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Battle of the Forms

Question. Over the course of two years the Supplier and Contractor entered into a series of twelve sales agreements for steel casings, or hollow steel pipe. Pursuant to those sales agreements, Supplier delivered steel casings to Contractor.

The parties do not dispute that their sales agreements constituted valid contracts. Contractor initiated each purchase by sending to Supplier a purchase order including the basic specifications of the steel casings desired. Each of Contractor’s purchase order forms included the following clause:

No terms or conditions, other than those stated herein, and no agreement or understanding in any way modifying the terms and conditions herein stated shall be binding upon purchaser, unless mutually agreed upon in writing.

In response to Contractor’s purchase orders, Supplier sent two subsequent documents to Contractor: an acknowledgement form, alternately labeled a “Sales Contract” or a “Sale Note,” sent prior to delivery of the goods, and a “Sales Invoice,” sent following the delivery of goods. Each acknowledgement form included the following paragraph:

This contract is made between the buyer and the seller whereby the buyer agrees to buy and the seller agrees to sell the undermentioned [sic] goods subject to the terms and conditions as stipulated hereafter. This contract reflects in its entirety all details as agreed between the parties thereto. Any changes must be in writing and accepted by both parties. Any contract disputes are to be resolved through friendly negotiations. If no settlement can be reached then either party may submit the dispute to arbitration as per the rules of the American Arbitration Association in New York.

Some of the acknowledgement forms also altered other terms contained in Contractor’s purchase orders, including changes in the length of the payment term and minor variations in the price and the amount of steel casing to be delivered.

After sending each acknowledgement form to Contractor, Supplier delivered the requested steel casings to Contractor. Contractor accepted each delivery of casings, but it failed to fully pay Supplier the amount due under various invoices.

Does a valid agreement or obligation to arbitrate exist?

answer NO. In this case, there is no dispute that Supplier and Contractor entered into a series of binding sales contracts, and the parties agree that those contracts are governed by New York law and in particular by the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) as adopted by New York. The parties do not, however, agree on the answer to the central question: whether those contracts included an agreement to submit disputes between Supplier and Contractor to arbitration. An arbitration clause appears in the acknowledgement forms Supplier used to confirm Contractor’s orders, but not in Contractor’s purchase orders. Contractor contends that its purchase orders constituted offers, and that Supplier’s acknowledgement forms constituted acceptances of those offers. Supplier argues that its acknowledgement forms were not acceptances of Contractor’s offers, but were instead counter-offers that Contractor accepted by performance when it took delivery of the steel casings.

Under New York law, section 2-207 of the UCC governs the formation of contracts when the terms of the parties’ writings are not identical. This provision was adopted to alter the common law rule requiring perfect symmetry between the terms of an offer and an acceptance and to resolve the “battle of the forms” problem in a way that better conforms to modern business practices.

Under paragraph (1) of section 2-207, a seller’s form response to a buyer’s purchase order normally constitutes a “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance” if it repeats the terms of the buyer’s order. According to the proviso at the end of paragraph (1), if the seller’s response does not state that acceptance is “expressly made conditional” on the buyer’s assent to additional terms the seller included, that response operates as an acceptance and a contract is formed. When a contract is formed under paragraph (1), paragraph (2) applies to determine whether the additional or different terms become part of the contract.

If, however, the seller’s response is “expressly made conditional on assent” to the divergent terms, then the proviso in paragraph (1) provides that no contract is formed, and instead the seller’s response constitutes a counter-offer. To be deemed ‚Äòexpressly conditional,’ the seller’s invoice must place the buyer on unambiguous notice that the invoice is a mere counteroffer

When the paragraph (1) proviso applies to prevent contract formation, the parties’ conduct may nonetheless recognize the existence of a contract, and in that case paragraph (3) of section 2-207 defines the terms of the agreement as those upon which the parties agree together with any supplemental default terms provided elsewhere in the U.C.C.

Supplier argues that its acknowledgement forms were “expressly made conditional on assent” to their additional terms, including the arbitration clause, and thus that they could not have operated as acceptances under section 2-207(1). Supplier asserts that its acknowledgement forms therefore constituted counter-offers, which were subsequently accepted by Contractor’s performance. The following two sentences from Supplier’s forms are the only likely candidates for Supplier’s alleged “express” condition:

This contract reflects in its entirety all details as agreed between the parties thereto. Any changes must be in writing and accepted by both parties.

But these sentences merely purport to characterize the acknowledgement forms as final versions of an agreement that the parties had already reached, rather than expressly requiring assent to additional terms. Supplier’s acknowledgement forms thus were not “expressly made conditional” on assent to their additional terms, and in particular to the arbitration clause they included.

The language in Supplier’s acknowledgements differs markedly from the express language that courts have found sufficient to establish an “express condition,” for example, a seller’s reply to a buyer’s purchase order with an acknowledgement form including the following statement, along with an added arbitration provision is enfprceable:

Seller’s acceptance is, however, expressly conditional on Buyer’s assent to the additional or different terms and conditions set forth below and printed on the reverse side. If the terms and conditions are not acceptable, Buyer should notify seller at once.

It should be noted that even if Supplier’s forms constituted counter-offers as it has argued, Supplier could not succeed in incorporating its arbitration clause into the contract. Where, as here, the conduct of the parties indicates that a contract was formed, but the parties’ writings do not themselves form the contract, section 2-207(3) applies to provide the terms of the agreement. The parties’ writings do not agree on the arbitration clause, and it does not fall under any default provision of the UCC, so section 2-207(3) would exclude the arbitration clause. Supplier’s arguments that its forms included some different terms regarding the price and specifications for the steel casings ordered and that Contractor never objected to these variations upon delivery are unhelpful, because Contractor’s conduct in accepting the goods only evidences the formation of a contract and Contractor’s agreement to certain undisputed terms.

Because Supplier’s responsive forms did form a contract under section 2-207(1) despite proposing additional terms, section 2-207(2) applies to determine whether those additional terms became part of the contract. Section 2-207(2) provides that when both the buyer and seller are merchants, the proposed additional terms become binding unless any one of three exceptions applies. The first exception, which is relevant here, excludes additional terms when “the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer.”

In each of its purchase orders, Contractor included the clause: “No terms or conditions, other than those stated herein, and no agreement or understanding in any way modifying the terms and conditions herein stated shall be binding upon purchaser, unless mutually agreed upon in writing.” This clause contains clear language expressly limiting acceptance to the terms contained in the purchase order. Supplier’s acknowledgement forms thus could not unilaterally impose additional terms without Contractor’s written assent.

Low Bidder Allowed to Correct Mistake After Bid Opening

Public bidding laws serve a dual purpose. The primary purpose is to benefit the public by enabling municipalities, public agencies or public authorities to obtain the best price for public improvement contracts through competitive bidding. The secondary purpose is to insure that contractors bidding on public projects are on an equal footing in competitive bidding. Actions or omissions which would place certain bidders at a disadvantage are to be avoided.

As a general rule, bidders must comply with the bid specifications. Public agencies may reject bids that fail to comply with the literal requirements of the bid specifications, such as the requirements for bid bonds or other collateral, pre-qualification of the bidder, or the timeliness of the bid. When a contractor who submits the lowest bid, and who is otherwise qualified to perform the contract, has failed to comply with technical requirements of the bid specifications, the public agency must balance the two purposes of the bidding laws. If the municipality rejects the low bid because of the non-compliance, the public may lose the benefit of the lower bid. If the municipality waives the non-compliance, it may be giving an advantage to the low bidder not enjoyed by the other bidders.

The dilemma faced by the public agency when it receives a bid that does not fully comply with the requirements of bid specifications is whether to reject the bid on the ground that the non-compliance is material or to accept the bid for the reason that the defect is a mere irregularity. As long as there is a rational basis for the public agency’s actions, courts almost invariably uphold the decision, provided that the decision is in the public interest and does not place other bidders at a competitive disadvantage.

In Matter of Arcon Construction & Management Services, Inc. v. County of Saratoga, Arcon Construction sought to annul a contract awarded by the County of Saratoga to Gross Electric, Inc. based on the County’s alleged violation of State competitive bidding laws.

Background

Both Arcon Construction and Gross Electric bid on electrical construction work at a water supply project. A preprinted bid form in the County’s bid package required the bidder to submit an amount on seven lines relating to various components of the work to be performed. An eighth line on the bid form contained a pre-printed “contingencies” amount of $300,000.00. The eight entries were then to be totaled and the resultant sum entered as the base bid.
According to Gross, it sent a representative to the bid opening with a bid form that was only partially completed; that is, without an entry on line 3, and the total base bid line left blank. Prior to the bid deadline, Gross instructed the representative to enter the amount of $1,533,000.00 on line 3, and the amount of $3,974,000.00 as the total base bid. However, the $3,974,000.00 was only the sum of lines 1 through 7; it did not include the $300,000.00 contingency preprinted on line 8.

Rather than reject Gross’ bid based on the discrepancy, the County recalculated the bid based on what appeared to be an obvious mathematical error on Gross’ part, added the $300,000.00 contingency amount to the base bid amount of $3,974,000.00, making $4,274,000.00 the total base bid. This bid amount made Gross the second lowest bidder behind Arcon, who placed a bid at $4,249,300.00.

Prior to award of the contract to Arcon, Gross was notified that it was the second lowest bidder. In a letter to the County, Gross’ president stated that the $300,000.00 contingency had been included in the $1,533,000.00 placed on line 3, and that Gross’ bid was actually the $3,974,000.00 listed as the total base bid. Accepting Gross’ explanation at face value, the County decided that Gross, and not Arcon Construction, was the lowest bidder and awarded the contract to Gross.

Arcon set forth several arguments in an effort to have the contract annulled. As an initial point, Arcon noted that the language of the bid documents prohibited Gross from explaining its bid after opening of the bid. Arcon also argued that Gross, at best, was opportunistic and disingenuous in its after-the-fact explanation that the amount of the mandatory contingency fee was included in its line 3 entry, and at worst, intentionally designed its bid to give it an unfair advantage over other bidders. Finally, Arcon argued that the County’s communications with Gross, at a time when Gross appeared to be the second lowest bidder, were improper.

Decision

The Trial Court sided with the County, rejecting Arcon’s arguments and denying Arcon’s request to annul the contract. In doing so, the Court noted that a municipality may waive technical noncompliance with bid specifications if the defect is a mere irregularity or clerical mistake and it is in the best interests of a municipality to do so. As long as the County’s decision to waive the prohibition against explaining bids after the opening was rational, the Court stated that such a determination must be upheld. The Court held that the County’s decision to award the contract to Gross based on Gross’ post bid explanation, even though unsubstantiated by documentary evidence, was not irrational as a matter of law. The Court also noted that the burden was on Arcon to prove that the County improperly awarded the contract to Gross. With the evidence before it, the Court lacked sufficient proof to find that Gross designed its bid in such a way as to gain an unfair advantage over the other bidders. The Court also held that there was insufficient proof to hold that the County’s post bid communication with Gross constituted a post bid, pre-award, negotiation which tainted the bidding process to an extent that would warrant setting aside the contract award.

Comment

Where technical noncompliance with bid specifications exists, a municipality is vested with a great deal of discretion when determining what constitutes a mere irregularity. For the determination to withstand judicial challenge, only a rational basis for the decision must be shown. When the determination is coupled with the motivation to save taxpayer dollars, the decision by a municipality will rarely be overturned by the judicial system.

Court Rejects Claims for Unwritten Change Order Work

Of the many problems that contractors must struggle with, probably none are adownsmore common than change orders and extra work. Most construction contracts require a written authorization for change orders and extra work. Courts generally hold that a contractor who fails to obtain a written change order will not be paid for that work.

In the recent case of Charles T. Driscoll Masonry Reconstruction Company v. County of Ulster, the appellate court addressed a claim for work performed where there were no written change orders.

Background

Charles T. Driscoll Masonry Reconstruction Company was awarded a contract by the County of Ulster for the completion of specified work, including window installation, sealant replacement, and External Foam Insulation System (“EFIS”) repair and painting. The contract specifically called for written change orders authorizing the work. Shortly after Driscoll began the work, the County complained of a lack of uniformity in the application of the sealant over the EFIS control joints. After several meetings to address this and other issues, it was verbally agreed that the contractor would perform a sample application using a different sealant and technique to accomplish the aesthetic qualities desired by the County. Though the County accepted the new sealant, it again complained about the manner in which the sealant was being applied by Driscoll. After the contractor twice recaulked the building in an attempt to alleviate the County’s concerns, the County informed Driscoll that it was terminating the contract.

Upon failing to receive payment for the amount claimed due, the contractor commenced an action seeking payment under the parties’ contract. Following a trial, the court found that the County breached the contract by wrongfully terminating Driscoll. The court also held that the contractor completed 80% of the work required under the contract, which was valued at $67,716.00, and that Driscoll was owed $34,860.00 for additional work performed at the County’s request.

The County appealed, arguing that the contract’s specific requirement for the use of written change orders precluded the award of damages beyond the contract price and any written change order work. The contractor argued that the County waived the requirement of a written change order by verbally agreeing that the recaulking should be performed.

Decision

The appellate court ruled in favor of the County. The court held that although clauses requiring a written change order can be waived by the parties, the clause was not waived in this instance. To waive the clause, the court stated that the conduct of the parties must demonstrate an indisputable mutual departure from the written agreement, that the changes were clearly requested by the County, and completed by the contractor. Here, the court stated that Driscoll was simply repeating work contemplated by the contract in an effort to satisfy the County’s complaints with the quality of the contractor’s work. The court was unwilling to find waiver where there was no evidence that the County intended to compensate Driscoll for the extra work performed, even though there was a need for the work.

The court also relied heavily on the fact that during the same time period, the contractor obtained at least two written change orders authorizing additional masonry and joint repair. According to the court, the written change orders demonstrated a continued intent by the parties to require that contract changes be in writing.

Comment

When the contract requires changes and extras to be in writing, courts generally hold that a contractor who fails to obtain a written change order will not be paid for that work. The prudent contractor should obtain a written order in the form specified by the contract prior to performing the changes or extra work. As shown in this case, the failure to do so can result in a contractor’s failure to recover for the changes and extra work performed.

Joint Checks

Question. Does a bank’s compliance with a restrictive indorsement establish compliance with reasonable commercial standards as a matter of law and if not, is the bank’s liability limited to proceeds remaining in its possession?

Answer NO. The situation at hand involves a contractor who was not confident that his subcontractor would use the funds it was being paid on the project to pay for project expenses. If indeed this was happening it could create disruption to the job, result in liens and may also put the contractor in the situation of paying twice for the same work and materials. In order to avoid such unpleasant circumstances the contractor, with the subcontractor’s consent, began paying the subcontractor with checks made payable directly to the subcontractor’s suppliers, sub-subcontractors, etc. The checks were not made out to joint payees and were not delivered directly to the suppliers and sub-subcontractors.

Despite the contractor’s best intentions the payments never reached the suppliers and sub-subcontractors. Instead, the subcontractor, placed handwritten indorsements on the back of each check (the checks totaled approximately $500,000) stating:

“[CONTRATOR], Inc.
Pay to the order of
[SUBCONTRACTOR]
For Deposit”

with Subcontractor’s account number underneath. Contractor brought a claim against the depositor bank for money had and received through the fraudulent indorsements.

It is normally a bank’s policy to deposit checks only to the business account of the named payee. They are not to be deposited to an individual account even though the payee may be an officer of the business. It is also against reasonable banking standards to deposit the checks into an account other than that of the named payee.

This particular bank took the position that the bank had not violated reasonable banking standards because it had complied with the indorsements on the back of the checks.

Section 3-419 (3) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that

“[s]ubject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in [its] hands.”

As to restrictive indorsements, the UCC states that, where there is an indorsement such as “for deposit,” the transferee “must pay or apply any value given by him for or on the security of the instrument consistently with the indorsement and to the extent that [it] does so [it] becomes a holder for value” ( UCC 3-206[3] ). The Bank’s primary argument is that it is not liable under Contractor’s claim for money had and received because it complied with the restrictive indorsements on the checks.

Section 3-419(3) limits the liability of representatives-including, as relevant here, depositary banks. As long as the bank complies with any restrictive indorsements and acts in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, its liability will be limited to “the amount of any proceeds remaining in [its] hands” ( UCC 3-419[3] ). Since the statute provides that the bank will not be “liable in conversion or otherwise,” the defense applies to a claim for money had and received.

The Bank argues that compliance with the restrictive indorsements is tantamount to acting in accordance with reasonable commercial standards under the statute.
The Bank also argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Contractor did not prove that the bank retained any of the proceeds of the checks. If correct, the Bank would be immunized from liability since it is apparently undisputed that the Bank no longer retains the proceeds. This argument also lacks merit.

As noted above, section 3-419(3) limits a depositary bank’s liability on an action for money had and received only when the bank satisfies the statutory criteria-compliance with restrictive indorsements, good faith and acting in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. Since the Bank did not satisfy all of the above criteria, because it did not act in conformity with reasonable commercial standards, the defense is unavailable and the bank’s liability is not limited to the amount of the proceeds remaining in its possession.
Rather, the Bank’s liability is determined by the common-law action for money had and received as it existed prior to the enactment of the UCC. According to that rationale, when a bank took a check for collection, it had an obligation to pay the proceeds collected to the true payee owner in the absence of a valid indorsement. The moment the collecting bank receives the proceeds it holds money belonging to the owner of the check and becomes a debtor of such owner and of no one else in the absence of a valid indorsement.

Statutory Warranty

Question: Does the statutory warranty apply when I am constructing a custom home on land owned by another?

Brief Answer – The Third Department has continually stated that it does not, but be aware that there may be a trend toward having Article 36-B govern the application of implied warranties on custom homes.

Answer – GBL ¬ß¬ß 777, 777-a and 777-b deal with implied warranties on newly built homes. GBL ¬ß 777 defines a new home as, “. . . any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less in which title to the individual units is transferred to owners. . . .” McKinneys General Business Law ¬ß 777, 2007. Transferring title means that the home and the real estate are being transferred to the buyer. So, Article 36-B applies only to new home construction that is conveyed to the owner along with the real estate upon which it sits.

GBL ¬ß 770 in Article 36-A of the General Business Law defines what a custom home is. A custom home is, “. . . a single family residence to be constructed on premises owned of record by the purchaser at the time of contract, provided that such residence is intended for residential occupancy by such purchaser. . . .” McKinneys General Business Law ¬ß 770, 2007. Customs homes are not conveyed along with the real estate. They are merely built on land owned by the eventual homeowner. An analysis of the two statutes would clearly show that the implied home warranty on new homes would not apply to a custom home because the real estate is not being conveyed with a custom home.

The Third Department has supported the reasoning that custom homes are not subject to implied home warranties. In Biggs v. O’Neil, 309A.D.2d 1110, 1110, 766 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (3rd Dep’t, 2003), the plaintiff was suing to recover damages for a breach of contract and express and implied warranties in regard to the faulty construction of the shell of a home on his property. The court stated that, “[a] housing merchant warranty is implied in the sale of a new home. It has no application to a contract for the construction of a ‚Äòcustom home’ on non-builder-owned property, which is afforded protection under General Business Law article 36-A.” Id., 766 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392. The court made it clear that a home built on the homeowner’s property is not considered a new home as defined in GBL ¬ß 777. Therefore, the implied warranties outlined in Article 36-B do not apply.

When the Biggs ruling is viewed in conjunction with another ruling, Gorsky v. Triou’s Custom Homes, Inc., 194 Misc.2d 736, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. Sup. 2002), there is confusion as to whether the implied warranty outlined in Article 36-B apply to custom homes. In Gorsky, the plaintiff had the defendant build a home on the plaintiff’s property. The contract between the parties incorporated General Business Law Article 36-B, which includes ¬ß 777. The contractor did not use the type of shingles specified in the contract, and more than a year later the roof had to be replaced. Id. at 737, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199. The defendant raised the affirmative defense that Article 36-B would preclude recovery by the plaintiff because the roof is not a major system and the claim for the roof was not raised within the one year warranty period. Id. at 738, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200. The plaintiff moved to strike the defendant’s defense by saying the 36-B does not apply in this case because the real property was not conveyed along with the new house. Id. at 739, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200. Before Article 36-B was enacted, the common law rule was that there was a six year statute of limitations based on contract law. Contract law also established that “. . . every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties.” Id. at 739-740, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200-201 (citing Caceci v. DiCanio Construction Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 530 N.Y.S.2d 771, 526 N.E.2d 266 (1988). When Article 36-B was enacted, it completely displaced the common law set out in Caceci. Id. at 742, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 203. Based on the court’s interpretation of legislative intent when it drafted Article 36-B the court ruled, “[t]he statutory new home implied warranties imposed by article 36-B of the General Business Law apply to custom homes and protect purchasers of such homes regardless of the fact that they own the real property upon which such homes are constructed prior to the home being built.” Id. at 210, 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 750. This ruling is in direct conflict with the holding of Biggs.

The Third Department strengthened their ruling in Biggs with its decision in Sharpe v. Mann, 34 A.D.3d 959, 823 N.Y.S.2d 623 (3rd Dep’t, 2006). In Sharpe, the defendant built a log cabin on land owned by the plaintiff. The contract between the parties incorporated GBL ¬ß 777, but the court stated in a footnote that,

“While the housing merchant implied warranty under General Business Law ¬ß 777-a is automatically applicable to the sale of a new home, it does not apply to a contract for the construction of a ‚Äòcustom home,’ that is, a single family residence to be constructed on the purchaser’s own property. Thus here, General Business Law ¬ß 777-a did not automatically apply to the parties’ contract as it involved the construction of a log cabin on plaintiff’s own property.” Id., 823 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (citations omitted).

The Third Department has made it clear that implied warranties on new homes do not include custom homes.

Since both the Biggs and Sharpe cases are Appellate Division cases, they have stronger precedence over the Gorsky since it is only a Supreme Court case. A strict reading of the statutes indicates that Article 36-B of the General Business Law does not include custom homes. The builder should be aware that there may be a growing trend in the courts that Article 36-B will apply to custom homes in the future.

Contractor Liable for Indemnification and Failure to Obtain Insurance for Owner

Construction contracts often contain a provision which makes the contractor an indemnitor for personal injury or property damage claims arising out of the work performed under the contract. Apart from indemnity clauses, construction contracts often contain a provision obligating the contractor to obtain insurance naming the owner as an additional insured under the contractor’s insurance policy. The enforcement of both provisions was addressed in the recent case of Trano v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.

Background

Douglastown Plaza Shopping Center, LLC, entered into two agreements with 4 Star Contracting, Inc., under the terms of which 4 Star was to remove, replace and cover all expansion joints on the sidewalk of a shopping center. Approximately one month after 4 Star last performed work at the project, Ms. Trano tripped and fell on an expansion joint, sustaining injury. She sued the owners of the shopping center, claiming that the defective expansion joint caused the accident because it was two to three inches above the level of the sidewalk.

The agreements between Douglastown and 4 Star contained an indemnification clause whereby the contractor agreed to indemnify the owner from all claims for personal injury and property damage “alleged to arise out of” the work performed under the agreements. The two agreements also contained a provision whereby 4 Star guaranteed the materials and workmanship to be free from defects for a one-year period, running from final completion.

Based on the indemnification provision, the owners of the shopping center demanded that 4 Star indemnify them for the costs incurred in defending the personal injury action. When 4 Star refused, the owners sued the contractor, requesting that the Court enforce the terms of the indemnification provisions contained in the agreements. The owners also sued 4 Star for breach of contract for its failure to procure insurance naming the owners as additional insureds, as was required by the agreements.

The contractor argued in its defense that even if the expansion joint was somehow defective, the duty to maintain the joint fell squarely on the owner of the property and not 4 Star, which had been off the job site for at least one month prior to the accident.

Decision

The trial court ruled in favor of the shopping center owners’ claim for contractual indemnification and for breach of contract based on 4 Star’s failure to obtain insurance protecting the owners. The court held that because the injury occurred within the one year guaranty of work and materials period, coupled with the plain contract language obligating 4 Star to indemnify the owner, the contractor was liable to the owners for the costs incurred in defending the personal injury action. Equally important, the Court also found 4 Star in breach of contract for its failure to provide an insurance policy naming the owners as additional insureds.

Comment

Though the Court relied on the one-year guaranty of work provision in rendering its decision, it is probable that even absent the guaranty, the Court would have enforced the indemnification agreement against 4 Star. This is because Ms. Trano claimed that the injury “arose out of” uneven expansion joints in the sidewalk. The contractor had performed work on the expansion joints up to one month before plaintiff’s fall. As to indemnification for costs incurred in defending the personal injury action, it is immaterial whether 4 Star’s work actually caused the trip and fall accident. What mattered was what Ms. Trano alleged in her lawsuit. Since she alleged that her injury arose out of 4 Star’s work, the contractor was required to indemnify the property owners.

As illustrated time and again, parties to a construction contract must carefully review the terms of the contract so that they fully understand their respective rights and responsibilities.

Safety Policy – Abatement Measures Under OSHA’s General Duty Clause

Imagine that one of your laborers is dead as the result of being struck by an excavator bucket in a trench, and that a compliance officer has cited your company for a “Serious” violation of OSHA’s General Duty Clause, ¬ß 5(a)(1).

Panic in such a situation has kept more than one employer from even calling his lawyer. The danger is seeing OSHA proceedings as a deck stacked against the employer where a fatality is involved; taking it as a given that the defense of the wrongful death lawsuit will be complicated by an adverse OSHA finding; and giving up on the OSHA citation from the outset (especially if your liability coverage won’t defray legal fees spent in defending the OSHA citation).

Anytime you are cited for an alleged OSHA violation classified as “Serious,” “Repeat,” of “Willful,” you should promptly contact an attorney experienced in OSHA representation.

Every citation gives you the opportunity to focus on your company’s safety program. Regardless of whether the citation can be successfully defended (or downgraded through negotiation) it provides the occasion to identify and to implement measures to better protect your employees and your business.

And, whatever the immediate outcome, an OSHA citation is a challenge to you to demonstrate, both to your workforce and to local OSHA personnel, that you are a safety-conscious employer. “If you’re going somewhere,” the adage goes, “you’re going to get some mud on your shoes.” That is, if you remain in business, and your company grows and takes on bigger projects, you will probably receive more, and not less, attention from OSHA. Life has, let us hope, pleasures greater than visits from government agents to enforce laws that cost you money. However, just as there is some small satisfaction in moving into a higher tax bracket (and since, in your heart, you believe your workers deserve a safe workplace) you should strive to put a cheerier and more enlightened “spin” on your increased business with OSHA, and to view it is a badge of your success.

Keep in mind that many OSHA cases that look terrible at first can be successfully defended, and it’s uncommon that solid legal representation cannot at least reduce the bad consequences to your business. It’s upsetting, naturally, to get a citation (especially when the citation follows the occurrence of a fatality or serious injury) but don’t assume OSHA is a rampaging bunch of zealots out to punish employers. The statute, the agency, and the enforcement and adjudicatory procedures aren’t perfect, but such is the human condition. OSHA has markedly improved workplace health and safety. The regulations (as well as OSHA enforcement personnel) are generally rational and comprehensible. Adjudicative hearings, although under Department of Labor auspices, are not a “Kangaroo Court.” Procedures are streamlined, but not unreasonably so. And the ALJs, even in cases involving serious injuries or death, are not in the business of trampling on the law, to punish the employer.

While fatalities nearly always trigger an inspection, it is the exposure of employees to unsafe or unhealthful conditions — not the occurrence or severity of actual harm, that constitutes the violation.

Secretary v. Mario Sinacola & Sons Excavating, Inc. illustrates that even seemingly tough cases can be won. That case presented the scenario described at the head of this article. A 3-man crew was installing a water line in a trench. Martinez, one of two pipe layers, was acting as signal man for the excavator operator, Ruiz-Hinojosa, whose limited visibility did not allow him to see that section of the trench where the pipes were to be fitted together. When a section of pipe was lowered into the trench, Martinez signed Ruiz-Hinojosa to stop, and walked under the excavator bucket to the opposite (north) side of the excavator, to assist the second laborer in joining the new section of pipe to the previously installed section.

A foreman, Harig, came to the south end of the excavator and, seeing that Martinez and the other laborer had the two pipe sections lined up, on Martinez’s signal (Martinez remaining out of Ruiz-Hinojosa’s sight, in the trench’s north end) signaled to the operator to move the bucket northward, to drive the new pipe into the joint. When that had been accomplished, Harig turned his attention to a different crew. Ruiz-Hinojosa moved the bucket back slightly, to take tension off the chain.

Unfortunately, as he did so, Martinez (still invisible to Ruiz-Hinojosa, as he tried to step around the bucket to regain his previous position) was struck by the bucket, and sustained fatal injuries.

The employer was cited under OSHA’s General Duty Clause, which violation comprises five elements. They are:

  • A hazardous workplace condition or activity;
  • That the hazard be recognized, whether by the industry in general, or by the cited employer;
  • That the hazard be likely to cause death or serious physical harm;
  • That the employer knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known, of the violation;
  • That there existed feasible means to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard.

Thus, the Secretary’s case required, among other things, that she articulate practicable means to abate those hazards that go along with having, in a confined space, workers on foot, an excavator with a movable boom and a heavy bucket, and an operating engineer with restricted visibility.

The Secretary’s burden is not met by “abatement measures” that — even if they appear plausible at first — on examination prove to be insubstantial. In Sinacola & Sons, for example, the citation listed the following:

  • “Develop and implement procedures to ensure that all personnel working near moving equipment are accounted for and . . . a safe distance away” before allowing the machine to be moved;
  • A “written hazard analysis” relating to the installation of pipes/utilities in trenches;
  • Developing methods to allow employees “to remain in constant contact with one another during the installation of underground utilities,” especially “where visual and oral communication is difficult and/or obsolete;”
  • The appointment of a safety monitor/signalman during underground installations; and
  • Development of a system of signals understood by all, the use of only one signalman at a time, and a formalized system to ensure that all are aware where responsibility is passed from one signalman to another.

Of the five abatement measures included in the citation, the Secretary dropped all but the first and last shown of them prior to the trial. And, as the ALJ rightly detected, “the first abatement method merely restates the recognized hazard, and suggests that [the employer] develop and implement additional procedures to eliminate it.” It is the Secretary’s obligation, if she is to sustain a General Duty Clause citation, not merely to command that the employer develop new procedures, but to indicate measures the employer ought to have employed, which precautions are recognized by knowledgeable persons in the industry as “necessary and valuable.”

As for the last-mentioned proposal concerning a single signalman, the operating engineer was trained to receive hand signals, signalmen were utilized, and the operator received hand signals from only one signalman at a time. There was no evidence, the ALJ found, “that a reasonable employer familiar with the conditions on Sinacola’s work site would have found these safety precautions inadequate.” Because the Secretary failed to propose a feasible means of abating the cited hazard, the General Duty Clause violation was vacated, and the citation dismissed.

Obviously, the employer’s win in this contested matter neither diminished the gravity of the loss of life, nor guaranteed a favorable outcome in a wrongful death action by survivors of the deceased employee. Nevertheless, the employer’s prospects in such an action were certainly not damaged by the outcome and, more generally, the same demonstrates that injuries, even fatal ones, do not constitute an OSHA violation, and citations related to tragic occurrences can often be successfully defended.

Thomas H. Welby is a licensed professional engineer, as well as an attorney with more than 20 years’ experience, and managing partner of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, a construction law firm with its main office in White Plains. Articles in this series are for general guidance only, and should not be relied upon as providing all information necessary for compliance with OSHA and other legal requirements.

Commercial Lease Indemnification Clause

Question: Is a commercial lease’s broad indemnification provision, requiring the tenant to indemnify the landlord for any accident occurring in the leased premises “unless caused solely by landlord’s negligence,” enforceable?

For reasons explained below I conclude that the indemnification clause, which was coupled with an insurance procurement provision, obligates the tenant to indemnify the landlord for its share of liability, and that such a lease provision does not violate General Obligations Law § 5-321.

Landlord leased a portion of its building located to Contractor. The lease required Contractor to indemnify Landlord as follows:

“Tenant shall indemnify and hold harmless Landlord … from and against any and all claims arising from or in connection with (A) the conduct or management of the Premises or of any business therein, or any work or thing whatsoever done, or any condition created (other than by Landlord) in or about the Premises during the term of this Lease …; (B) any act, omission or negligence of Tenant or any of its subtenants or licensees … or contractors; (C) any accident, injury or damage whatsoever unless caused solely by Landlord’s negligence) occurring in, at or upon the Premises; and (D) any breach or default by Tenant in the full and prompt payment and performance of Tenant’s obligation under this Lease ….”

The lease further obligated Contractor, at its expense, to maintain a comprehensive general liability insurance policy naming Landlord as an additional insured with coverage to be no less than $5 million “combined single limit per occurrence for bodily injury and property damage liability.” Another lease term directed Landlord and Contractor to obtain mutual waivers of subrogation in their respective insurance policies. Contractor procured the specified insurance coverage, and Landlord also maintained a separate insurance policy for the building.

After entering into the lease, Contractor hired a mechanical contractor to perform work on an existing sprinkler system as part of the project. During construction, a flood occurred, causing property damage to the premises of a tenant on the floor below. The water damage resulted from the failure to drain the pipes properly before beginning the sprinkler work.

The tenant below’s insurer-commenced a subrogation action against Landlord, Contractor and subcontractor to recover the monies it had paid to its insured on its property damage claim. Landlord interposed a cross claim against Contractor for contractual indemnification. The subrogation action was settled for $200,000 and all claims and cross claims among the parties were resolved, except for Landlord’s indemnification claim against Contractor. As part of the settlement, the parties stipulated that if the case had been tried by a jury, 90% of the liability would have been allocated to Landlord and 10% to the subcontractor. After the settlement, Landlord moved for summary judgment against Contractor on its claim for contractual indemnification.

Contractor advances two arguments to support its position that Landlord is not entitled to contractual indemnification. First, Contractor asserts that the language of the lease provision at issue does not unmistakably require indemnification under the circumstances of this case. Alternatively, even if interpreted to entitle Landlord to indemnification, Contractor urges that the lease provision is unenforceable and contrary to public policy under General Obligations Law ¬ß 5-321 because it obligates a tenant to indemnify a landlord for the landlord’s own negligence. I address each contention in turn.

Courts will construe a contract to provide indemnity to a party for its own negligence only where the contractual language evinces an “unmistakable intent” to indemnify. Here, subsection (C) of the indemnification clause in the lease required Contractor to indemnify Landlord for “any” accident occurring in Contractor’s premises “unless caused solely by [Landlord’s] negligence.” This broadly drawn provision unambiguously evinced an intent that Contractor indemnify Landlord for the latter’s own negligence, provided Landlord was not 100% negligent. In this case, the parties stipulated that Landlord was 90% at fault and Contractor’s contractor was 10% responsible for the water damage. Hence, Landlord was not solely liable under the terms of the stipulation and the clear language of the lease unmistakably affords indemnification under the circumstances of this case.

Having concluded that the indemnification provision was triggered, I next consider the contention that the provision is nevertheless unenforceable in light of General Obligations Law § 5-321. That statute provides:

“Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to any lease of real property exempting the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.”

This case presents a commercial lease negotiated between two sophisticated parties who included a broad indemnification provision, coupled with an insurance procurement requirement. That arrangement afforded the tenant below who sustained water damage, adequate recourse for the damages it suffered. Additionally, Contractor’s insurer-not Contractor itself-will bear ultimate responsibility for the indemnification payment, which is precisely the result contemplated by the parties when they entered into the lease. Where, as here, a lessor and lessee freely enter into an indemnification agreement whereby they use insurance to allocate the risk of liability to third parties between themselves, General Obligations Law ¬ß 5-321 does not prohibit indemnity.

Contractual Time Limitations Dooms Sub’s Payment Bond Claim

In the construction industry, labor and material payment bonds are normally required to be furnished on public projects. Some private owners, particularly on large or institutional projects, may also require contractors to furnish payment bonds.

The primary purpose of a payment bond is to protect subcontractors, materialmen and laborers against the default of contractors. When the principal on the bond does not pay, the surety company can be forced to pay if the bond claimant has complied with the terms and conditions of the bond. Should a bond claimant fail to comply with these special terms and conditions, the surety will have no obligation to make payment, even if payment is otherwise due and owing from the surety’s principal.

The terms of the bond will normally determine: (1) who may make a claim; (2) what material and labor is covered by the bond; (3) when and to whom notice of the claim must be given; (4) when suit must be commenced; and (5) where suit must be commenced.

The recent New York case of Techcon Contracting, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook underscores the importance of reading the terms of the bond, and strictly complying with the special conditions set forth in the bond.

Background

Techcon Contracting, Inc., a general contractor, entered into a public construction contract with the Village of Lynbrook to perform certain roadway improvements. Lincoln General Insurance Company, as surety, issued a payment bond for the work relating to the project, naming Techcon as its principal under the bond. Techcon later entered into a subcontract with Lizza & Sons Paving, Inc. to perform grading and paving work at the project.

After having performed work at the project without receiving payment from Techcon, Lizza was forced to suspend its work on July 31, 2002. Techcon later defaulted on its contract with the Village of Lynbrook and was terminated on September 23, 2002.

Pursuant to the terms of the payment bond issued by Lincoln General, all actions to recover on the bond were required to be commenced within one year of Techon’s last day of work at the project.

On May 25, 2004 Lizza Paving commenced an action on the payment bond, seeking to recover the money due it from Techcon. The surety moved for summary judgment dismissing the action of Lizza Paving, arguing that the action was time barred. According to the surety, the bond contained a one year limitation period running from the date upon which Techcon ceased work on the project. Techcon was terminated by Lynbrook on September 23, 2002. Under the time limitation provision of the bond, Lizza Paving would have had to commence its action by September 23, 2003. Since Lizza Paving did not commence its action until May 25, 2004, the surety argued that the action was time barred.

In contesting the surety’s motion for summary judgment, Lizza argued that statutory law applicable to public construction projects established the applicable time period within which to commence an action, not the language of the bond. State Finance Law section 137 provides for one year from the date on which final payment was due to commence an action on the payment bond. According to Lizza, since that date was disputed, the surety’s motion should be denied.

Decision

The trial court ruled in favor of the surety, granting summary judgment dismissing the claim of Lizza Paving. In doing so, the Court looked no further than to the language of the payment bond. It held that Lizza’s failure to commence an action within one year of the September 23, 2002 termination of Techcon was fatal to Lizza’s claim under the payment bond. The court held that the one year time limitation requirement was a precondition to recovery under the bond, and because Lizza failed to meet that condition precedent, its claim was lost.

Comment

This case is interesting because the court permitted the bond to shorten the time period otherwise established by New York’s State Finance Law on municipal public works projects. Only time will tell whether this case will withstand appellate review.

What is certain however, is that courts time and again strictly construe the terms of a payment bonds. This means that the courts will make certain that there has been strict compliance with the specific conditions of the bond. The bond claimant should be concerned with two time requirements under the payment bond. These requirements are first, the time within which notice, if any, must be given to preserve bond rights, and second, the time within which suit must be brought against the bonding company.

The unpaid claimant, or potential claimant, should make every effort to obtain a copy of the payment bond and become thoroughly familiar with its requirements. When dealing with an insolvent principal, the bond may provide the only opportunity to recover payment for work performed or materials furnished. If the terms of the bond are not complied with, the claim will be lost. The surety will only pay if the specific conditions of the bond are first satisfied.

Choice of Entity: Organizing Your Business (Part 2)

In each issue of the BAHV Newsletter, Thomas S. Tripodianos, Esq. provides our members with answers to their commercial litigation, real estate and construction law questions.

William A. Brenner, CPA provides members with information on a variety of business management, profitability and tax topics, intended to increase member awareness and stimulate thought about issues that can greatly affect profitability, business growth and quality of life.

Both Tom and Bill have often given the advice that no one professional can properly satisfy all your needs. Rather, a “Management Team” should be assembled to address the multitude of issues facing your business. At a minimum your team should consist of an attorney, accountant, and insurance professional.

In this special joint installment of their columns Bill and Tom explore the pros and cons of the various organizational forms available to business owners.

Tax Implications – Pass Through vs. Double Taxation

It is important to consider the legal attributes when choosing an entity type for your business, but careful consideration should also be given to the income tax implications. Here are the basic tax related characteristics of the various entities.

Sole Proprietorship. From a tax perspective this is the simplest form of business entity. All income, deduction, gain or loss is reported on Schedule C the individual’s personal tax return. The one downside, however, is that net profits are subject to self employment tax, which is typically 15.3% of net income, in addition to federal and state income tax.

Partnerships in General. There are several types of partnerships, all of which share many of the same tax attributes. Partnerships are pass through entities for tax purposes. This means that any income, deduction, gain or loss from partnership activities is passed through to the individual partners, who typically report it on Schedule E of their personal returns. The partnership itself files an informational return with the IRS and state to report basic partner information.

With pass through entities, the distributive share of partnership taxable income is taxed at the partner level regardless or whether or not any actual cash distributions are made to the partners. Depending on the partnership it is possible to pay tax on income that you have not yet received. This is called phantom income, and partnership managers generally try to distribute enough cash to at least cover the partner’s tax on reported taxable income. The great thing about partnerships from a tax perspective is their flexibility. Partnerships can allocate income, deduction, gain or loss to each partner in any amounts, regardless of each partner’s ownership percentage. This also applies to cash distributions. It is important to have a written operating agreement that allows these types of specific allocations. This is an important consideration where partners do not generate equal amounts of partnership profits and want to allocate income and distributions fairly.

There are two basic types of income passed through to partners – guaranteed payments and ordinary income. Guaranteed payments are payments made to partners without regard to profitability, and are similar to an employee’s salary. Ordinary income is the net profit of the partnership (after deducting the guaranteed payments), which is allocated to each partner. Generally speaking, both ordinary income and guaranteed payments are subject to self employment tax.

Another important tax consideration for partnerships is that the contribution of cash or property to the partnership in return for an ownership interest is not a taxable event. The same holds true for distributions of partnership property to partners in liquidation of the partnership. This is not the case with corporations.

The “basis” and “at-risk” rules that apply to pass through entities are complicated, and you should discuss their implications with your tax advisor. For the purposes of this discussion, having “basis” in the partnership allows you to receive an allocation of partnership losses. Once you have passed the basis hurdle, you must be “at-risk” to deduct the losses allocated to you on your personal tax return. If you don’t have basis or are not at-risk, the losses are not lost, just carried to future years.

The following are specific tax attributes associated with each type of partnership that we have discussed, in addition to the basics described above:

* General Partnership. Typically all income is subject to self employment tax. Since each partner is liable for the partnership debts, their allocable share of partnership liabilities increases their basis for allowing the allocation of partnership losses.
* Limited Partnership. The general partner’s distributive share of income is typically subject to self employment tax. Guaranteed payments to Limited Partners are subject to self employment tax, while their distributive shares of ordinary income are generally not. Limited Partners do not have basis in their allocable shares of partnership liabilities because they are not liable for partnership debt. The most they can lose is their investment in the partnership. However, the general partner is liable for the partnership debt, which does give the general partner basis for the allocation of partnership losses.
* Limited Liability Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships. All income and guaranteed payments allocated to each member or partner is generally subject to self employment income. Members and partners typically have no exposure for LLC or LLP liabilities. As such they have no basis in their allocable share of these liabilities. However, if any member or partner personally guarantees debt of the LLC or LLP, they have basis and are at-risk to the extent of the guarantee.

* Now, let’s look at the two types of corporations and how their owners are treated from a tax perspective.

C Corporations. Shareholders of C corporations who participate in the day to day operations generally receive their compensation through payroll. Like any other employee, wages are reported on their individual income tax returns. C Corporations are not pass through entities. Therefore, any net income is taxed at corporate rates, which can near 50%, federal, state, and city combined, making good tax planning crucial. For this reason, many C corporations try to eliminate net profits by paying bonuses to their shareholders at year end through payroll. In the event that a corporation has net income, and pays tax on it, the accumulated profits can be distributed at a later date to shareholders in the form of dividends. Unfortunately these dividend distributions are taxable to the shareholder at the 15% qualified dividend tax rate.

S Corporations. If a C corporation meets certain criteria, it can make federal and state elections to be treated as an S corporation. S corporations are pass through entities, just like partnerships. Income, deductions, gain or loss are passed through to the individual shareholders and then taxed on their individual tax returns. The main difference between an S corporation and a partnership with respect to the allocation of income is that while there is flexibility with partnerships, corporate income or loss must be allocated prorata based on share ownership. The same holds true for cash distributions. As with other pass through entities, owners are taxed on income even if no cash is actually distributed. The major difference is that income passed through from an S corporation to a shareholder is not subject to self employment tax. To make sure that shareholders pay their fair share of social security and Medicare taxes (the self employment tax), the IRS requires shareholders to receive reasonable compensation in the form of salary. With a few exceptions, S corporations pay no federal corporate tax and typically pay a small minimum state and or city tax.

For basis purposes, shareholders of S corporations must consider their original investment, plus their share of cumulative corporate earnings and additional investments, less their share of cumulative corporate losses and distributions. Additionally, any amounts loaned to the corporation directly by the shareholder can be considered basis for allowing the deduction of pass through losses on the shareholder’s individual tax return.

In most cases, contributions of cash or property to a corporation in exchange for stock can be structured in a tax fee manner. However, the distribution of corporate assets to shareholders in liquidation of their interests is a taxable event. For example, if a corporation distributes equipment to a shareholder in liquidation, it is treated as if the equipment was sold for fair market value by the corporation. The equipment is distributed to the shareholder, along with the income from the deemed sale. This can become a big issue if the corporate assets have appreciated over time, which can result in large amounts of income on distribution, with no actual cash to go along with it.

With the wide variety of entity choices as well as legal and tax consequences, we strongly recommend that you consult with your “management team” to make sure you have the information needed to make the right choice.

If you would like more information regarding this topic, please contact Thomas S. Tripodianos at TTripodianos@wbgllp.com, or by phone at 845-294-5500 x 317. Bill Brenner can be reached at , or by phone at 914-949-2990 x 313.

Please understand that this column provides general information only, and should not be construed as legal or tax advice to anyone under any circumstances. While we encourage you to contact us, you should not disclose to us any information that you consider confidential unless and until we have formally established an attorney-client or accountant-client relationship, and agreed to represent you in your particular matter. The opinions expressed in this column are of the individual authors, and not necessarily those of the Builder’s Association of the Hudson Valley.

Thomas S. Tripodianos is a partner at the law firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP. Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP emphasizes the practice of Construction Law, representing general contractors, subcontractors, sureties, developers, owners, suppliers, engineers, homeowners and other entities connected with the construction industry in transactions, litigation, arbitration, mediation, public and private construction contracts, mechanic’s liens, surety law and environmental law. Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP has its principal office in White Plains, New York, and also has offices in New Jersey and Connecticut. Mr. Tripodianos resides in Orange County.

Bill Brenner is a manager at the accounting and consulting firm of Citrin Cooperman & Company, LLP. Ranked among the top 40 accounting firms in the U.S., Citrin Cooperman provides business consulting, tax and accounting services to business owners in the Tri-state area and Hudson Valley. The Firm has offices in White Plains, mid-town Manhattan, and Springfield, New Jersey.