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Does a contractual forum selection clause trump statute?

Question. In an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, defendant (property owner) asserts that the action must be transferred to the county contractually designated by the parties for the commencement of all litigation arising under their construction contract. Lienor claims that CPLR 507 precludes such a transfer and that venue must remain in the county where the subject property is situated. Notwithstanding the seemingly mandatory nature of CPLR 507, which requires that a foreclosure action be brought in the county where the property is situated does a contractual forum selection clause, such as the one at issue here, trump the statute?

Answer. Yes. The contractual forum selection clause is controlling.

This action has its genesis in a construction contract between the property owner and Lienor-a contract that required Lienor to furnish labor, equipment, and materials for the installation of elevators at a property located in Brooklyn, New York. Lienor timely filed a mechanic’s lien with the Kings County Clerk. Subsequently, Lienor also filed a notice of pendency with the Kings County Clerk and commenced an action in Kings County seeking a judgment foreclosing its lien, as well as related relief. Owner responded with a demand to change venue to New York County, and, upon Lienor’s failure to acquiesce in that demand, moved for a change of venue.

In seeking a change of venue, owner points to the parties’ construction contract, which provides that: “Any and all action [sic], proceedings and lawsuits must be brought in the Supreme Court of the State of New York and County of New York unless such action or suit is founded upon a dollar amount that is less than the jurisdictional threshold of the Supreme Court.” Thus, owner argues that this broad forum selection clause is controlling and requires this action to be transferred from Kings County to New York County.

Lienor alleges that CPLR 507 mandates that an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien be brought in the county where the property is situated (here Kings County), and that a forum selection clause may not subvert the statutory mandate. Additionally, Lienor argues that a change of venue would be contrary to public policy because placing venue in another county would deprive it of its security interest and remedies under the Lien Law. Analysis of the issues presented must begin with an examination of the relevant statutory framework.

Pursuant to CPLR 507,

The place of trial of an action in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property shall be in the county in which any part of the subject of the action is situated [emphasis added].

CPLR 501, in turn, provides that:

Subject to the provisions of subdivision two of section 510, written agreement fixing place of trial, made before an action is commenced, shall be enforced upon a motion for change of place of trial.

Notwithstanding that CPLR 501 authorizes the enforcement of forum selection clauses generally, Lienor initially argues that this statute is inoperative when the cause of action, such as here, is governed by CPLR 507. This, it is urged, flows from the mandatory language of CPLR 507, which allegedly creates an inviolable rule requiring an action affecting real property to be commenced only in the county where the property is situated. I agree but there is case law supporting the property owner’s position.

CPLR 501 provides that the parties may contractually fix the venue of an action, which, of course, is the location where the trial will take place. The statute, however, does not dictate where the notice of mechanic’s lien and notice of pendency must be filed, which is governed by Lien Law ¬ß 10 and CPLR 6511. Nor does it dictate where the property must be sold, which is controlled by CPLR 5103. Thus, while CPLR 501 permits parties to select the venue of an action, it may harmoniously co-exist with these other statutory provisions. Viewed otherwise, a foreclosing lienor may comply with the forum selection clause of its contract while simultaneously complying with the procedural prerequisites to enforcement of its lien.

This creates some difficulties to a foreclosing lien holder who will be forced to proceed through various procedural hoops and submit filings in two counties. For example, if a trial in New York County results in a judgment of foreclosure, Lienor will have to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and file it in Kings County in order to enforce the judgment (see, CPLR 5103[a] ). However, whatever burden is imposed by these additional procedural hoops is a burden of Lienor’s own creation and one arising out of its decision to enter into the subject construction contract. I also note that, to the extent that Lienor will be compelled to perform additional procedural steps to enforce its lien, this is hardly tantamount to losing its rights under the Lien Law, as it has claimed.

In sum, Lienor, a sophisticated commercial enterprise, contractually agreed that the venue of any action arising out of this construction contract would be in New York County. Since enforcement of this contractual provision will not affect its rights as a lienor, the forum selection clause should be enforced as written and as authorized by CPLR 501.

Receipt of Summons and Compliance with Notice Requirement

Question. Does lack of actual receipt of a summons excuse insured from complying with notice requirement?

Answer. Not where the insured’s failure to keep its address current with the Secretary of State, is why the insured did not actually receive a copy of the underlying personal injury summons.

The subject insurance policy’s notice of claim condition precedent to coverage required the insured to notify the insurance company of an occurrence which might result in a claim “as soon as practicable.” The receipt of service of a personal injury summons with notice by the Secretary of State, as insured’s designated agent, constituted receipt by the insured itself. In New York, when you incorporate you register with the New York Secretary of State. In so registering you are designating the Secretary of State as your agent for service of process (i.e. to receive legal notifications). It is your obligation to keep the Secretary of State notified of any changes in your address. The fact that the insured did not actually receive a copy of the summons with notice, due to its failure to keep its address current with the Secretary of State, does not excuse its noncompliance with the notice requirements of the policy. As the insured did not provide notice of the action to its insurer until receipt of a motion for default judgment some five-and-a-half months after service of process, the insurance company was entitled to disclaim coverage.

New York law regarding referral fees for sale of Real Estate

Question. Builder (Residential Developer) builds and sells a home to Resident (Individual). Builder then agrees to pay Resident a referral fee if Resident refers a prospective buyer (Prospective Buyer) to Builder to build and sell a new home to Prospective Buyer. Is Builder legally allowed to pay Resident the referral fee if Resident is not a licensed real estate broker?

Answer. No.Under New York law a person may not be paid a referral fee (a.k.a. “kickback”) unless they are a licensed real estate broker. This specifically excludes a broker or other person from paying to someone who is unlicensed a referral fee, commission or other compensation for services, help and/or aid rendered in facilitating the sale of real property.

The purpose of the license requirement is to protect the public from inept, inexperienced or dishonest persons who may aid in the perpetration of a fraud. Due to the license requirement, an unlicensed person will not have legal standing to bring or maintain an action to enforce any such agreement.

A referral fee must be in relation to a transaction where the dominant feature of that transaction is the purchase or sale of real property. Therefore, if real property is the dominant feature of the deal, an unlicensed individual cannot evade the license requirement under the guise of a finder’s fee. However, a finder’s fee may be paid to an unlicensed person when real property is only an incidental part of a transaction, such as in the transfer of a business. Understand that just because it’s called a “finder’s fee” or “incentive” doesn’t make it so. Each transaction must be independently reviewed.

Another scenario that has come up is where Builder (who is not licensed) offers a new car with the purchase of a new home. There is no unlicensed third party involved here. This is really two transactions though; one is the sale of the house and the second is the sale or gift of the car. This transaction does not violate real estate licensing laws however, it does raise certain tax implications such as sales tax on the vehicle and the amount of money attributed to the real estate transaction for purposes of calculating taxes.

Referral fees are also illegal under federal law in certain circumstances. The Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act (RESPA) prohibits referral fees to unlicensed persons involved in a real estate transaction that involves a federally regulated mortgage loan, such as those financed by a government entity, or a financial institution that is insured by the federal government. Thus, the large majority of real estate transactions are subject to federal law, and subsequently, RESPA.

The issue of whether Resident may assert a claim against Builder for breach of contract to recover the referral fee would require that Resident: (1) must be a duly licensed real estate broker and (2) must have been a licensed broker at the time the cause of action arose. Because Resident was not properly licensed, Builder is prohibited from paying such a fee under state law and likely RESPA as well.

The foregoing, under both New York and federal law, does not preclude licensed real estate brokers from entering into referral fee agreements with one another. These agreements are most common when a seller-client is leaving the area and the agent refers them to another agent in the new area to which they are moving in exchange for a fee of the final commission.

Lien Law Expiration

Question. I am moving to have my mechanic’s lien extended for one year. What constitutes one year under ¬ß17. The plain language of the statute indicates that a lien shall expire one year from the filing of the original lien or previous extension, the Lien Law does not specify any details about when the year begins and expires?

Answer. This is actually a novel issue. The original date of filing a lien, or the date of filing of its extension, is excluded in making the reckoning to calculate the one-year period.

Lienor wants to have its mechanic’s lien extended for a year. Lienor filed the original mechanic’s lien on May 15, 2009. Lienor then properly extended the mechanic’s lien, pursuant to Lien Law Section 17, by the filing of an extension with the Clerk on May 4, 2010. On May 4, 2011, Lienor seeks to extend its mechanic’s lien for another year.

The application extending the lien for an additional year was opposed on the sole ground that the lien had expired on May 3, 2011. Lienor argues that its filing for an extension on May 4, 2011 was within the one year period provided for by Lien Law Section 17. Property owner contends that May 4, 2011 is one day after the one year period allowed for by Lien Law Section 17.

The novel issue presented is what constitutes a year under Lien Law Section 17. Lien Law Section 17 states, in pertinent part, that:

No lien shall be continued by such extension for more than one year from the filing thereof. In the event an action is not commenced to foreclose the lien within such extended period, such lien shall be extinguished unless an order be granted by a court of record or a judge or justice thereof, continuing such lien, and such lien shall be redocketed as of the date of granting such order and a statement made that such lien is continued by virtue of such order.

The plain language of the statute indicates that a lien shall expire one year from the filing of the original lien or the previous extension. However, the Lien Law does not specify any details when the year begins and expires. Therefore, we must resort to general statutory interpretation and construction to give meaning to the expression that the extension of the lien had to be filed no later than one year from the previous extension date of May 4, 2010.

Article 2 of the General Construction Law (“GCL”) gives the “meaning of terms” which GCL Section 110 states “is applicable to every statute unless its general object, or the context of the language construed, or other provisions of law indicate that a different meaning or application was intended from that required to be given by this chapter.” Under GCL Section 58, the term year, in a statute, contract, or any public or private instrument, means three hundred and sixty-five days. Furthermore, GCL Section 20 states that:

In computing any specified period of time from a specified event, the day upon which the event happens is deemed the day from which the reckoning is made. The day from which any specified period of time is reckoned shall be excluded in making the reckoning.

Based on GCL Section 20, the original date of filing of a lien, or the date of filing of its extension, is excluded in making the reckoning to calculate the one year period to extend a lien under Lien Law Section 17.

Using this method of calculation, the date of the filing of Lienor’s mechanic’s lien extension, i.e., May 4, 2010, is excluded as being counted in the reckoning of the one year time period under Lien Law Section 17. Thus, the counting of the year began on May 5, 2010 and the one year time period to extend the lien under Lien Law Section 17 continued through May 4, 2011. Accordingly, Lienor’s filing for an extension of the mechanic’s lien on May 4, 2011 was made on the last permissible day and was within the one year period allowed under Lien Law Section 17.

The better practice is of course not to wait till the last minute especially, on a lien of over half a million dollars.

Mechanic’s Liens and Residential Contracting

Question. Contractor completes a project that included a completely finished basement with a bathroom. For purposes of extending a mechanic’s lien without the need of a court order is this home now a de facto multiple-family dwelling despite what the certificate of occupancy states?

Answer. No.

The Contractor here was as the old adage says penny wise and pound foolish. He should have obtained a Court order or foreclosed his lien instead of attempting to file a lien extension.

Contractor filed a mechanic’s lien seeking payment of the balance owed for work performed. The Contractor filed an extension of the mechanic’s lien within a year of filing the original lien. The extension, states that, “this is not a lien on real property improved or to be improved with a single family dwelling.”

Pursuant to Lien Law ¬ß17, a mechanic’s lien expires one year after filing unless an extension is filed with the County Clerk or an action is commenced to foreclose the lien within that time and a notice of pendency is filed in connection. Further, pursuant to Lien Law ¬ß17 “a lien on real property improved or to be improved with a single family dwelling may only be extended by an order of a court of record, or a judge or justice thereof.” Stated another way, where a contractor does not obtain court orders of extension, as in the instant case, the lien is subject to discharge unless the encumbered realty is not real property improved with a single family dwelling. Here no such order was obtained.

Owner states that the property was used as a single family dwelling. In addition Owner submits copies of documents such as the deed, real property transfer report, recording and endorsement cover page, and certificate of occupancy all of which categorize the property in question is a single family dwelling. Owner states, in addition, that the Contractor has not commenced an action to foreclose the mechanic’s lien and that more than one year has elapsed from the filing of the initial lien. In addition, Owner contends that the extension of the lien is a nullity as the property against which it was filed is a single-family dwelling.

Contractor states that the entire project for which the Owner contracted included a completely gutted and finished basement with a bathroom and several segregated rooms. Contractor contends that, the basement was set up to be a studio apartment. Contractor claims that therefore, the property is now a de facto multiple-family dwelling, regardless of the use set forth in the Certificate of Occupancy. Contractor argues that the lien extension was proper as the Owner contracted for the conversion of a single-family dwelling into a multiple-family dwelling. Contractor urges that we should look to the use and reality of the property rather than looking at the Certificate of Occupancy.

The mechanic’s lien should be discharged and canceled pursuant to Lien Law ¬ß19(2) as the Contractor failed to begin an action to foreclose the lien within one year. In addition, the lien extension filed by the Contractor should be vacated as a nullity as such lien was not obtained by Court order.

Although the Contractor states that the Owner added a basement apartment to her property there is no proof that the Owner ever made use of the basement as a rental apartment or even intended to utilize the basement as a rental apartment. Those considerations should not alter the undisputed fact that the property has at all times – even during the period of construction – been used solely for residential purposes.

Entitlement of Lender to Recover on a Promissory Note and Individual Guaranty

Question. Is a lender entitled to recover on a promissory note and individual guaranty in connection with an acquisition loan where the existence of the note and guaranty is undisputed as well as the failure of the borrower and the guarantor to make payments according to the terms of those documents but lender failed to provide subsequent construction financing?

Answer. Yes.

Lender provided land acquisition financing to borrower, a limited liability company. The loan was personally guaranteed by borrower’s members. There were some discussions between borrower and lender concerning a subsequent construction loan being issued but there were never any formal documents prepared concerning construction financing. Borrower and guarantors question their obligation to repay the acquisition loan since construction financing was never provided.

Lender demonstrated its entitlement to judgment by establishing the existence of the note and the guaranty, and the Borrower’s and guarantors’ failure to make payments according to the terms of those documents (hereinafter the loan documents). Failure to issue subsequent construction financing is not a defense to that claim.

Borrowers may have a claim of promissory estoppel, (a theory under which the Lender would be compelled to abide by its “promise” to issue construction financing) but only to the extent that the claim is premised on conduct occurring after the execution of the loan documents. To the extent that the claim was premised on conduct occurring before the execution of the loan documents, there could be no reasonable reliance on any promise to provide a subsequent construction loan in light of the merger and waiver-of-defense (i.e. all prior negotiations, promises, etc. “merge” into the loan document) provisions in the loan documents. However, these contractual provisions do not preclude reasonable reliance on promises made after the loan documents were executed. Also, potentially available is a claim alleging fraud, but only to the extent that the fraud claim was premised on conduct occurring after the execution of the loan documents.

Question of Intrepreting a 90 Day Cancelation Policy in a Service Contract

Question. Owner executed a 10 year service contract with Elevator Contractor, and notified them, a year later, Owner was cancelling it. Elevator Contractor alleges the cancellation could only occur 90 days before the expiration of the contract term. That would mean the anticipated cancellation date was the same as the end of the contract. Was Owner’s cancellation proper?

Answer. Yes.

Elevator Contractor’s reading of the contract is improper. The contract did not state such, and such condition was not agreed to by the parties. The contract was mutually cancellable, but Elevator Contractor had a viable claim for 90 days worth of unpaid services from the date of Owner’s notice.

In relevant part, the contract provides that it may be cancelled as follows:

THE SERVICE IS FURNISHED FROM 10/1/08 FOR THE PERIOD OF TEN (10) YEARS AND WILL BE RENEWED FOR THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME UNLESS CANCELLED BY EITHER PARTY ON NINETY DAYS WRITTEN NOTICE PRIOR TO THE END OF ANY CONTRACT TERM AND ANY AND ALL OUTSTANDING INVOICES MUST BE PAID BETWEEN THE TIME THE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION IS RENDERED AND THE ANTICIPATED CANCELLATION DATE.

By letter dated September 24, 2009, Owner notified Elevator Contractor that it was cancelling the contract “effective today.” Elevator Contractor’s wrote back on September 25th that the cancellation letter was a “nullity” and that it was rejected because the contract was effective until September 30, 2018. According to Elevator Contractor, the cancellation could only occur “at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the contract term.”

Whereas Elevator Contractor claims the contract is unambiguous, Owner contends it makes no sense that an elevator service company would want to tie itself down to one client at an unfluctuating monthly rate for ten (10) years. Thus, Owner contends the cancellation clause has been misconstrued by Elevator Contractor, there is an ambiguity in the contract and it should be construed against Elevator Contractor since Owner had no part in authoring the document. According to Owner, the contract can be “CANCELLED BY EITHER PARTY ON NINETY DAYS WRITTEN NOTICE” at any time “PRIOR TO THE END OF ANY CONTRACT TERM…” Owner argues that if Elevator Contractor intended that this “could only be” cancelled “PRIOR TO THE END OF ANY CONTRACT TERM” it should have contained such language.

The terms of a written contract between the parties should be enforced in accordance with its terms. The interpretation by Elevator Contractor of the contract provision at issue is not supported by the very words in that particular provision or when examining the contract as a whole.

The cancellation clause indicates the contract is for a period of 10 years. It also states that it will automatically renew for another 10 years “UNLESS CANCELLED BY EITHER PARTY ON NINETY (90) DAYS WRITTEN NOTICE PRIOR TO THE END OF ANY CONTRACT TERM…” The contract does not state it can “only be cancelled on ninety (90) days written notice prior to the end of any contract term.” Adopting Elevator Contractor’s interpretation would mean that the “ANTICIPATED CANCELLATION DATE” is the exact same thing as the “END OF THE CONTRACT.” The contract does not state this and it is not a condition agreed to by the parties in writing.

The contract also has a separate provision dealing with payment of invoices. It states that:

THE COMPANY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO SUSPEND OR CANCEL THIS CONTRACT UPON FAILURE TO MAKE PAYMENT OF ANY OUTSTANDING INVOICES OVER 120 DAYS, SUCH SUSPENSION OR CANCELLATION TO BE EFFECTIVE UPON THE MAILING OF NOTICE THEREOF…

Consequently, the contract is cancellable at other times and for other reasons.

Arguments by Elevator Contractor, that it fully intended to be bound for the entire 10 year term of the contract and it could not be terminated sooner than that, only identify their misconception of what the contract stands for. The condition Elevator Contractor claims to have bargained for is simply not evident in the plain language of this agreement. Evidently the parties agreed they could mutually terminate the contract on notice. Elevator Contractor’s argument that it expected the contract to last a “minimum of 10 years” is easily reconcilable with the terms of the contract. It would have lasted 10 years, but for the decision by Owner to cancel it. It could also have been cancelled by Elevator Contractor, however, for non-payment and also on 90 days notice.

Since Owner gave Elevator Contractor notice of the Owner’s intention to terminate the contract, but stated it was effective “today,” Elevator Contractor has a viable claim for 90 days worth of unpaid services from the date of the notice. The notice was not rejected by Elevator Contractor because it failed to give 90 days notice, but because it was not 90 days before the end of the contract term.

Does the identification of a single address in liens result in a blanket lien so that Owner can seek discharge and cancellation of liens as “blanket liens” improperly filed against the entire property?

Question. Owner is the sponsor and developer of Condominium’s residential and commercial units. Plumbing performed work on the condo under three contracts, and filed three separate mechanic’s liens regarding the work performed and materials furnished. The liens clearly identified the individual units Plumbing sought to encumber, satisfying Lien Law ¬ß9(7). Liens included 36 residential units Owner did not own at the time the liens were filed. At least 26 of the 243 lots originally owned by Owner were sold and recorded before the liens were filed. Does the identification of “100 XYZ Avenue” in the liens result in a blanket lien so that Owner can seek discharge and cancellation of the liens as “blanket liens” improperly filed against the entire property?

Answer. No.

BACKGROUND

Owner can move to discharge and cancel three notices of mechanic’s liens filed by Plumbing against the subject property but because the liens substantially complied with the law, an amendment of the liens nunc pro tunc (pursuant to Lien Law ¬ß12-a ) to eliminate the lots conveyed before the filing would not prejudice any existing lienor or purchaser and Owner’s petition to discharge and cancel the liens should be denied.

Owner is the sponsor and developer of the Condominium which includes 239 residential apartment units and four commercial units (“Condominium”). According to the declaration establishing a plan for the condominium ownership, the street address of the property is 150 XYZ Avenue, (“Condominium Property”). Plumbing performed work on the Condominium Property pursuant to three separate contracts between Plumbing and Owner’s contractor.

Plumbing filed three separate notices of mechanic’s (“Liens”) with respect to the work allegedly performed pursuant to each of the contracts. The Liens claim a total amount of approximately $715,000.00. In all three Liens, the property subject to the Liens is identified as, “Premises known as 150 XYZ Avenue, more particularly described and as set forth in Exhibit “A” attached and Exhibit “B” pages 1-18 attached.” Exhibit “A” of the Liens identifies two commercial units in the Condominium by block, lot, and unit number while exhibit “B” of the Liens identifies the two remaining commercial units and each of the block, lot, and unit numbers associated with the residential condominium units followed by the description, “SINGLE RESIDENTIAL CONDO UNIT.” Exhibit “B” of the Liens also includes the prior lot number which has been superseded by the Condominium declaration, and is followed by the description, “APARTMENT BUILDING.”

Prior to Plumbing’s filing of the Liens, 36 of the residential units had been sold by the Owner. Owner argues that because the Liens specify the address “150 XYZ Avenue”, the Liens were not limited to specific condominium units in which Owner retained an interest and were therefore “blanket liens.”

A “blanket lien” is created with respect to a condominium development when the description of the property subject to the lien is not limited to the particular units of a condominium which are owned by the party liable to the lienor, thereby creating a lien on the entire property. A blanket lien, which is not valid as against the individual units, including the unsold units retained by the Owner, or the common elements of the condominium, should be summarily canceled pursuant to Lien Law ¬ß19(6) since it fails to adequately describe the property pursuant to Lien Law ¬ß9(7) in conformity with Real Property Law ¬ß339-l. However, as the Liens here clearly identify the individual units Plumbing sought to encumber, Owner’s argument that the identification of “150 XYZ Avenue” resulted in the formation of a “blanket lien” is unavailing.

Where a lien description includes too much property, but nevertheless includes and identifies all the property on which the lien could properly be claimed, the defect is not fatal, as the lien would be limited and restricted only to that part against which it could properly be enforced.

Here, although Plumbing did file each of the Liens against the entire superseded lot number, Plumbing also identified the individual condominium units in the Liens and thereby sufficiently identified the property properly subject to the Liens so as to satisfy the requirements of Lien Law §9(7)

While at least 26 of the 243 lots originally owned by the Owner had been sold and recorded prior to the filing of the Liens, the Liens substantially complied with Lien Law §9(7) and the amendment of the Liens, nunc pro tunc, so as to eliminate the lots conveyed prior to the filing of the Liens will not prejudice any existing lienor or purchaser.

It seems clear from the language in [Real Property Law §339-l(2)] that the Legislature has chosen to distinguish between the rights of those performing labor on or furnishing materials to individual unit owners in a condominium, and the rights of those performing labor on or furnishing materials to the common elements of a condominium. In the case of labor performed or materials furnished to any unit owner, there can be no lien unless the unit owner expressly consents to the lien or unless the lien is for emergency repairs to such unit. As a number of the condominium units were transferred by the Owner prior to the filing of the Liens, and there are no allegations that the new owners consented to the Liens, the work was for emergency repairs, or that the labor and services allegedly provided by Plumbing were requested by the new owners, the Liens may not encumber the units transferred prior to the filing of the Liens even where the recording of the transfers occurred after the filing of the Liens.

Is Consultant’s claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing duplicative of his breach of contract action?

Question. Consultant seeks to recover damages from Client in connection with the collapse of their business relationship, alleging breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Is Consultant’s claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing duplicative of his breach of contract action?

Answer. Yes.

Consultant brought an action against Client for its alleged failure to pay various fees to which Consultant was entitled under their agreement. Alleging claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Consultant seeks “recovery of money damages in connection with the breach of a binding, valid and enforceable contract, and a declaration of its future rights under the contract.”

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing “embraces a pledge that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” The covenant is implied in every contract governed under New York law. Accordingly, a “breach of the implied duty of good faith is considered a breach of the underlying contract.” For this reason, “a claim for breach of the implied covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] will be dismissed as redundant where the conduct allegedly violating the implied covenant is also the predicate for breach of covenant of an express provision of the underlying contract.”

Consultant cannot sustain both claims because they are premised on the same set of facts, and “a party may maintain a claim for breach of the implied covenant only if the claim is based on allegations different from the allegations underlying the accompanying breach of contract claim.” Because the success of either claim is dependent upon a finding that Client violated the terms of the contract, the claim for breach of the implied covenant is redundant.

Is an insured entitled to attorney fees incurred in litigating and defending against an insurer’s “late notice” claim, raised for the first time as an affirmative defense in litigation?

Question. Is an insured entitled to attorney fees incurred in litigating and defending against an insurer’s “late notice” claim, raised for the first time as an affirmative defense in litigation?

Answer. No.  Insured was not entitled to attorney fees incurred in litigating and defending against insurer’s “late notice” claim.

Upon the Carrier disclaiming coverage, the burden shifts to Insured to either file a coverage action or to accept the Carrier’s basis for the disclaimer and forgo the costs of litigation.

Here, Insured commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking defense and indemnification from Carrier under a comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy. In the context of that action Carrier raised for the first time a “late notice” claim, as an affirmative defense. Insured seeks attorneys’ fees for litigating and successfully defending the late notice issue.

The longstanding “American rule” precludes a prevailing party from recouping legal fees from the losing party except where authorized by statute, agreement or court rule.

Under New York law, Carrier can only cast Insured in defensive posture by naming Insured as defendant in an action. Insured would have been placed in a defensive posture if the Carrier commenced a declaratory judgment action against Insured to relieve Carrier from defense obligations under the policy. If Insured prevailed in such an action it may have recovered attorney fees necessarily incurred as result of its defense of that action.

Here Insured commenced its own declaratory judgment action to settle rights to defense under the policy. Insured argues that New York recognizes an exception to the American Rule, permitting insureds to recover attorneys’ fees where the insured has been cast in a defensive posture by the legal steps an insurer takes in an effort to free itself from its policy obligations.

Under the circumstances the late notice defense to support insurer’s declaratory judgment prayer for relief was “mirror image” of insured’s declaratory judgment action, even though defense was not previously asserted in insurer’s declination letter and therefore does not fall within the exception.