • All work-related fatalities;
  • All work related, in-patient hospitalizations of one or more employees;
  • All work-related amputa­tions; and
  • All work-related losses of one or both eyes.

As at present, fatalities will have to be reported to OSHA within eight hours of the employer finding out about it.  In-patient hospitalizations, amputations, and eye losses will have to be reported within 24 hours of the employer learning of them.

Only fatalities occurring within 30 days of the work-related incident must be reported.  An in-patient hospitalization, amputation, or eye loss will be reportable only if occurring within 24 hours of the work-related incident.

Employers have two, and will soon have three, options for reporting fatalities and the other incidents required to be reported:

  • By phone, to your local area office (the Tarrytown area office number is 914-524-7510, and the Albany area office number is 518-464-4338);
  • By calling the 24-hour OSHA hotline (1-800-321-6742); or
  • Electronically, through a soon-to-be-released system to be accessible through OSHA’s website, www.osha.gov.

Upon reporting any of the above occurrences to OSHA, all of the following information must be provided:

  • The name of the establishment;
  • The location where the work-related incident took place;
  • The date and time of the incident;
  • The type of incident (fatality, loss of eye, etc.);
  • A brief description of the incident;
  • The number of employees affected;
  • The name(s) of all affected employees;
  • The name and telephone number of a contact person for the employer.

Certain types of incidents are not required to be reported.  For example, injuries, etc. resulting from a motor vehicle accident on a public street or highway are not required to be reported, unless the accident happened in a construction work zone.

Likewise, incidents occurring on a commercial or public transportation system (airplane, subway, bus, ferry, streetcar, light rail, train) do not need to be reported.

Events occurring more than 24 hours after the work-related incident (or 30 days thereafter in the case of a fatality) are not required to be reported.

Finally, in-patient hospitalizations (defined as a formal admission to an in-patient service of a hospital or clinic for care or treatment) do not need to be reported, if admission was for diagnostic testing or observation only.  If, however, it is determined following admission that the employee suffered a heart attack due to a work-related incident, that must be reported.

The new rules also revise the manner in which OSHA classifies industries to determine which are “low hazard” industries, “partially” exempt from the rules requiring the maintenance of injury and illness records.  In general, the industries classified as “low hazard” are those with Lost Workday Injury and Illness rates 75% or less of the average rate for all of private industry.  Also, OSHA is switching from the “Standard Industrial Classification System” to the “North American Industry Classification System.”  While few, if any, construction-related companies are classifiable as “low-hazard” under either system, the record-keeping requirements apply only to employers having 11 or more employees at any time during the preceding calendar year.  (The exemption for size is based on the number of employees in the entire company, not just field employees.)

OSHA refers to the low-hazard industries as “partially exempt” because they may be required to keep records, on notice from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the BLS’s annual survey, or by OSHA, as part of the OSHA Data Initiative.  Note that even partially exempt employers must comply with the rules requiring that fatalities, hospitalizations, etc. be reported.  If you have any question concerning your company’s possible status as a “low-hazard” employer, instructions for determining if your company’s primary business activity qualifies it for such status may be found on OSHA’S website, or you can contact your local OSHA office for help.

Under OSHA’s recordkeeping regulations, certain employers must prepare and maintain records of significant occupational injuries and illnesses, using the OSHA 300 Log.  The data in these logs is used to evaluate the safety of the employer’s workplace, but also in identifying hazards, and developing measures to reduce and eliminate them.

I assume that nearly all readers of this series are already familiar with OSHA Form 300 (the Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses), Form 300A (Summary of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses) and Form 301 (Injury and Illness Incident Report).  The “Summary” (Form 300A) must be completed and posted annually, even if no recordable work-related injuries or illnesses occurred during the year.  The “Log” and “Incident Report” need to be completed only if a recordable injury or illness has occurred.  Forms equivalent to the official forms (such as an insurance form instead of the Incident Report, supplemented if appropriate to provide information, if any, not on the insurance form, that the Incident Report requires) may be used.

Still pending is a proposed rule that would permit OSHA to cite employers for discouraging workers from reporting injuries or illnesses.  OSHA is looking to deter employers from using incentive programs, such as rewarding workers for a fixed number of days without a reportable injury, to discourage workers from reporting when they are injured or made sick on the job.

A copy of the Final Rule can be found online at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=FEDERAL_REGISTER&p_id=24728.  OSHA’s website has a recordkeeping section, which may be accessed at https://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/.

Court Allows Subcontractor’s Delay Claim

New York courts generally enforce the no-damages-for-delay clauses found in many public work contracts and some private construction contracts. This provision prevents a contractor or subcontractor from recovering monetary damages for delays that occur on a construction project. However, there are certain exceptions to the enforceability of a no-damages-for-delay clause. One of the exceptions is where the delay was not contemplated by the parties at the time they entered into the contract.

In the recent case of N.J.D. Wiring & Electric, Inc. v M.A. Angeliades, Inc., the court denied the general contractor’s motion to dismiss the subcontractor’s delay claim, ruling that there was a triable issue as to whether the delay claim falls within the exception to the enforceability of a no-damages-for-delay clause.

Background

M.A. Angeliades, a prime contractor, entered into a contract with the New York City School Construction Authority to perform general construction work at a school in Brooklyn. On January 12, 2007, Angeliades entered into a subcontract with NJD Wiring and Electric whereby the subcontractor would perform the electrical scope of Angeliades’ work.  The subcontract required that NJD was to commence work on or about January 2007 and complete the work within 24 months.  The subcontract incorporated Angeliades’ prime contract and contained a standard no-damages-for-delay clause which prohibited monetary claims for delay and provided that the contractor would be fully compensated by an appropriate extension of time to complete the work.

NJD was prevented by no fault of its own from commencing work on the Project until eleven months after the expected start date.  According to NJD, the delays were caused by several factors which had absolutely nothing to do with NJD’s scope of work. NJD submitted the appropriate requests for an extension of time pursuant to its contract, but these requests were denied. Instead, Angeliades required NJD to complete its work in the remaining 13 months, which it did.  NJD thereafter incurred substantial additional expenses totaling $1,984,039 necessitated by its expedited completion of its work within the 13 month period.  The additional expenses included additional costs for labor wages, overtime and site supervision, extended general conditions and additional costs.

In April of 2008, Angeliades submitted a change order to the School Construction Authority seeking to recover its own acceleration costs as a result of the unforeseen delays, which was paid by the SCA.  In December of 2009, NJD submitted a request for equitable adjustment seeking payment for its acceleration costs.  NJD’s request was denied by the SCA on the grounds that all acceleration costs relating to the delay had already been paid to the prime contractor Angeliades under the April 2008 change order.

NJD commenced an action against Angeliades and its payment bond surety, for breach of the subcontract. Both Angeliades and the bond surety moved to dismiss NJD’s lawsuit, relying on the no-damages-for-delay clause in the subcontract.  NJD opposed the motion, arguing that the delays were uncontemplated as evidenced by the SCA’s payment to Angeliades for delay damages, notwithstanding the no-damages-for-delay clause in its own prime contract.

Decision

The court agreed with the subcontractor, finding that delays which were not foreseeable by the parties at the time of the contract are compensable even in the presence of a no-damages-for-delay clause, and that the issue of whether these delays were uncontemplated could not be determined without further pre-trial discovery.  The court noted, however,  that there was an identical no-damages-for-delay clause in Angeliades’ prime contract, for which Angeliades received compensation for its own delay costs, but Angeliades denies NJD damages for the same delay.  

Comment

In my Attorney’s Column of two months ago, I reported that New York City revised its standard contract to eliminate the no-damage-for-delay clause and allow claims against City agencies for delay and related costs under certain circumstances.  This case arose before the City eliminated the no-damage—for-delay provision.  Under the current revised City contract, it appears that the subcontractor would have satisfied the criteria for compensable delays.

Advance of Litigation Expenses for Corporation Director

Question.        Where there are issues of fact in a dispute over whether a director participated in alleged wrongful conduct, and acted in good faith on the corporation's behalf, is he entitled to advance of litigation expenses, including attorney fees?

Answer. Yes.

The Director founded the Corporation in 1964 and continued to be the president until 2009.  The Director also owned two adjacent commercial properties, Property A and Property B, where the Corporation operated its business.  It is alleged that The Director, as president of The Corporation, signed two leases for The Corporation's continued use of Property A and Property B. In both lease agreements, the Director signed the Lease as both the President of The Corporation, the tenant, and as a co-landlord.  The co-owners of the properties and current president of the Corporation are the Director’s children.

The Leases give the Corporation the exclusive and irrevocable option to buy the properties during the terms of the Leases, and the right of first refusal in the event of a bona fide offer to purchase by a third party.  Disputes have arisen amongst the tenant and the property owners as to rental payments, and the right of first refusal in a bid by the Corporation to purchase the property.  Allegations have been made against the Director involving breach of fiduciary duty.

The Director has requested reimbursement and the advancement of attorney's fees and costs in defending this action, pursuant to BCL §724(c), on the grounds that he is entitled to indemnification as a former officer and director of The Corporation.

The Director argues that he has denied any wrongdoing and raised issues of fact regarding whether his actions as president of The Corporation were in good faith pursuant to BCL 724(c). The Corporation argues that The Director is not entitled to indemnification and advanced legal fees because The Director admitted that his actions were not in the best interest of The Corporation and that he was balancing the interests of his son and his daughters pursuant to his personal "asset allocation" plan. Accordingly, plaintiff argues that pursuant to BCL 722(c), his actions were not in good faith or in the best interests of the Corporation.

Where there are issues of fact in a dispute over whether a director participated in alleged wrongful conduct and acted in good faith on behalf of the corporation, courts have generally permitted the relief of advanced litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, subject to reallocation at the end of the action pursuant to BCL 725(a).

The Director has defended this action and is requesting the advancement of legal fees pursuant to BCL 724. Accordingly, the Director is entitled to the advancement of attorney's fees pursuant to BCL 724(c).

Connecticut Supreme Court Reaffirms High Standard for Getting Around No Damage for Delay Provisions

As many contractors know, a “no-damage-for-delay” provision in a construction contract is onerous because it shifts the risks of delay to contractors who often have absolutely nothing to do with the cause of that delay. While these provisions routinely allow contractors extensions of time to complete their own work, such extensions of time do nothing to offset increased bond and insurance premiums, increased supervision costs and increased home office overhead costs. Because construction contracts are business contracts—and because courts give great deference to business contracts as the product of lengthy negotiations between sophisticated businesspeople—courts will strictly enforce these provisions absent narrow and unusual circumstances.

In 1991, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in White Oak Corp. v Dept. of Transportation (217 Conn. 281), adopted the four exceptions to the enforcement of a no-damage-for-delay clause adopted by New York’s highest court eight years beforehand in Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v State (58 NY2d 377 [1983]). Those judicially crafted exceptions will allow recovery even in the presence of a no-damages-for-delay clause where there are: 1) delays caused by the owner’s bad faith or its willful, malicious or grossly negligent conduct; 2) uncontemplated delays; 3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract; and 4) delays resulting from the owner’s breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract. In the recent case of C and H Electric v Town of Bethel (312 Conn. 843 [2014]), the Connecticut Supreme Court reaffirmed the heavy burden that a contractor needs to meet to get around one of these onerous clauses.

In C & H, the Town sought to renovate and expand one of its schools. This school was built in the 1960s and expanded in the 1970s. Typical of schools of that era, the building contained significant quantities of asbestos. Before undertaking the subject construction project, the Town hired an environmental consultant to look for hazardous materials within the school, including asbestos. The consultant indeed discovered asbestos, and the Town hired an abatement contractor to perform the removal work. The Town expected the abatement contractor to complete its work before any new construction.

For some reason, the abatement contractor completed just 70 percent of its work. Although the Town had yet to complete the abatement, it nevertheless moved forward with the construction, believing that the remaining asbestos would not affect the new construction work. C & H contracted with the Town to perform the electrical work for the project. The contract contained a no-damages-for-delay clause which expressly excluded from its scope any claims for “a delay … caused by acts of the Town constituting active interference with C & H’s performance of the [w]ork….”

Before entering into the contract, the Town openly discussed the remaining abatement work at a number of public meetings. However, the Town did not directly inform C & H about the fact of the incomplete abatement, and C & H was not present at these meetings. As part of the bid materials, the Town did provide C & H with drawings indicating the location of asbestos within the existing school building. Still, the original schedule provided to bidders indicated that abatement would be completed before any construction began. The Town failed to revise the project specifications to reflect that about 30 percent of the abatement work remained incomplete. The Town also did not discuss the progress of the abatement during contract negotiations with C & H, and C & H did not ask about it. Instead, C & H assumed this work would be completed prior to the start of construction.

The Town instructed C & H to commence work in February of 2007. The work went on as planned until the summer of 2007, when the continuing asbestos abatement work interrupted C & H’s work. The Town's abatement contractor barred access to certain areas of the school building, which required C & H to move its crews and equipment to different work areas and repeatedly return to certain work areas as the abatement proceeded. Despite these interruptions, C & H completed its work just about on time. However, C & H incurred extra expenses as a result. When the Town denied C & H’s claim for these extra expenses, C & H sued. To get around the no-damages-for-delay clause, C & H claimed that the Town knew the ongoing asbestos abatement work would interfere with construction but nevertheless ordered C & H to begin its work. In support of its delay claim, C & H asserted that it need only prove that the Town committed some affirmative, wilful act that unreasonably interfered with its work, and that the Town's actions fell within this standard because it actively concealed from C & H the delay in the asbestos abatement work. In addition, C & H argued that the Town's concealment and failure to provide C & H unfettered access to its work sites fell within the judicially crafted exceptions to no-damages-for-delay clauses.  

After a trial, the court found that C & H did not meet its burden of establishing either “active interference” by the Town or facts which would fit any of the judicially crafted exceptions to the enforcement of no-damage-for-delay clauses. Connecticut’s Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of C & H’s delay claim.

First, as to the “active interference” exception set forth in the parties’ contract, the Court held that this standard was synonymous with the judicially crafted “bad faith, willful, malicious or grossly negligent conduct” standard. After equating the standards, the Court found that although the Town had specific knowledge of the unfinished abatement work, the Town had no actual knowledge that this unfinished abatement work would interfere with C & H’s work. Therefore, the Court found that any interference which may have been negligently caused by the Town was neither willful nor unreasonable. Additionally, the Court further noted that while it was not imposing any additional requirements on contractor, it did note that as the Town did discuss the existence of remaining asbestos at public meetings it undermined C & H’s argument that the condition was actively concealed.

Next, the Court addressed the only other possibly applicable judicially crafted exception, the owner’s breach of a fundamental obligation. The Court noted that breaching a fundamental obligation involves more than ordinary, garden variety failures. Here, the Court held that the Town’s interference with C & H’s work schedule was minimal—as evidenced by the fact that C & H got the work finished on time—and that C & H could have anticipated the need to re-sequence its work based on the disclosures that the Town did make. Accordingly, any breach by the Town did not rise to the level of the breach of a fundamental obligation sufficient to get around the enforceability of the no-damages-for-delay clause.

In C & H, the Connecticut Supreme Court once again reiterated the high standard that a contractor must show before being able to recover delay damages in the face of a no-damage-for-delay clause. Here, even though an owner had specific knowledge of incomplete abatement work that was likely to interfere with the contractor’s work, the Court held that because the owner did not have specific knowledge that the incomplete abatement work would interfere with the work, the conduct did not rise to the required level. Further, in what could be seen as a perverse twist, the Court found that C & H, by successfully accelerating its performance to work around the owner’s delays, evidenced that the delays were not unreasonable and, therefore, evidenced that there was no breach of a fundamental contractual obligation by the Town which would permit recovery.

OSHA’s Place in the Realm of Workplace Safety Law in New York

From time to time, I am asked whether violating OSHA makes the employer liable in a personal injury action — or, more generally, how OSHA fits into the framework of statutory and case law provisions designed to safeguard the health and safety of construction workers, and to give workers redress for injuries suffered on construction jobsites.

Broadly speaking, in New York there are four schemes, whereby federal and state laws endeavor to safeguard workers, and provide injured workers with compensation:

  1. Federal OSHA (the OSH Act, and the agency that enforces it);
  2. The New York State Industrial Code, and activities of the New York State Department of Labor;
  3. Workers’ Compensation; and
  4. Personal injury litigation, under the common law, and N.Y. Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241(6).

Additional facets of worker protection, having limited relevance to construction activities, will be mentioned only in passing.  One is that mine safety (mining is more widespread in New York than you might think) comes not under the OSH Act, but under the Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977.  Both the United States and New York Departments of Labor have agencies known as the “Mine Safety & Health Administration.”  The federal MSHA enforces the Mine Safety & Health Act, while the New York MSHA concentrates on safety and health training programs.  There also exist a Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and a Federal Railroad Safety Act as well.

As in New Jersey and Connecticut, New York’s state and local municipal employees are outside the protection of OSHA.  In New York, they come under the care of the Public Employee Safety & Health Bureau, part of the State Department of Labor.

Also, while liability insurance (as distinguished from Workers’ Compensation) is not a statutory or administrative program, to the extent that it is, in practice, mandated on many construction projects, such coverage provides resources potentially available to compensate injured workers.

While many states comply with the federal OSH Act through state-administered, “Little OSHA” agencies, in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, most private-sector employment is overseen by federal OSHA.

 The NYS Industrial Code, and construction safety-related activities of the NYS Department of Labor, occupy a Zone straddling the boundary between preventative and compensatory aspects of New York’s employee safety environment.  The Industrial Code was, before OSHA, a primary source of protection for New York workers.  OSHA was enacted with a “savings clause,” and does not wholly pre-empt the Industrial Code.  Since the advent of OSHA, however, updates and amendments to the Industrial Code have been infrequent.  The NYS Department of Labor continues to carry out safety-related inspection and enforcement activities, but — except in the domain of State and municipal employment — generally the NYSDOL’s efforts in this area are modest, and confined largely to specialized issues, crane safety being one noteworthy example.

Workers’ Compensation, of course, was an early-20th century reform.  Its primary features are that virtually all employers are mandated to maintain workers’ comp coverage, and it provides relatively speedy   (albeit limited) compensation, on a “no fault” basis, to injured employees.

Personal injury lawsuits in which injured construction workers are plaintiffs are generally based on common-law negligence, and one or more of Sections 200, 240, and/or 241(6) of the Labor Law.  Section 200 is essentially a codification of common-law principles, requiring places of employment to be “so constructed, equipped, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, health and safety of all persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places.”  It provides further that “all machinery, equipment, and devices . . . be so placed, operated, guarded, and lighted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection to all such persons.”

  Labor Law § 240 is the notorious “Scaffold Law,” making both contractors and premises owners (excepting owners of one- and two-family dwellings who not direct or control the work) liable for injuries resulting from gravity-related occurrences, due to any failure to provide scaffolding, ladders and other safety devices.  Insurers, and those who pay their premiums, abhor this statute, because the injured plaintiff’s “comparative negligence” will not be considered by the jury, except if it was the “sole proximate cause” of the injury-producing occurrence.

Labor Law § 241(6) requires all areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed to be “constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places.”

The primary present-day importance of the Industrial Code is that, under Labor Law § 241(6), the touchstone of liability is that the defendant have violated one of its specific, “concrete” provisions, i.e., one not merely related to general safety standards.

One does see OSHA violations alleged in personal injury lawsuits, both as violations of Labor Law § 241(6), and as independent causes of action.  Such allegations are routinely rejected.  OSHA violations may come into evidence as indicative of negligence, but the fact that conduct violating OSHA caused, or contributed to, the plaintiff’s injuries does not establish negligence per se (even if the violation was cited by OSHA, and the citation was not contested, or was upheld).  There is no private right of action under OSHA.  An employee aggrieved by his employer’s violation of any OSHA standard is to report the violation to OSHA’s area office, which should trigger an inspection.

A major difference between OSHA and New York statutory and common-law liability is that OSHA focuses on the employment relationship, whereas liability under the Labor Law extends to injuries to “persons lawfully frequenting” the workplace.  Also, the owner of a construction site (other than the owner of a one or two-family dwelling who contracts for, but does not direct or control the work) may be liable for damages sustained by an injured worker, if it had the right to control the conduct of the injury-producing work, or actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition at issue.  Under OSHA, generally the owner will not be liable, at least if it did not have its own employees who caused, or were exposed to, the hazard.

Overall, as one New York judge observed, “the system used by OSHA to promote safety consists of inspections of worksites and citations and penalties conferred upon the employer,” but “New York law relies upon the threat of private lawsuit for damages brought by the injured workman to motivate the owner or contractor.

While OSHA violations, therefore, have but limited relevance to personal injury actions brought by injured construction employees, an employer’s conscientious compliance with OSHA’S construction standards will minimize, although it cannot totally eliminate, the prospect of injuries serious enough to result in a lawsuit.

Court Rejects Subcontractor’s Payment Bond Claim for Interest, Storage and Fuel Costs

A labor and material payment bond is a bond issued by a surety company to guarantee that the laborers, material suppliers and subcontractors on a project will be paid in full. In most cases, payment bonds are required by law on public construction projects. Private owners may also require contractors to furnish labor and material payment bonds.

In the recent case of Northeast Restoration Corp. v T. A. Ahern Contractors Corp., the court reaffirmed that claims for extra-contractual charges are not recoverable under a payment bond.

Background

In 2006, T. A. Ahern Contractors entered into a prime contract to perform certain construction work for the New York City School Construction Authority. The SCA required, and Ahern furnished, a labor and material payment bond in connection with Ahern’s work at the project. Ahern subcontracted out the window portion of its scope of work to Caliber Window, Inc., which, in turn, sub-subcontracted with Graham Architectural Products Corp. to fabricate the required windows. Ultimately, when Graham remained unpaid, it filed a mechanic’s lien against Ahern’s contract.

Plaintiff Northeast Restoration, another of Ahern’s subcontractors, commenced this action to, among other things, foreclose its own mechanic’s lien. Graham was named as a defendant because of its mechanic’s lien. In response to being included in Northeast’s lawsuit, Graham filed cross- and counter-claims seeking to foreclose its mechanic’s lien and to recover under Ahern’s labor and material payment bond. Included in Graham’s claim against Ahern’s bond were interest, storage fees and fuel surcharges arising from Ahern’s postponement of the delivery and installation of the windows it manufactured for the project. Graham moved for summary judgment on this claim.

Decision

The court originally granted summary judgment to Graham on the issue of liability. However, upon a motion to reargue, the court reversed itself and denied its motion. In doing so, the court held that the surety’s obligations under a labor and material payment bond are limited to those undertaken in the bond and the bonded prime contract. The prime contract here between the SCA and Ahern did not provide for the recovery of interest, fuel surcharges or storage fees. Accordingly, the court held that such items were not recoverable under the term of the payment bond.

Comment

Here, the court reinforced the settled case law that damages recoverable under labor and material payment bonds are limited to items expressly set forth in the bonded (prime) contract. This holding should serve to remind bond claimants to obtain copies of the payment bond and the prime contract so that they can become thoroughly familiar with the bond requirements and be aware of the type of claims that are recoverable under the terms of the bond.