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Is General Contractor entitled to coverage from Subcontractor’s Carrier?

Question. Injured Employee was injured during the course of his employment while working at the construction site. General Contractor and General Contractor’s Carrier allege that General Contractor is entitled to coverage from Subcontractor’s Carrier pursuant to a certificate of insurance that was issued by Subcontractor’s insurance broker that stated that General Contractor was an additional insured.

Subcontractor’s Carrier denies liability contending that General Contractor is not entitled to coverage under the policy since General Contractor is neither a named insured nor an additional insured on the policy. According to Subcontractor’s Carrier, the certificate of insurance issued by Subcontractor’s insurance broker, who is not Subcontractor’s Carrier’s agent, is not binding upon it.

General Contractor and General Contractor’s Carrier contend, in substance, that General Contractor is an insured of Subcontractor’s Carrier because the certificate of insurance issued by Subcontractor’s insurance broker noted Subcontractor’s Carrier as such.

Is General Contractor entitled to coverage from Subcontractor’s Carrier?

Answer. No.  A certificate of insurance is merely evidence of a contract for insurance, not conclusive proof that the contract exists, and not, in and of itself, a contract to insure.

General Contractor seeks to impose an obligation upon Subcontractor’s Carrier to defend and indemnify General Contractor against an underlying personal injury action filed by Injured Employee, an employee of Subcontractor.

The Certificate at issue specifically states:

“THIS CERTIFICATE IS ISSUED AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS UPON THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. THIS CERTIFICATE DOES NOT AMEND, EXTEND OR ALTER THE COVERAGE AFFORDED BY THE POLICIES BELOW.”

It is well settled that the insured has the burden to establish coverage and for the insurer to prove that an exclusion in the policy applies to defeat coverage. Moreover, it has been held that insurance coverage extends only to named entities and/or individuals defined as insured parties under the relevant terms of the policy.

On summary judgment, a certificate may be sufficient to raise an issue of fact, especially where additional factors exist favoring coverage but it is not sufficient, standing alone as it does here, to prove coverage as a matter of law.

Given the foregoing, the Court finds that General Contractor and General Contractor’s Carrier have failed to cite any facts or factors, policy, declaration, term condition, exclusion or endorsements to establish that General Contractor was either a named insured or an additional insured on the Subcontractor’s Carrier policy or that it had any contractual relationship with Subcontractor’s Carrier.

It should be noted that the issues presented by this particular fact pattern have resulted in conflicting decisions amongst the Court’s of New York. Therefore, depending in the jurisdiction in which the case is litigated a different result may be reached. We are hopeful that this issue will be addressed by the Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York) which should provide a uniformity of result.

Can the Court direct the bank to turn over funds, up to amount of judgment, held in a German bank account?

Question. I am trying to enforce a judgment I obtained in 2010. I have located the debtors assets in a German Bank. The Bank does business in New York systematically and continuously through a New York branch that is not incorporated and is not a separate entity. Can the Court direct the bank to turn over funds, up to amount of judgment, held in a German bank account?

Answer. YES.  A court in New York had general personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank that did business in New York systematically and continuously through a New York branch that was not incorporated and was not a separate entity. Thus, pursuant to a New York statute, the court could issue a turnover order that directed the bank to turn over the account funds of a judgment debtor, up to the amount of the judgment, regardless of whether the accounts were held in Germany or New York.

Section 5225(b) of the N.Y. CPLR provides the process by which a judgment creditor may compel “a person in possession or custody of money or other personal property in which the judgment debtor has an interest … to pay the money, or so much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, to the judgment creditor….” N.Y. CPLR 5225(b). Section 5225(b) requires the judgment debtor to proceed by way of special proceeding. Id. A special proceeding is a civil judicial proceeding in which a right can be established or an obligation enforced in summary fashion. Like an action, it ends in a judgment, but the procedure is similar to that on a motion. Speed, economy and efficiency are the hallmarks of this procedure.” Alexander, Comment C401:1 (McKinney’s N.Y. CPLR, 2010) (internal citations omitted).

The Bank contends that it should not be required to turn over any funds it holds in the name of Debtor, because the funds at issue are on deposit in a German bank at a branch in Germany. The New York Court of Appeals in Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 883 N.Y.S.2d 763, 911 N.E.2d 825 (2009) concluded that “a New York court with personal jurisdiction over a defendant may order [that defendant] to turn over out-of-state property regardless of whether the defendant is a judgment debtor or a garnishee.” Id. at 541.

In this case, the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Bank. Under N.Y. CPLR Sec. 301, New York courts may exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where that corporation is engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of doing business in NY as to warrant a finding of its presence in this jurisdiction. Bank admits that it does business in New York systematically and continuously through its New York branch, which is not incorporated and is not an entity separate from the German bank. This Court has general personal jurisdiction over Bank, and thus under Koehler, this Court may issue a turnover order under N.Y. CPLR Sec. 5225(b) directing Bank to turn over funds up to the amount of the judgment, regardless of whether those accounts are held in Germany or New York.

Does lack of actual receipt of a summons excuse insured from complying with notice requirement?

Question. Does lack of actual receipt of a summons excuse insured from complying with notice requirement?

Answer. Not where the insured’s failure to keep its address current with the Secretary of State, is why the insured did not actually receive a copy of the underlying personal injury summons. 

The subject insurance policy’s notice of claim condition precedent to coverage required the insured to notify the insurance company of an occurrence which might result in a claim “as soon as practicable.” The receipt of service of a personal injury summons with notice by the Secretary of State, as insured’s designated agent, constituted receipt by the insured itself.  In New York, when you incorporate you register with the New York Secretary of State.  In so registering you are designating the Secretary of State as your agent for service of process (i.e. to receive legal notifications).  It is your obligation to keep the Secretary of State notified of any changes in your address.  The fact that the insured did not actually receive a copy of the summons with notice, due to its failure to keep its address current with the Secretary of State, does not excuse its noncompliance with the notice requirements of the policy. As the insured did not provide notice of the action to its insurer until receipt of a motion for default judgment some five-and-a-half months after service of process, the insurance company was entitled to disclaim coverage.

Limited Liability Company Fiduciary Duty Improprieties

Question. A & B formed a limited liability company (LLC). Both A & B were managers of the LLC. A accuses B of breaching his fiduciary duties by taking improper cash payments from the LLC distributors, diverting funds to himself, and otherwise looting the LLC. Can A sue B directly for these alleged improprieties?

Answer. No, at least not under these facts.   Under New York law the claims belong to the LLC, rather than a LLC member. Additionally, the harm that the LLC member suffered due to a diminution of value in his ownership interest was indirect harm resulting from the managers’ alleged breach of their fiduciary duty to faithfully represent the LLC’s financial condition, and thus could be remedied only through a derivative claim.

There is no dispute that members and managers of limited liability companies owe fiduciary duties not just to the LLC, but also directly to the members of the LLC. Since fiduciary duties are owed both to an LLC and its members, a court must apply the “direct injury test” to discern whether a breach of these duties gives rise to a claim that may be asserted directly by an LLC member, or that must be asserted on behalf of the LLC. The critical question posed by the direct injury test is whether the damages a plaintiff sustains are derivative of an injury to a third party. If so, then the injury is indirect; if not, it is direct. However, the mere fact that a corporation may also bring an action based on acts that caused an independent injury to a shareholder does not make the shareholder’s suit derivative.

The allegation that B breached his fiduciary duties by (1) taking improper cash payments from LLC distributors, (2) diverting funds to himself, and (3) otherwise looting the LLC, properly belongs to the LLC. Assuming the truth of A’s allegations, Bs’ acts harmed the LLC directly by decreasing its value, and only harmed A indirectly by reducing the worth of his ownership stake in LLC. This is a quintessentially derivative claim.

The issue of whether A may assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on Bs’ alleged failure to faithfully represent the financial condition of the LLC is more complicated. As a general matter, members and managers of an LLC under New York law owe a specific fiduciary duty to other LLC members to fully disclose all information concerning the limited liability company. Thus, under the case law, Bs’ alleged misrepresentations to A of the value of the LLC would ordinarily provide a basis for a direct claim.

However, A expresses a theory of damages that is derivative. He alleges that Bs’ misstatements of the value of the LLC caused A “to suffer damages from the diminution of the value of his company in the amount of $5 million.” Harm that a plaintiff suffers only due to a diminution of value in his ownership interest of an entity is indirect harm, and must be remedied through a derivative claim.

Does the Owner’s request for detailed information go beyond the scope of Section 38’s requirements?

Question. Lienor, filed a mechanics lien against Owner for work performed on property. The lien was based on work Lienor performed under contracts with Owner, which were provided in the verified statement. Owner demanded Lienor produce a verified statement under Lien Law Section 38, including the names and addresses of the subcontractors and the work performed. Lienor argues the information requested goes beyond the scope of Section 38. Owner argues it should be provided with more detailed information to ensure it is not “double liened.” Does the Owner’s request for detailed information go beyond the scope of Section 38’s requirements?

Answer. Yes.  Where the lien is based on a contract, nothing would be accomplished by requiring the lienor to furnish an itemization of materials and labor performed under that contract. Only those items in dispute must be provided in a detailed statement.

Under Section 38 of the Lien Law, “on demand in writing” a lienor must deliver to the owner a verified statement that sets forth “the items of labor and/or material and the value thereof which make up the amount for which he claims a lien, and which shall also set forth the terms of the contract under which such items were furnished.” If the lienor fails to produce this statement within five days of the demand, the lienee may petition the court for an order “directing such compliance.” The intent of these provisions is to ensure that the lienee is apprised of the detail of the lienor’s claim, and of the basis for the statement of value as set forth in the lien.

Section 38, however, does not give a lienee an absolute right to a detailed statement from a lienor as to all the items for which he claims a lien. Itemization of all materials and labor is required only in a case where the lien is based on quantum meruit i.e. the reasonable value of the work. Where the lien is based on a contract for an agreed price, nothing would be accomplished by requiring the lienor to furnish an itemization of materials furnished and labor performed in performance of the contract. Only those items in dispute such as claims for extra work and material must be provided in the detailed statement.

Here, it appears that the lien is based on work that Lienor and its subcontractors performed pursuant to contracts with Owner’s general contractor. The Verified Statement contains copies of these contracts setting forth the work performed and the agreed upon price. Lienor has also provided signed change orders to the contracts. Furthermore, Owner has not indicated that there are specific items in dispute or that Lienor is asking for quantum meruit compensation. Instead, its only argument is that it should be provided more detailed information to ensure it has not been double liened.

If, as it appears here, the claim is based on agreed upon contracts that have been performed, Lienor need only supply enough information to allow Owner to check whether it has been double liened by subcontractors of Lienor. It has no obligation to provide more information than is already in the contracts. Requiring itemization of all material, work performed, and labor rates as Owner requests would accomplish nothing. Lienor’s Verified Statement includes the names of its subcontractors on which the lien is based, providing the information necessary to allow Owner to determine if it has been double liened.

May Lender seeking to enforce guaranty against nonresident guarantors of loan attach ownership/membership interests in various out-of-state business entities?

Question. May Lender
seeking to enforce guaranty against nonresident guarantors of loan
attach ownership/membership interests in various out-of-state business
entities?



Answer. Yes.



By agreement dated in 2005, Lender made a loan to borrower for the
purpose of developing and renovating real property. This loan was made
by Lender and accepted by the borrower in New York. Further, the
proceeds of this loan were disbursed from New York. On that same day,
Guarantors executed a guaranty of payment (guaranty) under which they
unconditionally agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the
borrower’s obligations under the loan and submitted to the jurisdiction
of any federal or state court in New York City in any suit, action or
proceeding arising out of or relating to the guaranty. By executing this
guaranty, Guarantors waived all defenses and counterclaims that might
have been asserted against Lender in the event the borrower defaulted on
the loan. In addition to being negotiated in New York, the guaranty was
to be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of New York
State.


The borrower thereafter defaulted on the loan and filed for bankruptcy
protection. Lender seeks to enforce the guaranty and recover the amounts
due under the loan. Lender sought and obtained a prejudgment order of
attachment seeking to attach Guarantors’ property interests as security
for the collection of any judgment entered against Guarantors.


Attachment simply keeps the debtor away from his property or, at least,
the free use thereof; it does not transfer the property to the creditor.
It is frequently used when the creditor suspects that the debtor is
secreting property or removing it from New York and/or when the creditor
is unable to serve the debtor, despite diligent efforts, even though
the debtor would be within the personal jurisdiction of a New York
court.


The property at issue consisted of Guarantors’ interests in 22 limited
liability companies formed in Delaware, Georgia and Florida and a
Florida corporation solely owned by Guarantor. Unlike stock
certificates, which are tangible property, Guarantors’
ownership/membership interests are intangible and uncertificated.


Lender eventually obtained a judgment against the Guarantor. To date,
the judgment has not been satisfied. Guarantor challenges the
attachment because he does not live in New York and his temporary
presence in New York when he was served was insufficient to support the
attachment and that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the ownership
interests Lender sought to attach because they were not located in New
York and, thus, could not be properly attached.


Guarantor voluntarily submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the
court by executing the personal guaranty. Because personal jurisdiction
was properly asserted over Guarantor the Court had the authority to
order pre-judgment attachment of the property Guarantor owned and/or
controlled, and service of the order upon him while he was in New York
was appropriate.


The next consideration is whether the property sought to be attached was
subject to attachment. The intangible property Lender sought to
attach-Guarantor’s ownership/membership interests in 22 out-of-state
limited liability companies-are akin to intangible contract rights, and
are clearly assignable and transferable. Thus, the interests in question
are “property”.


Here, the intangible interests sought to be attached are not evidenced
by written instruments, such as certificates or negotiable instruments.
If these interests were so evidenced, their situs would be where the
written instruments were physically present. Just as a debt clings to
the debtor when he enters a state other than the state where the debt
was incurred, it follows that Guarantors’ uncertificated ownership
interests, which Guarantor possesses or has custody over, travel with
him, and were attachable in New York based on his presence this state.

Can a Contractor and manufacturer of equipment avoid liability by shortening the time frame within which the Owner may bring claims against them?

Question. Can a Contractor and manufacturer of equipment avoid liability by shortening the time frame within which the Owner may bring claims against them?

Answer. Yes but with a caveat. Consumer and Homeowner protection statutes may modify the general rule so be sure to go over your particular circumstances with counsel.

The Contract was signed in September, 2006.  The Contract was pre-printed and four pages long.  On the first page of the contract appear the following notice:

YOU ADMIT THAT YOU HAVE READ THIS PAGE IN ADDITION TO THE ATTACHMENT WHICH CONTAINS IMPORTANT TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THIS CONTRACT BEFORE SIGNING. YOU STATE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND ALL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS CONTRACT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PARAGRAPHS 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, AND 10….
Paragraph 10 appears on the second page of the contract, and provides:
10. TIME TO FILE LAWSUIT OR OTHER ACTION. YOU AGREE TO FILE ANY LAWSUIT OR OTHER ACTION YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST U.S. OR OUR ASSIGNEES, AGENTS, EMPLOYEES, SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES OR PARENT COMPANIES WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THE EVENT THAT CAUSED THE LOSS, DAMAGE OR LIABILITY.

There is no dispute that Owner executed a contract with Contractor for the purchase of equipment. The parties also do not dispute that the contract identified Contractor as an “Authorized Dealer,” of the equipment and stated that the contract would be submitted to manufacturer “for approval and purchase of the system.” The parties further agree that the Contract provided that manufacturer would notify Owner only if it rejected the contract or otherwise did not purchase it from Contractor.

In April, 2007, the Owner began noticing defects in the work.  Owner contacted Contractor to schedule repair appointments for May 3, 2007, June 7, 2007, and June 18, 2007, but that at each of these appointments the Contractor did not show up.  Finally, on June 18, 2007 a representative of Contractor informed Owner that she should call the manufacturer for service.  Owner states that she called manufacturer and scheduled a repair appointment for June 20, 2007 at 8:00 a.m., but that it was too late: approximately 5 hours before the Contractor repairperson arrived, the home was flooded.

On July 25, 2008, more than a year after the plaintiffs’ home was flooded, the plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit in New York Supreme Court.  The Owner asserts the following claims against all the defendants: (1) negligence and gross negligence, (2) beach of express and implied warranties, (3) breach of contract, (4) products liability based on design and manufacturing defects, and (5) breach of the duty of care.  Contractor and manufacturer move to dismiss all of these claims on the ground that the Owner did not file suit within the one-year statute of limitations provided in the Contract.

It is well-settled that courts applying New York law will enforce a shortened statute of limitations when it is reasonable and agreed to by contract.  Also, New York courts have consistently held one year to be a reasonable period of limitations in similar cases.   New York courts also enforce contract provisions shortening the limitations period for bringing any claim against a party, including claims that sound in tort.  This includes enforcement of contractual limitations periods for claims of gross negligence.
Here, the parties have contracted to shorten the limitations period for filing “any” lawsuit against Contractor or its assignees. If enforced, the provision would therefore apply to all claims, including the plaintiffs’ allegations sounding in contract and tort. The one year period of limitations in the Contract is reasonable and enforceable under the prevailing law.

However, the contract, on its face, is between Contractor and Owner. Manufacturer therefore is not necessarily a beneficiary of the agreement, and arguably may not be able to enforce the contractual limitations period. Generally, a party may invoke the provisions of a contract to which it is not an original party only through theories of “assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver [or] estoppel.

Here, the theory that applies most directly is “assumption,” referred to also as assignment. Under New York law, the benefits and burdens of contracts are freely assumed or assigned absent a contractual provision to the contrary. If such an assignment took place, Contractor and manufacturer could enforce the shortened limitations period.

The Contract was assigned to manufacturer.  It therefore follows that manufacturer, stepping into Contractor’s shoes, may enforce all of the terms of the Contract against Owner, including the shortened limitations period.

Can Contractor be disqualified from bidding for a contract to supply replacement parts wHere the specifications are written such that there is only one viable?

Question. Can Contractor
be disqualified from bidding for a contract to supply replacement parts
were the specifications are written such that there is only one viable
supplier?



Answer. YES.
The only acceptable bidder’s (“AB”) products bore a
trademark and thus could be marketed as “genuine,” where Contractor’s
could not. Having legally obtained the right to use the trademark, no
one could question AB had the right to reap the benefits of its bargain,
even if it meant AB had a competitive advantage in the marketplace over
other products that may be identical, or even superior, to its own.



There is an inherent rationality to the city’s decision to rely on the
presumed suitability of the genuine replacement parts “GRPs” sold by AB.
Hence, the decision to disqualify Contractor had a rational basis.



Contractor can be deemed a non-responsive bidder based on the
determination that the replacement parts Contractor supplied for these
engines were not “genuine” replacement parts (GRPs). Similarly AB may be
categorized as not only a supplier of GRPs but also as the original
equipment manufacturer of the engines. As a result of these
determinations, AB emerges from the competitive bidding process as the
only viable supplier of GRPs for the engines at issue.



It should be noted that the particular kind of engine at issue here is
no longer in production. According to Contractor, production of these
engines ceased in 1988. At about the same time, AB purchased certain
intellectual property and marketing rights relative to the engines from
the original manufacturer including design specifications and schematics
for various engines and replacement parts, as well as the trademark and
the right to market its replacement parts with the trademark.



Contractor is in the business of servicing the engines and sells its own
replacement parts for them. Although Contractor does not market its
parts as “genuine” replacement parts, Contractor claims that it actually
uses many of the same manufacturers as AB to produce its parts and that
the technical specifications and tolerances for its parts are virtually
identical to those sold by AB. The similarity between the companies’
replacement parts is claimed to be a result of several factors including
the fact that the specifications for many engine parts are well known
within the industry (or in the “public domain” as Contractor puts it)
and that the current design of many parts are different from the
original design specifications as a result of improvements and
modifications that have been made to the engines over time.



The City has apparently been purchasing replacement parts for its
engines from Contractor on an interim “purchase order” basis. More
recently, the City decided to abandon the competitive bidding process
entirely and enter into a “single-source contract” for replacement parts
with AB.



The City argues, and Contractor does not seriously dispute, that there
were good reasons to require that contract applicants in the competitive
bidding process be suppliers of genuine replacement parts, as opposed
to so-called “or equal parts.” These engines are not easily or
inexpensively replaced. In order to “ensure the safe, trouble free
operation” of these engines, the City rationally determined that it
would use only genuine replacement parts which presumably can be relied
upon to meet the original equipment manufacturer’s tolerances and
specifications. This constitutes a rational basis for the preliminary
determination by the City that a successful bidder for the subject
contract should be one who supplied GRPs for the City’s engines.



The more central dispute in this case, however, concerns the rationality
of the two related determinations by the City that Contractor was not a
supplier of GRPs and that AB was. The resolution of this dispute
ultimately determines whether Contractor can compete to supply
replacement parts for the engines on an equal footing with AB.



The thrust of Contractor’s argument is not that it should have been
deemed a supplier of GRP’s but rather that, in light of the similarities
between AB’s and Contractor’s replacement parts businesses, the
determination that only AB was a supplier of GRPs was arbitrary and
capricious. Thus, Contractor reasons, AB is no more a supplier of GRPs
than Contractor is and their respective bids should have been considered
as equals.



Additionally, Contractor asserts that the designation of AB as the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the engines — which lies at the
core of AB’s ability to market its replacement parts as genuine parts —
was also arbitrary and capricious considering that AB has never
actually manufactured an engine. In Contractor’s view, AB’s only claim
to OEM status arises from its purchase of the trademark and other
intellectual property during the 1980’s after the engines went out of
production. Thus, according to Contractor, AB’s designation as OEM and
the related designation as a supplier of GRPs which flows from it is the
result of a legal fiction.



While the Contractor’s replacement parts may be functionally identical
to those supplied by AB, even if that assertion were found to be true,
there still remains a rational basis upon which to conclude that the
replacement parts marketed by AB are “genuine” parts while the parts
sold by Contractor are not. Therefore the decision to disqualify
Contractor from the competitive bidding process and the concomitant
decision to classify AB as the original equipment manufacturer and a
provider of GRPs had a rational basis.

Are the documents relating to the latter “privileged” so that in the context of litigation they need not be produced to the contractors making claims?

Question. The parties are
involved in a dispute over defects and delays in the construction of a
very large commercial project. The Owner of the project retained a
consulting firm under two different contracts to perform two different
services: (a) to provide construction management services, and (b) to
assist counsel by reviewing and analyzing claims submitted by various
contractors. Are the documents relating to the latter “privileged” so
that in the context of litigation they need not be produced to the
contractors making claims?



Answer. YES.
The two groups of documents were created by different
entities operating under different contracts and performing different
services. Documents created at the request of Owner’s counsel for claims
analysis and possible litigation position are protected under the
work-product doctrine.



The Owner’s construction management contract with the consultant charged
the consultant with implementing and enforcing the Owner’s procedure
for the processing of Change Orders and analyzing and evaluating all
claims for contract time extension or cost adjustment and making
recommendations for resolution, approval, or disapproval.



The Owner’s claims analysis contract charges the “Claims Analysis Group”
to perform “claims analysis.” The contract requires that the Claims
Group provide Owner with a preliminary claims analysis in order to
identify project delays and damage claims.



The work product doctrine, provides that a party may not discover
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative
(including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent) unless it can demonstrate a substantial need for the
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain
their substantial equivalent by other means.



The most contested condition necessary for work product protection is
that the material at issue was prepared “in anticipation of litigation.”
A document is prepared “in anticipation of litigation” if in light of
the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular
case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation. Under the work product doctrine,
if a document is created because of the prospect of litigation,
analyzing the likely outcome of that litigation, it does not lose
protection merely because it is created in order to assist with a
business decision. However, there is no work product protection for
documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or that
would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the
litigation. Even if such documents might also help in preparation for
litigation, they do not qualify for protection because it could not
fairly be said that they were created “because of” actual or impending
litigation.



Work product protection may be waived by the conduct of a party. Courts
applying this “fairness doctrine” have found, that for example, where a
party selectively discloses certain privileged or work product material,
but withholds similar (potentially less favorable) material, principles
of fairness may require a more complete disclosure.



The Consultant Claims Group and the Consultant Construction Management
Group performed different services. The ordinary review of contractor
payment requests performed by the Consultant Construction Management
Group involved contact with the contractors. By contrast, the claims
analysis performed by the Consultant Claims Group involved no
construction management work and no contact with contractors. Unlike
the Consultant Construction Management Group, the Consultant Claims
Analysis Group’s analysis was provided directly to Owner’s general
counsel. The Consultant Construction Management Group performed services
that were ongoing for the duration of the construction project; by
contrast, the Consultant Claims Group’s work involved a short-term
assignment. The documents at issue are the result of requests by
Owner’s attorneys for claims analysis including a particular possible
litigation position.

Are Homeowners liable to a construction worker who was injured while working on their home renovation project?

Question. As spring
approaches and many residential projects break ground a fairly common
fact pattern emerges. Homeowners were involved in the basic planning and
coordination of their home renovation project. Their participation was
however, not so significant that they could be considered serving as
their own general contractor. The Homeowners hired a construction
company to perform the work and the worker received direction regarding
the method and manner of his work from company representatives. In
addition, a company representative recruited and coordinated the work of
subcontractors, even though one of the homeowners was primarily
responsible for making sure that the subcontractors were paid and
documented their working hours. There is no evidence that Homeowners
had either actual or constructive knowledge of any alleged dangerous
condition regarding the property conditions.



Are Homeowners liable to a construction worker who was injured while working on their home renovation project?



Answer. NO.
The analysis (and the outcome) relies heavily on the
particular factual situation. This is certainly one situation where the
old adage “If you want something done right, do it yourself” does not
apply.



Construction Worker was employed by Contractor, which was hired by
Homeowners to perform renovation work at a lake house they owned. While
Construction Worker was digging holes to install concrete footers near a
retaining wall, the retaining wall collapsed onto him, causing personal
injuries. Seeking to recover damages for those injuries, Construction
Worker sued Homeowners.



With respect to Homeowners, it is well established that “[a]n owner of a
one- or two-family dwelling is exempt from liability under Labor Law §§
240 and 241 unless he or she directed or controlled the work being
performed.” As there is no dispute that Homeowners are owners of the
house, the relevant inquiry is whether they directed or controlled the
work that was performed there. In that regard, “[t]he phrase ‚Äòdirect or
control’ … is construed strictly and refers to the situation where the
owner supervises the method and manner of the work”.



Although Homeowners were involved in the basic planning and coordination
of the renovation project, their participation was not so significant
as to support a finding that they essentially served as their own
general contractor. Specifically, Homeowners hired Contractor to perform
the work at their house and Construction Worker received direction
regarding the method and manner in which he was to perform his work
directly from Contractor. Although Homeowners were primarily responsible
for making sure that the subcontractors were paid and they documented
when each was present and how many hours they worked, it was Contractor
who recruited them and coordinated their work. Despite Homeowners
completing the building permit application themselves, provided sketches
of the work that they wanted done and making payments for the work
directly to the subcontractors rather than through Contractor the result
is no different.



Homeowner’s actions however did not cross the line from being a
legitimately concerned homeowner to a de facto supervisor. That being
said homeowner’s should allow the construction professionals they hired
to do their job and contractors should strictly enforce the channels of
communication to prevent future disputes and minimize injuries, delays
and cost.