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Statutory Warranty

Question: Does the statutory warranty apply when I am constructing a custom home on land owned by another?

Brief Answer – The Third Department has continually stated that it does not, but be aware that there may be a trend toward having Article 36-B govern the application of implied warranties on custom homes.

Answer – GBL ¬ß¬ß 777, 777-a and 777-b deal with implied warranties on newly built homes. GBL ¬ß 777 defines a new home as, “. . . any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less in which title to the individual units is transferred to owners. . . .” McKinneys General Business Law ¬ß 777, 2007. Transferring title means that the home and the real estate are being transferred to the buyer. So, Article 36-B applies only to new home construction that is conveyed to the owner along with the real estate upon which it sits.

GBL ¬ß 770 in Article 36-A of the General Business Law defines what a custom home is. A custom home is, “. . . a single family residence to be constructed on premises owned of record by the purchaser at the time of contract, provided that such residence is intended for residential occupancy by such purchaser. . . .” McKinneys General Business Law ¬ß 770, 2007. Customs homes are not conveyed along with the real estate. They are merely built on land owned by the eventual homeowner. An analysis of the two statutes would clearly show that the implied home warranty on new homes would not apply to a custom home because the real estate is not being conveyed with a custom home.

The Third Department has supported the reasoning that custom homes are not subject to implied home warranties. In Biggs v. O’Neil, 309A.D.2d 1110, 1110, 766 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (3rd Dep’t, 2003), the plaintiff was suing to recover damages for a breach of contract and express and implied warranties in regard to the faulty construction of the shell of a home on his property. The court stated that, “[a] housing merchant warranty is implied in the sale of a new home. It has no application to a contract for the construction of a ‚Äòcustom home’ on non-builder-owned property, which is afforded protection under General Business Law article 36-A.” Id., 766 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392. The court made it clear that a home built on the homeowner’s property is not considered a new home as defined in GBL ¬ß 777. Therefore, the implied warranties outlined in Article 36-B do not apply.

When the Biggs ruling is viewed in conjunction with another ruling, Gorsky v. Triou’s Custom Homes, Inc., 194 Misc.2d 736, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. Sup. 2002), there is confusion as to whether the implied warranty outlined in Article 36-B apply to custom homes. In Gorsky, the plaintiff had the defendant build a home on the plaintiff’s property. The contract between the parties incorporated General Business Law Article 36-B, which includes ¬ß 777. The contractor did not use the type of shingles specified in the contract, and more than a year later the roof had to be replaced. Id. at 737, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199. The defendant raised the affirmative defense that Article 36-B would preclude recovery by the plaintiff because the roof is not a major system and the claim for the roof was not raised within the one year warranty period. Id. at 738, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200. The plaintiff moved to strike the defendant’s defense by saying the 36-B does not apply in this case because the real property was not conveyed along with the new house. Id. at 739, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200. Before Article 36-B was enacted, the common law rule was that there was a six year statute of limitations based on contract law. Contract law also established that “. . . every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties.” Id. at 739-740, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200-201 (citing Caceci v. DiCanio Construction Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 530 N.Y.S.2d 771, 526 N.E.2d 266 (1988). When Article 36-B was enacted, it completely displaced the common law set out in Caceci. Id. at 742, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 203. Based on the court’s interpretation of legislative intent when it drafted Article 36-B the court ruled, “[t]he statutory new home implied warranties imposed by article 36-B of the General Business Law apply to custom homes and protect purchasers of such homes regardless of the fact that they own the real property upon which such homes are constructed prior to the home being built.” Id. at 210, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 750. This ruling is in direct conflict with the holding of Biggs.

The Third Department strengthened their ruling in Biggs with its decision in Sharpe v. Mann, 34 A.D.3d 959, 823 N.Y.S.2d 623 (3rd Dep’t, 2006). In Sharpe, the defendant built a log cabin on land owned by the plaintiff. The contract between the parties incorporated GBL ¬ß 777, but the court stated in a footnote that,

“While the housing merchant implied warranty under General Business Law ¬ß 777-a is automatically applicable to the sale of a new home, it does not apply to a contract for the construction of a ‚Äòcustom home,’ that is, a single family residence to be constructed on the purchaser’s own property. Thus here, General Business Law ¬ß 777-a did not automatically apply to the parties’ contract as it involved the construction of a log cabin on plaintiff’s own property.” Id., 823 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (citations omitted).

The Third Department has made it clear that implied warranties on new homes do not include custom homes.

Since both the Biggs and Sharpe cases are Appellate Division cases, they have stronger precedence over the Gorsky since it is only a Supreme Court case. A strict reading of the statutes indicates that Article 36-B of the General Business Law does not include custom homes. The builder should be aware that there may be a growing trend in the courts that Article 36-B will apply to custom homes in the future.

Commercial Lease Indemnification Clause

Question: Is a commercial lease’s broad indemnification provision, requiring the tenant to indemnify the landlord for any accident occurring in the leased premises “unless caused solely by landlord’s negligence,” enforceable?

For reasons explained below I conclude that the indemnification clause, which was coupled with an insurance procurement provision, obligates the tenant to indemnify the landlord for its share of liability, and that such a lease provision does not violate General Obligations Law § 5-321.

Landlord leased a portion of its building located to Contractor. The lease required Contractor to indemnify Landlord as follows:

“Tenant shall indemnify and hold harmless Landlord … from and against any and all claims arising from or in connection with (A) the conduct or management of the Premises or of any business therein, or any work or thing whatsoever done, or any condition created (other than by Landlord) in or about the Premises during the term of this Lease …; (B) any act, omission or negligence of Tenant or any of its subtenants or licensees … or contractors; (C) any accident, injury or damage whatsoever unless caused solely by Landlord’s negligence) occurring in, at or upon the Premises; and (D) any breach or default by Tenant in the full and prompt payment and performance of Tenant’s obligation under this Lease ….”

The lease further obligated Contractor, at its expense, to maintain a comprehensive general liability insurance policy naming Landlord as an additional insured with coverage to be no less than $5 million “combined single limit per occurrence for bodily injury and property damage liability.” Another lease term directed Landlord and Contractor to obtain mutual waivers of subrogation in their respective insurance policies. Contractor procured the specified insurance coverage, and Landlord also maintained a separate insurance policy for the building.

After entering into the lease, Contractor hired a mechanical contractor to perform work on an existing sprinkler system as part of the project. During construction, a flood occurred, causing property damage to the premises of a tenant on the floor below. The water damage resulted from the failure to drain the pipes properly before beginning the sprinkler work.

The tenant below’s insurer-commenced a subrogation action against Landlord, Contractor and subcontractor to recover the monies it had paid to its insured on its property damage claim. Landlord interposed a cross claim against Contractor for contractual indemnification. The subrogation action was settled for $200,000 and all claims and cross claims among the parties were resolved, except for Landlord’s indemnification claim against Contractor. As part of the settlement, the parties stipulated that if the case had been tried by a jury, 90% of the liability would have been allocated to Landlord and 10% to the subcontractor. After the settlement, Landlord moved for summary judgment against Contractor on its claim for contractual indemnification.

Contractor advances two arguments to support its position that Landlord is not entitled to contractual indemnification. First, Contractor asserts that the language of the lease provision at issue does not unmistakably require indemnification under the circumstances of this case. Alternatively, even if interpreted to entitle Landlord to indemnification, Contractor urges that the lease provision is unenforceable and contrary to public policy under General Obligations Law ¬ß 5-321 because it obligates a tenant to indemnify a landlord for the landlord’s own negligence. I address each contention in turn.

Courts will construe a contract to provide indemnity to a party for its own negligence only where the contractual language evinces an “unmistakable intent” to indemnify. Here, subsection (C) of the indemnification clause in the lease required Contractor to indemnify Landlord for “any” accident occurring in Contractor’s premises “unless caused solely by [Landlord’s] negligence.” This broadly drawn provision unambiguously evinced an intent that Contractor indemnify Landlord for the latter’s own negligence, provided Landlord was not 100% negligent. In this case, the parties stipulated that Landlord was 90% at fault and Contractor’s contractor was 10% responsible for the water damage. Hence, Landlord was not solely liable under the terms of the stipulation and the clear language of the lease unmistakably affords indemnification under the circumstances of this case.

Having concluded that the indemnification provision was triggered, I next consider the contention that the provision is nevertheless unenforceable in light of General Obligations Law § 5-321. That statute provides:

“Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to any lease of real property exempting the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.”

This case presents a commercial lease negotiated between two sophisticated parties who included a broad indemnification provision, coupled with an insurance procurement requirement. That arrangement afforded the tenant below who sustained water damage, adequate recourse for the damages it suffered. Additionally, Contractor’s insurer-not Contractor itself-will bear ultimate responsibility for the indemnification payment, which is precisely the result contemplated by the parties when they entered into the lease. Where, as here, a lessor and lessee freely enter into an indemnification agreement whereby they use insurance to allocate the risk of liability to third parties between themselves, General Obligations Law ¬ß 5-321 does not prohibit indemnity.

Choice of Entity: Organizing Your Business (Part 2)

In each issue of the BAHV Newsletter, Thomas S. Tripodianos, Esq. provides our members with answers to their commercial litigation, real estate and construction law questions.

William A. Brenner, CPA provides members with information on a variety of business management, profitability and tax topics, intended to increase member awareness and stimulate thought about issues that can greatly affect profitability, business growth and quality of life.

Both Tom and Bill have often given the advice that no one professional can properly satisfy all your needs. Rather, a “Management Team” should be assembled to address the multitude of issues facing your business. At a minimum your team should consist of an attorney, accountant, and insurance professional.

In this special joint installment of their columns Bill and Tom explore the pros and cons of the various organizational forms available to business owners.

Tax Implications – Pass Through vs. Double Taxation

It is important to consider the legal attributes when choosing an entity type for your business, but careful consideration should also be given to the income tax implications. Here are the basic tax related characteristics of the various entities.

Sole Proprietorship. From a tax perspective this is the simplest form of business entity. All income, deduction, gain or loss is reported on Schedule C the individual’s personal tax return. The one downside, however, is that net profits are subject to self employment tax, which is typically 15.3% of net income, in addition to federal and state income tax.

Partnerships in General. There are several types of partnerships, all of which share many of the same tax attributes. Partnerships are pass through entities for tax purposes. This means that any income, deduction, gain or loss from partnership activities is passed through to the individual partners, who typically report it on Schedule E of their personal returns. The partnership itself files an informational return with the IRS and state to report basic partner information.

With pass through entities, the distributive share of partnership taxable income is taxed at the partner level regardless or whether or not any actual cash distributions are made to the partners. Depending on the partnership it is possible to pay tax on income that you have not yet received. This is called phantom income, and partnership managers generally try to distribute enough cash to at least cover the partner’s tax on reported taxable income. The great thing about partnerships from a tax perspective is their flexibility. Partnerships can allocate income, deduction, gain or loss to each partner in any amounts, regardless of each partner’s ownership percentage. This also applies to cash distributions. It is important to have a written operating agreement that allows these types of specific allocations. This is an important consideration where partners do not generate equal amounts of partnership profits and want to allocate income and distributions fairly.

There are two basic types of income passed through to partners – guaranteed payments and ordinary income. Guaranteed payments are payments made to partners without regard to profitability, and are similar to an employee’s salary. Ordinary income is the net profit of the partnership (after deducting the guaranteed payments), which is allocated to each partner. Generally speaking, both ordinary income and guaranteed payments are subject to self employment tax.

Another important tax consideration for partnerships is that the contribution of cash or property to the partnership in return for an ownership interest is not a taxable event. The same holds true for distributions of partnership property to partners in liquidation of the partnership. This is not the case with corporations.

The “basis” and “at-risk” rules that apply to pass through entities are complicated, and you should discuss their implications with your tax advisor. For the purposes of this discussion, having “basis” in the partnership allows you to receive an allocation of partnership losses. Once you have passed the basis hurdle, you must be “at-risk” to deduct the losses allocated to you on your personal tax return. If you don’t have basis or are not at-risk, the losses are not lost, just carried to future years.

The following are specific tax attributes associated with each type of partnership that we have discussed, in addition to the basics described above:

* General Partnership. Typically all income is subject to self employment tax. Since each partner is liable for the partnership debts, their allocable share of partnership liabilities increases their basis for allowing the allocation of partnership losses.
* Limited Partnership. The general partner’s distributive share of income is typically subject to self employment tax. Guaranteed payments to Limited Partners are subject to self employment tax, while their distributive shares of ordinary income are generally not. Limited Partners do not have basis in their allocable shares of partnership liabilities because they are not liable for partnership debt. The most they can lose is their investment in the partnership. However, the general partner is liable for the partnership debt, which does give the general partner basis for the allocation of partnership losses.
* Limited Liability Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships. All income and guaranteed payments allocated to each member or partner is generally subject to self employment income. Members and partners typically have no exposure for LLC or LLP liabilities. As such they have no basis in their allocable share of these liabilities. However, if any member or partner personally guarantees debt of the LLC or LLP, they have basis and are at-risk to the extent of the guarantee.

* Now, let’s look at the two types of corporations and how their owners are treated from a tax perspective.

C Corporations. Shareholders of C corporations who participate in the day to day operations generally receive their compensation through payroll. Like any other employee, wages are reported on their individual income tax returns. C Corporations are not pass through entities. Therefore, any net income is taxed at corporate rates, which can near 50%, federal, state, and city combined, making good tax planning crucial. For this reason, many C corporations try to eliminate net profits by paying bonuses to their shareholders at year end through payroll. In the event that a corporation has net income, and pays tax on it, the accumulated profits can be distributed at a later date to shareholders in the form of dividends. Unfortunately these dividend distributions are taxable to the shareholder at the 15% qualified dividend tax rate.

S Corporations. If a C corporation meets certain criteria, it can make federal and state elections to be treated as an S corporation. S corporations are pass through entities, just like partnerships. Income, deductions, gain or loss are passed through to the individual shareholders and then taxed on their individual tax returns. The main difference between an S corporation and a partnership with respect to the allocation of income is that while there is flexibility with partnerships, corporate income or loss must be allocated prorata based on share ownership. The same holds true for cash distributions. As with other pass through entities, owners are taxed on income even if no cash is actually distributed. The major difference is that income passed through from an S corporation to a shareholder is not subject to self employment tax. To make sure that shareholders pay their fair share of social security and Medicare taxes (the self employment tax), the IRS requires shareholders to receive reasonable compensation in the form of salary. With a few exceptions, S corporations pay no federal corporate tax and typically pay a small minimum state and or city tax.

For basis purposes, shareholders of S corporations must consider their original investment, plus their share of cumulative corporate earnings and additional investments, less their share of cumulative corporate losses and distributions. Additionally, any amounts loaned to the corporation directly by the shareholder can be considered basis for allowing the deduction of pass through losses on the shareholder’s individual tax return.

In most cases, contributions of cash or property to a corporation in exchange for stock can be structured in a tax fee manner. However, the distribution of corporate assets to shareholders in liquidation of their interests is a taxable event. For example, if a corporation distributes equipment to a shareholder in liquidation, it is treated as if the equipment was sold for fair market value by the corporation. The equipment is distributed to the shareholder, along with the income from the deemed sale. This can become a big issue if the corporate assets have appreciated over time, which can result in large amounts of income on distribution, with no actual cash to go along with it.

With the wide variety of entity choices as well as legal and tax consequences, we strongly recommend that you consult with your “management team” to make sure you have the information needed to make the right choice.

If you would like more information regarding this topic, please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at TTripodianos@wbgllp.com, or by phone at 845-294-5500 x 317. Bill Brenner can be reached at , or by phone at 914-949-2990 x 313.

Please understand that this column provides general information only, and should not be construed as legal or tax advice to anyone under any circumstances. While we encourage you to contact us, you should not disclose to us any information that you consider confidential unless and until we have formally established an attorney-client or accountant-client relationship, and agreed to represent you in your particular matter. The opinions expressed in this column are of the individual authors, and not necessarily those of the Builder’s Association of the Hudson Valley.

Thomas S. Tripodianos is a partner at the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP. Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP emphasizes the practice of Construction Law, representing general contractors, subcontractors, sureties, developers, owners, suppliers, engineers, homeowners and other entities connected with the construction industry in transactions, litigation, arbitration, mediation, public and private construction contracts, mechanic’s liens, surety law and environmental law. Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP has its principal office in White Plains, New York, and also has offices in New Jersey and Connecticut. Mr. Tripodianos resides in Orange County.

Bill Brenner is a manager at the accounting and consulting firm of Citrin Cooperman & Company, LLP. Ranked among the top 40 accounting firms in the U.S., Citrin Cooperman provides business consulting, tax and accounting services to business owners in the Tri-state area and Hudson Valley. The Firm has offices in White Plains, mid-town Manhattan, and Springfield, New Jersey.

Choice of Entity: Organizing Your Business (Part 1)

In each issue of the BAHV Newsletter, Thomas S. Tripodianos, Esq. provides our members with answers to their commercial litigation, real estate and construction law questions.

William A. Brenner, CPA provides members with information on a variety of business management, profitability and tax topics, intended to increase member awareness and stimulate thought about issues that can greatly affect profitability, business growth and quality of life.

Both Tom and Bill have often given the advice that no one professional can properly satisfy all your needs. Rather, a “Management Team” should be assembled to address the multitude of issues facing your business. At a minimum your team should consist of an attorney, accountant, and insurance professional.

In this special joint installment of their columns Bill and Tom explore the pros and cons of the various organizational forms available to business owners.

Choice of Organizational Form

Choosing an organizational form that best suits the needs of a business and its participants is complicated. This article presents a cursory introduction to the legal and tax implications of the choice.

The Range of Organizational Choices

The organizational forms that they can be used to structure a for-profit business exist along a continuum. Each form can be manipulated to approximate the characteristics of the others. Keep in mind that whatever structure you choose, it will not significantly affect how you conduct your day to day business. The organizational form determines legal relationships, responsibilities for business debts, and tax liability.

The more common choices available to business owners are:

Sole proprietorship. A single individual owns the business assets and is liable for any business debts; Proprietorships usually are small, with few capital needs that cannot be met from the owner’s resources and from lenders. There can’t be more than one owner of a sole proprietorship.

General partnership. If you arrange to operate the business with someone else, while sharing control and profits, you automatically create a partnership. As partners, you are each individually liable for all partnership debts. Partnerships are prevalent in service industries – such as law, accounting, and medicine – where trust must exist among the participants and capital needs are not great.

Limited partnership. You can form a limited partnership in which so-called limited partners provide capital and are liable only to the extent of their investment. General partners run the business and are fully liable for partnership debts. Since limited partners need not be general partners, one person or entity could be the general partner and both can be limited partners. Limited partnerships combine tax advantages and limited liability.

Limited liability Company. (“LLC”) You could form a limited liability company – an entity that is a hybrid between a corporation and a partnership. Like a partnership, the members of an LLC provide capital and manage the business according to their operating agreement; their interests are not freely transferable. Like a corporation, members are not personally liable for debts of the LLC entity.

Corporation. You can form a legal entity called a corporation. Shareholders provide capital, and directors and officers manage the business. Unless there is fraud or inequity that justifies “piercing the corporate veil”, corporate participants are not personally liable for corporate debts; only the corporation is liable. Corporations are the principal means of organizing businesses with complex organizational structures and large capital needs. The corporate form, however, works for any size business, including a one-person “incorporated proprietorship.”

There are other variants. A joint venture is basically a partnership with a defined, closed-end objective. In a business trust, investors transfer property to a trustee who manages and controls the property for their benefit. The investors’ beneficial interests are freely transferable, and the beneficiaries generally are not liable for trust debts. A professional corporation allows certain professionals – doctors, lawyers, and accountants – to obtain some advantages of incorporation without running afoul of ethical rules that prohibit professionals from limiting their liability through use of the traditional corporate form.

Choosing between a Partnership and a Corporation

If you want to share in the control and profits of the business, you would likely choose between a partnership, limited liability company, or a corporation. Although a business planner can adapt each form to suit particular needs, some characteristics are relatively immutable – formation, liability, and tax. Others require planning – duration, management, and transfer of ownership interests.

Life Span – Formation and Duration

General Partnership. A general partnership is created any time two or more persons associate to carry on a business as co-owners to share profits and control. It requires no legal documentation. Unless agreed otherwise, a general partnership dissolves upon the death, bankruptcy, or withdrawal of any partner. Without planning, there is no assurance that a partner will not withdraw and demand that the business be liquidated.

Limited Partnership. A limited partnership arises when a certificate is filed with a state official. A limited partnership lasts as long as the parties agree or, absent agreement, until a general partner withdraws.

Limited Liability Company. An LLC arises when two members file articles of organization with a state official. Unless otherwise provided for by agreement, an LLC dissolves upon the death or withdrawal of any member.

Corporation. A corporation arises when articles of incorporation are filed with a state official. Corporate existence is perpetual, regardless of what happens to shareholders, directors, or officers.

Management -Authority to Bind and Control the Business

General Partnership. Each partner is an agent of all other partners and can legally bind the partnership, either by transacting business as agreed by the partners (actual authority) or by appearing in the eyes of third parties to carry on partnership business (apparent authority). Unless otherwise agreed, a majority vote of the partners decides ordinary partnership matters, but anything that is extraordinary or contravenes the agreement requires unanimity.

Limited Partnership. General partners have authority to legally bind the partnership as to ordinary matters. Limited partners have voting authority over specified matters.

Limited Liability Company. Most LLC statutes give broad authority to bind the LLC in much the same way as partners. Management of the LLC business is decided in proportion to the members’ capital contributions, unless the members agree to centralize decision-making by electing managers.

Corporation. The corporation has a centralized management structure. Its business is under the management and supervision of the board of directors. Officers carry out the policies formulated by the board. Shareholders elect the board and decide specified fundamental matters; they cannot bind the corporation.

Transfer of Ownership Interests-Free or Restricted

General Partnership. A partner cannot transfer his or her interest in the partnership unless all of the remaining partners agree, or the partnership agreement permits it.

Limited Partnership. A general partner cannot transfer its interest unless all of the other general and limited partners agree, or the partnership agreement permits it. Limited partner interests are freely assignable.

Limited Liability Company. An LLC member cannot transfer her LLC interest unless all of the other members consent. Some LLC statutes suggest that under specified circumstances, the articles of organization can provide standing consent to new members.

Corporation. Corporate shares are freely transferable unless there are specific written restrictions.

Liability – Unlimited or Limited

General Partnership. Partners have unlimited liability. Their personal assets are at risk for all partnership obligations, whether they are contractual or arise because of misconduct (torts) of the partners or partnership employees.

Limited Partnership. At least one partner must be a general partner, with unlimited liability. Limited partners are liable only to the extent of their investment, so long as they do not “participate in the control” of the business. Older statutes did not define “participation,” and courts construed the term broadly. Limited partners were said to participate in control if they shared in operational decisions, retained control of financial matters, and decided the general partner’s tenure. Modern statutes clarify that some activities do not constitute participation in control. Limited partners do not lose their limited liability merely by being officers, directors, or shareholders of a corporate general partner, voting on major business matters, or advising the general partner.

Limited Liability Company. In both their capacities as capital contributors and managers, LLC members are not liable for LLC obligations beyond their investment. Some statutes, however, state that LLC members can become liable for LLC obligations by reason of their own acts.

Corporation. Shareholders have limited liability for corporate obligations. This is true also for directors and officers acting on behalf of the corporation. Corporate participants can lose only what they have invested unless there is fraud or an inequity that justifies “piercing the corporate veil.” Often, large creditors of small corporations will demand that corporate participants personally guarantee the corporation’s obligations, thus reducing the significance of corporate limited liability.

With any of these entities, if a partner, member of shareholder personally guarantees debt of the entity, he or she will be liable for that debt if the entity is unable to comply with its repayment terms.

If you would like more information regarding this topic, please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at TTripodianos@wbgllp.com, or by phone at 845-294-5500 x 317. Bill Brenner can be reached at , or by phone at 914-949-2990 x 313.

Please understand that this column provides general information only, and should not be construed as legal or tax advice to anyone under any circumstances. While we encourage you to contact us, you should not disclose to us any information that you consider confidential unless and until we have formally established an attorney-client or accountant-client relationship, and agreed to represent you in your particular matter. The opinions expressed in this column are of the individual authors, and not necessarily those of the Builder’s Association of the Hudson Valley.

Thomas S. Tripodianos is a partner at the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP. Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP emphasizes the practice of Construction Law, representing general contractors, subcontractors, sureties, developers, owners, suppliers, engineers, homeowners and other entities connected with the construction industry in transactions, litigation, arbitration, mediation, public and private construction contracts, mechanic’s liens, surety law and environmental law. Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP has its principal office in White Plains, New York, and also has offices in New Jersey and Connecticut. Mr. Tripodianos resides in Orange County.

Bill Brenner is a manager at the accounting and consulting firm of Citrin Cooperman & Company, LLP. Ranked among the top 40 accounting firms in the U.S., Citrin Cooperman provides business consulting, tax and accounting services to business owners in the Tri-state area and Hudson Valley. The Firm has offices in White Plains, mid-town Manhattan, and Springfield, New Jersey.

Contract was rendered nullity when vendors did not respond by prescribed to purchaser’s settlement proposal.

Question. I am a builder of a single family home who unsuccessfully negotiated its sale with a prospective purchaser. The sale was never consummated. During the course of various inspections, the parties agreed to numerous extensions of the inspection contingencies until in accordance with the contract, purchasers delivered to my broker a copy of the inspection report listing several substantial defects with notice that purchaser was invoking its option to cancel the contract as well as the option to defer such cancellation for 10 days to permit the parties to reach a written agreement. Thereafter, the parties continued negotiating terms and agreed to several additional extensions of the deferment period. Finally, by letter, purchaser proposed final terms for resolution of the remaining disputes and stated that “[i]f these provisions are not acceptable to your clients, we hereby invoke the contingency contained in Paragraph 14 of the Contract between the parties, deeming the Agreement cancelled, null and void, and hereby request that the deposit made hereunder be returned to the Purchaser.” I did not accept the proposed terms, but proposed by letter, a counteroffer. Purchaser responded by letter, which suggested terms for resolution and once again stated: “If this is acceptable to your clients, please let me know in writing. If not, we shall adhere to the terms of my original letter and the contract shall be regarded as a nullity.” I did not respond to this letter. Thereafter, the parties continued verbal negotiations, culminating with purchaser signing a revised contract and delivering it to me for my signature. I did not further respond to purchaser and did not sign the contract. I ultimately entered into a contract to sell the property to another party. The original purchaser now alleges that the contract is still enforceable and that I breached the contract. Purchaser has also filed a notice of pendency against the property. Did I do anything wrong?

NO. The answer turns upon whether the purchaser had effectively cancelled the contract. Paragraph 14 of the parties’ contract provides, in pertinent part:

“This Agreement is contingent upon a written determination¬∑ that the property is free from any substantial structural, mechanical, environmental, plumbing, electrical or roofing defects. With respect to all the aforementioned conditions except the roofing, this contingency shall be deemed waived unless [purchaser] shall notify [the real estate broker], in writing, post-marked no later than 14 days from acceptance, or by personal service by such date, of such substantial defect(s), and furthermore supplies a written copy of the inspection report. With respect to the roofing contingency, the period for notification shall be 60 days from inspection. If [purchaser] so notifies, then this Agreement shall be deemed cancelled, null and void, and all deposits made hereunder shall be returned to [purchaser] or, at [purchaser’s] option, said cancellation may be deferred for a period of ten (10) days in order to provide the parties any opportunity to otherwise agree in writing.”

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, it was incumbent upon purchaser to state facts which, if credited, allege that an enforceable contract existed between the parties at the time of the alleged breach. It appears that the purchaser concedes that after the builder failed to respond to the deadline imposed by purchaser’s letter, the “contract was deemed a nullity.”

Purchaser’s assertions that the contract was revived because the parties thereafter orally agreed to withdraw the cancellation and continued negotiating the terms of the contract, or because a signed cancellation and release was never delivered, are unavailing. The clear language of Paragraph 14 and the letters written by purchaser attorney invoking purchaser’s unilateral option to cancel the contract unless the parties agreed otherwise in writing within the proscribed time period leave no question that the contract became a nullity by operation of law, freeing the parties to negotiate a new written contract or abandon their efforts. As no new contract was ever executed by both parties, no contract existed on which to premise purchaser’s allegations of breach of contract.

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Lessee has no obligation to lessor for defective equipment.

Question. I have a finance-lease contract for equipment which I have personally guaranteed. The deal I negotiated provides that I can return the equipment if I am not satisfied and that I will either be refunded any payment made for the equipment or it will be replaced with equipment that is satisfactory. Either way, I had an unrestricted right of return on the equipment for 60 days after delivery. I was also assured that the warranty would be honored under all circumstances. The equipment has malfunctioned one month after delivery and the leasing company has refused to service same. Accordingly, I have stopped making payments (I’ve made one so far.) The leasing company has declared me in default and demanded all the money due under our agreement and the guaranty as immediately payable. Am I obligated to make payment? What are the leasing companies’ obligations with regards to the defective equipment?

This case illustrates a rule of thumb I have offered countless times but unfortunately few have grasped: “If it ain’t in writing it didn’t happen”. Origination credit for that phrase goes to my partner Thomas H. Welby. As it turns out the agreement the contractor (“Contractor”) posing this question thought he was entering into was not the one he signed.

A third-party finance agreement is an agreement whereby a third party agrees to provide the financing between a supplier and a consumer. In a finance lease, the lessee negotiates directly with the supplier or manufacturer and then arranges for the lessor to buy the goods to lease them to the lessee. In order for a lease to qualify as a third-party finance agreement, the lessor must not select, manufacture, or supply the goods. The transaction between the lessor and the lessee is therefore first and last a financial transaction. Thus, in such a situation it makes no sense to treat the lessor as a seller with warranty liability to the lessee, nor to free the supplier or manufacturer from the promises it would have made in an outright sale to the lessee. It is well-settled that third-party finance agreements are given full force and effect

The Contractor selected the subject equipment from the manufacturer, paid the manufacturer a down payment, and entered into the Lease with the financing company to finance the equipment. By submitting the subject Lease and proof that Contractor defaulted thereon after making only one payment, the financing company has met its initial burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Although Contractor indicates that the equipment was defective, under the terms of the Lease, the financing company made no representations or warranties to Contractor regarding the equipment. In this regard, paragraph 2 of the Lease provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]here are no warranties by or on behalf of the Lessor;” that “Lessor acknowledges and agrees ¬∑¬∑¬∑ [that] Lessor makes no warranties, either express or implied ¬∑¬∑¬∑ with respect to the equipment or as to the condition of the equipment, its merchantability, its fitness or suitability for any particular purpose, its design, its capacity, its quality ¬∑¬∑¬∑”; that “Lessee leases the equipment as is’ and with all faults ¬∑¬∑¬∑”; that “if the equipment ¬∑¬∑¬∑ is unsatisfactory for any reason ¬∑¬∑¬∑ Lessee’s only remedy, if any, shall be against the supplier or manufacturer of the equipment and not against the Lessor.” The Lease further provides that “[n]o defect, damage, or unfitness of the equipment for any purpose shall relieve the Lessee of the obligation to pay rent or relieve Lessee of any other obligation under this Lease.” Such provisions are typical of a finance lease, designed to comply with UCC 2-A-103(1)(g). The Lease expressly states that “Lessee agrees ¬∑¬∑¬∑ that it is the intent of both parties to this Lease that the Lease qualify as a statutory finance lease under Article 2A of the [UCC].” Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, Contractor expressly agreed that they selected the equipment and vendor, that the financing company did not participate in that selection, and that Contractor is requesting the financing company to acquire the equipment on their behalf by purchasing the equipment from the vendor.

The liability of the third-party manufacturer to the Contractor is independent of the financing company’s claims against the Contractor. Thus, the financing company, as lessor, has the right to enforce the Lease regardless of Contractor’ disputes with the supplier of the equipment.

Commercial General Liability

Question. Does a commercial general liability (CGL) insurer have a duty to defend a subcontractor as an additional insured under a sub-subcontractor’s policy in an action brought by worker who alleged his injuries were caused by the sub- subcontractor’s operations, even if it was uncertain whether any judgment would be within coverage?

answer. YES. The relevant facts may be briefly stated. General contractor (GC), hired HVAC subcontractor (SC) for a construction project. SC, in turn, subcontracted the HVAC-related steamfitting work for the project to sub-subcontractor (SSC). Laborer, while working on the project as an employee of another subcontractor, allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on a patch of oil at the work site. Laborer commenced an action against GC. It appears from the evidence gathered through discovery in the personal injury action that a question of fact exists as to which contractor was the source of the patch of oil on which Laborer slipped. Specifically, the oil may have originated from any of the contractors who used oil to thread pipe at the work site. Of these contractors, only SSC was a subcontractor of SC. SC’s insurer’s carrier argues that additional insured coverage under SSC’s policy would not be triggered until the cause of Laborer’s accident had been adjudicated. The insurance carrier also argued, in the alternative, that, even if its duty to defend SC under SSC’s policy had been triggered, it could not be determined whether it was required to bear 100% of SC’s defense costs as the primary insurer.

In the absence of unambiguous contractual language to the contrary, an additional insured (here the subcontractor) enjoys the same protection as the named insured (here the sub-subcontractor). An insurance company’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. The duty to defend is exceedingly broad and an insurer will be called upon to provide a defense whenever the allegations of the complaint suggest a reasonable possibility of coverage. If, liberally construed, the claim is within the embrace of the policy, the insurer must come forward to defend its insured no matter how groundless, false, or baseless the suit may be. The duty remains even though facts outside the four corners of the pleadings indicate that the claim may be meritless or not covered. For that reason, when a policy represents that it will provide the insured with a defense, it actually constitutes litigation insurance in addition to liability coverage. An insurer may be required to defend under the contract even though it may not be required to pay once the litigation has run its course. An insurer’s duty to defend an additional insured is not contingent on there having been an adjudication of liability issues giving rise to a duty to indemnify the additional insured.

Restrictive Covenant in Employment

question. Is a provision in an employment agreement prohibiting an employee from soliciting the employer’s workers during the one year post-employment period enforceable?

NOT LIKELY, unlessenforcement of the non-recruit provision serves a legitimate interest of the employer. Generally, a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement is reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. A violation of any prong renders the covenant invalid. The reasonableness test however, may vary depending upon the type of restriction involved and the circumstances.

For the covenant to be enforceable you must satisfy the three prong test by alleging that the employee recruited possesses confidential or proprietary information, or that she was in any position to acquire trade secrets or that she was a particularly valuable or unique employee, or provided services which cannot easily be replaced. There has to be something more than just a showing that the two competing employers who would like the services of a good employee. To the extent that interest is affected by the alleged recruitment here, it is not one of those interests which permit enforcement of a restrictive covenant in New York. Accordingly, in circumstances involving no competition, and no confidential or proprietary information at stake, no legitimate interest of the employer is served by the covenant, and it will not likely be enforced.

Notifying Insurer and Agent

Question. If notice of loss is provided to the individual or entity from who the policy was purchased and that individual or entity accepts the notice of loss on behalf of the insurer have the notice requirements of the policy been satisfied? The policy declarations page, which is a form with spaces to be filled in by the agent or broker when writing a new policy includes a space for “Named Insured and Mailing Address,” beneath which the name of the contractor and its address are entered. Adjacent to the space for the named insured and mailing address, the form includes a space for “Agent,” next to which an identification number is entered in type, and beneath which the name of the person who sold the policy appears.

answer. YES, under the above fact pattern and assuming there is nothing on the face of the policy to the contrary and nothing was communicated to the insured to lead him to believe that the powers of the agent were special or restricted. Insurance companies, doing business by agencies at a distance from their principal place of business, are responsible for the acts of the agent, within the general scope of the business intrusted to his care; and no limitations of his authority will be binding on parties with whom he deals, which are not brought to their knowledge.

The question that comes to my mind is why wouldn’t you send notice directly to the insurance company as well? The better practice is to read your policy and provide the insurance company as well as the person who sold you the policy with a Notice of Loss as soon as possible. The alternative is to pay you lawyer to convince a Court that your failure to comply with the policy requirements is excusable.

As a general rule under New York law, an insurance broker is the agent of the insured, not the insurance company, and notice to an insurance broker, absent exceptional circumstances is not notice to the insurer. Such exceptional circumstances have been found in situations where the agent’s role went far beyond that of solicitor of the policy and included responsibilities such as collecting premiums, issuing the policy, and being designated as an agent or broker for the insurer. For a broker to become the insurer’s agent, there must be evidence of some action on the insurer’s part from which a general authority to represent the insurer may be inferred. Selling a policy to the insured does not by itself make the broker an agent of the insurer. Furthermore, the use of the term “agent” in a contract is not conclusive as to whether an agency relationship existed. Rather, the acts of the individual may determine the category into which the person falls, and whether an agency exists hinges predominately on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The question of whether an agency relationship exists is both a question of law and fact.

The doctrine of apparent authority also bears discussion here. Apparent authority arises when a principal places an agent in a position where it appears that the agent has certain powers which he may or may not possess. If a third person holds the reasonable belief that the agent was acting within the scope of his authority and changes his position in reliance on the agent’s act, the principal is estopped to deny that the agent’s act was not authorized. Where the insurer has voluntarily placed the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence may be justified in believing that the agent has authority to perform a particular act, apparent authority may exist.

Bottom line is the under New York law, with limited exceptions, an insured must comply with the notice provision of an insurance policy in order to obtain coverage under that policy. Absent a valid excuse, a failure to satisfy the notice requirement vitiates the policy, and the insurer need not show prejudice before it can assert the defense of noncompliance.

Statutory Limitations for Challenging Local Laws

Question. What statutory limitations period applies to an action challenging the validity of a local law?

Generally speaking, statutes of limitations are statutes of repose representing a legislative judgment that occasional hardship is outweighed by the advantage of barring stale claims. In order to determine what limitations period governs a particular declaratory judgment action, the court is required to look to the substance of the action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and the relief sought. If the dispute can be, or could have been, resolved through a form of action or proceeding for which a specific statute of limitations is furnished by statute, then that limitations period will govern the action, regardless of the form in which it is presented Otherwise, the six-year “catch-all” provision of CPLR 213(1) will apply.

Specifically with regards to an action challenging the validity of a local law there is a dichotomy between issues addressed to the substance of the law or its constitutionality, as to which a declaratory judgment action is appropriate, and issues that arise from the procedures by which the law was enacted, which may be raised in a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The distinction drawn is between defects that are substantive, and those that are procedural. This distinction proceeds from the axiom that an article 78 proceeding is unavailable to challenge the validity of a legislative act.

The limitation, however, applies only to the review of the “wisdom or merit” of the determination in i.e., its substance, not to the procedures by which the law was enacted. Where the issue is not the “wisdom or merit” of the legislative act, relief may be had in an article 78 proceeding and the four-month statute of limitations is, therefore, controlling.