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Is the assignment to employee of additional work after a co-worker left an “adverse employment action,” for the employee to create a case of retaliation under both Title VII and New York Human Rights Law?

Question. Under these
harsh economic times many companies are being forced to reduce the size
of their workforce in an effort to reduce expenses. While studies have
shown that such downsizing only works in the short term one of the
effects of reducing the number of workers may be an increased work load
for those that remain.



Employers must not only be vigilant to make sure that they follow
the law with regards to terminating employees but must also be vigilant
to ensure a proper workplace environment is maintained for those who
remain.



In this month’s column we explore the latter issue. The assignment of
more work however, was not a result of layoffs but came about after a
co-worker left. The remaining employee claims that the assignment of
more work is an “adverse employment action,” and a clear case of
retaliation for having reported alleged acts of harassment. The
employee in question complained immediately about the extra work load,
and her workload was reduced as a result.



Is the assignment to employee of additional work after a co-worker left
an “adverse employment action,” for the employee to create a case of
retaliation under both Title VII and New York Human Rights Law?



Answer. NO.
To prove that she suffered an adverse action, Employee
must show that she “endure[d] a materially adverse change in the terms
and conditions of employment,” which “might be indicated by a
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or
salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices
unique to a particular situation. This requirement stems from the effort
to “protect[ ] individuals from actions injurious to current employment
or the ability to secure future employment.”



Employee claims that Employer’s actions against her amounted to unlawful
retaliation in violation of Title VII and state law. To make out a
showing of retaliation, Employee must offer evidence (1) that she was
engaged in a protected activity, (2) that Employer was aware of this
activity, (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4)
that there was a causal connection between her protected activity and
the adverse action. Title VII’s “anti-retaliation provision protects an
individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces
an injury or harm.” This is an objective standard: “a plaintiff must
show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”. Furthermore, “normally petty slights, minor
annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” in the workplace fall short
of this standard. If an employee meets her minimal burden and the
employer counters with legitimate justifications for its actions, then
the employee must show that the proffered reasons are merely pretextual.




Employee contends that employer retaliated against her for complaining
about harassment by assigning her more work following another employee’s
departure. Under the circumstances, however, this was not a
sufficiently adverse action. Employee has not shown that this falls
within the category of actionable harm. Moreover, she complained almost
immediately about the additional accounts, and her workload was reduced.
There is also no evidence causally linking the increase in workload to
her harassment complaint, nor has she established a basis on which to
conclude that employer’s explanation for the reassignment-other
employee’s departure-is pretextual.

Buyer and seller’s e-mail exchange was not an enforceable written agreement.

Question. Owner issued a request for proposal (“RFP”) to various potential suppliers for the design, manufacture and installation of a geothermal heating system at Owner’s New York facility. In response to the RFP, Contractor offered to design, manufacture, inspect, test and install a solar system. Owner informed Contractor of the energy savings it expected to realize at the facility. Contractor represented to Owner that it could design, manufacture, inspect, test and install a solar system that would perform in a superior manner compared to a geothermal system. Contractor also represented several times in writing that it had manufactured several solar systems of the size and type contained in Owner’s RFP.

As a result of their negotiations, Contractor prepared a final quotation for the design, manufacture, inspection, testing and installation of a solar system. In reliance on the representations and warranties contained in Contractor’ final quotation, Owner agreed to purchase a solar system from Contractor. Owner and Contractor executed an equipment purchase agreement (“Purchase Agreement”) for the solar system (“Equipment”); the Purchase Agreement incorporated the final quotation that Contractor had prepared and required that time was of the essence for the delivery of the Equipment.

The Purchase Agreement contained implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose and warranties arising from course of dealing or usage of trade. The Purchase Agreement also contained several express warranties, including a performance warranty that the Equipment would perform in accordance with the performance requirements as set forth in the specifications, that the Equipment would be designed and manufactured to conform to the specifications, and that the Equipment would be merchantable, of good material and workmanship, free from defects and fit and sufficient for the intended purpose.

Due to Contractor’ fault, the delivery and installation of the system fell behind the schedule set forth in the Purchase Agreement.

Since its installation, the solar system has never functioned according to the terms of the Purchase Agreement and has been shut down on numerous occasions for repair. The system failed within the first eleven months of operation and had to be shut down for repairs. Contractor has undertaken several repair attempts on a number of occasions. Since it installed the system Contractor has replaced several parts of the system. Defendant Contractor paid for the replacement parts and repairs, acknowledging that the problems were due to its conduct and were its responsibility.

On repeated occasions Contractor admitted that the system was manufactured in a defective manner and that it could not function for its intended and/or particular purpose. On several occasions Owner requested that Contractor replace the system.

Contractor modified the Purchase Agreement and provided an additional warranty of future performance for one year that, if the system failed within one year, Contractor would replace the system. The system failed shortly thereafter and Owner asked Contractor to manufacture and deliver a new system.

Owner and Contractor had several meetings regarding the design, manufacture, inspection, testing, installation and operation of a replacement system to be supplied at Contractor’ cost. Owner and Defendant Contractor came to an agreement relating to the replacement system (“Replacement Agreement”). The Replacement Agreement provided that Contractor would design, manufacture, inspect, test and install a replacement solar system with what Contractor described as “better technology” and continue to repair the existing system until the replacement system could be installed.

The Replacement Agreement also provided that, in exchange for Contractor’ agreement to provide a new solar system and for continuing to repair the existing one, Owner would award Contractor and certain of its affiliates preferred vendor status for identified projects.

Owner and Contractor had several meetings about the design, manufacture, inspection, testing, installation and operation of the replacement system under the terms of the Replacement Agreement; Contractor began performance under the terms of the Replacement Agreement; and Owner awarded certain projects to Contractor and/or certain of its affiliates pursuant to the preferred vendor status arrangement. Sometime thereafter Contractor requested an inspection of the existing system at the facility. Contractor conducted an inspection of the existing system at the Facility. Contractor’ repair crew arrived at the Facility to begin a round of repairs, which Contractor had estimated would take four to five weeks to complete.

At approximately the same time Owner met with Contractor. At that meeting, Contractor took the position, for the first time, that Owner was at fault for the performance failures because of misuse of the system. These were the same performance failures that Contractor had previously admitted were due solely to its defective manufacturing. After the meeting, Contractor refused to design, manufacture, inspect and test the replacement system and refused to continue to repair the existing system as required under the terms of the Replacement Agreement.

Question. With respect to the Replacement Agreement, there are three issues that the parties dispute:

(1) whether the Replacement Agreement was a new agreement or was a modification of the Purchase Agreement;
(2) whether a written Replacement Agreement exists and; if not,
(3) whether there is an enforceable oral Replacement Agreement based on the doctrine of partial performance.


1. New agreement or modification of the Purchase Agreement?
Owner contends that the Replacement Agreement is a new agreement, not a modification of the Purchase Agreement. Contractor, on the other hand, contends that the Replacement Agreement is a modification of the Purchase Agreement. The characterization of the Replacement Agreement is only important if the Replacement Agreement is an oral agreement.

If the Replacement Agreement was an oral agreement and that the Replacement Agreement was a modification of the Purchase Agreement, then Owner’s claim would fail. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, “[n]o amendment to this Agreement shall be effective unless it is in writing and signed by duly authorized representatives of both parties.” Therefore, under this paragraph, no oral modification of the Purchase Agreement would be enforceable. For purposes of discussion let’s accept Owner’s assertion that the Replacement Agreement is a new agreement and not merely a modification of the Purchase Agreement.

2. Written or oral agreement?
Assuming that the Replacement Agreement is a new agreement, separate and distinct from the Purchase Agreement, there is a question whether the e-mail exchange between the parties is sufficient to create a written agreement. Under ¬ß 2-201(1) of New York’s Uniform Commercial Code, “a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more is not enforceable an authorized agent of the defendant has signed a writing indicating the existence of the contract.” Owner asserts that the Contractor’s e-mail of to Owner constitutes the Replacement Agreement. That e-mail states as follows:

John,
This is to confirm that we have reached an agreement combining Contractor’s commitment to replace the solar system with Owner’s commitment to award business to Contractor.
1. Contractor to repair the existing system,-allowing Owner to operate the system. Owner will bear 50% of the repair cost including testing.
2. Contractor will fabricate a new system. Contractor will bear the cost of the new system- Owner will bear the cost of removing the existing system [f]rom its location and installing the new system in that location.

Owner will commit to award the following business to Contractor:
{LISTING OF FUTURE PROJECTS OMITTED}

For this business Contractor would have a ‚ÄòPreferred Vendor Status’ = Rights of first refusal.
Precondition:
Contractor must be technically qualified and competitive.
You and I will have to work out the contract and submit it to the respective management for approval and signature.


Agreements to agree are not recognized as binding obligations under New York law. There is a strong presumption against finding binding obligation in agreements which include open terms, call for future approvals and expressly anticipate future preparation and execution of contract documents. There is an established a framework for analyzing whether a written instrument constitutes a binding preliminary agreement or an unenforceable agreement to agree.

Ordinarily, where the parties contemplate further negotiations and the execution of a formal instrument, a preliminary agreement does not create a binding contract. Under some circumstances, however, preliminary agreements can generate contractual obligations. One example of such an agreement is where the parties have agreed on all points that require negotiation including whether to be bound, but agree to memorialize their agreement in a more formal document. Such an agreement is fully binding; it is preliminary only in form-only in the sense that the parties desire a more elaborate formalization of the agreement.

Furthermore, there is a four-part test for determining whether the parties intended their written statements to constitute a binding contract. These factors are: (1) whether there has been an express reservation of the right not to be bound in the absence of a writing; (2) whether there has been partial performance of the contract; (3) whether all of the terms of the alleged contract have been agreed upon; and (4) whether the agreement at issue is the type of contract that is usually committed to writing.

The first factor, the language of the agreement, is the most important. In this case, the language of Contractor’s e-mail to Owner demonstrates that his e-mail was not a fully binding preliminary agreement. Although Contractor used the word “Agreement” in the subject line of his e-mail and noted that this e-mail “confirm[s] that we have reached an agreement,” it is clear that, when read in its entirety, this e-mail does not constitute an agreement under New York law. Most particularly, the last line of the e-mail, in which Contractor stated that he and Owner would have to “work out the contract and submit it to the respective management for approval and signature[,]”makes clear that this e-mail is not a formal memorialization of an intent to be bound. To the contrary, this email indicates that the parties still have to “work out the contract” and that, before the parties are bound, they have to submit the contract to management for approval.

Furthermore, it is clear from subsequent e-mails in this exchange between Contractor and Owner that the parties had not agreed to all of the terms of the alleged contract. In a subsequent e-mail Owner wrote to Contractor that, although Owner is “in agreement to move forward” as Contractor proposed, there were “two clarifications” that he “planned to include on the proposal,” and he indicated that he would begin to work with Owner’s legal counsel to formalize Contractor’s proposals and that he would call later “to confirm that Owner was “ready to move forward as [he had] outlined.”

One month later, in an e-mail Owner wrote to Contractor that he was forwarding “the current draft of the formal agreement” and informed him that “[t]his draft is still being reviewed internally at Owner, so [Owner] may make some changes as well….” He also asked Contractor to “review [the draft] and send [him] any comments that [he might] have.” In addition, he stated that he would set up a call with Contractor and others “to go through a detailed review of any questions, additions or changes that [Contractor might] have.” Finally, Owner stated that he thought the parties were “moving forward to a successful closure of this issue, but want[ed] to make sure [the parties] close on the formal contract as soon as possible.”

Given the strong presumption against finding binding obligation in agreements which include open terms, call for future approvals and expressly anticipate future preparation and execution of contract documents, it is clear that the e-mail exchange between Contractor and Owner does not constitute a written contract.


3. Applicability of partial performance exception to § 2-201(1)
Since we have concluded that the e-mail exchange does not constitute a written Replacement Agreement, we must next determine whether the “partial performance” exception to ¬ß 2-201(1)’s writing requirement applies to this case.

Section 2-201(3), which allows for this exception, provides that
[a] contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller’s business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted (Section 2-606).

Owner contends that, under the terms of the Replacement Agreement, Contractor agreed to “design, manufacture, inspect, test and install a replacement solar system at the Facility … [and] agreed to repair the existing solar system at the Facility until the replacement solar system was delivered.” Owner also claims that “[t]he Replacement Agreement … provided that, in exchange for Contractor’s agreement to provide a new solar system and for continuing to repair the existing Equipment, Contractor would be awarded preferred vendor status for identified Owner projects.” Finally, Owner asserts that Contractor began performance under the terms of the Replacement Agreement, and in reliance thereon, Owner awarded certain projects to Contractor to their preferred vendor status arrangement.

Partial performance’ as a substitute for the required writing can validate the contract only for the goods which have been accepted or for which payment has been made and accepted. The reasoning is that if the subject of a contract is an indivisible unit, even part performance under the contract tends to prove the existence of the entire contract.

In this case, there is no doubt that the replacement solar system is a single indivisible unit. What is at issue, however, is whether both parties partially performed under the Replacement Agreement. Owner alleges that Contractor began performance under the terms of the Replacement Agreement and that, “in reliance [on Contractor performance, Owner awarded certain projects to Contractor pursuant to their preferred vendor status arrangement.

These allegations when accepted as true support a claim for breach of the Replacement Agreement and defeat the argument that the Replacement Agreement is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds

Does equitable subrogation apply or did the second mortgage cease to be a valid lien so that it may be canceled as a cloud on title?

Question. Second Mortgage Bank seeks to foreclose on a second mortgage, arguing the conveyance of the premises from Owners to Buyers was void. Buyer and Buyer’s Bank seek to vacate and remove Second Mortgage Bank’s mortgage from the public records. Buyer argues Owner never informed him of the existence of the second mortgage (i.e. lack of actual notice) and point to an undisputed error in indexing to prove they were not on constructive notice. Second Mortgage Bank argued it was entitled to equitable subrogation, contending its predecessor in interest, paid off and satisfied at least $78,275 of prior liens. Does equitable subrogation apply or did the second mortgage cease to be a valid lien so that it may be canceled as a cloud on title?

Answer. NO Equitable subrogation does not apply. The second mortgage ceased to be a valid lien. The Second Mortgage may be canceled as a cloud on title.

On June 2, the Owner purchased the subject real property and their deed to the premises was recorded on June 16 with the proper tax map designation. The Owner made this purchase using a $96,000 loan giving in return a mortgage on the premises. The mortgage through a series of transactions was eventually assigned to Second Mortgage Bank. The assignment was recorded twenty eight years after the mortgage loan was originally made.

In year 16 Owner, as borrower, executed a note with Second Mortgage Bank, for $152,000. To secure this loan, the Owner executed a $152,000 mortgage on the premises in favor of Second Mortgage Bank. The Second Mortgage was recorded in March in year 17, but with the incorrect lot designation.

In June, a year later, Buyer purchased the premises from the Owner for $225,000, taking out a loan from Buyers’ Bank for $202,000, and giving in exchange a mortgage on the premises for that amount (Mortgage Three).

In August of year 23, Second Mortgage Bank sought to foreclose on Mortgage Two. Buyer and Buyer’s Bank, assert improper indexing of Mortgage Two and seek to vacate and remove Mortgage Two from record. Second Mortgage Bank replies that the conveyance of the premises from the Owner to Buyer is void, being a fraudulent conveyance for the purpose of avoiding claims and liens of creditors, including those of Second Mortgage Bank and its predecessors in interest, and that Second Mortgage Bank is entitled to equitable subrogation.

Buyer states that the Owner never informed him of the existence of Mortgage Two, and that he lacked actual notice of Mortgage Two. Buyer’s Bank, states Buyer’s Bank had no actual notice of Mortgage Two at the time it loaned the funds to Buyer to purchase the premises from the Owner.

The unchallenged claim of Buyer and Buyer’s Bank are proof that they were not on actual notice of Mortgage Two, and the undisputed error in indexing proves they were not on constructive notice, either. Buyers and Buyer’s Bank have, thus, established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Real Property Law ¬ß291).

Second Mortgage Bank asserts, in opposition, that it is entitled to equitable subrogation. The doctrine of equitable subrogation applies where the funds of a mortgagee are used to satisfy the lien of an existing, known encumbrance when, unbeknown to the mortgagee, another lien on the property exists which is senior to his but junior to the one satisfied with his funds. In order to avoid the unjust enrichment of the intervening, unknown lienor, the mortgagee is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the senior encumbrance.

Second Mortgage Bank states that it paid off and satisfied at least $78,274.50 of prior liens on the premises in year 23. At the time these payments were made, Mortgage Three (year 24) did not yet exist. Equitable subrogation, thus, does not apply in this case. Moreover, Second Mortgage Bank did not become the assignee of Mortgage Two until year 28, the date of the assignment from Accredited, and, thus, was on notice of Mortgage Three, which had been recorded in year 27, and which should have led Second Mortgage Bank to conduct further inquiry.

As Mortgage Two has ceased to be a valid lien on the premises, it may be canceled as a cloud on title.

Second Mortgage Bank seeks to foreclose…

Question. Second Mortgage Bank seeks to foreclose on a second mortgage, arguing the conveyance of the premises from Owners to Buyers was void. Buyer and Buyer’s Bank seek to vacate and remove Second Mortgage Bank’s mortgage from the public records. Buyer argues Owner never informed him of the existence of the second mortgage (i.e. lack of actual notice) and point to an undisputed error in indexing to prove they were not on constructive notice. Second Mortgage Bank argued it was entitled to equitable subrogation, contending its predecessor in interest, paid off and satisfied at least $78,275 of prior liens. Does equitable subrogation apply or did the second mortgage cease to be a valid lien so that it may be canceled as a cloud on title?

Answer. NO. Equitable subrogation does not apply. The second mortgage ceased to be a valid lien. The Second Mortgage may be canceled as a cloud on title.

On June 2, the Owner purchased the subject real property and their deed to the premises was recorded on June 16 with the proper tax map designation. The Owner made this purchase using a $96,000 loan giving in return a mortgage on the premises. The mortgage through a series of transactions was eventually assigned to Second Mortgage Bank. The assignment was recorded twenty eight years after the mortgage loan was originally made.

In year 16 Owner, as borrower, executed a note with Second Mortgage Bank, for $152,000. To secure this loan, the Owner executed a $152,000 mortgage on the premises in favor of Second Mortgage Bank. The Second Mortgage was recorded in March in year 17, but with the incorrect lot designation.

In June, a year later, Buyer purchased the premises from the Owner for $225,000, taking out a loan from Buyers’ Bank for $202,000, and giving in exchange a mortgage on the premises for that amount (Mortgage Three).

In August of year 23, Second Mortgage Bank sought to foreclose on Mortgage Two. Buyer and Buyer’s Bank, assert improper indexing of Mortgage Two and seek to vacate and remove Mortgage Two from record. Second Mortgage Bank replies that the conveyance of the premises from the Owner to Buyer is void, being a fraudulent conveyance for the purpose of avoiding claims and liens of creditors, including those of Second Mortgage Bank and its predecessors in interest, and that Second Mortgage Bank is entitled to equitable subrogation.
Buyer states that the Owner never informed him of the existence of Mortgage Two, and that he lacked actual notice of Mortgage Two. Buyer’s Bank, states Buyer’s Bank had no actual notice of Mortgage Two at the time it loaned the funds to Buyer to purchase the premises from the Owner.

The unchallenged claim of Buyer and Buyer’s Bank are proof that they were not on actual notice of Mortgage Two, and the undisputed error in indexing proves they were not on constructive notice, either. Buyers and Buyer’s Bank have, thus, established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Real Property Law ¬ß291).

Second Mortgage Bank asserts, in opposition, that it is entitled to equitable subrogation. The doctrine of equitable subrogation applies where the funds of a mortgagee are used to satisfy the lien of an existing, known encumbrance when, unbeknown to the mortgagee, another lien on the property exists which is senior to his but junior to the one satisfied with his funds. In order to avoid the unjust enrichment of the intervening, unknown lienor, the mortgagee is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the senior encumbrance.
Second Mortgage Bank states that it paid off and satisfied at least $78,274.50 of prior liens on the premises in year 23. At the time these payments were made, Mortgage Three (year 24) did not yet exist. Equitable subrogation, thus, does not apply in this case. Moreover, Second Mortgage Bank did not become the assignee of Mortgage Two until year 28, the date of the assignment from Accredited, and, thus, was on notice of Mortgage Three, which had been recorded in year 27, and which should have led Second Mortgage Bank to conduct further inquiry.

As Mortgage Two has ceased to be a valid lien on the premises, it may be canceled as a cloud on title.

Contractor alleges Subcontractor’s union harassed…

Question. Contractor alleges Subcontractor’ union harassed and defamed him regarding a project. Contractor alleges Subcontractor erected a 12-foot inflatable rat in front of his offices and at a charity event, as well as handed out allegedly defamatory leaflets alleging Contractor exploited workers. Contractor filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the National Labor Relations Board against the union arising from the same conduct. May the Contractor also recover under a tortious interference claim?

Answer. NO. The claim is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act as Where the consequences of peaceful and violent conduct were separable, recovery may only be had for the latter. The Contractor did not allege any violence or threats of violence, thus, Contractor’s tortious interference claim was preempted by federal law.

Contractor alleges that the Union erected a 12-foot inflatable rat in front of Contractor’s offices. According to Contractor, The Union’s representatives shouted that Contractor exploits workers, and distributed allegedly defamatory leaflets which stated as follows:

SHAME!ON [CONTRACTOR] for allowing workers to be exploited.
Allowing contractors who pay workers in a fashion which permits them to bypass the City, State and Federal tax structure is not only against the law, it costs taxpayers millions of dollars in lost tax revenue.
Untrained and unskilled workers will always lead to an unsafe work-place, shoddy workmanship and a lower quality finished product.
While New York City construction workers rebuild our city, help show your support for their desire to work in a safe environment, receive a living wage, and be treated with the dignity and respect that they deserve.
Does [CONTRACTOR] think it’s worthwhile to exploit workers just so he can save a little money?
Call [CONTRACTOR] at [555-555-5555] and tell him that all workers deserve a living wage.

Contractor alleges that Subcontractor set up an inflatable rat in front of the building at an event where the Contractor was being honored and that Subcontractor’s representatives allegedly yelled that Contractor was a #&!* and a rat, exploits workers, and that he should be arrested. When Contractor arrived at the event, they allegedly surrounded Contractor and screamed #&!* and obscenities.

Later that month, Subcontractor allegedly appeared outside Contractor’s residence, where they again shouted that he exploits workers. On the same day, Subcontractor threatened to follow Contractor to California in order to disrupt an event at which Contractor would be addressing a large audience. Contractor also alleges that Subcontractor made telephone calls to Contractor’s receptionist in which they stated that Contractor exploits workers by paying below minimum wage and hiring non-union workers, and that on other occasions, Subcontractor called to imply that Contractor was in physical danger, because the speaker stated that he better watch his back. According to Contractor, Subcontractor threatened to go to Contractor’s son’s school, in order to humiliate and intimidate Contractor and his son. Contractor thereafter filed a criminal complaint against The Union and one of its members. It appears that the New York Police Department saw no criminal conduct and did not make any arrests.

When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by ¬ß7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under ¬ß8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. Therefore, state regulations and causes of action are presumptively preempted if they concern conduct that is actually or arguably either prohibited or protected by the Act. The purpose of the preemption is to prevent conflict between, on the one hand, state and local regulation and, on the other, Congress’ integrated scheme of regulation, embodied in ¬ß¬ß7 and 8 of the NLRA, which includes the choice of the NLRB, rather than state or federal courts, as the appropriate body to implement the Act.

Consequently, we must look at whether Subcontractor’ alleged conduct is arguably prohibited by federal labor law. Contractor alleges that Subcontractor tortiously interfered with Contractor’s prospective business relations. This conduct is arguably prohibited by the NLRA. Section 8 (b) (4) (B) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an unlawful labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to force or require any person to cease doing business with any other person (29 USC ¬ß158 [b] [4] [B]). Section 8 (b) (4) (D) states that it is unlawful to engage in forcing or requiring an employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization (29 USC ¬ß158 [b] [4] [D]). Section 8 (b) (4) (7) states that it is unlawful for a labor organization to picket any employer where any object thereof is to force or require the employer to bargain with the labor organization (29 USC ¬ß158 [b] [4] [7]).

However, the preemption does not apply where the activity: (1) touches interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act, or (2) involves conduct that would only peripherally implicate the concerns underlying the federal labor laws . Where the consequences of peaceful and violent conduct are separable, recovery may only be had for the latter. Where the consequences cannot be separated, recovery may only be had if the violent conduct was so pervasive that the proof might support that the conclusion that all damages resulting from the picketing were proximately caused by its violent component or by the fear which that violence engendered.

Applying the above principles to this case, the purported tortious interference with prospective business relations claim lacks merit. Contractor does not allege any violence or even threats of violence in connection with this alleged conduct. The sole basis for this claim is that The Union’s representatives erected an inflatable rat outside a hotel, and distributed allegedly defamatory leaflets in a restroom of the hotel. Therefore, Contractor’s tortious interference with prospective business relations claim is preempted by federal labor law.

No Oral Modification of Loan Agreement

Question. Bank seeks to collect on a note (the Note) executed by Borrower, guaranteed by the Guarantors. Pursuant to provisions set forth in the Loan Agreement executed at even date with the Note, Borrower was granted the option to extend the maturity date upon the existence of certain conditions. By amendment to the Loan Agreement, Bank and Borrower agreed that notwithstanding the failure of all conditions specified the maturity date would be extended. When payment was not made as promised, Bank sent Borrower and the Guarantors a notice of default.

Bank seeks a judgment against Borrower for the principal amount of the Note plus interest, and judgment against the Guarantors.

Guarantor asserts that the vice-president of Bank, told him that “we didn’t need to worry about the pending maturity of the notes (and) that the Bank would extend the loan on commercially reasonable terms for an additional year.”

Can a bank official orally agree to an extension of the maturity date of a note?

Answer. YES, but not under these facts.

The vice-president of Bank does not specifically deny the oral promises allegedly made by him, but refers to his letters to Borrower in which he advised Borrower that it was not entitled to rely on any oral statements purportedly made by Bank to refrain from exercising any of its rights under the Loan Agreement, the Notes, the Mortgages or any other Loan Documents. Bank acknowledges that after declaring the Note in default it did engage in negotiations relating to a possible extension of the Note, and that the parties entered into what Bank refers to as a Pre-Negotiation Agreement. Therein the parties agreed that no modification of the loan shall constitute a legally binding agreement until reduced to written documentation which is signed by all necessary parties and that Bank may terminate the negotiations for any reason or no reason, and defendants acknowledged that none of them has any defense, setoff, claim, counterclaim or cause of any kind or nature whatsoever with respect to the Loan Documents.

With respect to the claim of an oral modification of the maturity date of the Note, it specifically provides that Bank shall not by any act, delay, omission or otherwise be deemed to have waived any of its rights or remedies, and no waiver of any kind shall be valid unless in writing and signed by Bank. Also, as noted above, the Pre-Negotiation Agreement similarly bars an oral modification of the loan documents.

When an agreement contains a clause requiring any modification of the terms of such (agreement) to be in a writing signed by the (Bank), an oral modification is generally unenforceable. Exceptions to the foregoing principle will be applied in situations where a party can show partial performance…unequivocally referrable to the oral modification, as well as when the Bank has induced another’s significant and substantial reliance upon an oral modification, in which case an estoppel may be invoked to bar a party from enforcing the no oral modification clause.

The purpose of estoppel is to prevent someone from enforcing rights that would work injustice on the person against whom enforcement is sought and who, while justifiably relying on the opposing party’s actions, has been misled into a detrimental change of position. Here, in light of the facts asserted, including the letters and the provisions of the Pre-Negotiation Agreement, Borrowers have not shown that they were misled or that they significantly and justifiably relied on (the alleged oral promise to their) disadvantage, and thus an essential element of estoppel is lacking.

Failure to dispute account stated leads to quick results for creditor.

Question. Subcontractor submitted to Contractor, and Contractor received, monthly invoices for services it performed for Contractor. Contractor did not object to the invoices at any time, except for an undocumented allegation of an oral objection. Contractor also made a partial payment against a bill. Is Contractor now barred from disputing those invoices and can Subcontractor collect on its account stated?

Answer. YES. An account stated is an agreement between the parties to an account based upon prior transactions between them with respect to the correctness of the separate items composing the account and the balance due, if any, in favor of one party or the other. It is well settled that where an account is made up and rendered, the one who receives it is bound to examine it, and, if the accounting is admitted as correct, it becomes a stated account and is binding on both parties, the balance being the debt which may be sued for and recovered by law.

Contractor and Subcontractor entered into a written agreement. Subcontractor performed under the agreement and submitted numerous bills of account to Contractor, and Contractor has not objected to any of them.

Contractor acknowledged the validity of Subcontractor’s Invoices by: (1) failing to make any objection thereto; and (2) making five separate partial payments to Subcontractor.

In response to Subcontractor’s arguments regarding an account stated, Contractor maintains that they raised questions in connection with the Invoices. Contractor alleges that “questions” had “been raised,” and that Subcontractor’s fees were “a matter of frequent discussion.”

It is well established that an undocumented allegation of an oral objection is insufficient to defeat an account stated. Contractor’s fails to support his attestation that “questions have certainly been raised in connection with the Invoices” and that “the extent of the fees was a matter of frequent discussion” with and does not disclose the nature or content of those questions and discussions, i.e. whether they objected to the Invoices; nor does Contractor specify which Invoices they questioned or discussed.

Additionally, it is well established that where a partial payment is made against a bill, it acknowledges the validity of the bill, “thereby establishing it as an account stated”.

You should consult with your own attorney but the following sample clauses may be helpful to include in your contracts to achieve similar results and save on potential litigation costs:

[SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] books and records showing the account between [SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] and [CONTRACTOR] shall be admissible in evidence in any action or proceeding as prima facie proof of the items therein set forth. The statements also create an account stated and are conclusive as to the amount owed unless challenged in the thirty days after they were sent to CONTRACTOR, [SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] monthly statements rendered to [CONTRACTOR] shall be binding upon the undersigned (whether or not the undersigned received copies thereof) and, shall constitute an account stated between [SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] and [CONTRACTOR], unless [SUBCONTRACTOR/SUPPLIER] shall receive a written statement of [CONTRACTOR’s] exceptions within thirty (30) days after the statement was mailed to [CONTRACTOR].
The monthly statements should contain similar language on the bottom of every page,
THIS STATEMENT SHALL BE DEEMED CORRECT AND BINDING UPON YOU AND SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ACCOUNT STATED BETWEEN US, UNLESS WE RECEIVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF YOUR EXCEPTIONS WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER SAME IS MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU.

Language consenting to the jurisdiction of the local state or federal courts, choice of law and an agreement that service of process can be made by mail is also helpful.

Does a renewal judgment lien secured for a second 10-year period take effect nunc pro tunc on the expiration date of the original lien, cutting off the property interests of intervening mortgages?

Question. In 1991, plaintiff Judgment-Creditor obtained a default judgment against Judgment-Debtor for approximately $470,000 due on a note. On October 23, 1991, the judgment was docketed and acted as a lien on a Manhattan condominium owned by Judgment-Debtor. While a money judgment award is enforceable for 20 years, a real property lien resulting from the judgment is viable for just 10 years. But a renewal action may be brought between the same parties to the original action during the tenth year to extend the lien for an additional 10-year period.

Judgment-Creditor was unable to foreclose on the condominium and collect on the judgment and his other efforts to collect from Judgment-Debtor failed. So, on October 22, 2001-one day before the 10-year lien was to expire-Judgment-Creditor initiated the action to renew his lien. In February 2005, the Supreme Court granted Judgment-Creditor’s motion for summary judgment, granting him a judgment lien nunc pro tunc [retroactive] to October 23, 2001, the day the original 10-year judgment lien had expired.

Does a renewal judgment lien secured for a second 10-year period take effect nunc pro tunc on the expiration date of the original lien, cutting off the property interests of intervening mortgagees?

Answer. NO.

A renewal judgment does not have retroactive effect to the original lien’s expiration date. Nunc pro tunc treatment is inappropriate where, as here, additional lenders relying on the public record acquired rights in the property. The renewal lien becomes effective when granted by Supreme Court.

After Judgment-Creditor’s original lien had expired but before Supreme Court granted the renewal judgment-during the “lien gap” period two mortgage companies loaned Judgment-Debtor money in return for secured mortgages on the Manhattan condominium.

The mortgagees had no knowledge of Judgment-Creditor’s lien because a search of the public record revealed only the expired 10-year lien.

Because a lien on real property is only effective for 10 years and a money judgment is viable for 20 years the statute allows a judgment creditor to apply for a renewal of the judgment lien. To avoid expiration of the judgment lien at the end of 10 years real property lienholders may seek timely renewal of the judgment lien during the last year of the pendency of the original lien.

Those seeking to secure any interest in real property must be able to rely upon a public record to furnish full and complete information of any conveyances, liens or encumbrances affecting such property. They should not be penalized for failing to unearth an expired lien or not investigating the prospect that it might be subject to a pending renewal request. Nunc pro tunc treatment under these circumstances would be inimical to New York’s record notice based upon the certainty of a docketing system that alerts potential purchasers and lienholders to encumbrances upon real property.

The statute affords a judgment creditor a full year to renew his or her lien without suffering a lien gap. Where a judgment creditor diligently files at the beginning of this period and alerts the court to the applicable time constraint, a lien renewal application should be resolvable before the original lien expires.

Can a California Consultant compel Developer in New York Federal court to submit a dispute to arbitration pursuant to an unsigned agreement?

Question. Consultant, a California corporation with offices worldwide, provides technical and management support services for various infrastructure projects. Developer, a New York corporation, retained Consultant to provide engineering and consulting services in connection with the development of a property in Connecticut. The parties’ relationship was governed by a Master Services Consulting Agreement (“MSA”) that included, among other terms, a broad arbitration provision. The MSA provided that the terms for Consultant’s services would be negotiated between the parties through various Task Orders. Each Task Order incorporated by reference the terms of the MSA.

Eventually, a dispute arose between the parties concerning work performed by Consultant. After several attempts to resolve the dispute proved unsuccessful, Consultant served Developer with a demand for arbitration claiming that it was owed the sum of $1,788,127 for services rendered. Pursuant to the arbitration provision in the MSA, the American Arbitration Association scheduled an arbitration hearing in California. Can the Consultant in New York Federal court, compel Developer to submit the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the MSA and Task Orders?

Answer. YES.

A. Does the Federal Court have Diversity Jurisdiction

A federal court has the authority to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), provided that the court has jurisdiction over the underlying controversy. Here, Developer contends that the Court has no authority to compel arbitration and that the matter must be remanded to the state court because subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. In particular, Developer contends that the parties are not diverse and the amount in controversy is less than the $75,000 required by 28 U.S.C. 1332.

1. Whether the Parties are Diverse

It is well-settled that, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is a citizen of the state where it is incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business.. It is undisputed that Developer is a citizen of New York. Although Consultant is incorporated in California, Developer contends diversity jurisdiction is lacking because Consultant’s principal place of business is also in New York. Where, as here, a corporation’s activities are “decentralized and spread across numerous states, courts apply what is known as the ‚Äònerve center’ test,” to determine a corporation’s citizenship.. Under the “nerve center” test, courts focus on those factors that identify the place where the corporation’s policies originate.

Developer contends that Consultant’s principal place of business must be in New York because all of Developer’s business dealings with Consultant have taken place in New York. However, the fact that the parties’ business dealings were all conducted in New York does not go to the salient question of where the company’s policies originate. Consultant has been headquartered in Southern California since its formation in 1970. Consultant’s Long Beach, California headquarters houses hundreds of employees as well as the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, the General Counsel and the company’s marketing, corporate, and human resources departments. Under the circumstances, there can be no question that Consultant’s corporate policies are promulgated in California. Accordingly, Consultant has met its burden to show that the parties are diverse.

2. Whether the Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000

A party invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts must show that there is a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Developer contends that there is no monetary amount in controversy because it the only issue before the Court is whether to stay arbitration. Consultant counters that the Court may look to the amount it is seeking in the underlying arbitration to assess whether the amount in controversy requirement is met. The Consultant is correct.

In determining whether the jurisdictional amount in controversy is satisfied a court may look to the amount a party might obtain in the arbitration that it seeks to compel. Here, in the putative arbitration proceeding, Consultant is seeking $1,788,127 from Developer for services rendered. Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Accordingly, because Consultant has met its burden to establish that the Federal Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

B. Can the Consultant compel Developer to submit the dispute to arbitration?

The FAA provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court … for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. 4. It is well-established that the FAA creates a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. However, arbitration is a “matter of contract [and] … a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to so submit.”

Here, Developer claims that it is not bound by the MSA-and therefore not bound by the arbitration provision contained therein-because the MSA was never signed by a Developer representative. Consultant counters with an affidavit from its Project Manager, who avers that he witnessed Developer’s Chief Financial Officer sign the MSA. This purely factual dispute need not be resolved because there is an independent reason why the parties should be compelled to submit this matter to arbitration.

The Second Circuit has held that a nonsignatory to a particular agreement can be bound by an arbitration clause in that agreement where the nonsignatory enters into a separate contract that incorporates the arbitration provision. Here, pursuant to the terms of the MSA, the parties negotiated and entered into various Task Orders that set forth the price and nature of the services Consultant was to perform. Each Task Order provided that “except as otherwise specified herein, the terms and conditions of the [MSA] are incorporated in this Task Order by reference.”

Developer does not and cannot dispute that these Task Orders were signed by an authorized Developer representative. In light of the fact that the Task Orders unequivocally incorporated the MSA by reference, Developer is bound by the MSA and the clear and unambiguous arbitration provision contained therein.

Accordingly, Consultant can compel arbitration.

The Owner can make claim as equitable subrogee to the rights of the Town under the payment and performance bonds posted by Contractor.

Question. This matter arises from the excavation work undertaken in anticipation of the construction of a residential subdivision and golf course. Is the Contractor’s surety responsible for the reimbursement of the Owner for certain fees and costs the Owner paid to the Town, and additional fees and costs the Owner may be required to pay to the Town, in connection with the excavation?

Answer. YES. The Owner is entitled to recover the excavation fees as the equitable subrogee of the Town under certain bonds posted with respect to the excavation.

The Owner entered into an excavation agreement with Contractor1, pursuant to which Contractor1 undertook to perform excavation work with respect to the Owner’s 186-acre development project. The excavation agreement apparently was entered into in anticipation of the conditional approval of the subdivision that ultimately was granted by the Planning Board of the Town (hereinafter the Planning Board). Among the conditions imposed in connection with that approval was the requirement that the Owner implement certain mitigation measures identified in a findings statement that had been adopted by the Planning Board, in satisfaction of the requirements of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8, hereinafter SEQRA). One of those measures was the payment of fees required by the Town Code.

The excavation agreement specified that Contractor1 would be required to remove from the site and haul away approximately 1.665 million cubic yards of material in accordance with the SEQRA findings statement and the final engineering plan. It also specifically obligated Contractor1 to pay “any municipal fee … pursuant to the Town requirements,” making specific reference to the Town Environmental Preservation Capital Reserve Fund. The agreement also provided that Contractor1 “shall not over excavate any area.” With respect to Contractor1’s compensation for its services, the excavation agreement provided that the Owner would have “no financial obligation to [Contractor1] other than [Contractor1] shall own any and all excess material taken from the site in conformance with the approved plan.”The excavation agreement further provided, however, that Contractor1 would be paid $1.5 million to excavate the drainage and sewers for the development. The excavation agreement was signed by Contractor1’s principal.

The municipal fees to which the excavation agreement referred (hereinafter the Environmental Fund fees) are imposed by the Town Environmental Preservation Capital Reserve Fund Law. Prior to commencement of the excavation, the applicant “must post a bond in such form as shall be approved by the Town Attorney and in an amount to be specified by the Planning Board to guarantee performance in accordance with the approved site plan or the approved subdivision plan”.

To satisfy its obligations under the excavation agreement, Contractor1 entered into an oral agreement with the Excavate-Co. According to Excavate-Co’s principal, Contractor1 agreed to sell Excavate-Co approximately 471,425 cubic yards of excess fill at $3.50 per cubic yard, or approximately $1.65 million, which Contractor1 would dedicate to the payment of the Environmental Fund fees due to the Town. According to Contractor1, however, Excavate-Co was to make the payments for the fill directly to the Town.

Surety issued a “payment bond” (hereinafter the first payment bond) to the Town in the amount of $500,000. Executed by Excavate-Co, the first payment bond recited that Excavate-Co, as “Principal,” was obligated to provide a bond guaranteeing the payment of fees to the Town for the removal of material from the site, and bound Surety,” to pay those fees in the event that Excavate-Co failed to do so. The first payment bond was amended on the day of its issuance to add Contractor1 as a principal. According to Excavate-Co, however, the Town rejected the first payment bond because the amount was insufficient.

Another “payment bond” in the amount of $1.5 million (hereinafter the second payment bond) was executed by Paving Corp. as “Principal,” and Excavate-Co as “Sureties.” The second payment bond recited that Paving Corp. has applied to mine property belonging to the Owner at the same location and provided that the principal and sureties “hereby undertake and become bound in the sum of $1,500,000 to the Town for the payment of any sum due the Town by Paving Corp. for the mining of property of the Owner, incidental to the development of said site. According to Excavate-Co, the Town rejected the second payment bond because it was not issued by a bonding company.

The Owner disputes Excavate-Co’s contention that the Town rejected the first and second payment bonds.

Contractor1 and Excavate-Co, as “Principals,” and Surety executed a “Performance (Completion) Bond” (hereinafter the performance bond). According to its terms, Surety was obligated to the Town, up to the sum of $1.665 million, to satisfy the obligation of Contractor1 and Excavate-Co to remove approximately 1.6 million cubic yards of fill at The Owner site “in accordance with the construction specification of the Town all in conformance with the plot and drainage plan approved by the Town Planning Board and to the satisfaction of the Town.”

According to Excavate-Co, the performance bond replaced the first and second payment bonds, and was intended to comply with the bonding requirement of Town Code, and was accepted by the Town. The Town Attorney required, however, that the performance bond be relabeled a “restoration bond,” and that the language of the bond be modified to provide for Surety’s guaranty of the principals’ obligation to remove the fill “in accordance with the construction specifications of the Town and the Town Planning Board, as approved, pursuant to the Town Planning Board’s Subdivision Grant, and Town Planning Board’s Site Plan Grant, and furthermore, in conformance with the Plot and Drainage Plan approved by the Town Planning Board and to the full satisfaction of the Town .”

Surety made the requested change in a rider, which was executed by Contractor1 and Excavate-Co, on behalf of Contractor1 and Excavate-Co, respectively; the Town Board accepted the performance bond.

According to Excavate-Co, Excavate-Co paid the sum of $500,000 to the Town and the sum of $485,000 directly to Contractor1 pursuant to its oral agreement with Contractor1. Excavate-Co’s payments to the Town were made on its behalf by Paving Corp. in the sum of $300,000.

By letter the Town advised The Owner of its “concerns” with respect to a number of issues related to the project, including the over-excavation of the property and the failure to pay “all outstanding fees related to the excess materials application.”

The Town issued a stop-work order with respect to the project, citing over-excavation of the property. In order to resume work, The Owner paid the sum of $740,000 in Environmental Fund fees to the Town, and agreed, in a stipulation dated to deposit with the Town the additional sum of $250,000 with respect to the Town’s claim for additional fees as a result of the claimed over-excavation. The Owner also paid the sum of $50,000 to the Town for the engineering costs the Town had incurred in determining the amount of the over-excavation.

The Owner seeks damages as equitable subrogee to the rights of the Town under the payment and performance bonds.

Equitable Subrogation

The Owner attempts to establish a contract claim against Excavate-Co based upon Excavate-Co’s liability to the Town under the payment and performance bonds. Although The Owner is not a party to those bonds, it asserts that, having paid to the Town the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs guaranteed by the bonds, it is entitled, as the equitable subrogee of the Town, to recover from Excavate-Co the funds it has paid to the Town. Although The Owner’s argument is a novel one, it is meritorious and The Owner is entitled to judgment against Excavate-Co on this ground. The doctrine of equitable subrogation “is broad enough to include every instance in which one party pays a debt for which another is primarily answerable and which in equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the latter, so long as the payment was made either under compulsion or for the protection of some interest of the party making the payment, and in discharge of an existing liability

As an equitable doctrine, subrogation is designed to promote justice, and thus, is dependent upon the particular relationship of the parties and the nature of the controversy in each case Considering the circumstances here, insofar as the first payment bond and the performance bond are concerned, The Owner has satisfied all the requisite elements of its equitable subrogation claim and thus established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law against Excavate-Co for the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs it paid to the Town.

In its capacity as a principal under the first payment bond and the performance bond, Excavate-Co agreed that it would pay the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs directly to the Town. “Surety bonds-like all contracts-are to be construed in accordance with their terms” The first payment bond explicitly bound Excavate-Co to pay up to the sum of $500,000 with reference to “fees for the removal of materials” from the site. The performance bond expressly incorporated by reference all of the terms, regulations, and conditions imposed by the Town in connection with the construction and excavation at the site, which necessarily included the obligation to pay the Environmental Fund fees and engineering.

In satisfying Excavate-Co’s obligation to the Town, The Owner acted “under compulsion or for the protection of some interest” of its own. As the developer of a 177-unit residential development, The Owner had an undeniable interest in the timely completion and approval of the project. That interest was threatened when the Town withheld certificates of occupancy and stopped work on the project by reason of the alleged over-excavation. In order to address this threat, The Owner paid the Town the sums of $990,000 in Environmental Fund fees and $50,000 in engineering costs, and thereby satisfied the Town’s condition for permitting development work to resume. The payments were made, therefore, for the purpose of protecting The Owner’s interest in the completion of the project.

Finally, the Environmental Fund fees and the engineering costs were obligations “which in equity and good conscience should have been discharged by” Excavate-Co. Excavate-Co agreed, both as a principal on the performance bond and in its oral contract with Contractor1, to pay the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs required by the Town. In return, Excavate-Co took possession of the fill, a valuable commodity. Excavate-Co thus received the benefit of its bargain. The Owner, by contrast, both paid the fees and costs required of it and otherwise lost the ability to recover the value of that commodity, which would thus enable it to recover the fees and costs it had paid. In “equity and good conscience,” therefore, The Owner should be able to recover the value of its payments to the Town from Excavate-Co.

On this basis, The Owner thus established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to claim sounding in equitable subrogation, insofar as asserted against Excavate-Co on the first payment bond and the performance bond. The same cannot be said, however, of The Owner’s claim with respect to the second payment bond. Excavate-Co is not a principal under the second payment bond; the principal on that bond is Paving Corp.. There is no evidence as to the relationship between Excavate-Co and Paving Corp.. The Owner failed to carry its burden, therefore, with respect to its equitable subrogation claim under the second payment bond.

In response to The Owner’s prima facie showing with respect to the performance bond and the first payment bond, Excavate-Co’s obligation, if it is to avoid the entry of judgment against it, is to demonstrate the existence of a material and triable issue of. Excavate-Co raised such an issue with respect to the first payment bond, but has not done so with respect to the performance bond.

Generally, delivery and receipt of a bond constitutes sufficient approval and acceptance of it Here, however, the Town Code requires that the bond be “approved by the Town Attorney … in an amount to be specified by the Planning Board”. Excavate-Co claims that the Town did not accept the first payment bond.. Thus, Excavate-Co raised a material issue of fact whether the Town Board had accepted those bonds pursuant to the requirements of the Town Code

Excavate-Co did not raise a triable issue of fact, however, with regard to the Town’s acceptance of the performance bond.

Surety

Surety contends that the Town never accepted the performance bond because it was renamed a “restoration bond” and that, in any event, the performance bond only obligated it to pay the cost of restoring the premises in the event of default by the contractor. Contrary to these contentions, as shown above, the Town Board issued a resolution adopting the performance bond which, as amended, did not absolve Surety of its conditional liability as surety for the payment of the Environmental Fund fees and engineering costs, but rather expanded Surety’s obligations to include a requirement that it restore the site in the event of breach by the principals. Surety also argues that The Owner cannot recover under the doctrine of equitable subrogation because it was satisfying its own debt when making payments to the Town. As discussed above, however, the Owner was paying the obligations of Contractor1 and Excavate-Co, obligations for which Surety was conditionally liable as surety under the performance bond.