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Contractor Justified in Stopping Work for Nonpayment

The majority of cases concerning abandonment of work on a project is because of a dispute over nonpayment. A contractor or a subcontractor has the right to stop work for nonpayment if there is a significant delay in making progress payments. Recovery may be denied, however, where the contractor fails to comply with the provision in a contract requiring that the contractor give written notice of its intention to cease performing work on the jobsite

In the recent case of U.W. Marx, Inc. v Koko Contracting, Inc., the court addressed the question of whether a subcontractor is precluded from recovery because it stopped work on the project without complying with the contractual provision regarding notice of its suspension of work for nonpayment.

Background

U.W. Marx, Inc. was the general contractor on a school construction project. Marx entered into a subcontract with Koko Contracting, Inc. for the roofing work. The contract contained the following provision:

"If the Contractor does not pay the Subcontractor through no fault of the Subcontractor, within seven days from the time payment should be made as provided in this Agreement, the Subcontractor may, without prejudice to any other available remedies, upon seven additional days' written notice to the Contractor, stop the [w]ork of this Subcontract until payment of the amount owing has been received. The Subcontract Sum shall, by appropriate adjustment, be increased by the amount of the Subcontractor's reasonable costs of demobilization, delay and remobilization."

During the project, Koko remained unpaid for three months despite repeated demands for payment. On October 31, 2007, Koko ceased work on the jobsite. On November 3, 2007, Marx sent a letter to Koko giving it three days’ notice to cure its default in, among other things, failing to staff the job. Three days later, Koko belatedly provided Marx with the contractually required seven days’ written notice of its suspension of work based on nonpayment. Marx ultimately declared Koko in default, terminated the contract based on Koko’s removal of its workers and commenced a lawsuit to hold Koko liable for the claimed default. Koko countersued for the amounts which Marx failed to pay under the contract. After a trial, the court found that Marx’s justifications for withholding payment were unsupported, and that Koko was entitled to payment. Marx appealed.

Decision

On appeal, Marx did not argue that it was justified in withholding payment. Rather, Marx argued that the subcontractor was precluded from recovering on its counterclaim because it failed to give the required seven days’ written notice before removing its workers from the project. The court found that Koko indeed failed to comply with the written notice provision. However, in affirming the trial court’s judgment in favor of Koko, the appellate court held that Marx’s own breach of the contract by failing to make three successive progress payments without justification excused Koko’s strict compliance with the notice provision. As stated by the court, “Marx cannot preclude Koko from recovering for Marx’s material breach of the contract by relying on Koko's subsequent failure to comply with a clause that inures to Koko’s benefit.”

As for Marx’s argument that excusing Koko’s compliance with the notice provision based on its own failure to pay would render the notice provision meaningless, the court noted that the language of the notice provision is designed to protect the subcontractor and to compensate it if it has to stop work for nonpayment and then remobilize. In light of the language of the notice provision, however, the court held that Koko’s failure to comply would preclude it from recovering remobilization costs if it resumed work. Nevertheless, because of Marx’s own breach of contract for nonpayment, Marx could not use Koko’s failure to give written notice as a shield to insulate itself from the effects of Marx’s breach of contract.

Comment

The court in this case applied well settled case law to find that Marx’s prior breach of the contract excused Koko from compliance with the notice of suspension of work provisions of the contract.

While no subcontractor can tolerate continuing to work in the absence of payment, the subcontractor would be well advised to nevertheless follow the contractual notice provisions—and be certain that there is no justification for withholding payment before removing its workers from the jobsite. Only then will the court find, as in this case, that the subcontractor was justified in removing its workers from the jobsite for nonpayment.  

  

Subcontractor Claims a Violation of the Prompt Payment Act (PPA)

Question.        Subcontractor claims a violation of the Prompt Payment Act (PPA). Subcontractor alleged it submitted invoices to Contractor for work that was completed, but Contractor failed to remit payment on the invoices within 30 days of their issuance, nor object to them, or advise of any reason for the non-payment. There is no record of any objections to Subcontractor's demand for payment, and invoices, and payment was not timely made.  Is Contractor in violation of the PPA?

Answer. Yes.

Subcontractor alleges a violation of New York's Prompt Payment Act (the "PPA").

Subcontractor and Contractor entered into an oral agreement whereby Contractor hired Subcontractor to perform certain work on two projects, (“Project A" and "Project B"). Subcontractor alleges that pursuant to the oral agreement, the parties did not agree to a billing cycle for the work on the projects. However, Contractor contends that the parties agreed to a bi-weekly billing cycle.

Subcontractor alleges that it submitted invoices to Contractor for the work performed as the work was completed but that Contractor failed to remit payment on all the invoices. Specifically, Subcontractor alleges that it submitted to Contractor the invoices for Project A but that Contractor failed to remit payment on the invoices within thirty days of their issuance. Additionally, Subcontractor alleges that Contractor failed to object to the invoices or advise of a reason for non-payment of the invoices, in writing, within twelve business days after the invoices were issued, and failed to approve or disapprove the invoices within twelve business days after the invoices were issued.

Subcontractor alleges that it submitted to Contractor the invoices for Project B but that Contractor failed to remit payment on the invoices within thirty days of their issuance. Subcontractor alleges that in response to receiving the Project B invoices, Contractor advised Subcontractor of an alleged discrepancy in certain invoices related only to the rates being charged for labor but that Contractor did not object to any other portion of the invoices. Subcontractor submitted revised invoices to Contractor to reflect a slight change in the rate being charged for labor on the Project B. Subcontractor alleges that Contractor did not object to, provide a reason for non-payment of or approve or disapprove the revised invoices within twelve business days after their issuance.

Contractor paid Subcontractor over $220,000 for work performed on the Project A and over $100,000 for work performed on the Project B but failed to remit payment on the remaining invoices totaling over $565,000.  

The New York State Legislature enacted the PPA in an effort to help contractors secure timely payment on private construction projects.  Pursuant to the PPA, "[t]he parties to a construction contract may, by mutual agreement, establish a billing cycle for the submission of invoices requesting payment for work performed pursuant to a construction contract. In the absence of an agreement by the parties as to the billing cycle, the billing cycle shall be the calendar month within which the work is performed." GBL §756-a(1). Additionally, pursuant to GBL §756(1), "'[c]onstruction contract' means a written or oral agreement for the construction, reconstruction, alteration…of any building, structure…and where the aggregate cost of the construction project…exceeds one hundred fifty thousand dollars." The PPA further provides that

Upon delivery of an invoice and all contractually required documentation, an owner [or contractor] shall approve or disapprove all or a portion of such invoice within twelve business days. Owner [or contractor] approval of invoices shall not be unreasonably withheld nor shall an owner [or contractor], in bad faith disapprove all or a portion of an invoice. If an owner [or contractor] declines to approve an invoice or a portion thereof, it must prepare and issue a written statement describing those items in the invoice that are not approved.

GBL §756-a(2)(a)(i).

"An owner [or contractor] may decline to approve an invoice or portion of an invoice for" reasons which include, inter alia, unsatisfactory or disputed job progress; defective construction work or material not remedied; disputed work materials; and failure to comply with other material provisions of the construction contract. Id. However, "[i]f any interim or final payment to a contractor is delayed beyond the due date established in paragraph (a) of subdivision three of seven hundred fifty-six-a of this article, the owner [or contractor] shall pay the contractor interest beginning on the next day at the rate of one percent per month or fraction of a month on the unpaid balance, or at a higher rate consistent with the construction contract." GBL §765-b(1)(a).

Contractor's assertion that it agreed to pay Subcontractor on a price per square foot basis for each project but that Subcontractor improperly invoiced Contractor on a time and materials basis and that Subcontractor inflated its time costs on the invoices is not a defense to payment of the invoices pursuant to the PPA. The PPA requires that any objections to the invoices be made within twelve business days of their receipt. See GBL §756-a. However, it is undisputed that Contractor failed to make any objections to the invoices and thus, it has now waived those objections pursuant to the PPA.

Contractor's assertion that it was not required to pay the invoices or respond to the invoices in the time frame provided by the PPA because Subcontractor did not deliver the "invoice and all contractually required documentation," as required by GBL §756-a(2)(a)(ii), is without merit. Specifically, Contractor alleges that the parties agreed that Subcontractor would supply Contractor with an executed partial waiver and release with each invoice and that it failed to do so. As an initial matter, even if such contention is true, Contractor should have objected to the invoices on that basis in the time frame provided for in the PPA. Indeed, the PPA provides that "[f]ailure to comply with…material provisions of the construction contract" is a basis for withholding approval of an invoice. GBL §756-a(2)(a)(i)(4). Moreover, Contractor has failed to establish that the waivers and releases constitute "contractually required documentation" pursuant to the PPA as it has failed to allege that such documentation was required as a condition precedent to Contractor making payments on the invoices. Indeed, even if it had made such allegation, it cannot be substantiated as it is undisputed that Contractor paid over $300,000 to Subcontractor on invoices which did not include executed partial waivers and releases. Thus, such agreement was clearly not a condition precedent to payment on the invoices and therefore, such documentation cannot be "contractually required documentation" as provided for in the PPA.

If you would like more information regarding this topic please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at TTripodianos@wbgllp.com, or call him at 914-607-6440.

Please understand that this column provides the information only, and should not be construed as legal advice to anyone under any circumstances. The author reserves the right to modify any questions submitted so as to broaden their appeal. While we encourage you to contact us, you should not disclose to us any information that you consider confidential unless and until we have formally established an attorney-client relationship, and agreed to represent you in your particular matter. The opinions expressed in this column are of the individual author, and not necessarily those of the Hudson Valley Builders and Remodeler’s Association. Citations to legal authority have been omitted.

Court Rejects 22 Day Delay Claim

Construction delay claims are one of the most common causes of construction litigation. Delays can have devastating economic effects on both owners and contractors. Owners seek to protect themselves from paying damages for delays on a project by including a “no-damages-for-delay” cause in the construction contract. This provision is enforceable by the courts.

New York courts have recognized certain exceptions to the enforcement of a no-damages-for-delay clause. The exceptions are: (1) delays caused by bad faith or willful, malicious or grossly negligent conduct; (2) uncontemplated delays; (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract; and (4) delays resulting from the breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract.

The recent case of Advanced Automatic Sprinkler Co., Inc. v Seaboard Surety Co., a court ruled on the enforceability of a no-damages-for-delay clause where there was a 22 month delay.

Background

In June of 2001, Dart Mechanical Corporation, a prime HVAC contractor, entered into a contract with the New York City Department of Sanitation to refurbish two separate garages in Brooklyn. Thereafter, in June of 2002, Advanced Automatic Sprinkler Co., Inc. entered into a subcontract with Dart to install automatic sprinkler systems in the two garages. The subcontract contained a no-damages-for-delay clause which provided that Dart would not be liable to Advanced for any damages “resulting from delays, accelerations, inefficiencies, variations in the scope, schedule or sequence of the WORK”. The contract also provided that “DART shall have the right, at any time …. to modify progress schedules to accelerate, delay or vary any sequence of the WORK, in whole or in part”. It was not disputed that the entire project, including Advanced’s scope of work, was delayed by 22 months because: the owner failed to eject the previous owner, who held over in possession of the property; contaminated soil was encountered; the electrical contractor failed to perform its own scope of work; and the owner’s engineers made design errors in the sprinkler system Advanced was to have installed.

Advanced commenced a lawsuit against Dart’s payment bond surety, Seaboard Surety Company, to recover damages for the delay. Seaboard moved for summary judgment arguing, in part, that the no-damages-for-delay clause barred the delay claim because the delays were contemplated by the parties at the time the subcontract was entered into and they were referenced in the subcontract.

Decision

The court agreed with Seaboard and dismissed Advanced’s delay claim. In doing so, the court found that “the categories of delay alleged in the complaint—denial of access to the Project site, flawed design, failure to adhere to or properly coordinate the progress schedule, delays due to the work of another (the electrical) prime contractor—are all delays within the scope of the contractual provisions.” The court further distinguished cases in which other courts denied enforceability of the no-damages-for-delay clause by noting that the contracts in the distinguishable cases did not have language which was as broad and comprehensive as the language contained in the Dart-Advanced subcontract.

Comment

Here, the court once again reminds us that the exceptions to the enforceability of a no-damages-for-delay clause are extremely limited—particularly where the clause is comprehensive and sets forth a list of situations where a delay is contemplated. Given that each case is necessarily limited to its own facts, it is important to consult with an attorney early in the process so that the claim can be properly analyzed and documented. In doing so, it may be possible to avoid the result suffered by Advanced.

“Exposing” Employer Not Exempt from Being Cited by OSHA for Condition It Was Not Empowered to Abate

As an employer, you may have OSHA liability for a violation you did not create, and lack authority to correct.

The OSH Review Commission recently decided the Secretary’s appeal from part of an Administrative Law Judge’s decision that vacated two “Willful” items issued against a formwork subcontractor, arising out of the collapse of a garage during a concrete pour.  The garage was part of a construction project for a new six-story parking garage and an adjoining condominium tower.  The owner hired a firm of architects and a general contractor.  The architect engaged the engineer of record, who prepared “signed and sealed” structural drawings.  The GC, Choate, hired subcontractors, including a concrete finishing company, Pittman, and Southern Pan, the cited employer, and the shoring and formwork subcontractor.

Southern Pan was responsible for obtaining shoring and reshoring drawings, building the formwork, and placing concrete for some of the vertical pours (but not the horizontal pours).  The horizontal pours were Pittman’s responsibility.

Southern Pan hired two additional engineering firms:  Patent Engineering, to provide drawings for the shoring and reshoring, and Universal, to inspect the shoring and reshoring, and to determine whether these components were constructed according to Patent’s drawings.  The owner hired yet another engineering firm, Synergy, whose duties included insuring that the construction of all load-bearing components complied with the permit documents, and that the shoring and reshoring conformed to the plans.

Patent’s plans showed that shoring or reshoring was to extend down to the ground until the end of the construction phase.  Southern Pan, however, removed reshoring from the first, second and third levels of the garage well before the end of construction, and did so without making or requesting changes to Patent’s drawings.  Southern Pan elected to switch the shoring method to the “one over two” method, which, instead of shoring to the ground, shored the top level, and reshored only the two levels immediately below it.

Following the removal of the reshoring, the general contractor and concrete finishing sub successfully placed two horizontal pours in the garage.  During the next pour, however, part of the garage collapsed, killing one Southern Pan employee and injuring more than twenty.

Following an OSHA inspection, Southern Pan was issued four citation items (two “Serious” and two “Willful”) with recommended penalties totaling $125,000.  Southern Pan contested all four items, and following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (1) vacated both “Serious” items; (2) vacated one “Willful” item alleging a violation of a standard (29 C.F.R. § 1926.701[a]) that requires the employer to determine, “based on information received from a person who is qualified in structural design, that the structure or portion of the structure is capable of supporting” load to be placed on a concrete structure or portion of a concrete structure; and (3) affirmed a “Willful” item, that the employer had failed to have formwork plans available at the jobsite (29 C.F.R. § 1926.703[a][2]).

The Secretary sought review of the ALJ’s vacatur of the “placement of construction loads” citation item, and Southern Pan asked for review of the affirmance of the “availability of formwork plans” citation item.  In a 2-to-1 decision, the Commission upheld the Secretary’s appeal, and denied that of the employer.

The crux of the ALJ’s decision to vacate the “construction loads” citation item was his view that the standard applies only to the employer(s) directly responsible for the concrete operation (Choate, the general contractor, and Pittman, the concrete finishing contractor).

One member of the three-member Commission, Commissioner MacDougal, agreed with the ALJ in her dissent, and cited the preamble to the final rule indicating that the construction loads standard applies to an employer “directly responsible for the concrete operations.”

The majority, in setting aside the ALJ’s determination to vacate the construction loads item, found the issue to be not the applicability of the standard, but the nature of Southern Pan’s compliance obligations.

Based on long-standing Commission precedent, the majority found, an employer whose own employees are exposed to a hazard or violative condition (an “exposing employer”) has a statutory duty to comply with a particular standard, even where it did not create or control the hazard.  In the case before the Commission, the majority found, Southern Pan was indisputably an “exposing employer.”  As such, it was required to do what was realistic, under the circumstances, to protect its employees, even though full, literal compliance with the standard might have been unrealistic.

Citing a 1975 Commission decision, the Commission in Southern Pan stressed that “simply because a subcontractor cannot himself abate a violative condition does not mean it is powerless to protect its employees.  It can, for example, attempt to have the general contractor correct the condition, attempt to persuade the employer responsible for the condition to correct it, instruct its employees to avoid the area where the hazard exists if . . . practical, or in some instances provide an alternative means of protection against the hazard.”

The Commission remanded this item for a determination of whether Southern Pan had made reasonable efforts to protect its two employees exposed to the violative condition, and (if it did not) whether it knew or should have known of the condition giving rise to the violation.

The Commission also found that the “formwork drawings available onsite” citation item was rightly affirmed by the ALJ.  In addition to rejecting a somewhat technical pre-emption” argument made by Southern Pan, the Commission rejected Southern Pan’s arguments that it had all “available” plans onsite, and that its responsibilities were fulfilled when Synergy (the owner’s inspector) obtained consent via e-mail from the Project Engineer to carry out the shoring and reshoring removal.

Unlike many documentary requirements, which typically result in “Other than Serious” citations at most, the requirement of having all formwork plans and revisions onsite is no mere technicality.  Formwork is designed to transfer weight from the structure.  Without the drawings or plans immediately accessible, questions regarding the design and integrity of the forms or shoring layout cannot be properly addressed, and the standard’s purpose, to prevent accidents that could result from improperly erected formwork, is compromised.

The “takeaway” from Southern Pan is that plans and revisions regarding construction loads must be maintained on-site.  Also, if any of your employees are exposed to a violative condition that your company neither created nor controlled, you remain responsible for that condition, even if it is beyond your power to fully abate it.  If you know or should know of the hazard, your obligation under OSHA is to notify (we suggest in writing whenever possible) the directly responsible party (and the general contractor and premises owner) and to take any and all such other measures, practicable in the circumstances, to have the condition corrected, and to protect your employees.

Are Design-Build Contracts Legal in New York?

When it comes to construction project delivery systems, for everyone involved, efficiency is king. Increased efficiency in the contracting, design and construction phases of a project means tremendous added value. Of course, the overall quality of the project design, in terms of functionality, safety, and durability, is also important. The latter concern has been translated into legislation requiring that construction design services only be provided by licensed design professionals and enforcing legal penalties against those entities that provide or aid in provision of unlicensed design services. See, N.Y. Educ. Law § 7200 et. seq. and § 6512-6516. This legislation, while promoting important public policies, can be a hurdle to the overall efficiency of project delivery by forcing owners to retain separate entities and enter separate contracts for the design and construction aspects of their projects.

One type of project delivery system, known as Design-Build, attempts to avoid this hurdle by providing, in a single contract between the contractor and the project owner, that the contractor will use an independent licensed design professional to perform all design work on the project; there is no separate contract by the owner for the design.  Design-Build contracts offer owners efficient full-package project delivery in a single contract while also fostering coordination of work by increasing the contractor’s familiarity with the project design. Design-Build contracts have been utilized in both public and private construction and are noted for a handful of benefits including schedule acceleration, lowered costs, superior risk allocation and encouragement of investment in New York infrastructure.

The current authorization for the use of Design-Build in private construction is attributed to the 1988 New York Court of Appeal’s decision in Charlebois v. J.M. Weller Associates, Inc.1 where the Court of Appeals determined that a contract which provided that the general contractor would subcontract design work to a licensed professional engineer was not in violation of the Education Law or its underlying policies. As for public construction, the use of Design-Build contracts is generally seen as a violation of the Education Law in the absence of legislation to the contrary. For instance, New York State Assembly Bill S50002-2011 explicitly allowed a few state agencies to use a Design-Build project delivery system for contracts costing $1.2 million or more for three years after passage of the bill.2

Interestingly, at the same time that Bill S50002-2011 authorized Design-Build contracts, it also seemingly condemned their use on other public and private construction projects. The bill included a paragraph stating that under existing law, pre-bill, public entities were not authorized to use a Design-Build delivery system. This poses a problem because the Education Law governs both public and private construction, without distinction, and thus its application to public construction could translate to private construction.

So where does that leave the status of Design-Build in New York? In the public realm, contracts that were entered into pursuant to the Bill S50002-2011 Design-Build authorization are unaffected. However, the limited authorization provided by the bill expired at the end of 2014 and due to discord in the state senate over labor-related portions of the bill, the anticipated extension of the Design-Build authorization never occurred. Thus, use of Design-Build is currently unauthorized on public contracts entered into in 2015 or later and will remain so until passage of new Design-Build legislation. The failure of the state legislature to extend the authorization of Design-Build contracts potentially prevents New York agencies, and therefore taxpayers, from reaping prospective savings exemplified by the estimated $1.5 Billion saved through the use of Design-Build on the new Tappan-Zee Bridge Project alone, not to mention a handful of other transportation related projects.3

As far as private construction goes, the use of Design-Build appears to be in less jeopardy. New York case law since Charlebois has upheld the notion that a design-build project delivery method does not violate the provisions of the education law licensing protections or the public policies that stand behind said protections. Until a New York State court decides otherwise, Design-Build appears to rest on stable ground for private construction in New York.

Conclusion:    With the status of Design-Build in jeopardy, project owners, general contractors, and design professionals are faced with a perilous catch-22. One the one hand, the prospect of utilizing a design-build project delivery system seems optimal in terms of saving money and harmonizing work. On the other, all three parties risk financial and possibly criminal consequences for engaging in a seemingly benign, if not beneficial, process. Parties who plan to use a Design-Build project delivery method should consult with their construction attorney to ensure that the contract language provides for an authorized use of the design-build method and also to ensure that that language is being complied with at every step of construction.

 

1Charlebois v. J.M. Weller Associates, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 587, 531 N.E.2d 1288 (1988)

2See, http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S50002-2011

3http://www.cityandstateny.com/2/83/infrastructure/dot-commissioner-%E2%80%9Cdisgrace%E2%80%9D-if-state-design-build-law-lapses.html#.VK1ycSvF-4I

Subcontractor’s Recovery for Change Order Work is Contractually Limited to Amounts Recovered by General Contractor from Owner

Question.        Subcontractor alleged General Contractor's breach by failing to pay for additional change order work at two school renovation sites done under Notices of Direction from the Owner. The Article 9-Change Orders section in the parties' contracts specified that the Subcontract Price and time adjustments hereunder shall be limited to the amount and extent of the adjustments actually allowed by the Owner.  Is the Subcontractor’s recovery limited to the significantly lesser amounts approved by the Owner?

Answer. Yes. Rather than the combined $373,976 Subcontractor claimed entitlement to, the General Contractor's liability for change order work at the two projects was limited to $27,622 and $17,886, the respective amounts approved by the Owner.

Background

Subcontractor alleges that General Contractor breached contracts between the parties by failing to pay Subcontractor for certain asbestos abatement work it performed at two public school renovation sites for the Owner. Subcontractor alleged that in addition to the base contract work it performed for General Contractor, Subcontractor also performed additional, change order work, for which Subcontractor has not been paid by General Contractor.

The parties reached an agreement to settle the base contract claims.  The only unresolved issue is General Contractor's liability, if any, with respect to additional or change order work performed by Subcontractor.

Subcontractor contends that (i) based upon the parties' written contract for the Elementary School Project, it should be allowed the full amount of its claim arising from the additional work it performed on the Elementary School Project, and thus be awarded $79,101.09; and (ii) as there is no written contract governing the parties' rights and obligations relating to Subcontractor's work on the Middle School Project, Subcontractor is entitled to $294,874.86 for the additional work it performed at Middle School under a theory of quantum meruit.

General Contractor contends that (i) pursuant to the (written) contracts between the parties for the Elementary School Project, General Contractor is not liable to the Subcontractor for any amounts claimed by the Subcontractor for additional work which exceed the amounts recovered by General Contractor from the Owner; and (ii) with respect to Middle School, Subcontractor cannot bring a quantum meruit claim because there exists a contract governing how payment for extra work will be determined.

There are three relevant construction subcontract agreements, two for the Elementary School Project, and one for the Middle School Project.

Elementary School Project

During the course of its base contract work on the Elementary School Project, Subcontractor was instructed by General Contractor to do additional asbestos abatement work pursuant to a Notice of Direction (NOD) issued by the Owner.

The established practice in performing change order work for the Owner is for the contractor or subcontractor to proceed immediately with the work as described in the NOD.  The Owner regularly issues change orders for its projects and often determines that the value of work performed pursuant to change orders is less than the amount requested by subcontractors.

Subcontractor attended meetings with the General Contractor and the Owner at which General Contractor negotiated in good faith with the Owner for the Subcontractor's claims of additional work at the Project. In the end, the Owner determined that the fair and reasonable value of such additional work by the Subcontractor was $27,622.37, and issued a change order authorizing payment to Subcontractor in that amount.

The Elementary School Contracts between General Contractor and Subcontractor, contain a section entitled Article 9-Change Orders, which specifically provides that the Subcontract Price and time adjustments hereunder shall be limited to the amount and extent of the adjustments actually allowed Contractor under the Contract Documents, i.e., by the Owner.

Each of the three written contracts between Subcontractor and General Contractor referred to above defines Contract Documents as (a) this Subcontract and the exhibits, schedules and other supporting materials to which the Subcontract refers, some of which are attached hereto, and (b) the prime contract between the Owner the Owner, whether directly or through an agent such as the Contract Manager, and the General Contractor or Contractor, as the case may be, and the documents to which the Prime Contract refers.

In this case, Subcontractor, as subcontractor, actually attended and participated in such settlement negotiations. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 27-Disputes of the Elementary School Contracts, General Contractor is not liable to the Subcontractor for any amounts claimed by the Subcontractor which exceed the amounts recovered (or agreed to) by General Contractor from the Owner for that work: In no event shall Contractor be liable to the Subcontractor for Subcontract Work performed or for any cause whatsoever, except to the extent that Contractor may recover therefore, from the Owner.  That amount was $27,622.37 for the Elementary School Project.

Middle School Project

While neither party signed the Middle School Contract on the signature page Subcontractor did sign the Middle School Contract on three separate pages, specifically the Equipment Use Release, Project Labor Agreement, and Safety Rider.

Subcontractor states that it performed its services on the Middle School Project in good faith and that those services were accepted by General Contractor and Owner. Subcontractor concedes that it performed what was intended to be the base contract work for the Middle School Project, and has been paid for such.

The Middle School Contract contains the same provisions regarding Change Orders and Disputes, respectively, as are contained in the Elementary School Contracts.

During the course of its base contract work on the Middle School project, Subcontractor was instructed by General Contractor to perform additional work pursuant to an NOD issued by the Owner. Subcontractor furnished, provided and supplied the work, labor and services required on its part to be supplied and performed pursuant to the Change Order Work for the Middle School Project.

Subcontractor attended meetings with General Contractor and representatives of the Owner to negotiate Subcontractor's claims for additional work on the Middle School Project. During the meeting, the Owner and General Contractor came to an agreement that the additional compensation due to the Subcontractor for additional work associated with NOD was $17,886.89. The Owner subsequently issued a change order authorizing payment to Subcontractor in that amount.

The Elementary School Contracts are valid and enforceable and the parties are bound by their terms. When interpreting a contract under New York law, the intention of the parties should control, and the best evidence of intent is the contract itself. If an agreement is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face, it must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.

The Elementary School Contracts limit Subcontractor's payment for its change order work to the amount that General Contractor recovered from the Owner for such work. As noted, the contracts contain a section entitled Change Orders, which provides that the Subcontract Price shall be limited to the amount and extent of the adjustments actually allowed Contractor and/or GC under the Contract Documents. Pursuant to the provisions of 'Article 9-Change Orders' of the Agreement, General Contractor is entitled to settle subcontractor claims with the Owner, the results of which settlement are binding on the Subcontractor.

Article 27 of the Elementary School Contracts provides that in no event shall Contractor be liable to the Subcontractor for Subcontract Work performed or for any cause whatsoever, except to the extent that Contractor may recover therefore, from the Owner the Owner.

Accordingly, based upon the unambiguous language of Articles 9 and 27 of the Elementary School Contracts Subcontractor's recovery against General Contractor for the change order work it performed at the Elementary School is limited to $27,622.37, i.e., the amount that General Contractor was able to recover from the Owner.

General Contractor's liability to Subcontractor for change order work performed for the Middle School Project is limited to $17,886.89 (the amount approved by the Owner)

Subcontractor's contention that there is no binding agreement fails. Clearly the parties intended to be bound by the Middle School Contract. Subcontractor concedes that it performed its services on the Middle School Project in good faith and that those services were accepted by General Contractor and Owner. The parties conducted themselves as though there was a signed contract between them regarding Subcontractor's work on the Middle School Project.

There was a binding, written agreement between Subcontractor and General Contractor for the Middle School Project. Subcontractor cannot recover under a theory of quantum meruit, which only applies in the absence of an express agreement.

Based upon the parties' clear intention to be bound by the Middle School Contract, and the unambiguous language of Articles 9 and 27 of the Middle School Contract Subcontractor's recovery against General Contractor for the change order work it performed at Middle School is limited to what General Contractor was able to recover from the Owner, i.e., $17,886.89.

Safety in Using Hand Tools and Portable Power Tools: Some Basics

It’s important from time to time to review, and to remind your employees, about even the most basic procedures to be followed to ensure the safe performance of work in the construction trades.

Although such injuries are seldom fatal, it’s common for workers to be injured while using hand tools and portable power tools.  Injuries sustained while using tools may result from the use of the tools themselves, as well as from falls, being struck by falling objects or projectiles, and exposure to harmful fumes, or other airborne substances.

Perhaps the most basic rule to observe is that no one should use a tool that he or she doesn’t know how to use, and use safely.  No less fundamental is that only competent, authorized personnel should be permitted to repair tools, in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications.

Common injuries from the use of hand tools include cuts or lacerations from sharp edges or surfaces, eye injury from flying objects dislodged and projected from the tool, and bruises from the user striking some part of his body with the tool.

Generally, hand tool injuries are caused by the use of the wrong tool for the job; the improper use of the tool; the use of a defective tool, or one not properly inspected or maintained; and the failure to wear eye or face protection, safety shoes, or other necessary personal protective equipment.

It is essential, therefore, when using hand tools, for employees to wear appropriate PPE, and to inspect their tools to detect loose hammer heads, bent screwdriver bits, dull knives, etc., and to remove defective tools from service, and report the matter to a supervisor.  Employees should also be trained that, if uncertain as to what PPE to use, they should consult a supervisor.  To reduce the risk of slips and falls, floors in areas where tools are in use must be kept clean, dry and free of debris.  The use of tools in proximity to explosive or flammable substances generally requires the use of spark-resistant tools of brass, wood, plastic or aluminum.

Power tools present dangers exceeding those associated with hand tools.  Electric tools have as their main hazard the danger of electrocution, shocks, and burns.  Those dangers are caused or enhanced by faulty power cords, the misuse of power cords, improper insulation or grounding, the failure to use a Ground Fault Circuit Interrupter, and use in wet conditions, or around wet surfaces.  Electric tools should always have a three-wire cord (and be plugged into a three-hole receptacle) or, better, be double-grounded, with a housing unable to conduct electricity to the user.

Gasoline and mixed-fuel tools may emit flammable or explosive fuel vapors and/or toxic exhaust.  Care must be taken in handling, transporting and storing the fuel.  The device must be shut off and allowed to cool before refueling (to prevent accidental ignition of hazardous vapors) and ventilation, or PPE, is required as protection against carbon monoxide or other hazardous emissions, especially where the device is to be used in a closed area.

Gasoline or mixed-fuel devices should be equipped with a trigger lock to prevent accidental activation, as well as a constant pressure throttle control (like the one on your lawn mower) that will shut the power off when pressure is released.  They should be inspected regularly for fuel leaks, and to ensure that mufflers, spark plugs and wires are in good condition.

Pneumatic tools’ greatest danger is the risk of being struck by one of the tool’s attachments or a fastener.  PPE (including, in the case of jackhammers or other high-decibel devices, hearing protection) are essential.

“Do’s” for the safe use of pneumatic tools also include checking to see that the tools are fastened securely to the hose; safety clips or retainers to prevent attachments (such as the chisels on a chipping hammer) from being “shot” from the barrel, and the use of screens to protect other employees or passersby from being struck by flying fragments.

The air-hose must be designed to withstand the pressure to be applied.  If the hose is more than half an inch in diameter, a safety excess flow valve must be installed, to shut down the source of air automatically, in the event that the hose breaks.

“Don’ts” in using pneumatic tools include the use of an air line having a leak, the use of an air hose for cleaning at nozzle pressures exceeding 30 psig (or without chip protection), kinking the airhose, or permitting it to lie across walkways or aisles.  Generally, the trigger on an air hammer, impact wrench or similar tool should not be squeezed, until the tool is in contact with the work.

Every type of power tool has its own safety requirements, but the following is a partial list of safety rules that most types have in common:

  • Read and understand the manual.
  • Use tools only for tasks that they are designed to perform.
  • Use electric power tools that are properly grounded, and in conjunction with a Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters.
  • Don’t use electric power tools around flammable vapors, dusts or construction materials.
  • Avoid using electric tools in wet environments.
  • Only use recommended attachments, and be sure that they are properly installed.
  • Inspect tools for damage.  If a tool is damaged, or becomes damaged while in use, report it, and remove the tool from service until repaired.
  • Feed materials at the rate the tool is designed to handle, and avoid excessive force to try to make cutting tools cut faster.
  • Maintain your balance, avoid over-reaching, use a tight grip, and grasp the side handle where available.
  • Never use power tools when tired, distracted, or under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Your training and procedures should include maintenance, storage, and transportation protocols.  Power tools, for example, should be periodically checked and repaired, as necessary, by authorized repair personnel.  The power supply should be disconnected before making repairs.  Only equivalent replacement parts should be used, the tool or its parts should not be altered, and parts should not be added or removed.

Sharp tools should be stored in a specially-designated cabinet equipped with a blade guard.  Gasoline or other flammable fuels should be drained before long-term storage, and tools should, when appropriate, be de-energized (removing air pressure, de-pressurizing hydraulics, and removing loads).

Transportation guidelines should include prohibitions against carrying power tools by their electric cord, air line, or hydraulic hose.  Sharp or pointed tools should not be carried with the “business end” pointed upward or toward the body, or handed to another person with the sharp end toward the receiver.  Tools must never be thrown at, or toward, another person, or handed to another person while in operation.

Six-Month Contractual Time Limit Bars Contractor’s Delay Claim

Contractors are well-advised to familiarize themselves with the various time limitations periods in their construction contracts, including those setting forth the time within which to bring a claim for delay damages. At times the limitations period can be short. Questions also arise as to when the limitations period begins to run and whether the owner has waived its right to enforce the contractual limitations period.

In the recent case of Dart Mechanical Corp. v City of New York, an appellate court upheld the enforcement of a six-month time limitations period and resolved the questions of when the delay claim accrued and whether the public owner’s conduct showed an intent to waive the contractual limitations period.

Background

In June of 2001, Dart was awarded a contract for the installation of HVAC systems for the New York City Department of Sanitation. Under the original project schedule, Dart was to have commenced its work on February 21, 2002 and be substantially complete by December 29, 2004. The contract allowed Dart to apply for an extension of time to complete performance; otherwise, failure to meet the project deadlines would leave Dart subject to liquidated damages.

The contract further required Dart to submit to the Commissioner of Sanitation a detailed verified statement of a delay claim within 45 days of the damages resulting from the delay, and to continue to supply such statements every 30 days thereafter “for as long as such damages are incurred”. Any claim for breach of contract not otherwise subject to one of the dispute resolution procedures had to be commenced within six months of the issuance of the certificate of substantial completion, unless it arose out of events occurring after that date.

Although Dart was supposed to commence its work on February 21, 2002, for various reasons it was not given full access to the site until March of 2003. Further delay was occasioned by problems with the electrical work and the fire alarm system. As a result, Dart was not substantially complete until December 6, 2007, 952 days after the originally scheduled completion date. Dart claimed delay damages of $2,598,843.

In March of 2010, Dart submitted its substantial completion payment requisition, together with a time extension request and a particularized statement of its delay damages claim. The City denied the delay claim, claiming that it had not been preserved under the Contract’s notice provisions. The City ultimately approved Dart's payment requisition for substantial completion in early February 2011. Dart commenced this action more than a year later, on March 30, 2012, and sought compensation for the damages it incurred as a result of the project’s delay. The trial court dismissed Dart’s lawsuit for Dart’s failure to file the delay claim within the six month time limit required under the contract. Dart appealed.

Decision

Dart argued that the claim was timely because the City did not finish processing its substantial completion payment requisition until early 2011 and no suit could have been brought prior to that time because it would not have been ripe. Dart also claimed that the City’s request for additional information relating to the substantial completion payment application without requesting more information relating to the delay claim operated as a waiver of its objection to the timeliness of the delay claim.

The appellate court rejected both arguments, first noting that the six month limitations period was not unreasonably short. On the question of the time limits within which to bring the claim, the appellate court held that the period to submit the delay claim began to run upon the engineer’s issuance of the certificate of substantial completion. Further, as the claim for payment and the claim for delay damages were separate, the limitations period for the delay claim did not conflict with the limitations period for a payment claim and Dart could have submitted its delay claim to the City prior to its substantial completion payment application.

As to the waiver argument, the appellate court relied on well-established law that a waiver must be supported by evidence of a clear manifestation of an intent to relinquish rights under the contract. There was no such clear manifestation by the City under the circumstances of this case.  

Comment

The courts continue to enforce agreed-upon contractual time limitations. Contractors should provide notices as soon as they have information relating to potential claims, rather than wait for all of the information to fall in line. An early claim submission can always be supplemented with additional information as it becomes available. A late claim, however, is dead on arrival and cannot be resurrected.

The Importance of Knowing YOUR Contracts

Editor: Thomas S. Tripodianos, Esq.

The construction industry requires a contract for just about everything. The contract you enter into, whether it is a construction contract, a performance or payment bond, an insurance agreement, a design contract or some combination of the above, contains language that will determine whether you are protected if the project goes awry. The necessity of risk allocation in construction projects has led to the widespread use of form contracts developed to reduce to writing what the form’s author believes to be a fair transfer of risk between contracting parties. However, using a commonly employed form contract is no guarantee of optimal risk allocation and no excuse not to read and understand the language of your contract.

A recent decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department in Archstone v. Tocci Bldg. Corp. of New Jersey, 119 A.D.3d 497, 990 N.Y.S.2d 44 (2014), highlights the importance of familiarizing yourself with your contracts, even when a form is used. In 2004, Archstone, a project owner, enlisted Tocci as the general contractor for the construction of a 396-unit apartment complex. Before construction, Tocci secured a performance bond from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) to ensure the completion of the contract. The bond format was a commonly used form performance bond from the American Institute of Architects (AIA) known as A312 – 1984. After Tocci had substantially completed the project, Archstone discovered extensive water intrusion damage which it alleged was attributable to Tocci’s faulty design and construction. In 2008, Archstone brought an action against Tocci and Liberty Mutual.

Liberty Mutual argued in response that Archstone failed to comply with notice provisions of the performance bond and was thus precluded from asserting any claim on the bond. Paragraph 3.1 of the bond required that Archstone notify both Tocci and Liberty Mutual if it was considering declaring a default and to further request and attempt to hold a conference within 15 days of that notice to discuss alternative solutions to declaring a default. Archstone, admittedly, had not complied with 3.1. The Supreme Court, Nassau County agreed with Liberty Mutual and granted summary judgment dismissing Archstone’s claim against it. The decision was affirmed by the Second Department, which cited other New York courts interpreting non-compliance with Paragraph 3.1 of A312 – 1984 to be a bar to recovery on the bond.

The AIA makes changes to its forms on a regular cycle in order to better suit the needs of contracting parties. Interestingly, in 2010, the AIA updated form A312 adding a new paragraph after 3.1 explicitly stating that compliance with 3.1 was NOT a condition precedent to recovery under the bond and therefore recovery could be had without compliance with that paragraph. The change reflects AIA’s opinion that the notice provisions of 3.1 were meant to protect sureties from actual prejudice from non-compliance, not to be an escape rope. Unfortunately for Archstone, its contract predated the 2010 changes, and so, although the outcome is contrary to the AIA intention as described in the 2010 change, it was barred from recovering on the bond.

Practice Tip: The Archstone decision is a reminder of a couple key points. The first is that form contracts provided by entities such as the AIA are constantly changing and so the parties that use those forms should stay apprised of what changes are occurring and why. Second, form agreements are only a good starting point. Each project is unique and the agreements used on that project should be drafted to take that uniqueness into account. Third, and most importantly, carefully read each of your contracts including ancillary agreements such as bonds and insurance contracts. When doing so, pay close attention for provisions that affect your ability to assert your rights under the contract and when in doubt, consult your construction attorney to help you draft or identify and understand these key provisions.

See other changes to A312-1984 and related AIA documents at the link below:

http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/aia/documents/pdf/aiab083075.pdf

Proper Sureties Claim

Question.        Sureties issued a performance bond to the Public Owner in connection with Contractor's contract. The Sureties claim the Public Owner made an improper post-termination payment to Contractor to the detriment of their rights as potential subrogees. The sureties neither performed the contract themselves nor financed the project's completion.  Is the Sureties claim proper?

Answer. Not at this time.

The Sureties issued a performance bond in connection with a public improvement project. The Contractor has alleged the Public Owner is in material breach of the contract seeks to withdraw from the same.  The Public Owner has declared the Contractor in default and asserts that the Sureties have breached their obligations under the performance bond. The Contractor contests the Public Owner's claims of default. The Sureties assert that the Public Owner improperly made a post-termination payment to Contractor to the detriment of the Sureties' rights as potential subrogees.

In the Bond, the Sureties agreed,

if requested to do so by the [Public Owner], to fully perform and complete the Project to be performed under the Contract, pursuant to the terms, conditions and covenants thereof, if for any cause the Contractor fails or neglects to so fully perform and complete such Project…. [and] to commence the work of completion within twenty (20) days after written notice thereof from the [Public Owner] and to complete such Project within such time as the [Public Owner] may fix.

At the conclusion of the 20-day period, the Sureties notified the Public Owner that they have been unable to conclude that Contractor is, in fact, in material breach of the subject Contract such that it could properly be terminated for default under the terms and conditions of that Contract. Therefore, the Sureties have been unable to conclude that the conditions triggering any obligation under the Bond have been met.

The Sureties further contend that the Public Owner made a post termination payment to the Contractor and in doing so the Public Owner failed to mitigate its damages, to the ultimate detriment of the Sureties.  The Sureties never notified the Public Owner that it should not make further payments to Contractor or that doing so would impair their interests.

The Sureties assert that the Public Owner's post-termination payment to Contractor was improper, notwithstanding that the payment was approved before Contractor's termination. They argue that any balance the Public Owner owes Contractor under the Contract serves as the Sureties' collateral in the event that they are required to pay or otherwise perform under the Bond. According to the Sureties, if the Public Owner is correct that Contractor materially breached the Contract, then payment was an overpayment that impaired their interests in the unpaid balance of the contract price. The Sureties further contend that, in the event that Contractor is found liable and they are compelled to fulfill their obligations under the Bond, they are entitled to a damages offset under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.

Subrogation is the right one party has against a third party following payment, in whole or in part, of a legal obligation that ought to have been met by the third party. The doctrine of equitable subrogation allows insurers to "stand in the shoes" of their insured to seek indemnification by pursuing any claims that the insured may have had against third parties legally responsible for the loss. In short, one party known as the subrogee is substituted for and succeeds to the rights of another party, known as the subrogor. The doctrine of subrogation, which is based upon principles of equity, has a dual objective as stated by New York courts: It seeks, first, to prevent the insured from recovering twice for one harm, as it might if it could recover from both the insurer and from a third person who caused the harm, and second, to require the party who has caused the damage to reimburse the insurer for the payment the insurer has made.

Generally in a public improvement contract, the contractor is required to find a surety that will secure the performance of his contract. Upon default by the contractor, the surety, pursuant to a performance bond, completes the contract, at its own cost and expense. It then becomes equitably subrogated to the rights of the contractor and certain of the rights of the owner in the unpaid balance of the contract price.

Here, it is undisputed that the Sureties have neither undertaken performance of the Contract themselves nor financed the project's completion. The Sureties' lack of performance to date precludes them from asserting an equitable subrogation claim at this time for any improper payments that the Public Owner purportedly made to Contractor.