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Author: Thomas H. Welby

Safety Policy: Where Is OSHA Enforcement Headed?

As OSHA nears its fortieth birthday, the agency and affected constituencies are taking stock of what OSHA and the OSH Act have accomplished, and the likely direction of enforcement efforts under the Obama Administration.

The OSH Act became law toward the end of the 30-year postwar period that followed World War II, and at the end of a decade that saw unprecedented initiatives intended to benefit minorities, working people and the disadvantaged.  The OSH Act was the product of bipartisan collaboration in Congress rarely if ever seen in recent years, and was signed into law by Republican President Richard M. Nixon.

Many changes in the economic and political landscape have come about since the 1970s.  I don’t think anyone would claim that OSHA has even approached the goals envisioned by its drafters.  Still, traumatic workplace deaths fell by half under OSHA (as the workforce grew by 60% and more), a substantial achievement.  And, through thick and thin, under Democratic and Republican administrations, since 1970 employee safety has always enjoyed at least some place on the national political agenda.

In the minus column, the OSH Act’s goal of assuring safe and healthful working conditions for American workers remains far from full realization.  Confirmation requires nothing more than pointing to the fact that, during OSHA’s first quarter-century, approximately 294,000 Americans died of traumatic injuries in the workplace.

Traumatic deaths, moreover, are just the tip of the iceberg:  most occupationally-related deaths are due to illness resulting from exposure to workplace chemicals or toxins.  They often become manifest years or decades after the exposure, and are seldom recorded in an employer’s OSHA 200 Log, or by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.1 

While some claim that OSHA trails only the IRS as America’s least-beloved federal agency, the lore concerning Kafkaesque regulations and over-zealous enforcement personnel is larded with propaganda.  What OSHA really does have in common with the IRS is the necessity to rely, for the most part, on voluntary compliance.  OSHA has never enjoyed ample staffing, or generous funding, but on the whole it does a creditable job of leveraging the limited assets that it has. Less than religious adherence to OSHA standards remains, certainly, widespread.  I have heard clients complain, sometimes rightly, about citations they believed lacked justification.  Nevertheless, while OSHA compliance is often fitful (and seldom enthusiastic) almost no one expresses contempt for the idea that employee safety is a good thing, or even that there is a government agency that works to promote it.

For several years, momentum has been gathering to increase the number of OSHA inspections and “SWR” (Serious, Willful and Repeat) citations, and to increase both monetary penalties generally, and criminal penalties — if only for “Willful” violations that result in employee fatalities.

One area which appears to be targeted for increased enforcement is OSHA’s (many) record-keeping requirements.  These are “low-hanging fruit” for OSHA inspectors (as few employers’ records are above reproach).  Moreover, brazen book-cooking is believed to be widespread, many employers keeping two sets of records (one for OSHA and the company’s Workers’ Comp insurer, and the other for its health clinics).

Locally, the word is that area OSHA offices are hiring considerable numbers of new enforcement personnel.  In our firm’s practice we are already seeing greater willingness on the part of compliance officers to cite OSHA violations as “Willful,” and less readiness to bargain such citations down to “Serious” ones.

We’re seeing also an uptick in the number of citations alleging violations of the many OSHA provisions requiring that employers train their forces to recognize and avoid health and safety hazards.  Not only is “failure to train” increasingly cited as an OSHA violation, but we detect at least some willingness on the part of OSHA to look to test the sufficiency of detail in an employer’s training program directed to a particular hazard (even where the extent of the regulatory mandate is uncertain).

I’ve always encouraged my clients and readers to train (and re-train) employees.  One reason I’m so adamant about repeat training is that it’s one thing to spend for a glossy, state-of-the-art company safety manual, but quite another to get your 21st century workforce to understand and observe even the fundamentals.

Critics of American educational and social institutions would argue that many young people have limited verbal skills, don’t comprehend complex instructions, and resist obeying them even if they do.

Also, employment relationships are in general more transient than they were circa 1970 when the OSH Act became law, and it’s not a given (certainly in the New York metro area) that a company’s workforce will even have a common language.

The Tower-of-Babel situation resulting from decades of high immigration levels obviously makes effective training more difficult.  An example of how pitiful the laws’ response to the diversity “explosion” has been is that defendants in certain kinds of civil litigation (notably, consumer collection and landlord-tenant matters) are required to be served with a bilingual summons, in both English and Spanish.

While such requirements are no doubt well-intentioned, it’s almost comical to see judges fretting over whether Gujurati, Yiddish and Fujian-speaking defendants have been duly served with papers written in Spanish.  And while it’s praiseworthy that some employers have paid to produce editions of their company safety manuals in Spanish, the last census counted 322 languages in daily use in American households.  Most of those linguistic groups are small and many are tiny, but if you’re running a substantial construction project in the NYC metro area, chances are that the workforce will include speakers of (in addition to English and Spanish) Korean, several varieties of Chinese, Haitian Creole, Urdu, Russian, Bengali, Arabic, Punjabi, Portuguese (European, Brazilian and African varieties) French (including its African varieties, plus Qu√©becois) and others.2 

A further complication is that OSHA regulations have an extensive and exotic jargon.  Not only have many regulations technical aspects not readily understood by laymen, but there lots of acronyms, specialized terms and “buzz words” in OSHA parlance.  

Studies as to how much of the information imparted during the OSHA 10-hour course is really absorbed have yielded discouraging results.  One tested not rank-and-file construction workers, but students in a master’s program in construction management.  The proportion who achieved a grade of Satisfactory or better, after sitting through the OSHA 10-hour course, was only about twenty percent.  A less highly-educated group of Spanish speakers produced no test-takers achieving “Satisfactory” scores.

While training employees effectively is a problem you can’t avoid wrestling with, policy should take into account both the harsh economic climate and the difficulties (most of them due to larger forces, over which employers have no control) of getting bang-for-the-buck, true comprehension, from safety training outlays.  This, I believe, is not an opportune moment to abruptly raise the bar, or to instruct OSHA compliance officers to issue large numbers of citations to push the limits of how much detail must be taught, especially as to hazards that account for few injuries and fatalities.

As your paramount goal should be to minimize employee injuries, not exposure to citations, consider focusing on your field supervisors.  Whatever difficulties there be in bringing your entire workforce to an optimal level of OSHA knowledge, you can give your field supervisors the most comprehensive training you can afford, plus an unambiguous mandate to enforce safety rules.  While priorities vary according to trades, the perennial evils are falls, excavation cave-ins, “struck-by” hazards, and electrocutions. If OSHA is stepping up inspections, it’s just plain dumb to have anyone, ever, working aloft without fall protection, or in an unshored trench.  A review of OSHA record-keeping requirements applicable to your firm should be on your “To Do” list as well.


1 The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health estimates that, for every worker killed in a sudden traumatic occurrence, as many as 15 may die each year from job-related exposure to chemicals and toxins.

2 Fears of retaliation among undocumented workers, or those from countries in which demands for a safe workplace are responded to not by OSHA inspectors but by dismissals (or by “death squads”) no doubt exert a degrading effect on OSHA compliance.  Also, given reports that U.S. counter-terrorism efforts are hampered by a lack of personnel fluent in just a handful of critical foreign languages, is it realistic that private employers — lacking Pentagon’s virtual blank check from the taxpayers — are expected to effectively teach OSHA to workers speaking (even if we ignore the smaller linguistic communities) dozens of different languages?

Safety Policy: “Swing Radius” Hazards, OSHA%u2019s General Duty Clause, and the Infeasibility Defense

Although many construction hazards have their very own OSHA standards, even in the absence of a standard directly addressing a particular worksite hazard, the same may be subject to OSHA’S “General Duty Clause.”

 “Struck by” incidents being a major class of construction site injuries, OSHA compliance officers are attentive to the hazard of employees being struck by rotating or swinging parts of cranes, drilling rigs, and other types of heavy equipment.  A recent case illustrates one type of “swing radius” hazards not covered by any specific OSHA standard, but falling within the General Duty Clause.

OSHA has never pursued the unachievable elimination of all conceivable workplace dangers, but does requires workplaces free from recognized health and safety hazards.  One aspect of this policy is the “infeasibility defense,” which may apply where full, technical compliance with a standard is infeasible.  This defense is discussed in the second of the two cases discussed below.

In Secretary v. A. H. Beck Foundation Co., Inc., the employer was drilling 55-foot foundation pier holes for a bridge.  The employer was using a track-mounted mobile drilling rig.  After each dig, the operator would swing the bucket on the end of the rig arm 90 degrees to one side, to dump soil into a designated area.  

Although the employer was aware of red-tape barricades as a precaution against swing radius hazards, it had no such barricades in place in the area where its drilling rig was in use.  Its superintendent testified that such barricades were used only where there was too much activity, or too many pieces of equipment, to permit a “stim man” to safely act as monitor.  A. H. Beck’s “stim man” was responsible to constantly monitor the rig, and to ensure, by exchanging hand signals with the operator, that the rig did not rotate, unless and until all employees were clear of the swing radius area.  Employees were trained to position themselves outside the rig’s swing radius every time the drilling rig was about to rotate.  The rig rotated slowly — 3 RPM maximum — and had multiple, large warning signs stating “Danger.  Keep Out of Turning Area.”

Swing radius hazards on this type of equipment do not fall under any specific OSHA standard.  Because, however, they are a hazard recognized by the employer or its industry, they are governed under the OSH Act’s General Duty Clause.  Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act states that “each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.”  To sustain the citation alleging a violation of the General Duty Clause, the Secretary had to prove that (1) a condition or activity in the workplace presented a hazard to employees; (2) the employer or its industry recognized the hazard; (3) the hazard was likely to cause death or serious physical harm, and (4) a feasible and effective means existed to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard.

Elements (1) through (3) of the violation being conceded as obvious, the question of whether the employer had violated OSHA in A. H. Beck turned on whether it had sufficiently protected its employees by the use of a “stim man,” together with the warning signs and employee training.

At trial, the Secretary acknowledged two recognized (but not exclusive) means of protecting employees against swing radius hazards.  The first (“Abatement Method A”) is, essentially, to barricade all accessible areas of the swing radius of the rotating structure of the drilling rig.  An alternative, “Abatement Method B,” is recognized “during operations that require the equipment to be constantly moving,” and requires “any available alternative precautions” to include the posting of signs, instructing employees in the dangers of both swinging parts of the equipment and “pinch points,” instructing operators to swing only on signals from a foreman or designated signal man, and requiring employees not to move a rig, until they know the area is clear.

The Secretary’s argument in A. H. Beck was that “Abatement Method B” was not available to the employer, because its drilling rig was not “constantly moving.”

The Administrative Law Judge held that the Secretary had failed to demonstrate a violation of the General Duty Clause, rejecting its “constantly moving” argument on two grounds.

First, the ALJ stated, the rig in question was mobile.  It was “constantly moving,” as part of the digging and excavation process, and no piece of heavy equipment performs its primary function without stopping to perform other, associated activities.  The Compliance Officer had conceded that he would consider the rig to be “constantly moving” (and thus eligible for Abatement Method B)  if it were stopping repeatedly to drill a series of 6-foot deep holes, because it would not then remain in place for a long period of time.  The ALJ found arbitrary the Secretary’s position that “constantly moving” encompassed numerous stops to drill 6-foot holes, but not a single stop to drill a 55-foot hole.

The ALJ found also that the General Duty Clause does not limit employers to abatement methods recognized in prior cases, but not comprising part of the regulations.  It being conceded that the employer had essentially put “Abatement Method B” into effect, the ALJ found no reason to conclude that the same would be effective when the rig was mobile, but not when it was stationary.  After all, the judge observed, the mobile rig presents two swing radius hazard possibilities:  (1) that employees will walk into the swing radius of the rig’s rotating parts; or (2) that the rig itself will bring the hazard to employees, by maneuvering into an area where employees are present.  If one were to accept the argument that the rig in question was stationary, the ALJ concluded, given the Secretary’s concession that the use of signs, training and signaling watchmen would be effective abatement for a mobile rig, the same would necessarily be effective abatement for a stationary one.

In Secretary v. J. F. White Contracting Co., the employer was cited for a violation of 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.550(a)(9), which requires that “[a]ccessible areas within the swing radius of the rear of the rotating superstructure of the crane, either permanently or temporarily mounted, shall be barricaded in such a manner as to prevent an employee from being struck or crushed by the crane.”  The usual, approved method of barricading involves attaching 10-foot long pipes to the tracks of the crane, with caution tape placed at the ends of the pipes.

The employer pleaded the affirmative defense of infeasibility of compliance, arguing that the crane was not barricaded because it was to be used in an area where it was too narrow to place barricades in the usual manner, and still be able to rotate the crane.

The infeasibility defense requires proof that the means of compliance under the applicable standard were infeasible, in that (a) their implementation would have been technologically or economically infeasible, or (b) necessary work operations would have been rendered technologically or economically infeasible by their implementation.  In addition, the employer must show either (a) that is employed an alternative method of protection; or (b) that there existed no feasible alternative means of protection.

The ALJ in J. F. White found that the employer had successfully shown that technical compliance (using the usual method) was infeasible, but that the defense failed nonetheless, because its use of employee spotters provided a lesser margin of safety than the available alternative means of using PVC poles and yellow caution tape as a physical barricade.  By not   making the barricade, the ALJ found, the employee had failed to do everything it could to reduce employee exposure to the rotating superstructure of the crane.  Accordingly, it was not entitled to the benefit of the infeasibility defense.

Thus, whenever you recognize a hazard not covered by a specific OSHA standard, the General Duty Clause requires you to abate it, if feasible.  And, while there exists an infeasibility defense under the statute, it’s an issue on which the employer has the burden of proof, and it must prove not only the infeasibility of strict compliance, but that the best alternative means of protection were employed (or that no alternative means were feasible).

Safety Policy: Check Out OSHA Compliance Assistance

As OSHA nears its 40th birthday, most Americans are too young to recall that this program, today seen as a familiar part of the landscape, was enacted only after a pitched three-year battle, following skirmishes and forays into the area of federal regulation of workplace conditions reaching back to the later years of the 19th century.

The years preceding the enactment of OSHA, the mid-1960s, were a propitious time for renewed federal efforts.  Not only was Congress considering, and passing, civil rights and environmental laws which would have been unthinkable just a few years before, but workplace conditions of the time served as a spur to the effort.

That is to say, America was still an industrial economy in the 1960s, and the long-extant dangers of the belts-pulleys-and-gears technology of the early 20th century were being joined by an array of more newfangled (largely chemical) technologies and processes that posed considerable risks to worker safety and health.

A 1965 Public Health Service report stressing the links between chemical exposure and cancer, the disclosure in 1967 of a shockingly high incidence of lung cancer among uranium miners dating back more than two decades, and a West Virginia mine explosion in 1968 that killed 78 led President Johnson to declare that the time had come “to do something about the effect of a workingman’s job on his health.”  As of 1968, in what was obviously a much smaller workforce than today, more than 14,000 workers were killed on the job annually, and more than 2.2 million injured.

Paradoxically, the famously persuasive President Johnson failed in 1968 to win passage of an ambitious proposal for federal health and safety regulation in the workplace.  That initiative fell victim to the president’s waning influence, due to the race riots and antiwar controversies of the day.

Some may be surprised to learn that although, to be sure, the proposals made by his successor were somewhat less labor-friendly than LBJ’s failed proposal, Richard M. Nixon had promised action on the issue while campaigning for the White House in 1968, and after taking office, he carried through on that promise.

The U.S. Chamber of Congress, representing industry, had hoped to limit actual penalties under any workplace safety legislation to willful, flagrant violators, and to prevent implementation of safety standards more demanding than “consensus” standards developed by industry groups.

One issue dear to both sides was that organized labor wanted authority over any new regime wholly under the control of the Department of Labor, while industry was flatly opposed to that.  The Department of Labor also had a “turf battle” with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

While the Democrat-controlled Congress ultimately gave labor much of what it wanted, one compromise divided authority, with a newly-created agency within the Department of Labor setting the standards and carrying out inspections, and the OSH Review Commission acting as a first-level appellate tribunal for parties disagreeing with administrative law judge decisions.

While noting some reservations, President Nixon signed the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and joined with both industry and labor in praising it.  Years afterward, as American politics tilted to the right, and labor softened its demands hoping to slow the rush of manufacturing jobs offshore, at times OSHA drew fire from liberal and advocacy groups for not enforcing standards stringently enough.

Despite some significant impairment in its protective mission as a result of companies abandoning the American labor market to manufacture goods abroad, OSHA has achieved considerable success.

The OSHA leadership has also exhibited some resourcefulness in deploying limited resources to achieve widespread compliance with its standards and lower rates of injury and illness from workplace conditions.

In August, results of an analysis of federal safety data by the Associated General Contractors of America showed a drop in the construction industry fatality rate over the 10-year period from 1998 to 2008 of 25% — from 12.9 deaths per 100,000 construction workers to 9.6.  The gross number of fatalities, despite the considerable grown of the market, fell from 1,171 in 1998 to 969 in 2008 (a drop of 17%).

During the same 10-year period, the number of “time missed” injuries in construction fell 42% from 3.3 per hundred to 1.9.

It’s probably no coincidence that the period in which there occurred such heartening reductions in construction-workplace injury and death corresponds to the inception of the “collaborative safety oversight” approach introduced by OSHA in the late 1990s.

Recognizing its limitations as the “safety police,” OSHA over the past 10 years has devised a number of programs, which vary in their scope and their details, but all have in common a voluntary collaboration between employers and OSHA.  To use as an example just one such program, the “Strategic Partnership Program for Worker Safety and Health,” the Partnership aims at getting a formal agreement with an employer (or, commonly, a group of employers), workers, and worker representatives, to identify the most serious workplace hazards, develop workplace or site-specific safety and health management systems, share resources, and identify and implement effective ways to reduce worker injuries, illnesses, and deaths.

“Partnerships” are most popular with small businesses (50 employees or less) and many construction employers and construction-related trade unions, have  participated.

If you check out the osha.gov website, you will see details concerning a variety of “compliance assistance” programs as well as a number of success stories from around the country.

Certainly, much can be said in favor of inviting active technical assistance from OSHA, and demonstrating to both OSHA and your workforce that as an employer you don’t see OSHA as a mere nuisance and ducking citations as your #1 safety priority.

The approach, to be sure, has its critics, notably safety advocates who complain that “compliance assistance” is essentially a pro-employer, anti-enforcement device, whereby companies (mostly larger companies with good safety programs and low accident rates already) consume OSHA staff members’ scarce man-hours that might better be spent fining, and finding, violators than in “preaching to the choir” in programs that lack enforcement “teeth.”

“Compliance assistance” first caught on in the Mining Safety and Health Administration and, in the wake of the Crandall Canyon mine disaster in 2007, critics savaged the concept as a means of avoiding confrontation with well-connected mine owners (such as the one in that case, whose direct and indirect contributions of almost $1 million to Republican candidates were seen as having won cursory MHSA review of the mining plan alleged to have led to the fatalities).

Certainly, it cannot be denied that, as argued by a former (Clinton-era) senior MHSA official that “every minute you spend on compliance assistance is a minute you’re not spending on enforcement.”

On the other hand, it’s probably unrealistic, and perhaps too cynical, to suppose that it was chiefly the fear of stern enforcement that (before “compliance assistance”) motivated employers to comply with OSHA.  Most employers do care about employee health and safety — and, as monetary penalties for violations have always been modest (at least for non-“Willful” violations) it could hardly be that it was mainly the fear of such penalties that motivated OSHA compliance prior to 1998.

Nevertheless (and allowing that the mining industry may have issues that don’t apply to general industry or to construction) the utility of “compliance assistance,” in the universe of companies regulated by OSHA, must ultimately be measured by results.  While determining the exact extent to which “compliance assistance” may be credited with falling accident rates is not an easy task, if the growth of the approach coincides with sharp drops in safety incidents, it’s likely a good idea.

In terms of your own safety strategy, trying out a “Partnership” or other voluntary program may be worthwhile, following which you will make your own determination as to whether programs of this type help keep your workers alive and safe.

Safety Policy: Two “Serious” Violations Upheld Against Underpinning Subcontractor

A recent OSH Review Commission case, upholding two “Serious” OSHA violations against an underpinning subcontractor, is instructive both as a reminder of the regulations violated, and for aspects of how the employer handled the matter.

 In Secretary v. JPC Group, Inc. the employer was hired to underpin foundation walls of two buildings, 1902 and 1910 Spring Garden Street, located on either side of a construction site in Philadelphia.  JPC did a test dig at building 1910, removing enough soil from against the wall to expose a portion of its foundation.  This revealed loose stones in the foundation, with no mortar between them.  Uncertain that the wall was suitable for underpinning, laborer Claude Enoch approached JPC foreman and designated “competent person,” Jeffrey Nicolai, to request that Nicolai assess the wall’s condition.  Nicolai did so and, agreeing with Enoch’s view, referred the matter to JPC project manager Timothy Boyce, an engineer.  Boyce told Nicolai to close the test dig area, and to halt all underpinning work until Boyce could evaluate the site.

The following day, JPC performed another test dig attended by Boyce, project engineer Bevan Lawson, and others.  This revealed that, due to the deterioration of the mortar, some of the foundation wall’s stone work had collapsed, following efforts to excavate soil from beneath the foundation.  Boyce determined that excavation under the wall of building 1910 could not be done without endangering the building’s stability.  Underpinning, Boyce determined, would have to be delayed until Lawson could revise the plans.  In the meantime, Boyce determined that the walls should be protected by applying Gunite, a waterproofing agent.  That process would necessitate removing all of the soil along the sides of each wall, but not from underneath the wall.

Nearly 2 weeks thereafter, a crew made up of laborers Enoch (who had done the first test dig) and Theodore Slater, and backhoe operator Richard Hartley, began preparing the foundation walls for the Gunite application.  Hartley first removed all of the soil berm left by the GC to support the walls of building 1902, then moved his backhoe to the rear of building 1910.

  As the parties would later stipulate, Hartley began excavating at the rear of building 1910, and worked his way along the wall towards the front of the property.  The two laborers then used shovels to remove the remaining soil that Hartley could not remove with the backhoe, before attaching mesh and rebar to the wall.  JPC did not use any type of support system, such as shoring, while performing the excavation work.

Hartley had removed the berm along about half the length of the foundation wall of building 1910, when he had to pause because soil in bulk was blocking his way.  Enoch and Slater were near the south end of 1910, preparing to place rebar and mesh, when they heard popping sounds.  Heeding shouts by a foreman working nearby, both men ran away from the building, and thus avoided being struck as it collapsed.

The Secretary grouped together two related violations, one for performing excavation adjacent to a foundation wall without providing adequate support, and the other for failing to ensure that a “competent person” inspect the work area as needed throughout the shift.  A single, $2,500 penalty was assessed.  The employer contested the citation, which was upheld by the ALJ at trial.  The OSH Review Commission upheld, on appeal, the grouping of the two citation items.1

While reported decisions don’t always tell the entire story, my sense is that the employer in JPC Groupcould have handled this matter more advantageously.

First, either there occurred a grave communications breakdown within the company, or a decision was made to proceed with the soil removal and application of Gunite without adequate supervision, and without adequate instructions to the crew.

Every OSHA citation — this point  recurs here often — is largely about your next violation.  Although, certainly, you should consider every legitimate defense that may be available, winning today’s battle is seldom the main thing.  Citations should be used as an opportunity to improve your company’s safety performance, and your reputation with OSHA (and your workforce) as a conscientious, safety-conscious employer.

Frankly, upon reading the ALJ and Commission decisions in the JPC Group case, I was at a loss to figure out why the employer had not owned up to the violations, paid the modest penalty, and done some in-house training, considering itself lucky indeed that its employees had escaped injury.  The “background” elements (status as employer, project in interstate commerce, applicability of the regulations cited, etc.) all were in place.  The substantive elements, too, were clearly present, as no support system was in use, and no competent person inspected the work area.

Given the laborers’ testimony that they avoided being struck by the collapsing building only by running away, it was hardly open to the employer to argue that no employees had been exposed to the unsafe condition.

The ALJ easily turned aside JPC’s attempt to argue that its work in connection with the Gunite application had not threatened the stability of the foundation walls.  Project manager Boyce’s testimony that he had had “no concerns” about exposing the walls, and that there were no restrictions on uncovering them for waterproofing them was discredited by his admission that he had suggested putting a tieback through the wall, or even pouring another foundation wall.  Further, the Compliance Officer testified that Boyce had told him that he was greatly concerned about the wall’s stability, and that the plan had been to uncover the walls in 20′ lengths, apply the rebar, mesh and Gunite, and then replace the soil.

The employer took a weak stab, also, at disputing constructive knowledge, but given that its consulting engineer, project manager, and site foreman had all attended the meeting at which the condition of the wall was discussed, the underpinning put on hold, and a plan formulated to remove the soil berm in 20′ sections, the ALJ easily found that the employer knew, or should have known, of the condition.

The rest of the employer’s defense was chiefly Hartley’s testimony (seconded by the two laborers) that he had not used the backhoe on either building on the day of the collapse.  If believed, this testimony would have done little for the employer’s cause, as it was plainly doing excavation work close to an unshored foundation wall.  The testimony was not believed, among other things as the employer had stipulated that Hartley had removed the soil berm from building 1910 with his backhoe on the day of the collapse.  

Employee safety training should include instructing your workers that OSHA violations will likely occur, and that they are not to misstate facts to OSHA personnel, or at any hearing as may be held.  In the JPC Groupcase, the ALJ decision featured prominently a five-paragraph discussion on why the employer’s witnesses (its project manager as well as the three workers) had been disbelieved.  Counsel, it would appear, failed to properly prepare the employer’s witnesses — and, if the facts making out the violations are readily established, and the ALJ finds your witnesses unworthy of belief, you’re probably going to lose.

Contesting OSHA citations is expensive.  Except, perhaps, where the violation alleged is “Willful,” or the citation includes an uncommonly large number of “Serious” items, the costs of taking a contest through trial (let alone appeal) is likely to be a multiple of the penalty first assessed.

Lawyers like to impress clients with their fighting spirit, but that’s not always called for in the OSHA context.  “Scorched earth” is a dubious strategy given, especially, that you will probably be seeing OSHA again in years to come.  Contests should be maintained only where there is an honest basis, and a substantial prospect of having the citation vacated.


1 I am guessing that the OSH Review Commission chose to review the grouping on its own initiative, as it’s not apparent to me why either the Secretary or the employer would have appealed, based only on that issue.

Safety Policy: Eye Safety Fundamentals

The construction industry leads all occupations in the incidence of time-lost eye injuries.  Construction accounts for more than one-fifth of all significant eye injuries suffered in the U.S. workforce each year.  Workers in the various trades are at risk from exposure to nearly every known threat to the eyes:  impact, ultraviolet radiation, liquid splash and infrared radiation.  From overexposure to the sun, flying wood, paint chips, cut wire ends and nails, toxic cleaning chemicals and paint to infrared exposure from torch welding and cutting, vision hazards can be found nearly everywhere on the jobsite.  While fall hazards, trench cave-ins, crane accidents and electrocutions due to contact with live wires rightly deserve attention as principal causes of construction fatalities, the loss of vision is devastating.  Eye safety, given the ubiquity of the hazards, requires constant attention.

Perhaps the most startling thing about eye safety in construction is that, despite the occurrence of nearly a thousand injuries per day, barely half of the workers in building construction and special trades, and barely a quarter in heavy construction, regularly wear non-prescription safety glasses or goggles while working.  Since safety glasses with “ANSI Z87” certification can be bought for as little as $10 a pair, clearly this is a source of injuries and lost time that could be drastically reduced, at very modest expense.

The observance of five simple rules can greatly reduce the frequency and severity of construction site eye injuries.

Rule #1, obviously, is that protective eyewear should always be worn while workers are performing tasks, or in locations where potential eye hazards are present.  Although, to be sure, protective eyewear is not a 100% guarantee against injury to the eyes, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that approximately 60% of lost-time eye injuries occur when the affected employee is not wearing any eye protection. 

Rule #2 is that eyewear should be of the right kind, and must fit properly and comfortably.  Although contact with chemicals is a major source of eye injuries (accounting for roughly a fifth of those experienced in construction) by far the greatest source is flying of falling objects or sparks.  Nearly 70% of all eye injuries result from such causes and, in nearly three-fifths of those cases, the objects striking the worker’s eye are smaller than a pinhead.

Goggles should always be worn, if dust, liquids, or gases will be present.  Goggles must fit over any prescription glasses (or prescription goggles may be worn).  Eye protective devices should allow air to circulate between the eye and the lens (although unvented goggles are indicated for use with contact lenses).  A clear, plastic face shield is required for work with corrosive chemicals, grinding, chipping, the use of a wire brush on welds, flying particles and, of course, sandblasting.

Even where an enhanced degree of protection is not indicated, workers on construction sites should always wear goggles or, at least, safety glasses having side shields.  Special care is required, of course, for workers engaged in welding and flame cutting.  Several variables (the intensity of radiant energy, background lighting — mainly, whether one is working indoors or outdoors — and the difference between standard or reflective lenses) will affect the minimum shade number of lens that must be used.

While most welders are well-trained in the use of appropriate protection against UV rays, “welder’s flash” may affect the vision of others working close by.  Workers should be trained not to look at the welding arc, or reflections of the arc, unless they are wearing a welding hood with the same lens as the welder’s.  OSHA further requires the use of a flameproof screen around a welder, to protect others from UV rays.

Not only must protective eyewear be matched to the job to be performed, it must also be properly maintained.  Most eyewear will not withstand repeated impact or abuse, so regular inspection, and the replacement of badly scratched or broken eyewear, are required.

Rule #3 is that engineering controls and industrial hygiene must be employed where practicable.  Notably, the use of local-exhaust ventilation or fans will often be indicated to blow away fumes or dust.  OSHA requires, also, that eyewash stations be available if there are materials that could injure employees’ eyes.   

Rule #4 is that both rank-and-file workers and supervisors should be instructed concerning what to do when eye injuries occur.

Where an irritating or dangerous chemical comes into contact with the eye, the workers should immediately commence to rinse it out for at least 15 to 20 minutes.  Flowing tap water, if available onsite, should be used (and contact lenses, if worn, should first be removed).  This first-aid measure should be followed up at once with professional medical attention.

If an employee is struck in the eye area, a cold compress (ice cubes in a plastic bag or clean cloth) may be used to reduce swelling, but pressure should not be applied to the eye.  If pain persists or blurred vision occurs, the employee should be seen by a doctor.

If a worker is struck in the eye by flying metal, wood, or material from a power tool, if the eye is cut or punctured or the worker experiences eye pain from any impact-type injury to the eye, he or she should be taken to an emergency room or doctor at once.  Immediate medical attention is often critical in preventing or limiting permanent damage to the worker’s eyesight.

Workers should be instructed that, if the eye is cut or punctured, they should not push on it, wash it out, or try to pull out anything that has become lodged in the eyeball.  Instead, get that worker to a doctor!

Rule #5 is that you must be persistent —you’ve got to be willing to nag.  Nearly all construction workers know, generally, that eye hazards are all around them on the jobsite, but half or more neglect to use protective eyewear.  Just as no one should be able to get into a lift bucket without a harness and lanyard, workers exposed to eye hazards must be required to don protective eyewear before beginning work.  A sizeable minority of workers, unfortunately, will not religiously use eye protection unless made to do so — and, if workers see that eye protection is not insisted on by management, many will not use it consistently.  Quite simply, the minor discomfort or inconvenience associated with the regular use of protective eyewear must be perceived by workers as a lesser irritant than being nagged, told to return to the changing area to retrieve eyewear, or being disciplined for failing to use proper eyewear.

 Studies show, in fact, that although most employers furnish eye protection at no cost to employees, most workers suffering eye injuries do so while performing their regular jobs and claim not to have been aware that eye protection was needed.  About 40% of construction workers claim a lack of instruction regarding where and what kind of eyewear should be used.   The nationwide cost of eye injuries on construction sites is estimated to exceed $300 million annually in lost production time, medical expenses and workers’ compensation.  The impact on individual workers suffering partial or total loss of vision from such incidents is incalculable.

It’s in your employees’ interest, and your own, to make the modest efforts necessary to prevent and reduce the severity of eye injuries in construction activities.

Safety Policy: Owners’ and Contractors’ Non-Delegable Duty to Ensure Compliance With “Specific” Safety Rules in New York’s Industrial Code

While most construction-industry employers in New York are somewhat knowledgeable about OSHA’s construction regulations and the notorious “Scaffold Law,” many have never heard of New York’s “Industrial Code,” which is another source of regulations your safety program needs to take into account.

By statute, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor issues safety regulations.  They are collected in Part 12 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations (NYCRR).

The recent 4-3 decision by the New York Court of Appeals in Misicki v. Caradonna, in addition to giving me an opportunity to alert you to the murky rules of liability under the Industrial Code, overturned existing precedent, and has lowered the bar somewhat for an injured plaintiff to get his case to a jury.

Misicki, a laborer, was working on the renovation of a pool deck at a residential cooperative.  The owner, whom we’ll call “Shore” for short, had engaged Misicki’s employer, “Upgrade,” to perform the job.
One day Misicki was given a hand-held, 9-inch, electrically-driven angle grinder, and was told to cut a slot into a line marked on a wall, between one and two feet above the deck.

The grinder was supposed to have a removable handle, which could be fitted onto the grinder in any of several different positions.  Misicki complained to his foreman about the missing handle, but was instructed to use the grinder without it.

At one point, Misicki had to lie on his side beneath a protruding balcony, and use the grinder in an awkward position.  The grinder “kicked back,” the grinding wheel struck Misicki in the face, and he was badly injured.

Although of course unable (because of the Workers’ Compensation Law) to sue his employer, Misicki sued Shore for common-law negligence and under several provisions of the Labor Law.  As usual in such cases, Share then brought a third-party action against Upgrade.

After discovery and the weeding out of several claims through motion practice, what remained was a single claim under Labor Law ¬ß 241(6), which “requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor.”  That duty is “non-delegable” — which is to say that the premises owner may be held liable, even if it did not supervise the work.

A finding that an Industrial Code safety rule was not observed does not mandate a finding of liability: it is merely evidence for the fact-finder to consider on the question of the defendant’s negligence.  And, unlike the Scaffold Law, the plaintiff’s comparative negligence may be considered.

Where matters become really confusing is that a breach of the non-delegable duty will not support a lawsuit under Labor Law § 241(6) unless the provision not complied with mandates compliance with specific specifications, as opposed to merely reiterating safety standards in general terms.
In Misicki, analysis of whether the provision in question, 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a), was “specific” or “general” focused on the following three sentences:

  1. All power-operated equipment shall be maintained in good repair and proper operating condition at all times.
  2. Sufficient inspections of adequate frequency shall be made of such equipment to insure such maintenance.
  3. Upon discovery, any structural defect or unsafe condition in such equipment shall be corrected by necessary repairs or replacement.

Defendant moved in the trial court for summary judgment, relying on a line of prior Second Department precedents holding that section 23-9.2(a) merely establishes general safety standards which do not give rise to a non-delegable duty.1 

Supreme Court, the trial court, at first agreed that, since it was sitting within the Second Department,  it was bound by precedent to dismiss Misicki’s Labor Law ¬ß 241(6) claim.  Plaintiff moved to reargue Supreme Court’s dismissal order, and convinced Supreme Court to distinguish earlier Second Department cases and instead follow the Zucher case, from the Fourth Department, to find an actionable violation of  a sufficiently-specific mandate to remedy upon discovery a “structural defect or unsafe condition.” Misicki argued that, read together, the second and third sentences mandate sufficient inspections, and the correction of any defects or unsafe conditions found.

Supreme Court therefore reversed itself and reinstated the plaintiff’s Labor Law ¬ß 241(6) claim.  Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which reversed the reinstatement of the plaintiff’s claim, reaffirming its rule (prevalent also in the First and the Third Departments) that ¬ß 23-9.2(a) is too general to give rise to a non-delegable duty.

The Court of Appeals agreed to hear the plaintiff’s appeal, in order to resolve the conflict between the Fourth Department on the one hand, and the First, Second and Third Departments on the other.
The appeal to New York’s top court produced a 4-3 decision adopting the minority (Fourth Department) rule, reversing the Second Department, and reinstating Misicki’s claim.  It produced also two sharp dissents, disagreeing both with the majority decision and with one another.

Many non-lawyers would approve the common-sense approach of the dissent by Judges Smith and Pigott.  These dissenters found the entire “specificity” analysis uncalled for, because Subpart 23-9 is limited by its terms to “heavy equipment or machinery.”  This dissent likens scrutinizing, for specificity, a provision which plainly ought not to apply “to deciding whether I would be a bicycle if I had wheels.”

Remarkably, the inapplicability of a rule concerning “heavy equipment or machinery” was never raised by defendant’s attorney.  Judges Pigott and Smith argued in vain that an exception should be made to the rule relied upon by the other five Judges in choosing to exclude this obvious, common-sense argument —  namely, that generally cases must be decided based upon arguments actually raised by the litigants.

The third dissenter, Judge Graffeo, wrote her own opinion, agreeing with the majority that the applicability argument could not be considered, but voting nevertheless to affirm the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, based on the reasoning of the prior Second Department cases that found the provision too general.

The four-Judge majority, however, found in the last of the three sentences quoted above (imposing a duty to replace or repair defective or unsafe equipment) a “distinct standard of conduct” which, in their view, is “precisely the type of ‚Äòconcrete’ specification” required.

While ultimately the issue of liability was left for the jury, under the Court of Appeals’ decision in Misickiif some party to or participant in the construction project should be found to have caused the plaintiff’s injuries, then the defendant-owner would be vicariously liable without regard to fault.

Misicki, in which each of the three decisions that followed the first one reversed the one that preceded it, underscores the dubious wisdom of having different liability rules for “specific” and “general” duties under the Industrial Code.  Your safety director must nevertheless take into account, in fashioning your safety program, provisions of the Industrial Code that even arguably apply to the work performed by your trade.


1 The four “Departments” of New York’s Appellate Division comprise, in theory, a single statewide court.  However, the “Departments” may differ among themselves (until their conflict is resolved by the Court of Appeals) in which case the lower-level trial courts within each Department are bound by the precedent established by the local Appellate Division.

Safety Policy: Eighth Circuit Adopts Broad View of General Contractor’s Duty to Protect Subcontractor’s Employees

An issue long unsettled for purposes of the OSH Act is the extent of a general contractor for OSHA violations affecting only subcontractors’ employees.

A view long favored by the OSH Review Commission, is that the general contractor may be cited for violations it created, and any to which its own employees were exposed, but not for hazards created by others subcontractors or other employers at the site.

The Secretary of Labor for years has proposed a more expansive view, that the GC (at least where it has authority sufficient to prevent or abate hazards) must protect all employees — not only its own — from OSHA violations.1

In a recent appellate decision, Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the applicable regulation permits employers to be cited, even where their own employees are not exposed to the subject hazards.

In Summit Contractors the GC on a dormitory project subbed out virtually all of the work and had only a project superintendent and three assistants onsite.

On two or three occasions, Summit’s project superintendent observed employees of its exterior brick subcontractor, All Phase, working without personal fall protection on scaffolds lacking guardrails.  Although Summit’s super cautioned All Phase to correct these problems, upon moving the scaffold to another location, All Phase’s men again worked without fall protection and guardrails.

OSHA cited Summit under OSHA’s  “controlling employer” citation policy, despite the fact that none of Summit’s own employees were exposed to any hazard created by the scaffold violation.

Summit argued at trial that 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1912(a) places a duty on employers to protect only their own employees — not those of any subcontractor.  The Administrative Law Judge rejected this argument, and upheld the citation.

The OSH Review Commission granted Summit’s petition for review, and held, by a 2-1 margin, that as Summit had argued  1910.12(a) only that each employer protect its own employees.  The Commission therefore vacated the citation against Summit, but the Secretary petitioned for further review by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  

Section 1910.12(a), which dates back to OSHA’s inception in 1971, provides:

The standards prescribed in part 1926 of this chapter [the construction industry standards] are adopted as occupational safety and health standards under section 6 of the Act and shall apply, according to the provisions thereof, to every employment and place of employment of every employee engaged in construction work.  Each employer shall protect the employment and places of employment of each of his employees engaged in construction work by complying with the appropriate standards prescribed in this paragraph.

The Secretary’s initial multi-employer worksite policy, as indicated in OSHA’s initial Field Operations Manual (1971) adopted the “creating” and “exposing” employer citation policies, but not the “controlling” employer policy.  Thus, in OSHA’s early days, OSHA considered itself as having authority to cite general contractors only for hazards to which its own employees were exposed (plus any it had itself created).  In the early 1970s, the OSH Review Commission likewise construed the policy in the same, narrow fashion.

Indeed, for a brief period during the mid 1970s, the Secretary was engaged in making its policy even narrower, at the same time that some courts were heading in the opposite direction.  Two Courts of Appeals, including our Second Circuit2 in the Brennan case, expressed the view that 29 U.S.C. ¬ß 654(a)(2) — which requires “each employer” to “comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter” — is not limited to “situations where a violation of a standard is liked to exposure of his employees to the hazard.”

At about the same time, the Secretary temporarily altered the OSHA Field Manual to limit citations only to the “exposing employer.”  In light of the cases, however, favoring a more expansive policy, in 1976 the Secretary reversed its view, essentially viewing the policy to have been judicially expanded.

Over the years since 1976, most employer challenges to the broader “controlling employer” rule have not succeeded, although one circuit, the Fifth, has doggedly held to the contrary.  In 1995 (as the recentSummit Contractors decision noted) a decision by the District of Columbia Circuit remarked in passing that the current multi-employer worksite doctrine is in “marked tension” with 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1910.12(a).

In Summit Contractors, the majority of the Eighth Circuit panel read the language of ¬ß 1910.12(a)(2) (concerning the employer’s duty to protect the “places of employment of each of his employees”) as permitting the Secretary to cite “controlling” employers.  It found that “the plain language of part (2) does not preclude an employer’s duty to protect . . . others who work at the place of employment, so long as the employer also has employees [there].”

While the majority took the view that ¬ß 1910.12(a)(2) “unambiguously” supports the Secretary’s view and the “controlling employer” policy, it stated further that even assuming the provision to be ambiguous, the courts must defer to any reasonable interpretation construction by the agency (even if “not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards”).

The dissenting judge argued that ¬ß 1910.12(a) is unambiguously contrary to the construction adopted by the majority, and that it yields an unworkable result, as even the most sophisticated general contractor cannot  be expected to recognize violations of the intricate requirements affecting the trades of specialized subcontractors. 

Obviously, a general contractor detecting a serious OSHA violation by a subcontractor should act to correct it, whether its own forces are exposed or not.  Worker safety is more important than the precise boundary between employers’ responsibilities under OSHA (not to mention that negligence law imposes on a general contractor, in most states, a duty to abate worksite hazards where it has authority to do so).

Nevertheless, we should hope that Summit Contractors or a similar case soon makes its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The dissent, I believe, correctly argues that the majority’s interpretation of ¬ß 1910.12(a)(2) rests upon a “puzzling and unsupported extension of regulatory intent” and that it is impractical and unjust to impose on general contractors full mastery of the detailed requirements affecting all of the subcontractors’ trades.

Thomas H. Welby is a licensed professional engineer, as well as an attorney and managing partner of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, a construction law firm with its main office in White Plains. Articles in this series are for general guidance only, and should not be relied upon as providing all information necessary for compliance with OSHA and other legal requirements.

The liability discussed in this article (and the OSHA cases mentioned) is only exposure to being cited by OSHA for violations of the Act (not liability for civil damages for personal injury or wrongful death).tort claims for personal injury or wrong.

The Second Circuit embraces New York, Connecticut, and Vermont.

A further difficulty with the majority’s interpretation is that, by the logic of its grammatical analysis, there is no basis to restrict the extension of the duty to protect the workplace to employers effectively having the authority to do so.

Safety Policy: Are MUTCD Rules Part of OSHA?

In 1900, there were only about 8,000 registered motor vehicles, and 10 miles of paved roads, in the United States.  The first centerline to be painted on an American highway was in Michigan, in 1911, and the first STOP sign appeared in Detroit in 1915.

The early decades of the Automobile Age saw a chaotic lack of uniformity in road and highway signals and signage.  The first serious attempt to publish proposed uniform standards appears to have been a mimeographed manual, prepared under the joint auspices of the National Conference on Street & Highway Safety and the American Association of State Highway Officials, which appeared in 1935.

While that first “Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices” was a private effort, for some years now the traffic control “Bible” appearing under that name has been promulgated by the Federal Highway Administration, part of the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The power that goes with the ability to dispense — and to withhold — federal highway funds has been employed to oblige all of the States to adopt MUTCD as part of State law, although many states (including New York and Connecticut) have adopted the Federal MUTCD with state-specific supplements, and about a half-dozen states, while declining to adopt Federal MUTCD outright, have kept federal highway funds flowing to them by adopting State versions in “substantial compliance” with the Federal version.

MUTCD is thus to be found on the bookshelves of state and local highway agencies, planning, construction and engineering organizations, law enforcement agencies, insurance companies, and many others.

Familiarity with MUTCD is obligatory, not only in the obvious case of companies engaged in the construction and maintenance of highways and other thoroughfares, but also if your company does work in proximity to roadways, as may affect traffic.

But is MUTCD part of OSHA?

A recent decision of an administrative law judge of the OSH Review Commission gives this answer:  yes, as to those mandatory provisions of Part VI of MUTCD, “Temporary Traffic Control,” which are incorporated by reference in construction standard ¬ß 1926.200, “Accident prevention signs and tags.”

In Secretary v. CPM Constructors, the general contractor was performing road paving and related work in a high-traffic area, with a high volume of pedestrians, on-street parking, and retail businesses, in Freeport, Maine.

Following inspection, the employer, CPM, was cited for a “Serious” violation of 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.200(a), which provides that “Signs and symbols required by this subpart shall be visible at all times when work is being performed, and shall be removed or covered promptly when the hazards no longer exist.”

Specifically, CPM was alleged to have failed to remove or cover promptly a sign announcing the presence of flaggers ,when a portion of its work was concluded on Main Street (a north-south road) and the flaggers followed CPM’s crew a distance of perhaps four tenths of a mile to a site on Mallet Drive, a roadway intersecting with, and perpendicular to, Main Street.

MUTCD ¬ß 6E.05 provides that “flagger stations should be preceded by proper advance warning signs.”  The Secretary and the employer agreed that, as the roadways in question were in an urban (low speed) setting, due to heavy traffic congestion and a high volume of pedestrians, under MUTCD the minimumdistance between the flagger and the nearest “Flagger Ahead” sign was 100 feet.

A “Flagger Ahead” sign located near the Fire Station on Main Street was left in place, the parties agreed, for approximately 45 minutes after the time that the work crew and flaggers had moved over to Mallet Place.  Following that move, the distance between the sign near the Fire Station, and the one flagger in use on Mallet Place, was about 4/10 of a mile.  Neither the cited OSHA standard, nor MUTCD itself, prescribes a maximum distance between the “Flagger Ahead” sign and the flagger.

Why the apparent oversight in removing (or covering) the “Flagger Ahead” sign by the Fire Station after the work crew had moved was alleged to constitute a “Serious” OSHA violation is suggested by MUTCD ¬ß 2C.02, which states in part:

The use of warning signs should be kept to a minimum as the unnecessary use of warning signs tends to breed disrespect for all signs.

The Secretary asserted that the employer ought to have promptly removed the “Flagger Ahead” sign near the Fire Station when work at that location was completed, and placed within a reasonable distance (between 100 and 300 feet) from the place on Mallet Drive where the work was proceeding.

The Secretary further argued that the 2000 foot distance between the sign near the Fire Station and the flagger on Mallet Drive was “patently unreasonable.”

The citation in CPM Constructors was submitted on stipulated facts to the Administrative Law Judge for his decision on the law.  Interestingly (and contrary to any notion that the employer can’t get a fair shake in a contested OSHA citation before an administrative law judge, paid by the Department of Labor) the citation was vacated.

First, to prove an OSHA violation, one necessary element which the Secretary must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, is that the cited standard applies.  While the standard cited provides that a “required sign” must be removed, or promptly covered, when no hazard exists, nothing in 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.200(a) actually requires a flagger sign when using a flagger.  Section 6F.2D of MUTCD, the ALJ observed, states that “flagger stations should be preceded by proper advance warning signs,” but “should” makes the prescription discretionary, not mandatory, and it is only mandatory elements of MUTCD Part VI that are mandatory under OSHA.

The only mandatory statement in MUTCD that specifically requires a flagger sign applies to lane closures on low-volume, two-land roads.  That section provides that “when flaggers are used, the Flagger symbol sign shall be used in place of the YIELD AHEAD sign.”

The ALJ found that standard did not apply to the facts of CPM Constructors,  because the road at issue was a high-traffic area, not a low-volume, two-land road.  Thus, on the facts in CPM Constructors, the “Flagger Ahead” sign was not a “required sign” that had to be removed or promptly covered, and the Secretary thus failed to carry her burden to show that the cited standard applied.

Moreover, the ALJ in CPM Constructors found, even assuming the applicability of the cited standard, the Secretary failed to show noncompliance with its terms.

Part 2 of MUTCD provides, as a standard, that “the use of warning signs shall be based on an engineering study or on engineering judgment.”  While the Secretary argued that the 2000-foot distance between the flagging activity on Mallet Drive and the flagger sign on Main Street was the equivalent of there being no flagging activity on Mallet Drive for purposes of the cited standard, the employer asserted that the placement of the flagger sign was reasonable in the circumstances, because any other placement would have resulted in its effect being lost in the flood of traffic, pedestrians, parked vehicles, and retain business advertisements and signs.

CPM’s proffer of reasons, tailed to the specific facts of the case, that supported the placement of the flagger sign, coupled with the Secretary’s failure to allege (much less demonstrate) a failure to use an engineering study or engineering judgment, was found by the ALJ to add up to a failure to prove noncompliance with the cited standard’s terms.

Note that while it is only the mandatory provisions of MUTCD Part VI that are technically mandatory under OSHA, the non-mandatory provisions re properly referred to when interpreting a doubtful term of a provision.

The obvious lesson from CPM Constructors is that compliance with MUTCD’S mandatory provisions related to accident prevention signs and tags is part of OSHA compliance.

A further lesson, I propose, is that CPM Constructors underscores that ALJ proceedings in the OSH Review Commission are not to be shunned as stacked against the employer.  The judges there are knowledgeable and meticulous, and (usually) “get it right” on the law.

Safety Policy: Rules Aren’t Enough: Training, and Repetition, Are Critical

Having comprehensive general and project-specific safety manuals and formal safety policies are fine and necessary elements of an effective safety program.  However, your workforce isn’t going to stay up nights reading and re-reading your safety manual.  And, studies have shown, even engineering students (a group arguably more sophisticated than your labor force) have trouble understanding terms and acronyms as basic as those used in the OSHA 10-hour course.  Other studies suggest that workers whose first language is one other than English can sit through the OSHA 10-hour course, and come away having understood almost nothing of what they have been taught.

As an administrative law judge pointed out in Secretary v. David H. Elliot Construction Co., Inc., while rules are essential, “no rule can cover all contingencies.  That is the responsibility of a training program.”  The repetition of key concepts is critical, as is taking effective steps to discover and to discipline workers who violate safety rules.  Both from my firm’s OSHA practice, and from the research that goes into preparing these articles, I frequently see cases in which lapses, often by experienced workers who certainly had been trained to know better, have resulted in serious injury or death.
In Elliot Construction. the employer contracted to tear down an old power distribution system, encompassing 4000 poles extending over 226 miles, that had been badly damaged in an ice storm.

To minimize service interruptions, the existing lines were transferred (while still energized) from the old poles to hot rollers on the new poles.  The old poles were then torn down, and new lines strung.  This required the contractor to clean off everything attached to the old lines, and to reconnect customer connections with temporary jumpers which would then be removed when the new lines were pulled into place.

By the time of the fatal occurrence, the contractor was ready to remove the old lines, and to string new ones.  Two four-man crews, headed respectively by foremen Howard Hall and Randy Wood, were combined to form a single crew, with Hall being placed in charge.

The expanded crew removed the old phase and neutral wires, and then strung and sagged the new phase and neutral wires.  After sagging, the conductor had to be tied or clipped to the insulators.  This was done from a lift bucket or, where the poles were set away from the road, by climbing the pole.  Late in the day, Hall, working with part of the crew at Pole 64, sent two linesmen, Morris and Angel, to work on Poles 50 and 51, roughly half a mile away.

Hall directed Morris and Angel to find the groundman, Dixon, and take him to Poles 50 and 51.  They were further instructed to inform Wood of their assignment, so that Wood would be able to inform Hall when Morris, Angel and Dixon were clear of the lines prior to energization.  Angel and Morris found Dixon at Pole 42, and proceeded to Poles 50 and 51.  However — and here occurred the fatal lapse — Angel and Morris disregarded Hall’s order, and failed to tell Wood of their assignment.

When Wood’s group had finished their work, Wood radioed Hall to report that everyone at his end was clear.  However, due to Angel’s and Morris’s having neglected to tell Wood that they (and Dixon) would be working at Poles 50 and 51, Wood was not aware that Hall would assume, when he got Wood’s “all-clear,” that Wood’s signal included Angel, Morris and Dixon.

Hall told Wood to remove the ground at Pole 42, install a jumper and energize the line.  Morris — who, unbeknownst to Hall, was still working on Pole 50 —  was electrocuted when the lines were energized.

The ALJ’s decision (which sustained only two citation items out of seven charged against the employer) had to consider and resolve a number of thorny issues.  While space does not permit all of them to be analyzed here, I will remark that the ALJ addressed each of the technical legal issues thoughtfully and painstakingly.  Although the ALJ did not accept every argument advanced by the contractor, my reading of Elliott Construction reinforced my long-standing belief that, notwithstanding that the administrative law judges draw paychecks from the Department of Labor, they are (certainly as a general proposition) knowledgeable, conscien¬≠tious, and fair.

One citation item alleged was that:

At the jobsite, the employer did not ensure that employees performing a stringing operation were trained in procedures, such as but not limited to:  placing grounds at all job locations, placing tags on deenergized lines, and accounting for all workers prior to re-energizing lines, thereby exposing employees to an electrical hazard.

The ALJ found persuasive the contractor’s arguments that neither point of work grounding nor tags were required.  The generalized standard (requiring that grounds be installed at each work location, where work was being performed at more than one location on the line) was pre-empted, the ALJ found, by standards that apply specifically to stringing operations.  These standards, 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.955(c)(10) and (d)(9), which provide that transmission clipping crews must work “between grounds” when working on bare conductors, and that grounding at every work location is mandatory only when there is a possibility of “dangerous induced voltage,” had been observed by the contractor.  The crew worked between grounds, and there was no danger of a dangerous induced voltage.

Tagging was not necessary, the ALJ agreed, because the cited standard, 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.950(d), only requires it when “the means of disconnecting from electric energy is not visibly open or visibly locked out.”  Although at Pole 42, where a mechanical jumper had been removed as part of the process of de-energizing the line, no tag had been placed to indicate that men were working on the line section, there was a large visible gap between the energized line on one side of the pole, and the de-energized line on the other.

Tagging is intended to prevent an employee from accidentally turning the switch or disconnector.  On Pole 42, there was no switch or connector to attach the tags to.  Once the jumper was removed, no one would be working at that pole anyway.  As the means of disconnect was visibly open, there was no way that an employee could have inadvertently energized the line.  Tagging, therefore, was not required.

This citation item was upheld, and a monetary penalty assessed, however, on the third and final ground:  that the contractor had insufficient procedures to account for all employees prior to the re-energization of the lines.  While the standard does not specify exactly what instructions must be given for that purpose, an employer must instruct its employees in the recognition and avoidance of those hazards of which a reasonably prudent employer would be aware.

The contractor’s foreman, Hall, simply assumed that Morris and Angel had followed his instruction to inform Wood that they had been assigned to work on Poles 50 and 51.  Had Hall been properly trained to avoid the hazards inherent in making such an assumption, the ALJ found, the hazardous condition would likely have been avoided.  (I would observe that Morris and Angel might also have been better trained that lives are placed in danger whenever the individual responsible to authorize the re-energization of the line lacks knowledge of where each crew member is, and what he is doing).

The ALJ denied the Secretary’s motion to amend the citation to upgrade to “willful” the item alleging that the designated employee in charge failed to ensure that all employees were clear of the line prior to re-energizing it.

Nevertheless, this item was affirmed as a “serious” violation, as the evidence was undisputed that Hall had failed to determine that all crew members were clear of the lines, and “unpreventable employee misconduct” was rejected as a defense, because of the insufficiency of the employer’s training of its foremen.

Safety training in construction is one of those problems that can’t be solved, but must be wrestled with anyway.  It’s no small challenge, and getting the message across, so that potentially lethal employee lapses are minimized, requires persistent effort.

Safety Policy: Under-Appreciated Dangers in Demolition Operations

Demolition activities present an unexpectedly complicated array of professional issues. Practical success and OSHA compliance require careful (and documented) advance planning. Even with the best planning, demolition is fraught with unexpected and often nasty surprises. These can result, for example, from deviations from design documents during construction; approved, unapproved or undocumented modifications; materials hidden within structural members, and unknown weaknesses or defects in materials.

Especially on smaller projects, one sees lots of needless risks taken, and lots of inadequately-trained workers. Accidents in demolition operations (notably, falls and injuries resulting from structures collapsing unexpectedly) are common, and too often serious or fatal.

OSHA regulations under Subpart T of the construction standards (Section 1926 in the Code of Federal Regulations) are deceptively brief. However, while obviously Subpart T needs to be reviewed and complied with, there are more than a dozen additional areas of the OSHA regulations that are likely to come into play on a typical demolition job.

Even if your company is a specialty demolition contractor, or regularly engages directly in demolition work, it’s a fairly safe bet that your personnel could stand to know more about demolition safety (or could use a refresher course). Given the impossibility of more than “scratching the surface” in this article, I’d suggest that you consider enrolling key personnel in one of the many useful courses (many of them OSHA-approved) which address topics relating to demolition safety.

If you work in a trade that doesn’t involve performing demolition, or you sub out demolition to specialists, you still should be knowledgeable about demolition safety. Keep in mind OSHA’s “multi-employer doctrine,” and laws that may impose liability for personal injury or wrongful death, even where you had no direct authority over demolition operations.

As a further recommendation, I’d suggest you speak with your safety director or safety consultant to review whether — like most contractors — your written safety plan needs more “beef” on demolition-related topics, and those topics merit more frequent and in-depth attention via training seminars and toolbox meetings.

The following are just some of the safety topics which — although not specific to demolition operations — require attention to carry out demolition operations safely, comply with OSHA, and improve your written policies and training programs:

  • Asbestos;
  • Confined spaces;
  • Fall protection;
  • Lead exposure;
  • Personal Protective Equipment ;
  • Respiratory protection;
  • Noise and hearing conservation;
  • Scaffolding;
  • Trenching and excavations;
  • Welding, cutting and brazing.

Many basic resources regarding demolition safety are readily found online. Subpart T (29 C.F.R. Sections 1926.850 through 1926.860) is an obvious place to start, but those regulations are only a small part of what you ought to know.

Virtually all local building departments require demolition permits, with associated paperwork being more or less burdensome. These non-OSHA requirements are in large part safety-related, and should not only be complied with, but properly documented.

Permit requirements generally overlap the “Preparatory Operations” described in OSHA, 29 C.F.R. ¬ß 1926.850. Typically, these will include but not be limited to the following:

  • Checking adjoining structures to determine the condition of the framing, floors and walls, and to assess the risk of unplanned collapse;
  • Shoring and bracing (if workers will need to work within the structure to be demolished) especially if the latter has been damaged by fire, flood, explosion, etc.;
  • Notification to utility companies, and the shutoff or capping of electric, gas, water, steam, sewer and other service lines;
  • Identifying and eliminating potential hazards from the storage or prior use of flammable or hazardous chemicals, gases, explosives, etc.;
  • Abating hazards from glass fragmentation;
  • Covering floor openings that will not be used as material drops;
  • If applicable, the enclosing of areas onto which materials are to be dropped through holes in the floor without the use of chutes, and posting warning signs;
  • Protecting wall openings, where employees could fall through them;
  • Erecting needed sidewalk sheds and/or canopies;
  • Obtaining all necessary inspections, permits, and insurance required by local law);
  • Complying with additional local requirements (asbestos certificates, rodent control, fencing, notices to nearby property owners, posting signs, etc.)

A case illustrating several issues mentioned above is Secretary v. Fabi Construction Co., Inc. (1996). In that case, a subcontractor was to demolish manually a temporary “knockout panel,” made of reinforced concrete, which covered a shaft in a 10-story parking garage, atop which a 21-story hotel was to be built in Atlantic City.

As installed, the knockout panels varied from floor to floor. On the ground floor, the panels were flush to the slab on grade, and rested on 4″ wide ledges on all sides, with a metal deck below. On the second floor, the knockout panels rested on parapet walls, were doweled into the wall on one side, and had a metal deck below. On the roof, however, the panels were supported on two sides only, and there was no metal deck below them.

The demolition procedure for the knockout panels had workers standing on the edge of the panels and, using a jackhammer, making pilot holes, to determine the location of the supporting lip or ledge, expose the rebar, determine how far apart the rebar was, and to see if the individual panel was doweled (and if so, where the rods tied into the concrete around the panel).

The accident occurred as two laborers were demolishing one of the five-ton panels on the garage roof. One laborer made a 1′ x 2′ pilot hole and, seeing no movement in the rebar when he jackhammered around it, assumed that the rebar was tied into the adjoining wall. He proceeded to expand the hole, to determine where the next rod was. Stress cracks up to 5′ long were observed, but the second laborer, Kane, asked the laborer wielding the jackhammer, Caucci, to remove a little more concrete, to confirm that the rods were in fact tied in. As Caucci complied with Kane’s request, the entire slab, with both men standing on it, fell down the open shaft. Kane luckily seized onto a knee-wall on the floor below and survived. Caucci plunged to his death.

OSHA hit the employer with a number of “serious” violations in connection with this fatality. Significantly, for purposes of our immediate focus, the employer’s more-or-less conscientious written safety program and fall-protection training were held to be noncompliant with OSHA. The employer’s “plain vanilla” written program contained no section that specifically addressed demolition hazards. A fall protection video had been shown to some, but by no means all, of the subcontractor’s employees, but the subjects covered (e.g., perimeter protection, floor openings, PPE) failed to address site-specific (or demolition-specific) hazards. The latter were not adequately addressed in toolbox meetings.

The employer in Fabi Construction was found to have violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(a)(2) (not a Subpart T regulation), by failing to determine that the walking/working surfaces on which the employees were required to work had sufficient strength and structural integrity to support them. As two engineers testified at the trial, the drilling of pilot holes (with jackhammers!) destroyed the integrity of the knockout panels. Once you start cutting pieces off the panel, the expert witnesses testified, the panel loses strength and if you remove either rebar or concrete, the slab loses its character as a reinforced concrete slab.

If you perform demolition, or your employees typically follow on sufficiently early that demolition may still be underway, you want to be sure that you (or the demolition sub) comply with an critical additional requirement discussed in Fabi Construction: the preparation of a written engineering survey, by a competent person, of the structure to determine the condition of the framing, floors, and walls, and the possibility of unplanned collapse of any portion of the structure (or any adjacent structure, where employees may be exposed). See § 29 C.F.R. § 1926.850(a). If you are not the entity responsible to prepare such a survey, obtain from the responsible contractor, and keep in your files, a copy.

Although the citation under this standard was vacated in Fabi Construction, I would hesitate to predict that, today, a dozen years later, the Commission would find sufficient the review that was made in that case, which consisted largely of inspections of the structure (carried out, however, by a highly-experienced engineer) plus addressing what were in large part cost-estimation issues, such as manpower and equipment needs.

Over and above the “preparatory operations” summarized above, Section V, Chapter 1 of OSHA’s Technical Manual (available on OSHA’s website) proposes further subjects you should consider including in your pre-demolition planning and written engineering survey. Some of those topics are as follows:

  • A schedule of safety equipment needs (e.g., respirators, lifelines, warning signs, safety nets, face and eye protection, hearing protection);
  • A comprehensive plan (if applicable) for confined space entry;
  • In addition to identifying and shutting off or limiting utility services, informing all workers of the locations of existing and relocated utility services;
  • Advance provision for the contingency of having to transport a seriously-injured worker to receive medical care. Identify the closest facility, provide in advance of the need for transportation (jobsite gurneys, a pre-identified ambulance service); have information such as phone numbers and the quickest route to the hospital, in the hands of supervisory personnel, etc.;
  • Ensuring that a properly-stocked first-aid kit is onsite and, if possible (especially if no medical facilities are close by) have a person with a first aid training certificate from the Red Cross, U.S.
  • Bureau of Mines, or equivalent onsite;
  • A detailed fire plan, containing (among other things) prevention in respect of electrical wiring, internal combustion exhausts, the use and storage of flammable materials, heating devices, fire hydrants, and smoking. Other items to include are unobstructed exists, roadways kept clear of equipment, rubbish, etc., unobstructed hydrants (with sufficient water pressure assured), alarms and communications equipment, and the posting of alarm codes and reporting instructions.
  • Additional measures, described in the Technical Manual, where a chimney, stack, silo or cooling tower is to be demolished.

Fabi Construction involved employees of an experienced subcontractor, on a significant project, jackhammering underfoot, while uncertain of what (if anything) supported the concrete slab on which they were standing, 10 stories aloft. That even able and conscientious people sometimes do such things is a sobering reminder never to take safety in demolition operations for granted.

Thomas H. Welby is a licensed professional engineer, as well as an attorney and managing partner of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, a construction law firm with its main office in White Plains. Articles in this series are for general guidance only, and should not be relied upon as providing all information necessary for compliance with OSHA and other legal requirements.